kind towards the spirit of conservatism. Too severe in terming it
misoneism and too kind in regarding it as the only normal condition of
societies. The hospitable reception given to novelties is an equally
normal function, although intermittent. If instead of making all his
sociological ideas circle round the idea of the _new_, and creating
an unfruitful antithesis between the love and the hatred of novelty,
he had taken as his central notion the idea of imitation, and proved
the universal distinction between the imitation of the new and the
imitation of the old, M. Lombroso would have escaped many errors. In
all of us, caprice exists by the side of habit, due to physiological
misoneism; and the conflict between them goes on in each individual
throughout our life. Caprice triumphs at the commencement, but the
contest is terminated in old age by the definite victory of habit. It
is the same in the social life. The inclination to adopt new ideas is
due to the law of imitation, which is a more important factor in great
social movements than misoneism.
M. Belot remarks that he would not dare to write the title _Une théorie
nouvelle de la liberté_ if it referred to a theory of his own. Under
it he criticises the theory advanced by M. Bergson in his _Essai sur
les données immédiates de la conscience_; according to which freedom
belongs, not to the empirical personality of the superficial ego, but
to the deeper ego, the subjectivity itself, the alteration of which
through the laws of thought and exigencies of science gives rise to the
former. According to M. Belot, on the contrary, the will and freedom
are shown in the forcing back of the lower ego, which comes to the
surface, and its impulses by enlightened ideas. To act in harmony with
these is freedom, which is not inconsistent with determinism in the
proper sense. Determinism becomes freedom in becoming intelligent.
Until then we obey concealed impulses, which may belong to our parents,
our ancestors, or our social surroundings, and therefore we are not
free.
By an excellent series of experiments, M. Féré has demonstrated that in
attention all the qualities of movement are modified; its rapidity, its
energy, and its precision, the physiological condition of the process
being a general tension of the muscles. It is an error to suppose the
intervention of arrestive action, of inhibition, in the physiology of
attention. Voluntary immobility results from very intense muscular
activities, and has for its physiological condition the general
tension of the muscular system, which places the subject in such a
condition that he can react in the quickest and most energetic manner
possible to an excitation from whatever point it may come. This is
the physiological condition of attention. The exercise of immobility
is the most favorable to the development of intelligence, while the
relaxation of the muscles which results from the removal of the tension
tends to the suppression of attention, and of the psychical activity.
Excitations of the skin determine exaggerated reflex activities, more
rapid and more energetic movements. As intelligence is developed, the
reflex movements become less imperious, the multiplicity of motives
of action gives the illusion of freedom of choice. When the excitable
centres are incompletely developed, as with women and children, and
especially with degenerates, the impulsions and the reflex activities
generally, of which the centres are better developed, are more violent
and more uncontrollable. (Paris: Félix Alcan).
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PSYCHOLOGIE UND PHYSIOLOGIE DER SINNESORGANE. Vol. I.
Nos. 4 and 5.
CONTENTS:
UEBER DAS ERKENNEN DER SCHALLRICHTUNG. By _J. v. Kries_.
ZUR PSYCHOLOGIE DER KAUSALITAET. By _Th. Lipps_.
ZUR INTERAUREALEN LOKALISATION DIOTISCHER WAHRNEHMUNGEN. By _Karl
L. Schaefer_.
ZUR PSYCHOLOGIE DER FRAGE. By _Rich. Wahle_.
UEBER NEGATIVE EMPFINDUNGSWERTE (I). By _H. Ebbinghaus_.
VERSAMMLUNGEN: Internationaler medizinischer Kongress zu Berlin
1890. I. Sektion für Augenheilkunde. Referiert von _Claude du
Bois-Reymond_.—II. Sektion für Ohrenheilkunde. Referiert von
_Krakauer_.
LITERATURBERICHT.
Professor J. von Kries examines the hypotheses propounded of late
concerning the recognition of the direction in which sound-waves
reach the ear. Professor Preyer maintains that different irritations,
according to the source of sound, take place in the semi-circular
canals, and Münsterberg, on the basis of his own experiments, has
with some essential modifications accepted Preyer's views. The
author devotes his chief attention to the localisation of sounds
originating either to the right or to the left of the median plane.
