and fecundity, although it had need of such a one in a much higher
degree. Both thinkers were masters of the philosophical style. But
Lotze's symmetrically rounded and intricate periods, with their
inexhaustible influx of incident relations, makes very different
demands upon the patient resignation of the reader than the lightly
moving, epigrammatically pointed style of Schopenhauer. Lotze for this
reason never really became popular. His influence has remained rather
a scholastic and academic one. It has been fruitful in high degree
in its effect on the special departments of philosophical science,
particularly on psychology, whose present representatives in Germany
almost without exception received from him incitation and a solid
scientific view-point. Not unimportant, too, is his influence upon
academic instruction in philosophy, through the "Dictations" to his
lectures, published after his death, which are in every student's hands
and serve in many ways as a substitute for the study of his principal
work. Lotze's authority, finally, stands like a rock with all whose
great concern it is to find ways of reconciling the claims of theology
and of religious belief with the present state of science.
And their number is by no means inconsiderable. Official Germany has
become pious, or, at least, would like to appear so; and although this
is not to be understood exactly in the sense of especial dogmatic zeal,
yet people adhere nevertheless with a certain tenacity to the religious
background of the prevailing world-conception. Abroad it is the custom
to regard the Germans upon the whole as a nation of atheists, because
they have produced several curious fellows like Strauss and Feuerbach,
enjoy having a good time on Sunday, and drink plentifully. Nothing
can be more erroneous than this opinion. The average German has long
since learned to place implicit confidence in the declaration of
his teachers, that the great critical liberal movement of the later
Hegelian school is not to be seriously taken but to be looked upon
merely as the outcome of a "pathologically over-excited" epoch. Nowhere
in the great civilised countries has freethought practically found
so little footing; nowhere is its dependence upon the central powers
of government greater; nowhere is it more impossible to wrest even
a tittle from the authority of the old system of education with its
foundation laid in the theological world-theory.
This condition of things, the obstinacy, the timidity with which state
and public opinion hold fast to religion,—and now in times of imminent
social danger more so than ever,—must be borne in mind if we wish
to understand the comparatively great success that the philosophy of
Schopenhauer and Hartmann has had in Germany. In the support of these
two systems the philosophical opposition of freethought has simply
found expression—the opposition that has arisen against the official
philosophy, of which it cannot exactly be said that it theologises, but
which carefully avoids coming into conflict with theology, and does
not, in its aristocratic academic exclusion, endeavor to influence more
extended circles. The factor that made this philosophy of opposition
accord with the spirit of the times—its proximity, namely, to the
scientific world-theory—has already been emphasised; and the fact
that its pessimistic coloring has not been changed by its connection
therewith will be found intelligible when we consider the turn that
pessimism took in the hands of Hartmann. Only the quietistic Buddhism
that Schopenhauer taught, could, in an age of the highest expansion and
display of power both at home and abroad, appear as an incomprehensible
riddle of the national mind. The evolutionistic pessimism of Hartmann,
however, which demands of the individual complete and resigned
submission to the struggle for existence, although it is able to
offer him in the remotest background of time no better outlook than
the ultimate annihilation of existence itself—is in its immediate
practical commands too closely akin to an optimistic conception not
to satisfy fully the needs of life, and is again too analogous to
certain cosmological prophecies of natural science not to pass as the
metaphysical expression of a truth otherwise accredited.
As opposed to this state of things Neo-Kantianism or the Critical
Philosophy in its various forms has taken no firm position; no more
than its master Kant himself did. To a great extent it makes use of the
limitations of knowledge that have been critically determined, in order
to leave open behind the same a realm of transcendent possibilities
in which religion may lead a passably secured existence. Behind the
greatest critical acumen theological prejudice is only too often
concealed.
