of well-being is in diminishing crime. He has found them extremely
weak. Severity of repression alone appears of some efficacy; indulgence
augments crime. For the sake of social selection, the criminal ought
to be eliminated, by capital punishment, perpetual banishment, etc.,
according as the case demands. Temporary imprisonment has no place
in this system. Finally, the only criterion of penality is lack of
adaptability to social life; this criterion will replace the false
principles of "moral responsibility" and "proportionment of the
punishment to the crime." It is too apparent that the prevailing penal
theory and the jurisprudence in agreement with it, seem to tend to
protect the criminal against society, rather than society against the
criminal. And what absurdities besides! The attempt is less severely
treated than the consummated offence; preparatory acts are _never_
punished, the attempt at a crime is _always_ punished.
The criterion of penality once accepted, it is necessary to find the
indices of this lack of fitness, of the impossibility of adaptation
to social life, which justifies repression. M. Garofalo seeks them
no longer in "premeditation," but he finds them in the motive of the
crime and in the way in which it has been prepared or perpetrated. We
cannot follow him into the details of this discussion, which presents
the highest interest. Our exceptions would turn on the interpretation
of certain features; they do not bear on the general principles of this
great and solid work.
LUCIEN ARRÉAT.
BOOK REVIEWS.
THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. By _William James_, Professor of
Psychology in Harvard University. In two volumes. New York: Henry
Holt & Co., American Science Series. Advanced Course.
In the present status of psychological science every attempt to gather
the diversified facts and views and present them in a single, though
extensive work, cannot but be scrutinised with great care and interest;
and when this work comes from the pen of one who has gained so wide and
appreciative a circle of readers, the interest becomes deeper and more
personal.
It was, perhaps, the professor of mental science, struggling for years
with text-books, inadequate, or antiquated, or narrow, or unscientific,
or dry, or unpedagogic, who most anxiously awaited the appearance of
Professor James's volumes; and his expectation was the more warranted,
as the work was announced in a series of text-books deservedly
successful and popular. To such a one, the work itself does not come
to fill the place of a text-book; not alone the great length (1,400
pages), but the general supposition of knowledge on the part of the
reader which it is the object of college courses to supply, together
with the selection of topics and the peculiar division of space amongst
them, limit the work to students of a much more advanced type than
(unfortunately, perhaps) American education as yet supplies. But while
our professor must still patiently hope for some work that will present
in brief and convenient form the main facts of Psychology, he will find
his task made easier and more interesting by these welcome volumes.
He will find in them an original and frequently brilliant treatment
of many of the deepest problems of modern Psychology: and it is as a
contribution to science and as an aid to the professional student that
a discussion of their contents and tenets will be pertinent in these
pages.
To begin with, the attitude of the author to his subject is that of a
professional scientist to his specialty. "I have kept close," he says,
"to the point of view of natural science throughout the book. Every
natural science assumes certain data uncritically, and declines to
challenge the elements between which its own 'laws' obtain, and from
which its own deductions are carried on.... This book, assuming that
thoughts and feelings exist, and are vehicles of knowledge, thereupon
contends that Psychology, when she has ascertained the empirical
correlation of the various sorts of thought or feeling with definite
conditions of the brain, can go no farther—can go no farther that is
as a natural science. If she goes farther she becomes metaphysical."
This position does not carry with it the condemnation of all matters
metaphysical, but simply excludes them from Psychology; nor does
this independence place Psychology in a position unrelated to other
sciences. Such relation is a cardinal fact in the mental world, and
nowhere is it more necessary to bear in mind that the division of the
sciences is largely an expression of the lines of men's interests and
the inevitable specialisation of knowledge. Those forms of adaptations
of means to ends which we study as forms of psychic action, while
theoretically distinguishable from other modes of action, in fact,
often resemble them; in other words, "the boundary line of the mental
faculty is certainly vague. It is better not to be pedantic, but to let
the science be as vague as the subject," and include all facts, whether
they are usually called physiological, or biological, or not, that shed
light on the main problems dealt with.
This conception accordingly views mind as distinctly related to and
an essential part of its environment; it views mental phenomena as
infinitely varied, as most intricately conditioned by and in turn
conditioning other natural phenomena. For the complete survey of
its domain, it calls upon experiment, observation, introspection,
comparison, analysis, hypothesis, deduction, each properly controlled
by the others, and limited by community of purpose to a firm foundation
of fact.
It is true that in the more intricate problems, those with the smallest
connection with sensation and the largest with inference and analysis,
the author will be regarded as more metaphysical than psychological and
plainly admits his fault; it is true that the personal leanings of the
author lead him to lengthy discussions of these more intricate points,
but none the less the positive, broad, and evolutionary spirit that
dominates the general view of the subject leaves a clear impress of
vitality, progress, and interest on every page.
