us in Germany only since the days of J. F. Herbart who abandoned the
ancient psychological theory of the faculties and discovered in ideas
the sole component elements of all psychical activity, derived feelings
and volitions from the interrelation and interoperation of ideas, thus
denied the absolute freedom which the possibility of formation of will,
or education, excludes, and upheld the determinability of the will by
the ideas.
Although Herbart himself applied his system of psychology
pedagogically, yet it bore in the life-time of its author only scanty
fruit in this direction. Psychological pedagogics was not developed
beyond its original generality and unprofitableness of character until
Professor STOY of Jena and especially Professor ZILLER of Leipsic took
up, with an energy that equalled their tact, the practical construction
of psychological pedagogics.
Pedagogics now exerted a reactive promotive influence, if not on
the further development of psychology, yet on its study. After the
psychological writings of Herbart, it was eminently the _Empirical
Psychology_[144] of M. W. DROBISCH, sustained in the Herbartian spirit
but written more in agreement with "scientific" (i. e. inductive)
methods, that supplied psychological pedagogists with nourishment.
The last-named work, which in many respects possesses value even
to-day, was received with especial favor, since it avoided happily the
metaphysical tendencies which Herbart rather assiduously employed.
A like excellence and a like favorable reception were the merit and
reward of the large work, later appearing, of LAZARUS: _Das Leben der
Seele in Monographien_. Subsequently, were effective two little books
by I. DRBAL and by LINDNER: _Lehrbuch der empirischen Psychologie_ and
_Handbuch der empirischen Psychologie_. Lindner's treatise has recently
appeared in an English translation, published by Heath of Boston, under
the title of "A Manual of Empirical Psychology as an Inductive Science.
A Text-book for High Schools and Colleges. By Dr. G. A. Lindner, of
Prague. Translated by Chas. de Garmo." The English edition of this
book received an unfavorable review in the London _Academy_ (Nov. 1,
1891); yet in one respect the criticism was in our opinion justified.
Too little use, namely, has been made of the results of experimental
psychology.
[144] Leipsic, 1842.
This is, moreover, not only true of Lindner's book but holds for all
the psychological books that have exerted any considerable influence
in pedagogical circles, is true in fact of the great _Lehrbuch der
Psychologie_ by VOLKMANN, the latest edition of which, prepared by
Cornelius, is not in this respect abreast of the position of the times.
Neglect in such a matter in the country of a Wundt appears striking
at first glance; yet it has its good reasons. The labors of the
school of Wundt were antagonistic to the Herbartian psychology and
the pedagogics founded thereon, to the extent that a goodly portion
of the old theory of the faculties has been re-introduced into those
labors. The English association-psychology could have counted on a much
more welcome reception. Happily, there has appeared within the last
few months a remarkably clear, and withal handy, volume which will
succeed in introducing into the pedagogical circles of Germany this
association-psychology. It bears the modest title of _Leitfaden der
physiologischen Psychologie_ (The Elements of Physiological Psychology,
Jena, Fischer, 1891), and consists of lectures delivered by PROF. DR.
ZIEHEN at the University of Jena. In many respects the book of Ziehen
is like the recent work of Dr. Paul Carus[145]: except that everything
of a speculative character is lacking in the former, of which from our
point of view we cannot approve.
[145] _The Soul of Man_, Chicago, 1891.
Now that I am speaking of pedagogics particularly, I will mention
still another work of Lindner, to whom I referred above, which is
the first of its kind in Germany. Its peculiarity appears from its
title: _Grundriss der Pädagogik als Wissenschaft, auf Grund der
Entwickelungslehre und der Sociologie neu aufgebaut_ (Outlines of
Pedagogics as a Science, Newly Constructed on the Basis of the Doctrine
of Evolution and of Sociology, Vienna, 1890). The endeavor of the
author of this work has been, to make fruitful within the domain of
the Herbartian system the principles of evolution and of the science
of sociology; and though he has not been successful in this respect as
regards all the details of educational methods, the book nevertheless
represents a good beginning.