Few only of the intellectually eminent representatives of this movement
like Alois Riehl and Ernst Laas exhibit in this respect perfect
determination and the consciousness that the consequences of modern
science unavoidably demand the laying aside of current religious
conceptions and the substitution for them of more correct ones. Laas
especially, in many passages of his principal work (Idealism and
Positivism), as also in his readable little treatise _Kant's Stellung
im Conflicte zwischen Glauben und Wissen_,[60] has emphasised strongly
the view that there can be ideals only for the man who acts, and that
so-called ideals where mingled with the function of pure cognition only
falsify reality and lead to irresolvable conflicts. And Laas likewise
belongs to the few who have laid prominent stress upon the educational
task of modern philosophy as a substitute for systems of religious
ideas.
[60] _Kant's Position in the Struggle between Faith and Knowledge._
* * * * *
From the point of view of different systematic hypotheses, but
substantially with exactly the same tendencies, analogous ideas find
representation in EUGEN DÜHRING, who in versatility of talent and
literary activity is perhaps to be placed directly by the side of
Lotze and Hartmann, though the favor in which his works stand and the
circulation they have obtained fall far below the position of the
latter. He presents a different form of positivistic philosophy in
Germany, a philosophy not preponderantly critical but constructive,
and begins with what Ludwig Feuerbach about the middle of this century
in his Principles of a Philosophy of the Future (_Grundsätze einer
Philosophie der Zukunft_) once propounded as programme. His chief work,
_Cursus der Philosophie als strengwissenschaftlicher Weltanschauung
und Lebensgestaltung_ (Course of Philosophy as Exact-Scientific
World-Conception and Conduct of Life), and the treatise against
pessimism entitled _Der Werth des Lebens_ (The Value of Life) sketch
a world-picture that is intended theoretically to be but the simple
conceptual interpretation of the present contents of experience, and
therefore rejects the metaphysical constructions of Lotze, as well
as the new conceptual mythology of Hartmann, and criticistic doubts
concerning the objective reality of the world given in consciousness.
In the practical direction, as an offset to the world-throe of
humanity, the gladdening power of a life and action based on universal
sympathy is emphasised. Dühring is a unique, but isolated phenomenon;
standing, like Schopenhauer once did, in sullen antagonism towards
the official academic philosophy, and totally ignored by it; unable
by virtue of the conditions already delineated to influence wider
circles, which the unanimated rigidity of his manner of presentation
does not contribute to make easy. Eminent mental endowment and
extensive knowledge are perhaps displayed in a higher degree in his
historical works (_Kritische Geschichte der Allgemeinen Principien der
Mechanik_[61]; _Kritische Geschichte der Philosophie_[62]; _Kritische
Geschichte der Nationalökonomie und des Socialismus_[63]) than in his
systematic treatises.
[61] _Critical History of the General Principles of Mechanics._
[62] _Critical History of Philosophy._
[63] _Critical History of Political Economy and Socialism._
Nevertheless, Dühring can at the farthest be regarded only as one of
the forerunners of that Messiah that is destined for German philosophy
and German intellectual culture perhaps in the coming century; of
that man who shall be able to cast up the accounts of the work of the
present period, with its infinite analyses, its historical comparative
character, and its pyramidal yield of material, and to condense that
which now everywhere surges about us like a spiritual ether, but
nowhere palpable or tangible, into the unity of a system that shall
point out the paths to be followed and shall dominate all minds.
* * * * *
There are many,—and among them eminent investigators and estimable
scholars,—who smile at this prophecy as an Utopian dream; nay, almost
stand in dread of such hopes, as perilous to science. The day of
systems, say they, is past. Philosophy, too,—perhaps it were more
proper to say "mental science,"—is breaking up into a number of
special sciences, over which it is sought to place a general science
of knowledge or theory of science, as the last representative of that
which was once called philosophy and was recognised as the queen of the
sciences.
As intimated, I do not know whether the impulse toward unity that
inheres in the human mind is to be so easily driven from the field;
whether we shall be satisfied in the long run to behold that light
that irradiates the universe, broken a hundred-fold by the prisms of
the single sciences. But one thing is certain. The more irresolute
they are in whom the science of the future places its confidence,
the more actively will they press forward who hold that the precious
treasure of truth has long since been granted unto man, and who would
fain forge with this heritage of the past the fetters of the future.