Passing from point of view and purpose to content we do not look
for and do not find any 'closed system,' but "a mass of descriptive
details" in the selection of which personal interest has been the
controlling factor. The articles which Professor James has written from
time to time in the periodicals appear, sometimes a little remodelled,
in the larger work; each chapter is thus largely an independent essay
upon the topic printed at the head of it. On the physiological side we
have an admirable chapter on the functions of the brain, but elsewhere
the student is referred to other works for the physiological points
involved.
Following this is an excellent essay on Habit and Automatism,
whereupon without further ceremony the reader is invited to a somewhat
speculative series of chapters upon 'Mind Stuff,' 'Knowledge and
Reality,' and the like, and may resume the more concrete chapters on
Attention, Conception, Discrimination and Comparison, Association, only
after struggling with the complex picture of 'the Stream of Thought,'
'the Consciousness of Self,' and 'the Snares of Psychology.' Each
of these chapters presents a distinct problem, presents it well and
positively, and contributes much that is original to the discussion.
In all this there is strongly emphasised the subjective contribution
to Psychology,—the value of a discerning and critical introspection
and the importance of the subject in all processes of sense, judgment,
attention, association, and the like. The mind is not a passive
receptacle of experiences, but is continually active, making and
shaping, seizing and transforming, absorbing and assimilating the
stimuli of its environment.
A second series of topics take up the perception of those general
concepts, Time, 'Things,' Space, Reality, and Form, the largest and
heaviest chapters in the work, amongst which, as if to whet the
appetite, are distributed more concrete pages dealing with Memory,
Sensation, and Imagination. The former devote much space to criticism,
and would, perhaps, border upon the metaphysics that was to have been
avoided, were it not that they spring from considerations much more
concrete and provable; the latter group of chapters are amongst the
most interesting of the volume, and though treating but a small and
somewhat arbitrarily selected portion of each of the topics, treat them
in a suggestive and inspiring way. Discerning and ingenious sketches
of single mental traits and processes, happy illustrations, suggestive
side issues make these pages a striking contrast to the usual text-book
tone, and will attract students of all shades and grades of agreement
or disagreement with the author's views.
The remaining chapters deal with Reasoning, Movement, Instinct,
Emotions, Will, Hypnotism, Necessary Truths; in addition to the
characteristics already indicated, we find here a wise use of the
facts of Morbid Psychology, of the inferences from the abnormal to
the normal. This naturally stands out prominently in the discussion
of Hypnotism—so recent and yet so essential a department of mental
science.
When we close the cover of the second volume we do so with the feeling
that our mental horizon has been enlarged, our interests have been
quickened, our attention has been held, our time agreeably spent,—and
yet the result of all this reading seems intangible, diffuse,
scattered, unsatisfactory. The scholar and the professor always retain
the student feeling and the student habit of thought; and what is
unpedagogic for the one is uneconomical for the other. A logical order
of exposition, a unifying grouping of topics, a just perspective of
details, a painstaking selection of facts, constitute much to convert
useless knowledge into useful science; such works contain a large
element of drudgery, must be impersonal in one sense of the term, and
yet are not inconsistent with a high degree of originality, but it is
such works that are enormously helpful, that form landmarks by which
progress is measured and retained. These useful qualities we miss in
Professor James's work. True, it does not pretend to possess them,
but psychological text-books are not written every day, and when so
influential a one appears, the wish that its utility shall reach a
maximum demands expression. Finally, it is a work destined to be much
quoted, to arouse considerable discussion, to excite quite different
opinions from different critics, and so, every one interested in modern
Psychology will find it necessary and profitable to learn at first hand
this important American contribution to the science of Psychology.
J. J.
THE SCIENCE OF THOUGHT. By _Charles Carroll Everett, D. D._ Boston: De
Wolfe Fiske & Co. Revised edition.
An excellent manual of that which is accepted as logic. The author
is a disciple of Hegel, and throughout conforms his treatment of
the topic to the lines laid down by his master, although in various
connections where these lines permit, the author contributes from his
own resources, and from other masters, much needed supplementary matter.
The appearance of late of so many essays, manuals, and treatises
professing to deal with logic and its affiliated topics is quite
noteworthy, and is the manifestation of a need that has become, not
merely a crying, but an absolutely groaning one. It is scarcely a
metaphor to say that to-day the intellectual world is in great travail
over its need of an organon. We are crying unto our logical desire
from the depths of our souls and waiting for it as they that wait for
the morning. This intensity of our want makes us intolerant of the
old incompetences and sets us to fault-finding in the hope of better
insight when the current obscurities shall have been dissipated. We
scan each effort as it appears, and as it discovers no even single
clear organic general principle around which the wealth of knowledge
now ascertained can set in order we lay it aside with a feeling of
being merely tantalised. We cannot but assimilate our condition to that
of the Haunted Man in Bret Harte's clever travesty of Dickens: "'Here
again?' said the Haunted Man. 'Here again,' assented the phantom, in a
low tone. 'Another novel?' 'Another novel.' 'The old story?' 'The old
story.' 'It won't do, Charles! It won't do!' and the Haunted Man buried
his head in his hands and groaned."