The experiments were made with two movable whistles, the intensity of
which could easily be regulated. The result was that concerning right
and left direction, and also with regard to simultaneous sounds from
both directions at a different pitch, each note could be correctly
localised. He adds that, so far as he can judge, even he who adopts
Münsterberg's view has to fall back upon a comparison of the intensity
in both ears. A localisation of whistle-sounds in the median line, be
it in front or at the back, was not so certain. A single tone was, upon
the whole, correctly localised; yet it was difficult to discriminate
two sounds in the median plane.
In another article on the same subject, entitled _On Interaureal
Localisation of Diotic Sensations_ Karl L. Schaefer of Jena
recapitulates in brief the monotic and diotic experiments made by
Silvanus B. Thompson, Purkynés, Urbantschitsch, and Preyer; completing
the inquiries of Fechner on the subject he states the following result:
"Let two tuning forks be placed at an equal distance from the median
plane in front of the ears, so that their sound is medianly localised:
1) Synchronal vibrations of any pitch, at the same distance, and in
exactly opposite directions, produce median oscillations; 2) If the
forks are moved a tempo to the right or to the left, i. e. in the same
direction, the sound rolls from ear to ear, so long as the motions
are not too rapid; 3) If they are executed as quickly as possible the
vibrations have their seats in both ears."
_The Psychology of Causality_ is the subject of a longer article (47
pages) by Prof. Th. Lipps. Lipps declares that his "investigation
intends to reduce causality to association, and the law of causality
to the law of association." The author does not identify his
undertaking with the psychology of association, and protests against
considering mind-activity as passive processes. He devotes almost too
much space to stating what is, or can easily become, an anthropomorphic
conception of causation. Where he propounds his positive views,
we miss discriminative exactness. _Ursache_ and _Grund_ are not
sufficiently distinguished, and the definitions of formal and material
cognitions, are not lucidly stated. Dr. Lipps says: "All cognition
is objectively conditioned representation; respectively associations
of representations. In purely formal cognition the objective
_raison d'être_ (_Grund_) consists in the presence of a contents of
consciousness. In material cognition, or cognition by experience in
the narrower sense, it consists in the consciousness of the objective
reality of a contents of consciousness."[66] The author's conclusion is
summarised as follows:
[66] The passage being so difficult to translate, we quote
the original in full: "Alle Erkenntniss ist objectiv
begründetes Vorstellen, bezw. Verbinden von Vorstellungen.
Bei der lediglich formalen Erkenntniss besteht der
objective Grund im Dasein eines Bewusstseinsinhaltes, bei
der materialen oder Erfahrungserkenntniss im engeren Sinne
besteht er im Bewusstsein der objectiven Wirklichkeit eines
Bewusstseinsinhaltes."
"Hume's work and his mistake can thus plainly be recognised. That
causal connection is a connection among our ideas, not a connection
among the objects represented, that the necessity which distinguishes
this connection consists in the psychological compulsion to combine one
fact with another, that this compulsion has its reason in association,
is the discovery of Hume; and this discovery of Hume is one of the
most important in the history of philosophy. That the world becomes a
world regulated by law, by being subjected to the law of our mind, this
anthropocentric standpoint was therewith determined. Hume's mistake
consisted only in this: He did not recognise the full importance of the
law of association. Therefore he did not see what associative relations
are directly identical with the causal relation. An attempt was made
to cover the defect rising therefrom by the principle of habit. Not
the principle of association, but the principle of habit depriving the
principle of association of its strength, hindered Hume from proposing
the correct answer to the question, 'How in experience are general and
necessary judgments possible?'" Professor Lipps does not answer this
question satisfactorily either; he gives no explanation of the fact
that in experience general and necessary judgments are possible. He
simply states the fact. Every natural scientist, he says, expects that
a certain result that has been observed once, will always take place
again if the experiment be repeated under exactly the same conditions.
Professor Lipps states, in concluding, that he is fully conscious of
having discussed only a small part of that which might be said on this
subject, and adds: "Perhaps objections or criticisms will give me an
occasion for additional remarks." We here call his attention to the
treatment of the subject in Dr. Paul Carus's pamphlet _Ursache, Grund
und Zweck_ (Dresden: Grumbkow, 1881) and also to his articles on Form
and Formal Thought and on Causality in _Fundamental Problems_.