After the Catholic church under Pius IX. had hurled in the face of
modern culture and science its frantic _Anathema sit_, it began under
his successor a much quieter, yet far more determined warfare. Like
one of the famed lianas of the primeval tropical forests, it entwines
the giant Science, to sap his best powers and slowly but surely to
stifle his life. Whatever the modern mind with the help of freedom
won by bitter struggles has gained in the knowledge of nature and
of history, is twisted and turned, falsified and misinterpreted by
hundreds and hundreds of busy hands until it has been fashioned to fit
that ready-made scheme of things composed on the one hand of Catholic
dogmatical teachings, and on the other of the Aristotelian-Thomistic
philosophy. As many representatives as secular freethought can show,
there will be found beside them to-day an ecclesiastical _advocatus
diaboli_ who will neither rest nor cease until of the hero has been
made a wretch and mangy heresiarch.
Under protection of the principle of free inquiry, and with all the
helps of science, a warfare of extermination is here carried on against
all freedom of mind and all science, which is the more dangerous in
proportion as the opponent loves to decorate himself with the borrowed
plumes of science, and as he is able skilfully to mask his real
designs. Catholicism is striving with untiring efforts to gain by the
help of this reformed and modernised scholasticism, the mastery of the
schools, of education, of the universities, and of the entire activity
of science. And compared with the position of the representatives of
modern thought it has decidedly the advantage. Not only is it in the
possession of a unitary world-theory, but it defends that theory with
most determined vigor and heedlessness against all differing views.
The representatives of modern science, on the contrary, are not so
fortunate as to possess inherited truth and infallible authority, and
they not only have to contend with the formidable internal difficulties
that stand in the way of a unitary formulation of their conception
of the world, but frequently even avoid entering on this task with
determination in order to make less prominent the contrast with the
religio-theological system to which every exact scientific conception
of the world must of necessity lead.
Against these aggressive endeavors of the theological mind, neither
lofty indifference, nor calm historical contemplation, nor mere
literary warring will avail. The power of freethought must be
displayed, and the positive work that it can do must be shown.
Otherwise the time may come when the fame of rigid scientific thought
and successful research in special fields will not exonerate German
philosophy from the reproach of having left the nation in the lurch
at a period of momentous spiritual crisis. To make useful the rich
acquisitions of these labors toward the construction of a general
theory of the world, remains, therefore, the serious task of the German
philosophy of the future.
I shall be permitted, perhaps, in a future article to present an
account of the literature of these special departments.
FRIEDRICH JODL.
II.
RECENT FRENCH PUBLICATIONS.
The works that have appeared during the last three months belong to
authors of different nationalities—Italian, Roumanian, Belgian, and
I ought to add Russian; but I shall not speak on this occasion of the
important work of Sergneyeff, _Physiologie de la Veille et du Sommeil_.
It is, as you see, a gathering of good company, on French soil.[64]
[64] All these works are published by Alcan.
* * * * *
The only French work to be mentioned is that of M. CH. ADAM,
_Philosophie de François Bacon_, a memoir presented in the prize
competition of which M. Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire was the reporter and
preferred by the Academy of Moral and Political sciences.
M. Ch. Adam is already known by several works relating to the
history of philosophy. The study which he now gives to the public
is conscientious; we must commend his erudition and the moderation
he has displayed both in his praise and in his criticism. I am not
sure, however, if he is right in asserting that the fame of Bacon
will increase and diminish alternately, according to whether patient
analyses or daring hypotheses find the more favor in the scientific
world. I have known many a savant, profoundly metaphysical and
imaginative, who, in admiring Bacon, delusively believed himself in
the possession of a solid safeguard against metaphysics. There is more
chance, to my mind, of finding the admirers of the Chancellor among
pure philosophers than among men of science. This is why I subscribe
completely to the judgment of M. Ch. Adam, when he subordinates Bacon
to Descartes and to Galileo. Especially should he be put below Galileo,
who was the great initiator of modern science, at least the first to
add a link to the chain of human science then being forged; one, I
might say, who by his solid contributions really founded physical
science, as chemistry was founded by Lavoisier and his contemporaries a
century and a half later.