CHRISTIAN UFER.
BOOK REVIEWS.
OUTLINES OF A CRITICAL THEORY OF ETHICS. By _John Dewey_. Ann Arbor:
Register Publishing Company. 1891.
The title of this very thoughtful book expresses well the author's
method of comparing opposite one-sided views with the aim of
discovering a more adequate theory. In carrying out this aim not only
is an analysis given of the main elements of the theory of ethics, but
the main methods and problems of contemporary ethics are considered
also. Professor Dewey rejects both Hedonism and Kantism. He rejects
Hedonism because pleasure fails as a standard of ethics, and he rejects
Kantism because it is a barren abstraction. Kant's "ought" does not
root in and does not flower from the "is." Professor Dewey says:
"Hedonism finds the end of conduct, or the desirable, wholly
determined by the various particular desires which a man happens to
have; Kantianism holds that to discover the end of conduct, we must
wholly exclude the desires. Hedonism holds that the rightness of
conduct is determined wholly by its consequences; Kantianism holds
that the consequences have nothing to do with the rightness of an
act, but that it is decided wholly by the motive of the act. From
this contrast we may anticipate both our criticism of the Kantian
theory and our conception of the true end of action. The fundamental
error of Hedonism and Kantianism is the same—the supposition that
desires are for pleasure only. Let it be recognised that desires are
for objects conceived as satisfying or developing the self, and that
pleasure is incidental to this fulfilment of capacities of self, and
we have the means of escaping the one-sidedness of Kantianism as well
as of Hedonism. We can see that the end is neither the procuring of
particular pleasures through the various desires, nor action from the
mere idea of abstract law in general, but that it is the satisfaction
of desires according to law" (pp. 82-83)
The author acknowledges his indebtedness to the writings of the late
Professor Green and others for the "backbone" of his theory, which he
states to be "the conception of the will as the expression of ideas,
and of social ideas; the notion of an objective ethical world realised
in institutions which afford moral ideals, theatre and impetus to the
individual; the notion of the moral life as growth in freedom, as the
individual finds and conforms to the law of his social placing." Among
the specific forms which the author calls particular attention to, as
giving "a flesh and blood of its own" to that backbone, are the idea
of desire as the ideal activity in contrast with actual possession;
the analysis of individuality into function including capacity and
environment, and the statement of an ethical postulate.
This postulate may be regarded as summing up the ethical theory as
presented by Professor Dewey. It is thus expressed: In the realisation
of individuality there is found also the needed realization of some
community of persons of which the individual is a member; and,
conversely, the agent who duly satisfies the community in which he
shares, by that same conduct satisfies himself. We have here postulated
a community of persons, and a good which realised by the will of one
is made public. In "this unity of individuals as respects the end
of action, this existence of a practical common good," we have what
is called "the moral order of the world." This view would seem to
satisfy the requirements of both Individualism and Socialism, but is
it consistent with the law of progress elsewhere insisted on by the
author? He affirms, as against the Hedonism of Spencer, that moral
ideals are always developing. Progress is itself the ideal, since
"permanence of _specific_ ideals means moral death." But this progress
must originate with the individual, who by the formation of the new
ideal ceases to be in perfect accord with the community, and will
continue to be in disaccord with it until the community has accepted
his ideal. A perfect realisation of individuality in the community
would be the "fixed millennium" which the author properly objects to,
and to escape which it is necessary, that the equilibration towards
which the individual, as well as the social, organism is ever tending
shall never be actually attained. Its attainment would mean stagnation
and death.
We have not space to say more of Professor Dewey's book than that it is
a very thoughtful work, most so in its critical parts, and will form an
excellent help for the student of ethics.
Ω.
AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY. By _John S. Mackenzie_. New
York: Macmillan & Co. Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Co. 1890.
