the reviviscence of previous combinations of cerebral activity, that is
in the play of memory-images. We have here to deal with the connection
in time of the activity of the brain, that is with the relative
illumination of this activity by consciousness. Especially on this
field does hypnotism throw valuable light. The whole process of memory
is in itself completely independent of consciousness and exhibits
very interesting laws, for which I refer the reader to Ribot (l. c.).
We discover the laws of the memory in ourselves for the greater part
through the illumination by consciousness of the activity of the brain.
But it is not proper to oppose a conscious memory to the organic or
unconscious memory. There is but one memory, which consists _a_) in
the weakened preservation of the vibrations of every cerebral action
(nervous activity in general), _b_) in the powers of reviviscence, or,
better, power of re-invigoration of these actions, and often, _c_) in
the re-cognition, that is in the identification, of the re-invigorated
activity with the original one (localisation in time)....
"We all possess a second consciousness, the consciousness of dreams or
sleep, which, qualitatively, does not differ in essential respects from
the consciousness of the waking state....
"We may not, accordingly, place conscious and unconscious activity in
opposition to each other."
Dr. Forel discusses in other chapters of his pamphlet the relation
of nervous activity and nervous substance to the states of
consciousness (Chap. ii). He explains suggestion, compares sleep with
hypnosis, treats the symptoms of hypnosis, resistance of hypnotised
persons, auto-suggestions, the "suggestion à échéance," retroactive
hallucinations or suggested memory falsifications, the import and
nature of suggestions (Chap. iv). He then proceeds to investigate
diseased states of mind with reference to hypnotism, and maintains that
insane people are least suggestible (Chap. v). He gives some valuable
hints for suggestive or psycho-therapeutic treatment to hypnotisers
(Chap. vii), and presents cases of successful cures (Chap. viii). The
legal aspect is treated in Chap. x, the hypnotisation of animals in
Chap. xi. An interesting and indeed candid chapter is Forel's views on
quackery (Chap. ix); acknowledging the fact that at best one sixth only
of patients are cured by physicians, our author hopes that the full
recognition of the suggestion theory in therapeutics will contribute
not a little to the advancement of medical science and also to the
moral attitude of the profession.
κρς.
DER MODERNE MENSCH. Versuche über Lebensführung. By _B. Carneri_. Bonn:
Emil Strauss. 1891.
During a long and laborious life Mr. Carneri has been an indefatigable
champion of the monistic world-conception. With a keen eye he
recognised years ago the importance Of physiological investigations for
psychology, and he saw at once the moral import of the evolution theory
even at a time when most of its defenders denounced it as the immoral
law of nature. Carneri thus became the preacher of a new ethics; he
taught the morality of science and helped us out of the pessimism that
naturally followed a time when the old foundations had been overthrown
and the new ones had not as yet been built. The author is now at a very
advanced age and the present book contains his maturest and dearest
ideas. He is a man whose burden of life has been heavier than that the
average man has to bear. Physical weakness, since birth, long periods
of illness accompanied with almost incessant pain, later on periods of
recovery and transient happiness followed. He married and had children.
But new visitations came. He buried his wife, and also a little son at
the premature age of ten years.
These are some facts of the author's life not mentioned in any one
of his books; they are only hinted at in a line of the preface of
the present book, quoted below. But his readers should know these
facts, because they bring the author so much nearer to us. We learn to
understand him better and shall the more appreciate his genuine courage
in working out a noble conception of life and sound rules of moral
conduct.
The present book contains a number of articles on various subjects,
and the author has as he says in the preface "put into them his whole
heart." It differs from former publications of his. The latter are
as a rule scientific and objective, they are investigations into the
laws of life and of ethics. The present book is subjective; it shows
the aim and the path of the author's conduct of life. Carneri adds:
"And that I, visited with ills above the average measure, have found
life beautiful, and being in my seventieth year now, find it beautiful
still, speaks in favor of this path. It speaks also for a happy
individuality, but I hope that this will not detract from the truth
that the present book is not mere imagination but is taken from the
thrilling pulse of life."