When the singular difficulties of the search are considered, all
this is, no doubt, void of that sweet reasonableness that should
obtain. Still the interests of progress are too supreme to permit any
compromise with error or incompetence.
So, although the excellent manual under notice makes no pretensions
that are unwarrantable, according to the customs usually observed
in such cases, it yet affords salient features, apt as texts for
a course of comment that applies, not merely to the doctrine and
treatment adopted in it but to the doctrine and methods of the accepted
logic-books in general.
The book is entitled, "The Science of Thought." This exposes an
incompetent comprehension of the topic. The Science of Thought should
be a mere branch of psychology. In logic, we of course, have an almost
prime need of information concerning the anatomy and physiology of
thought. But this is not the peculiar motive of logic. The _raison
d'être_ of logic is not the _general_ economy of thought, but the
phenomena of _untrue_, _incompetent_, or _fallacious_ thought, or,
in other words, _erroneous thought_. Did but the mind of man always
supply him with true and competent thoughts he would find no need of
seeking logical criteria, however much he might be interested in the
phenomenology of thought in general.
Man being, however, what he is, informed by a mind, prone to error,
and he, in consequence, frequently subjected to evils and misses that
better information would have enabled him to avoid or mitigate, he
naturally seeks to solve the causes of his errors, and to discover
means of testing the worth of his thoughts and of deriving thoughts
that are true and competent. This search is the study of logic; the
true information relevant thereto is logic, and no other device of
man ought to trespass upon the name. Using for this turn the word
truth in a broader sense than usual, so as to include the sense of
competence, we may say that Logic is the Science of Truth and Untruth
in Thought,—take notice, _in thought_—for we are supposing that there
neither is, nor can be, any other or further _means_ of becoming aware
of aught of the nature or features, of aught that is pure alternate to
mind, than thought merely, and that, therefore, truth and untruth in
thought exhausts all the proper possibilities of truth and untruth.
Following Hegel, and concurring with so many others, our author
starts with Being as the proper primordial universal notion. Is this
not taking note merely of the comprehensive meaning of thought, in
ignorance of its denominate meaning? Prior, at least logically, to
Being, Form, Mode, Limit, Relation, and the like, must there not
be posited or supposed somewhat to _be_, to _be formed_, to _be
modulated_, to _be limited_, to _be related_, etc? Must not Quality
be quality _of_ somewhat, and Quantity, quantity _of_ somewhat? So it
seems to us and we therefore posit Ground as primordial in thought.
Ground as intended here is not the same as the Absolute Being of Hegel.
It is in general independent of the notions either of existence or
reality, being in general that of which aught is predicative either
in discourse or thought. It is pure logical denomination free of all
logical comprehension. The imaginary number and the ideal number of
mathematics are each just as truly grounds according to this intent as
is a house or a tree.
Ground is the seat or basis of Being, Mind, Form, Mode, Limitation,
Relation, etc. Behind any momented thought, say Sun shines, Mind
thinks, or It is, lies, it may be latent, but all potential, the
mere thought stripped of all comprehension: Sun, Mind, or It. It is
wholly irrelevant that a ground is manifest only by means of its
comprehension if it be true that it _must_ be supposed as the seat of
that comprehension. Undistributed and therefore unrelated or absolute
ground from its very nature admits of no other predicate than mere
being. It is in general at once the All and Existence. Its negative
or Naught has no ground, being, or comprehension whatever, and no
proper denomination, its name being only quasi-denominative and for
convenience of notation merely. Form or Thought breaks this barren
universe of mere Ground and Being by the formation of modes of Ground
and by the more or less arbitrary fiats and finds of Limitation.
By the formation of Mode emerge Form, Time, and Extent, and perhaps
Cause and Aim. By Limitation emerge Part and Whole, Number, and
Relation in all their manifold involutions. Attribute being only
_degraded_ Relation, and Quantity being only one _power_ of Relation.
It is a most notable peculiarity of thought that it has the ability and
that it is its custom to take any form or phase of Being, and regard
and deal with it as a ground.
Hence every momented thought (which in effect embraces every thought
properly speaking) makes two distinct references, its ground reference
and its being or predicate reference. This seems to be the bottom truth
in respect to the much vexed topic of extension and comprehension.
There would seem to be, therefore, in reality only two ultimate
categories, Ground and Being.
As to how the categories, usually taken as such, and their complements,
should be distributed between Ground and Being, would seem to be a
matter requiring much pondering to arrange. Owing to the double quality
of so many of the mental alternates, as in one regard Being and in
another regard Ground, much difficulty might well be anticipated.