Dr. Richard Wahle, Privat-docent in Vienna, defines in a short sketch
on _The Psychology of the Question_ the meaning of Question in the
following way: a question is "the preparation during a state of
indecision for a perception of the decision." In explaining the meaning
of this decision Richard Wahle makes an occasional fling at that kind
of psychology which divorced from physiology confines itself to the
method of introspection.
The last article, by Prof. H. Ebbinghaus, is the first part of a
criticism of Fechner's posthumous letters on _Negative Empfindungs
verthe_, published in the first numbers of this periodical. These
letters, Ebbinghaus declares, afford an interesting insight into
the scientific personality of Fechner; yet the doctrine contained
therein, he adds, has its drawbacks. Ebbinghaus does not accept
Fechner's presentation of the case, but refers us to Delbœuf from
whose experiments alone, he says, the correct interpretation of
negative values of sensations can be derived. Delbœuf's views are not
so clearly presented in his first statement as in a later article
written in answer to the objections of Tannery, published in the
_Revue Philosophique_ V. 1878, and republished under the title _Examen
critique de la loi psychophysique_ (Paris, 1883). Ebbinghaus adopts
Langer's definition of negative values of sensations. They are "such
as under all circumstances if additively connected with equally great
positive ones produce as a result zero."
The reports of the proceedings of the International Congress of
Physicians, Berlin, 1890, will be of special value to physicians. The
present number contains those of the sections of oculists and aurists.
The number contains a valuable bibliographical catalogue of the chief
works on physiological psychology for the year 1889. (Hamburg and
Leipsic: L. Voss.)
PHILOSOPHISCHE MONATSHEFTE. Vol. XXVII. Nos. 1 and 2.
CONTENTS:
QUANTITAET UND QUALITAET IN BEGRIFF, URTHEIL UND
GEGENSTAENDLICHER ERKENNTNISS. By _Paul Natorp_.
ZUM BEGRIFF DES NAIVEN REALISMUS. By _E. von Hartmann_.
BEMERKUNGEN ZU VORSTEHENDEM AUFSATZ. By _A. Döring_.
RECENSIONEN.
LITTERATURBERICHT.
Professor Paul Natorp, the editor, discusses Quantity and Quality in
Concept, Judgment, and Objective Cognition. His object is the attempt
not to proceed subjectively, or psychologically, or genetically, or
causally, or teleologically, but purely objectively in the same sense
as mathematics proceeds objectively. The result which he reaches is
summarily expressed in the statement "that there is no formal logic
... and that it cannot exist at all—except it be based upon the logic
of objective cognition (transcendental logic), or represents a part
thereof, the severance of which from the whole to which it belongs
can have merely technical not scientific reasons." (Heidelberg: Georg
Weiss.)
RIVISTA ITALIANA DI FILOSOFIA. September and October, 1890.
CONTENTS:
DELLA PERCEZIONE DEL CORPO UMANO. By _L. Pietrobono_.
LE IDEE PEDAGOGICHE DI PIETRO CERETTI.
DELL' ATTENZIONE. By _V. Benini_.
LA SCUOLA E LA FILOSOFIA PITAGORICHE. By _S. Ferrari_.
BIBLIOGRAFIA.
BOLLETTINO PEDAGOGICO E FILOSOFICO.
NOTIZIE.
RECENTI PUBBLICAZIONI.
RIVISTA ITALIANA DI FILOSOFIA. November and December, 1890.
CONTENTS:
IL PRESENTE DELLA STORIA DELLA FILOSOFIA. By _L. Credaro_.
LA PEDAGOGIA DI JACOPO SADOLETO. By _A. Piazzi_.
DELLA PERCEZIONE DEL CORPO UMANO. By _L. Pietrobono_.
BIBLIOGRAFIA, etc.