Carneri is fully convinced that morality will find a better foundation
in the unitary nature of man than in the old conception Of his
double nature and in this sense he discusses the following topics,
Gratitude, Labor, Egotism, Justice, Versatility, Passion, the Ideal,
the Inevitable, the God-idea, Truthfulness, Morality, Love, Family,
Imagination, Continence, Honor, God-everywhere, Death, Tolerance,
Character, Art, and Humor. The whole tenor of the book is very
sympathetic and we might describe the author as one of the high priests
of the coming Religion of Science.
κρς.
UEBER DIE GRUNDLAGEN DER ERKENNTNIS IN DEN EXACTEN WISSENSCHAFTEN. By
_Paul du Bois-Reymond_. Nach einer hinterlassenen Handschrift. Mit
einem Bildnis des Verfassers. Tübingen: H. Laupp'sche Buchhandlung.
1890.
This little book of the late Prof. Paul du Bois-Reymond has been
prepared for print by Dr. Guido Hauck with the assistance of the
author's brother from a posthumous manuscript. The pamphlet contains in
popular form the final résumé of a thinker's life-work; complementing
and completing his investigations, and maturing mainly his favorite
ideas which he had presented to his students in a course of lectures on
gravitation during the winter '87-88 at the Technical High School of
Berlin, where he was Professor of Mathematics.
Prof. Paul du Bois-Reymond is not only as powerful and at the same time
as subtle a thinker as his more famous brother Emil du Bois-Reymond,
but he also agrees with the latter's philosophical attitude. Both are
agnostics and both represent an unusually profound and scientifically
elaborate agnosticism. They have become agnostics because they have
arrived at results which, to their mind, present an insolvable problem.
Prof. Paul du Bois-Reymond does not despair of a final solution of the
problem of life, which according to Emil du Bois-Reymond decidedly
belongs to "the seven world-riddles," but he considers gravitation as
incomprehensible. The purpose of all our attempts to explain phenomena
is to limit the incomprehensible to the smallest space possible and
to reduce it to the simplest expression (p. 13). Comprehension,
according to Paul du Bois-Reymond, can be attained by three methods,
(1) the empirical, (2) the mechanical, and (3) the meta-mechanical.
The empirical is inductive, the mechanical is deductive, and the
meta-mechanical attacks those problems which are at the bottom of all
our fundamental conceptions. The meta-mechanical tendency of science
is not satisfied with the results of the empirical and mechanical
investigations; it attempts to conquer all the difficulties or at least
to arrive at the limits of human comprehension. "Its province is to
comprehend matter, how matter can have effect on other matter, how
actio in distans can produce pressure or motion; it tries to understand
the great concepts of time and space and whatever profound problems may
now or during the further progress of science be proposed."
Having explained these preliminary views concerning the methods of
comprehension, the author discusses the following topics: Is the
Space-filling Substance Continuous or Atomistic? (Chap. iii).—Actio
in Distans (_Fernkraft_) (Chap. iv).—Several Syntheses (Chap.
v).—The Idealistic and the Empiristic World Conception (Chap.
vi).—Atomism and Actio in Distans with Reference to the Absolute
(Chap. vii).—Concerning World-Conceptions (Chap. viii). In the first
of these chapters (viz. in Chap. iii. of the book) the author presents
the difficulties which beset the theory of a continuous substance.
At first sight it appears most plausible to conceive of that which
fills space as something constant and uninterrupted, but continuity of
substance, our author declares, excludes a possible change of volume;
compressibility and expansibility, properties which we predicate of
any kind of substance, stand in a patent contradiction to a continuous
filling of space. Substance therefore cannot be continuous, it must
consist of a material which can be shifted, which is compressible, can
be mixed, is liable to chemical changes, and allows imponderabilia to
pass freely through; it is porous, or in other words it is permeated
by space free from substance. Prof. Paul du Bois-Reymond conceives
of substance as dust-like, viz. it consists of spatially distinct
corpuscles, and he thinks that there must be supposed to be different
kinds of dust. These dust-particles are in his synthesis the vehicles
of any actio in distans, their properties are energy and inertia. Actio
in distans, we are informed in the next chapter, cannot be explained
by constructing a world-synthesis either out of absolutely rigid
elements or out of absolutely elastic elements. Since we cannot derive
a construction of actio in distans from mechanical concepts, we are led
to the conclusion that we have reached here the limit of cognition.