Neglecting this distribution we may say that very universal terms of
thought are Ground, Being, Form, Mode, Limit, Number, Part, Relation.
Epoch, Place, Alteration, Event, Cause, Effect, Aim, and the like.
The cardinal mental activities which _produce_ thought seem to be, in
order, Attention, Conception, Recognition, Induction, and Deduction.
In all these operations there is opportunity for not only true, but
erroneous thought, and logic in its office as the inspector and judge
of thought in respect of its truth or error, should study all these
operations and those which are subsidiary to them, and ascertain the
causes of error and the means of truth, and perfect methods of deriving
truth with certainty and ease.
It is very presumptuous and hazardous to essay a definition of truth,
yet since such a definition is a great desideratum, and since it will
not be effected except by earnest trial, and since also, in such a
matter, even failures that are consequent on devoted attempts are
instructive to subsequent attempts, we venture our submission:
A thought is true which while representing its applicate (that is
whatever to which it is directly applied) also, in so far as its
purport implies, represents in mind a thorough and respective parity
and ratio, through which each thought-analyton and thought-syntheton
(whether ground, mode, limit, number, part, relation, etc.) corresponds
to its proper applicate-analyton or applicate-syntheton. Truth is this
representative and correspondent parity and ratio in general. A thought
may be true and yet incompetent, that is unfit to serve some assigned
purpose or turn in view, by reason, it may be, of its irrelevancy, or
it may be of its restricted application or purport. It is a question
that has been much mooted whether or not our sensations are true to
their mind-alternate excitants. The argument towards showing that they
are would be prolix and must be passed. If however they are not true it
would be interesting to hear by what quality or nature they are to be
characterised in respect to their verity.
Attention is a mental activity of considerable importance in logic in
connection with that very fruitful source of error, mal-observation.
But by far the most important mental activity to be studied and
thoroughly known for the behests of logic is Conception, with its
all important adjunct of denomination. The verity or error of all
other mental operations that generate thought depends largely on the
truth or untruth, the competence or incompetence of Conception. On
our conceptions as a basis is erected and must ever be erected every
scheme of our notation, and in so far as our conceptions are untrue
or incompetent, so probably is, and so will be, in perhaps a multiple
measure, all our knowledge. Very much more ought to be said in this
connection, but space will not permit.
The mental operation which is here called Recognition, but which has
been called hypothesis and otherwise, and which the author reviewed
calls Identification, has not received the attention from logicians
in general which its importance requires. It is a true variety of
inference, as Mr. C. S. Peirce has fully shown. Our conceptions which
are the central facts of logic would be of little value to us were
we not able truly to subsume our perceptions under them. A variety
of facts are available to show how very often we do this wrongly,
imperfectly, or not at all.
Induction, and its rationale, depends also very largely upon conception
and its intimate consequences, denomination, attribution, and
relationising. Deduction and the Syllogism are trite themes, although
the part that attribution plays in the process has been insufficiently
noticed, and although the rules of deduction from relation-terms,
the most important and fruitful of all, are as yet very partially
ascertained. What is needed as an indispensable prerequisite to
this last, seems to be a census and classification of the manifold
relations that are known, after the model of say Roget's Thesaurus,
and then a determination of the consequences of such combinations and
constructions as are admissible and fruitful, and a tabulation of the
same as our multiplication table is a tabulation of the consequences of
the multiplication of numbers. The Logic of Relatives as it is called
suffers from its having been formed thus far on so very abstract and
formal a plan that its formation lacks the check and correction of
frequent comparison with concrete knowledge, while its results are
almost if not quite useless owing to their extreme generality, which in
defect of the mediate formula leaves them inapplicable to aught that
can manifest their utility or power.
F. C. R.
THE TIME-RELATIONS OF MENTAL PHENOMENA. By _Joseph Jastrow_. New York:
N. D. C. Hodges.
The accomplished Professor of Psychology at the University of Wisconsin
gives in this publication, which forms one of the series of "Facts
and Theory Papers" issued by Mr. Hodges, the results of numerous
observations by Cattell, Münsterberg and other observers. His object
is to present a general view of what has been done already in this
department of research. The study of the time-relations of mental
phenomena is of importance in various connections. As Professor Jastrow
remarks:
"It serves as an index of mental complexity, giving the sanction of
objective demonstration to the results of subjective observation; it
indicates a mode of analysis of the simpler mental acts, as well as
the relation of these laboratory products to the processes of daily
life; it demonstrates the close interrelation of psychological with
physiological facts, an analysis of the former being indispensable to
the right comprehension of the latter; it suggests means of lightening
and shortening mental operations, and thus offers a mode of improving
educational methods; and it promises in various directions to deepen
and widen our knowledge of those processes by the complication and
elaboration of which our mental life is so wonderfully built up."