We have here, in an enlarged form, the substance of the Shaw Lectures
delivered by the author, at the University of Edinburg, in January,
1889. The work is professedly, not a systematic treatise on the
subject dealt with, but only a slight contribution to the discussion
of it; and it is said to be "not so much a book as an indication
of the lines on which a book might be written." The force of these
apparently deprecatory remarks depends entirely on the result attained.
If an introductory study is based on true principles it may be of
more general value than an elaborate work, because it will probably
present the conclusions of the latter in a simpler and less technical
form. This presupposes, however, a knowledge of previous inquiry,
and, therefore, the use of the term "Introduction" is somewhat of
a misnomer. Mr. Mackenzie remarks, indeed, that his inquiry may
be thought to belong to the end rather than to the beginning of
philosophic study.
The leading idea of Mr. Mackenzie's work is embodied in the sentence
just quoted. The value of social life depends on the ultimate end to
be attained, and the author sets himself to discover what is the true
aim of society. The existence of a society of human beings cannot
be accounted for without the conception of purpose, for to whatever
element of accident may be due the bringing of those human beings
into relation to each other, "the particular direction in which their
relations become developed is obviously due to certain aims by which
they are guided." The inquiry into the principles which determine the
nature of those aims, and as to the ideal to which such principles
lead, is what constitutes Social Philosophy. This falls within the
third of Hegel's chief divisions of philosophic study, the _Philosophy
of Spirit_, which is concerned with objects in so far as they are
themselves creations of thought; and the objects of Social Philosophy
may be described as the relations of men to each other, their relations
to the material world, and the development of individual character
in so far as that is affected by these relations. Before treating of
the aim which constitutes the social ideal, our author states the
conditions of the social problem, those of _difficulty_ on the one
hand, and of _hope_ on the other, and he finds that the general state
of society for a number of generations back has been one of "tumultuous
progress." There is a great improvement in the condition of nearly
all classes of people and "a very great brightening of our general
outlook." But life has become in many directions more chaotic and
uncertain. What is now wanted is "some principle which will enable
us to bring about a more perfect connection between the parts of our
society, to form new links and ties, so that men may no longer be
subject to the directions of iron laws over which they have no control.
We have to overcome individualism, on the one hand, and the power of
material conditions, on the other." To do this will be the chief step
towards the realisation of the social ideal, which is dependent on the
nature of society and on the nature of men.
The recognition of the fact that everything deepest in nature, and
especially in human nature is a product of growth has, says Mr.
Mackenzie, "passed over into popular thought, and become a part of
our intellectual atmosphere." Nature is thus regarded as _organic_,
by which our author means "a systematic unity, in which neither the
parts exist independently of the whole nor the whole independently of
its parts." This view is distinguished from that of Monadism, which
regards the world as a collection of mutually independent parts, and
of Monism, according to which Mr. Mackenzie declares the world is a
single system, in which the nature of every part is predetermined by
the whole. According to the organic view the world is a real unity,
though it is a unity which expresses itself through difference. It goes
without saying that there is no Monism of Mr. Mackenzie's description.
No Monist would ever deny that the unity of the world expresses itself
through difference.
Whether or not our author is right in rejecting what he describes as
the monistic view of nature, does not really affect the conclusion
as to the nature of Society. This he declares to be organic, and it
is shown that society possesses the three conditions which belong
essentially to the nature of an organic system; that is, the relations
of the parts which form the whole are _intrinsic_, changes in it take
place by an internal adaptation or growth, and its end forms an element
in its own nature. This conclusion would, indeed, seem to be required
by the fact that society consists of a number of individuals who are
themselves organic units. At the same time it might be objected that,
although many of the lower animals dwell together in societies, these
can hardly be regarded as organic. This consideration gives rise to
the thought that the organic nature of human society depends on the
conditions by which man is differentiated from other animals. In
treating of this point, Mr. Mackenzie shows that there are several
stages in the development of the "self," and he concludes that although
an animal is conscious of a self, yet that it is not conscious of "the
unity of its individual life, the connected system of its experiences
as a whole, in which each single experience has a definite place,"
being that which constitutes the highest development of self, and which
is the distinguishing self-consciousness of humanity.