Indeed, the incomprehensible in all forces is and remains the actio in
distans. All the hypotheses which try to explain the problem, will only
defer it by introducing some medium which is to be the vehicle of the
actio in distans, and the simplest method is after all to consider the
atom as this vehicle. "The far-effective atom, conceived as a centre
of activity, endowed with inertia, freely movable, is the simplest
mechanism that can be used as the basis of our synthesis, and we call
it briefly the far-effective (fernwirkende) atom" (p. 52).
It seems to us that Professor du Bois-Reymond has disposed of the idea
of a continuous substance too easily, and that he is at the same time
too easily satisfied with the shortcomings of his atomistic theory of a
dust-like substance. We grant most willingly that the idea of an actio
in distans is inconceivable, for an action can be effective only where
it takes place, it can have no effect in other and more distant places.
But action is never confined to a limited point: it always stretches
over a field of some size. Suppose an action _a_ takes place along the
line _b c_, can we speak of _b_ as being effective in _c_; or is it not
rather _a_, i. e. the whole process, which takes place in _b_ and in
_c_. The sun's mass exercises an effect upon the earth; and yet they
are about 80,000,000 miles distant. But let us use an instance which
can become a more direct object of our observation. We have a pair of
scales and put a weight on one of them. At once, simultaneously with
the sinking of the weighted scale, the other scale rises. Is this not
just as much an actio in distans as any other instance of gravity? In
fact our astronomers compare the gravitating celestial bodies quite
frequently to the action of a balance. It may be objected to this
comparison that we see the beam of the scales, while there is no beam
between the sun and the earth. If there is no beam, there must be a
connection of some kind. If the earth and the sun are two disconnected
bodies, we see no possibility for an explanation that the effects of
the sun's mass are felt upon the earth. Is not after all the hypothesis
of a continuous world-substance the easiest explanation of gravity?
It seems to me that it is the only possible way of explaining what is
commonly and perhaps awkwardly called actio in distans. The atomistic
philosophers are bound to have the world a composition of innumerable
particles of dust; they wish to construct the universe mechanically and
this view of things appears for certain purposes very well adapted. Yet
they cannot construct the world of isolated world-dust particles, they
must have some glue or cement to fasten their atoms into a single whole
that sticks together. Professor Du Bois-Reymond is consistent enough
to see the impossibility of this construction. The cement of which the
mortar of atomism consists is the inconceivable, unthinkable idea of an
actio in distans.
Let us try to look at things from the other side. Our world-conception
consists of the sum of all the divers things we are acquainted with;
but daily experience teaches, that the world is not a composition of
things or of atoms, the world is one inseparable whole, and the least
change in one part affects the whole universe. Some one said, if I
raise my finger the entire cosmos is shaken; and this we know is true,
although the vibrations are too insignificant to be noticed by our dull
senses. We speak of the earth and we speak of the sun, but in reality
there is neither an isolated sun on the one side nor an isolated earth
on the other, there is a whole and continuous world, one part of it is
called sun and another part is called earth. Every action of every part
of the world has its effects on all the other parts, and there is no
action taking place in the world which in this sense is not an actio in
distans. If we call the part played by the sun alone his action, then
there is certainly actio in distans, and actio in distans would be the
basis of the existence of the world as a cosmic whole. Yet we should
remember that the sun does not perform any action alone for itself. The
actions that take place in reality are relations among the inseparable
parts of the universe. The sphere of every action extends, closely
considered, over the whole world.