There are two problems which at present command a general and a keen
interest in all countries; viz. the psychological problem and the
ethical problem, the latter comprising all the questions of education
and instruction, religious as well as secular. If this is true of
Germany, France, England, and the United States, it is no less true of
Italy. The _Rivista Italiana di Filosofia_, so ably edited by Luigi
Ferri, Professor at the University of Rome, shows this tendency in its
latest numbers in a marked degree. They contain among other valuable
materials an article by Luigi Pietrobono on the perception of the
human body, a psycho-physiological investigation of sentient substance
with special reference to sensation and perception. The author arrives
at a result, which, if it could be sustained, would lead to an
outspoken dualism. Pietrobono believes in two principles, a psychical
and an organical, forming an original synthesis and antithesis,
interdependent upon and inseparable from each other. Vittorio Benini
discusses in the same number the captivating subject of Attention,
starting from a discussion of Ribot's monograph on the subject, and
devoting his main interest to what he calls "l' attenzione perceptiva
è accompagnata dall' intelligenza." The latter kind of attention is
of especial importance in education, a subject which is discussed in
the conclusion of the article. This leads us to another essay which
treats of an exclusively educational subject, proposing the pedagogical
ideas of Pietro Ceretti. This article does not contain new truths,
but emphasises truths which have perhaps been too little recognised
in Italy. Starting from the maxim that all education must develop the
faculties of body, soul, and mind (le facoltà del corpo, dell' anima e
della mente), and that all education must be conducted so as to let the
social body derive the benefits therefrom, he urges besides demanding
the moral and intellectual culture of man a technical instruction, and
among the sciences, literature, and history, he would give mathematics
a prominent place.
It may be added that the department of Bibliography contains among
other reviews discussions of the following works: 1) Reich's book on
Gian Vincenzo Gravina as an author of æsthetics; 2) Antonio Rosmini's
Fragments of a Philosophy of Law and Politics; 3) Robert Benzoni's The
Philosophy of Our Day; 4) Pietro Ellero's The Social Question; 5),
in the December number, Ferdinando Puglia's Evolution in the History
of Italian Philosophical Systems; 6) The national edition of Galileo
Galilei's works; and 7) La Somiglianza nella Scuola Positivista e
l'Identità nella Metafisica Nuova, by Donato Jaia.
VOPROSY FILOSOFI I PSICHOLOGUII.[67] Vol. I. No. 4.
[67] _Questions of Philosophy and Psychology._ In the Russian
language.
CONTENTS:
(PART I.)
REMARKS. By the Editor, _Prof N. Grote_.
THE POLITICAL IDEALS OF PLATO AND OF ARISTOTLE IN THEIR UNIVERSAL
HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE. By _Prince E. N. Trubetzkoi_.
THE RELATIONS OF VOLTAIRE TO ROUSSEAU. (Conclusion.) By _E.
Radlow_.
THE ETHICAL DOCTRINE OF KANT. By _L. Lopatine_.
HYPNOTISM IN PEDAGOGY. By _A. Tokarsky_.
CONCERNING THE QUESTION OF FREEWILL FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF
HISTORICAL PROCESS. By _N. Karyew_.
THE VITAL PROBLEMS OF PSYCHOLOGY. By _N. Grote_.
NECROLOGY. M. I. Vladislavlew, Rector of the University of St.
Petersburg. By _K._
(PART II.)
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: The Elements of Will. By _N. Lange_.
CRITIQUE AND BIBLIOGRAPHY.
COMMON CHARACTERISTICS. Concerning the conflict with the Occident
in connection with the literary activity of a Slavophil. By _V.
Rotzanow_. The ethical doctrine of Count Tolstoi and its most
recent criticism. By _P. E. Astafiew_.
BOOK REVIEWS. Reviews of Russian philosophical works on
Metaphysics, Logic, Psychology, Ethics, and Æsthetics. Reviews
of foreign philosophical periodicals. Philosophical articles in
Russian ecclesiastical periodicals.
MATERIALS FOR THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY IN RUSSIA. (1855-1888).
TRANSACTIONS OF THE MOSCOW PSYCHOLOGICAL SOCIETY.
The distinguished Editor, Prof. N. Grote, in his introductory
remarks calls attention to the fact that the present issue of this
philosophical and literary review in the Russian language, completes
the series that had been promised during the first year of its
existence. The review does not claim, during this brief lapse of time,
to have been able to solve all the many problems incident to the task
that it had assumed at the outset of its career; but it may at least
modestly claim to have won the hearty sympathy of an intelligent
fraction of the Russian people, expressed by the acquisition of a
comparatively large number of subscribers. This material success,
moreover, attests the fact that the editor did not deceive himself
when at the original publication of the review he seemed to notice an
awakening in his country of more serious intellectual interests, and
the rise of a desire for a philosophical analysis of the principles of
knowledge and of life.