* * * * *
The Roumanian writer is M. BASILE CONTA, whose unfinished work, _Les
Fondements de la Métaphysique_, has been translated by M. Tescanu.
M. Conta died in the heyday of his powers. Born in 1845, he was
successively, from 1875 to 1881, professor of jurisprudence at the
University of Jassy, deputy, and minister of public instruction. The
author and his works have, therefore, serious claims to our attention.
Nevertheless, I can hardly believe that M. Conta always kept in the
path in which he started, for if he had, it would have led him to
considerable results.
M. Conta held that every combination of ideas, that is to say every
ultimate generalisation, is essentially mobile, alterable in character,
and that there will never be any final, definitive philosophical
system. Subject to the benefit of this wise reserve, he undertook,
nevertheless, to frame a "materialist" metaphysic, founded like the
positive sciences on induction, and he attempted to rise to a general
system, from which it appeared to him that the ancient notions of the
soul, of freedom, and of God could not be legitimately excluded.
According to my mind, the defect of his method was the allowing too
much to reasoning, the too great desire to create reality by simple
logic. Unfortunately, the intellectual necessity that he proclaimed,
of reducing all to unity, does not carry with it the means of properly
making this reduction by a subtle operation of the mind. In order to
advance towards his end, M. Conta found himself led to formulate a
compendious sketch of a theory of cognition, a psychology, and a logic,
at the risk of sinking at times in the quicksands of a treacherous
discussion. As a matter of fact, metaphysics, spiritualism, and
materialism, are conceptions of great vagueness, and the problem to
reconcile them by any fashion of union, is rather like inquiring how
many ways there are of placing three persons at table, or even a
greater number.
This is not said by way of disputing the merits of a writer whose loss
is justly regretted, or to discourage the reading of a book in which
many will find much to accept.
* * * * *
The Belgian author is M. ALBERT BONJEAN, a barrister of Verviers. His
book, _L' Hypnotisme, ses Rapports avec le Droit et la Therapeutique,
la Suggestion Mentale_, affects too much the style of an address
before a court in which the orator wishes to exhibit wit and acumen.
Nevertheless, it is written with clearness, is agreeable to read, and
the verbal nicety sought does not impair its good sense.
M. Bonjean has developed the three following theses: First, that the
action of magnetism is not explained by the hypothesis of a fluid,
that we cannot speak with M. Ochorowicz, of "a certain tonic vibratory
movement which propagates itself outward from the periphery of the
body," but that it is explainable by simple suggestion; second, that
the power of suggestion is almost unlimited; and third, that though
verbal suggestion is incontestable, mental suggestion remains doubtful
until proof to the contrary.
M. Bonjean thus sides with MM. Ochorowicz and Delbœuf, and the whole
school of Nancy, against that of the Salpêtrière. He endeavors
especially to show the serious consequences, in criminal and civil
affairs, of immoral suggestions, the dangers of which he reproaches M.
Gilles de la Tourette with having concealed far too much. His personal
conviction does not rest itself solely on the expositions of others,
but on experiments which seem to have been conducted with prudence.
Extraordinary as this almost passive obedience of a subject to the
suggestion of an act which is repugnant to his moral tendencies
appears, we come in a position, it seems to me, to comprehend it by
the observation of the degenerate patients of our asylums in their
various manias. The dipsomaniac resists with all his power the impulse
to drink, and the kleptomaniac the impulse to steal; they fight against
it even to agony, but they end always by yielding to it. "It was
stronger than I"; such is the formula that we have noted most often in
the answers of these unfortunates. And remark, that the dipsomaniac
does not drink for pleasure, but by compulsion, be the beverage what
it may, water, urine, or petroleum; just as the kleptomaniac does
not steal with a view to enjoying the product of his theft, which he
ordinarily abandons or restores, but steals to deliver himself from
agonising torture. In this manner also the onomatomaniac acts, who
is seeking a word, and who rises at night to consult the dictionary,
etc. The hypnotised subject is in the same predicament, whatever
pathological difference there may be between the two; his personality
has momentarily sunk in hypnosis, as does that of an insane person
during the attack of insanity; his moral resistance must finally yield,
and it is not at all remarkable that it does.