This faculty of self-consciousness might be reduced to simpler
elements, but it is that by which, as Mr. Mackenzie shows, we are
enabled to understand the organic nature of human society. The
recognition of the fact that the universe is a systematic whole
constitutes an ideal, which, although consciously aimed at by few,
gives a progressive character to the general mind. Man is the only
creature that has an ideal, because he has been able to catch a glimpse
of a kind of consciousness of that which he has not attained, but which
he is bound to strive to attain. He begins with vague impressions
and animal impulses, "and his whole life is a struggle towards
clearness—clearness in the conceptions which he applies to things in
knowledge, clearness in the conception of ends of which he makes use
in conduct." The struggle between the immediate experience of what
is present in sense and "the 'still small voice' of the ideal, which
bids us have regard for the Universal," would be fruitless, however,
if the individual were alone. Society is necessary for the proper
development of the more ideal elements in human nature, as it provides
the rational environment required for a rational being. This leads to
a consideration of the ultimate end of society. In the course of the
discussion of this question the author deals with the different views
entertained as to the principles by which we are guided in conduct and
by which human progress is determined. He points out that what we seek
is some definitely ascertainable end, which we recognise as good, and
which is the happiness or well-being of persons. He rejects, however,
the Utilitarian theory, showing that pleasure cannot be the end of
conduct, and concludes that, if "we have any rational end at all, it
must consist in some kind of realisation of our nature as a whole"; of
knowledge, and will, and feeling, taken together. The true end is in
fact self-realisation, and this includes society, for we cannot suppose
that the ideal should be realised within our lives. It is conceivable
only "by our being able to see the world as a system of intelligent
beings who are mutually worlds for each other." The true nature of
man's end is thus necessarily a social one, and it includes everything
that belongs to the highest good. It embraces the realisation of
Reason, Order, and Beauty in the world; the realisation of Life; the
perfection of Knowledge and Wisdom, of Will and of Feeling.
We have given so full a summary of Mr. Mackenzie's argument that we
can add only a mere outline of what he considers "the form of social
union in which, under given conditions, the progress will be most rapid
and most secure towards that good which we must regard as the ultimate
end." The social ideal is said to depend on three chief elements of
well-being, Individual Culture, Subjugation of Nature, and Social
Organisation; which give rise to the one-sided ideals of Liberty,
Equality, and Aristocracy, not of birth but of talent. The Organic
ideal, which is that of Fraternity, is the true one, and it consists in
constant progress. This progress includes the three elements of human
well-being, personal development being the most important, as education
reacts on social life generally, by bringing new ideals of life as well
as a new sense of duty. In leaving Mr. Mackenzie's excellent work, we
may say that it deals in a clear and logical manner with the important
questions considered, and that it fully justifies the author's remark
that "Social Philosophy is a subject which at present will repay a
careful study."
Ω.
TWELVE LECTURES ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE CENTRAL NERVOUS SYSTEM. By
_Ludwig Edinger_. Philadelphia and London: F. A. Davis, Publisher,
1890.
Dr. Edinger, of Frankfort-on-the-Main, Germany, is one of the very
best authorities on the anatomy of the nervous system and the brain.
His twelve lectures contain a statement of our present knowledge of
the subject, to which the author has added considerably in several
not unimportant details. No one who is a student of the human brain
can do without Edinger's book, and we are glad that so soon after its
appearance in German it has been translated by competent men into
English.
κρς.
HYPNOTISM. By _Albert Moll_. New York: Scribner & Welford. 1890.
Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Company.