On the other hand, with regard to whether the problems treated of
in the pages of the review are identical with those that occupy by
preference the minds of intelligent Russian readers; or whether the
exposition and the methods of investigation have been properly adjusted
to the degree of development and to the mental calibre of the mass of
its readers, it will suffice to remark, says the editor, that the full
development of all the potential forces of nature and of mind can be
attained only through slow and persistent action. We have to bear in
mind that the attempt is by no means easy to organise for the first
time in a project of this kind the many active workers of a country in
which people had never before been associated in a similar undertaking.
Yet in confidently entering upon the publication of this review, the
editor well knew that there existed in Russia abundant intellectual
powers, perfectly adequate to the demands of a high-class philosophical
magazine—scientists, learned specialists, talented thinkers, and men
of letters; and the review without doubt will not fail to enlist the
valuable assistance of all these men in the arduous task, which it will
continue steadily to pursue. The main task above all, is to advance
the development of _self-consciousness_ in modern Russian society, but
the success of this aspiration depends of necessity on the continued
sympathy and good will of the public.
As regards the external form of the review, for the greater convenience
of the public, instead of four volumes of 20 sheets, as hitherto, there
will be issued during the present year five volumes in all—one volume
of 15-16 sheets bimonthly, except during the midsummer months.
The editor in conclusion expresses his acknowledgment to several
of his western colleagues, to the editors of _Mind_, the _Revue
Philosophique_, the _Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie_, and _The
Open Court_—all of whom have promised to note with genuine interest
the contents of the Russian review "Questions of Philosophy and of
Psychology." (Moscow, 1890.)
VOL. I. APRIL, 1891. NO. 3.
THE MONIST.
THE FACTORS OF EVOLUTION.
THEIR GRADES AND THE ORDER OF THEIR INTRODUCTION.
The usually recognised factors of evolution are at least five; viz.:
(1) Pressure of a changing _environment_ affecting function and
function affecting structure, and the changed structure and function
inherited and integrated through successive generations indefinitely.
(2) _Use and disuse_ of organs reacting on growth-force and producing
change in form, structure, and relative size of parts, and such change
inherited and integrated through successive generations. (3) _Natural
selection_ among individuals of a varying progeny, of those most in
accord with an ever-changing environment—or as it has been otherwise
called "_survival of the fittest_" in each successive generation. (4)
_Sexual selection_: the selection by the female, among varying male
individuals all competing for her possession, of the strongest or the
most attractive. Among mammals the selection is mainly of the strongest
as decided by _battle_; among birds, of the most attractive as
determined by splendor of color or beauty of song. (5) _Physiological
selection_, or selection of those varieties, the individuals of
which are fertile among themselves, but sterile or less fertile with
other varieties and with the parent stock. This has also been called
"_segregate fecundity_" by Gulick, and homogamy by Romanes.
These five factors are all usually but not universally recognised. The
first two are Lamarckian, the second two Darwinian factors. In the
Lamarckian factors the changes occur _during individual life_, and
the offspring is supposed to inherit them unchanged. In the Darwinian
factors on the contrary the _changes are in the offspring_, and the
individuals during life are supposed to remain substantially unchanged.
The fifth factor has, only very recently, been brought forward by
Romanes and Gulick and is not yet universally recognised; but we
believe that with perhaps some modifications it is certain to triumph.
(6) To these recognised factors of organic evolution must now be added,
in _human evolution_, another and far higher factor, viz. conscious,
voluntary _co-operation in the work of evolution_, conscious striving
for the betterment of the individual and of the race. This factor
consists essentially in the _formation and pursuit of ideals_. We call
this a factor, but it is also much more than a factor. It stands in
place of nature herself—it is a higher-rational nature using all the
factors of physical nature for its own higher purposes. To distinguish
the evolution determined by this factor from organic evolution, we
often call it _progress_.
Underlying all these factors as their necessary condition, and
therefore themselves not called factors, are two opposite operative
principles, viz. _heredity and variability_. Like the conservative and
progressive elements in society, one tends to fixedness, the other to
change. The one initiates change, the other accumulates its effects in
successive generations. The one tries all things, the other holds fast
to whatever is good. They are both equally necessary to the successful
operation of any or all of the factors.
Let us now compare these six factors, as to their grade or position in
the scale of energy and as to the order of their introduction.