This view of things is not a construction of the world, it has not been
invented for making a philosophical synthesis, it is a description of
the world as we know it by experience. The description is imperfect
and it presents many difficulties which will have to be formulated in
problems. But we are confident that this descriptive method is the only
procedure that promises success and will produce results in the future.
Attempts to reconstruct a world-system from its analysed elements have
been made and, although we have not as yet reached a general consensus,
we must consider these attempts as being at least in part successful.
Suppose we call the simplest and most original state of substance ether
and consider matter as ether-whirls of a certain kind. The ether must
have a peculiar aggregate state of its own which in some respect is
like a fluid, for its parts are continuous as well as interchangeable.
An ether whirl, or an atom, being a condensation of ether, would
naturally produce a tension which stands in some proportion to the
condensed mass.
Let an india-rubber plate in a frame such as the designers use for
altering the size of a picture represent the normal relation among the
different parts of pure ether. Now put the finger-tips of both hands
upon the india-rubber and contract them so as to condense in both
places the india-rubber inside your finger-tips. Would not the tension
between both condensations be increased? and suppose the two condensed
spots were swimming freely in the india-rubber, they would in that
case attract each other in a similar way as masses of matter gravitate
toward each other.
This comparison is of course rude, but it may serve here as an
illustration of how we can conceive of actio in distans without
committing ourselves to the assumption that an action has its effects
in a place where it does not operate. We should not venture to speak
of the absolute rigidity or absolute elasticity of the world-substance
until the phenomena which urge us to form our views about ether have
been better classified and understood.
In the chapter on "Several Syntheses" the author discusses problems
without coming to any conclusion. The synthesis of organised life may
lead us to something which is quite as incomprehensible as actio in
distans and cannot be reduced to it (p. 70). The riddles grow before
our eyes, "above the fog of that which lies near us rises the imposing
problem of the soul and towering above all other things appears the
awful question of the consciousness of the ego." Prof. Du Bois-Reymond
does not attempt any solution and proposes no reconciliation between
the empirical and idealistic world-conceptions (which are contrasted
in Chapter vi). This lack of arriving at a definite solution leads
our author into mysticism, in which he indulges in the last chapters
to a greater extent than we are inclined to allow a man of science.
He speaks of a treble world in which we are shut up as if in a
treble cage, (1) the world of immediate apprehensions, (2) the world
of conceptions, and (3) the world of reality. The third world is
"extra-phenomenal," it is the physical beyond our ego included. But
"we are lacking the organ of reality" (p. 120) and "in the physical
beyond nothing is impossible" (p. 122). It is strange that Prof. Du
Bois-Reymond mentions Professor Kirchhoff's famous preface to his
mechanics, in which he replaces the word "explain" by "describe" (p.
13). He also mentions Professor Helmholtz's term that phenomena (i. e.
sensations) are symbols or signs of reality, _Zeichen der Wirklichkeit_
(p. 121). But he overlooks entirely that the world-conception derived
from these ideas can be developed in a positive world-conception
that can satisfactorily reconcile idealism with empiricism. As soon
as we know that cognition means description, we can dispense with
meta-mechanics and need not join in the disheartening cry of the
agnostic _ignorabimus_. The inscrutableness of reality, says our
author, is almost a matter of course. Happily we forget it constantly,
for the idea is one of the dreariest and the most weird (trostlosest
and unheimlichst).
The whole result is negative, for we can predicate of reality nothing
save that it is contained in a space and that there is motion taking
place in it. But of what kind this space and the time depending on the
motion are, and in what relation they stand to our conceptions of time
and space we can say nothing.
This is sad, but, adds Prof. Du Bois-Reymond, "world-pain is of no
avail and yet, the world is not so bad after all" (p. 124).
κρς.
TUISKO-LAND DER ARISCHEN STAEMME UND GOETTER-URHEIMAT. Erläuterungen
zum Sagenschatze der Veden, Edda, Ilias, und Odyssee. By Dr. _Ernst
Krause_. Mit 76 Abbildungen im Text und einer Karte. Glogau: Carl
Flemming. 1891.