The present book is a translation from the second edition of the German
original. It reviews in 410 pages the main facts of Hypnotism. The
author begins with the history of Hypnotism (Chap. i); he then explains
the different hypnotic methods and stages of hypnotism (Chap. ii). The
symptoms of hypnotism (Chap. iii) are contrasted and compared with
cognate states (Chap. iv). Information is given concerning several
theories of hypnotism (Chap. v); all of them, however, are meagrely
sketched and the author does not arrive at a conclusion himself.
Simulation and its influences are briefly treated (Chap. vi). The
medical and legal aspects of hypnotism (Chap. vii and viii) are good
expositions of the matter, presented in lucid terms and impartially.
The last chapter, on Animal Magnetism, treats of a series of questions
which, as the author rightly remarks, refer to "phenomena which are
often mentioned in connection with hypnotism, although the connection
is rather historical than essential." In Mr. Moll's view they "are
the consequences of erroneously interpreted observations." The topics
here discussed are (1) animal magnetism, (2) telepathy, (3) supernormal
acts of somnambulism, (4) the experiments with the magnet, and (5) the
effects of the mere approach of drugs.
The author does not present new views of his subject, but he is
considerate in his statements, as well as scientific and clear. He is
not blind to the dangers of hypnotism, yet upon the whole he looks upon
it favorably, saying that "hypnotism and suggestion will outlive many
remedies whose praises fill the columns of medical journals at present."
κρς.
DER HYPNOTISMUS: SEINE PSYCHO-PHYSIOLOGISCHE, MEDICINISCHE,
STRAFRECHTLICHE BEDEUTUNG UND SEINE HANDHABUNG. By Dr. _August
Forel_. Zweite umgearbeitete und vermehrte Auflage. Stuttgart:
Verlag von Ferdinand Enke. 1891.
Prof. August Forel's pamphlet on hypnotism was, even in its first
edition, one of the best publications of its kind. The second edition
which now lies before us is enlarged and improved. The author has not
changed his views; he retains his old definitions, explaining hypnosis
as a state of abnormally increased suggestibility; but at the same
time he has added some chapters which present his position much more
accurately than he has ever done before. He rejects most positively the
fluidum theories; he opposes the views of Dr. Luys whose experiments
Dr. Forel repeated with his most sensitive somnambulists and obtained
negative results.
The position which Professor Forel takes is unequivocal Monism. He says
in his preface:
"A psychological introduction seemed to me indispensable, for it is
a daily discovery with me, how much the monistic foundation of the
doctrine of suggestion is misunderstood. Normal dream-life, the theory
of suggestion, and the relation of the latter to medicine and to
mental disorders generally, demanded substantial complements, and the
addition of a few new instances of therapeutic suggestion seemed to me
advantageous."
In agreement with this proposition he says in the first chapter of his
pamphlet:
"Hypnotism throws much light on the phenomenon we call consciousness,
and in a manner that substantially agrees with the monistic
world-conception. To understand hypnotism in other relations, we must
know what we have to understand by consciousness and its relation to
nervous activity....
"With dualists, who regard the soul as one thing and the body together
with all matter and all the forces of nature thereto appurtenant as
a totally different thing, the doctrine of the psychical faculties
follows of itself: herein the consciousness, the will, the mind, and
the rest must be regarded as separate departments of the soul....
"The monistic conception of the world aims to reduce all cosmic
phenomena to a single unity, and regards matter, force, and
consciousness ultimately as only forms of appearance of a same
primitive potency. Especially, however, it denies, that the soul is
anything else than forces of nature....
"Considered from the monistic point of view, consciousness by itself
is nothing; as Ribot ('The Diseases of Memory') correctly remarks
with Huxley and others, 'Consciousness is merely the accompaniment of
certain nervous processes; it is as incompetent to influence the latter
as the shadow is the steps of the wayfarer it follows.' It follows,
however, immediately from this, that the notions of consciousness and
subject, or subjectivism, are identical and undefinable. Consciousness
is merely the subjective form of appearance of nervous activity....
"Consequently, our human consciousness denotes only a summarised,
synthetical, subjective illumination Of the more powerful portion of
our cerebral activity....