The volume of M. Bonjean ends with an interesting discussion of the
celebrated case of Lully. The deceit that gave rise to belief in
suggestion without words or gestures appears to be established; the
subject reads from the lips of his magnetiser.
* * * * *
Let us turn to the fine work of M. R. GAROFALO, _La Criminologie, Etude
sur la Nature du Crime et la Théorie de la Pénalité_. M. Garofalo has
himself translated his work from the Italian; this second edition is
entirely recast.
The Italians have always had a taste for juridical studies. Their
school of criminologists has placed itself at the head of the movement
which ought to result in the reform of all criminal codes. Two
principal tendencies are predominant in the works of this school:
the physicians and anthropologists, for example M. Lombroso, have
conformably to their mental tendencies, particularly studied the
_criminal_, of whom they have endeavored to fix the type; the jurists,
like M. Garofalo, vice-president of the civil tribunal of Naples,
consider by preference the _crime_, which they determine by reference
to our social organisation. M. Garofalo shows himself at once an
innovator, in that he endeavors to give a positive definition of crime,
to take the place of the vague and incomplete definition which was
accepted by the old jurists, and conforming to which anthropologists
have thought themselves able to mark the characteristics of the
criminal man. That definition has relation to the average morality of
the societies of to-day; crime or criminal offence is to be sought,
according to him, only in the violation of altruistic sentiments
acquired and consolidated in the average social individual—compassion
and probity. New categories ought then to be established; that of
"revolutionists," for example, with whom the offence does not proclaim
moral monstrosity.
The violation of altruistic sentiments certainly reveals in the
offender a grave anomaly; it marks him as not adapted to the
conditions of society, and even incapable of adapting himself to
them, in consequence of psychical and physiological irregularities.
The principle, then, is correct, although M. Garofalo has based it
on an analysis of sentiments which appears to me insufficient. The
sympathetic emotions which compassion embraces, are not the only source
of our moral activity; probity arises in part from intelligence,
and the logical sense intervenes to give the form of justice or
injustice to an act of passion. Now, feebleness of judgment becomes,
incidentally, an important element of the diagnosis of the criminal.
Let us agree, nevertheless, that the absence of compassion and of
probity upon the whole makes up the "natural crime." This suffices
surely in practice.
On the other hand, it is not convenient, and it is unquestionably not
indispensable, to make a difference between an anomaly "in relation to
a superior civilised type," and an anomaly "in relation to the human
type itself." Here is the criterion that M. Garofalo—prepossessed
as he is to take away from born criminals the benefit, too easily
obtained, of disease—proposes to us, in order to distinguish from the
anomaly truly morbid, an anomaly not pathological, but which depends
in some way on the cerebral organisation. Subtle is this distinction
which he opposes to the opinion of French alienists, according to whom
the immoral are always more or less physically degenerated. I will
confine myself to recalling on this point a remark of Dr. Magnan. Very
often, said this eminent clinician one day to me, a father of poor
moral stability but otherwise healthy of body, has a son well balanced
in his moral and intellectual tendencies but already on the way to
degeneracy. The anatomical anomaly invoked by M. Garofalo would be
then not far from the physiological anomaly; functional disturbance of
the higher faculties is not alone concerned. Fundamentally, this is
of little moment to the practical conclusions of his system, which we
must rapidly indicate. With regard to the repression of crime, and as
to a large category of criminals, the social point of view necessarily
dominates the medical point of view.