Dr. Ernst Krause, better known by the nom de plume of "Carus Sterne,"
has of late made a special study of comparative mythology, and
many interesting articles of his have appeared in different German
periodicals, analysing and collating the myths of the Aryan nations
and investigating their material as to their probable origin. Dr.
Krause distinguishes between two kinds of myths, (1) those which might
and actually do originate in any place, and (2) those which could
originate only in a certain and limited locality. The former are most
interesting to the psychologist. We can expect that they will afford
us an important clue to the development of the human soul. The latter,
however, are valuable material to the historian and ethnologist, and
from their rich mines Dr. Krause quarries his main arguments to prove
the European origin of the Aryas. The course and the effects of the
sun vary so greatly in the south and in the north that it would have
been strange if the solar myths also did not vary. Now it is natural
that such a myth as that of Baldur's death, for instance, could only
originate in a northern climate, and if we find the same legend told
with slight modifications in the south, we must assume that it has been
transplanted there. The attempt has often been made to explain the
similarities between the Edda on the one hand and the Greek or Hindoo
legends on the other by the influence of the latter on the former; yet
we find that this theory is no longer tenable and we must grant, if not
to the Edda itself, certainly to the substance of the Edda traditions
a far greater antiquity than we ever could have anticipated. Let us
compare, for instance, the Baldur myth with the account of Herodotus in
"Klio" (Chaps. 34-45), and let us bear in mind that here we have not
to deal with history, but with legends, for Plutarch already observes,
the ancient historians had noticed that Solon died soon after Kroesos's
accession to the throne (563 B. C.); accordingly it was little probable
that he saw the Lydian King while at the height of his power. The
striking similarity of the two versions can be seen in eight points:
1. King Odin has two sons, of 1. King Kroesos has two sons of
whom the one is a model of whom the one excels by his
perfection, beloved by God and virtues all his companions,
men, while the other appears to while the other appears to be
be excluded from the succession unable to succeed his father
by the fact of his being blind. on the throne. He is deaf.
2. The Ases have evil dreams, 2. Kroesos dreams that a
indicating that some danger is pointed iron will kill his
threatening to Baldur. favorite son Atys.
3. Frigga takes an oath from 3. Kroesos removes all iron
all created things not to arms within reach of his son.
injure her son.
4. Baldur is married young, the 4. Atys is married young, his
name of his wife being Nanna. mother's name is Nana.
5. The Ases make a sport of 5. Atys goes a hunting, because
shooting at Baldur because no in this sport he need not fear
missile can hurt him. the tooth of the boar.
6. Baldur's own brother kills 6. A friend (who was a fratricide
him without intention. by accident) kills Atys
unintentionally.
7. Loki is accused of being 7. Not he who threw the fatal
guilty of the murder. missile is accused, but the God
who predicted Atys's fate in
the dream.
8. The innocent murderer is 8. The innocent murderer
slain. commits suicide.
We must consider it as an additional proof of the theory that the
southern version has been taken from northern sources when we find
incidental features which have sense only so long as they appear
connected with their original surroundings. The Ilias also contains
a modified version of the Baldur myth in the account of Patroclus's
death. Patroclus is the kind hero, obliging and friendly to all who
knew him, the brightest and purest figure of the whole poem. He falls
by the intrigues of a God. When Patroclus's body is burned the same
thing happens as with Baldur. Achilles lights the funeral pyre but it
will not burn, and as in the Edda a giant-woman is called in, so in the
Iliad, Iris is sent for in order to call Boreas and Zephyr who by the
promise of considerable sacrifices are induced to make the fire burn.
There is no reason here why the fire should not burn, but in the Edda
there is a very obvious reason, for all the elements had promised by
oath not to harm Baldur's body. The flames were not allowed to burn
him, the logs on which the funeral ship should roll into the waves
were not allowed to carry him down, and the waves were not allowed to
receive him.