quality of feeling, it will form a basis for given facts of soul-life.
Feeling substance having been exposed to a special stimulus, or having
performed a certain function, has thereby undergone a rearrangement
in its molecular parts. The structure has suffered a change in its
configuration, the form of which is preserved in the general flux
of matter, and there is thus produced in the feeling substance a
disposition to respond more quickly to impressions of the same kind.
The feeling accompanying a subsequent impression of the same nature is
coincidently felt to be a revival of a former feeling, similar or the
same in kind. In other words, feeling substance, preserving the forms
of its functions, is possessed with memory.[24] The preservation of
form in a function which is accompanied with feeling makes it possible
that the feeling accompanying a special form of function will become
a mark of signification. By being felt to be the same in kind as a
former feeling it will come to denote a certain condition of feeling
tissues. A feeling that is felt to be the same as or similar in kind
to a former feeling, the revival or memory of which it causes, is in
this way endowed with meaning; by which we understand the awareness of
the congruence or similarity of two or several feelings. Thus in the
lapse of time, by constantly renewed experience, one special feeling,
whenever repeated, will naturally become the indicator showing the
presence of certain external facts that cause it. An isolated feeling
is naturally meaningless; yet through a preservation of form, viz.,
through memory, it is by repetition necessarily changed into a symbol
of representative value.
[24] Memory is no mysterious power; it is the preservation
of form in feeling organisms. See Ewald Hering's treatise
on Memory, English translation in Nos. 6 and 7 of _The Open
Court_. Compare also the author's article _Soul-life and the
Preservation of Form_, in No. 143 of _The Open Court_.
Feelings, accordingly, in the course of time, necessarily acquire
meaning; they naturally and spontaneously develop mind. They can as
little avoid co-ordinating into a mental organism, as water at a low
temperature can escape congealing into ice; or as a seed can keep
from sprouting when it is exposed, with sufficient moisture, to the
light. Mind, accordingly, is the necessary outcome of a combination
of feelings. It is as necessary an effect of special causes, as, for
example, a triangle is the product of a combination of three lines.
The first step in the organisation of feeling, which will throughout
remain the determining feature of its development, is the fact that
with the help of memory the different sets of feeling acquire meaning,
and in this way the mere feelings are transformed from given facts into
deduced facts.
* * * * *
#Subjectivity and objectivity.#
The nature of given facts is subjectivity, while the character of
inferred facts is objectivity. The latter having grown out of the
former will nevertheless, so far as they are states of consciousness,
always remain subjective; yet they contain representations of that
which is delineated by certain given facts. Thus they contain an
element which stamps upon them the nature of objectivity. They
represent objects, the existence of which the feeling subject cannot
help assuming, because this is the simplest way of indicating certain
changes that are not caused within the realm of its own subjectivity.
Objectivity, accordingly, does not mean absolute objectivity.
Objectivity means subjective states, i. e., given facts or feelings
representative of outside facts, i. e., of facts that are not
subjective, but objective.
#The projection of objective facts.#
The sense-impression of a white rectangle covered with little black
characters is a given fact; yet the aspect of a sheet of paper is an
inferred fact. The former is a subjective state within; the latter
is the representation of an objective thing without. The process of
representing is a function of the subject, but the fact represented
is projected as it were into the objective world, where experience
has taught us to expect it. And the practice of projection grows so
naturally by inherited adaptation and repeated experience that the
thing represented appears to us to be external. We no longer feel a
sensation as a state of consciousness but conceive it as an independent
reality.
#Projection, an economy of labor.#
The practice of projecting subjective sensations into the outside world
is not an act of careless inference, but the inevitable result of a
natural law. This natural law is that of the "economy of labor." When
a blind man has undergone a successful operation, he will first have
the consciousness of vague color-sensations taking place in his eye.
Experience will teach him the meaning of these color-sensations and his
motions will inform him where to find the corresponding outside facts.
His consciousness will more and more be concentrated upon the meaning
of the sensations. The less difficulty he has in arriving at their
proper interpretation, the more unconscious his sense-activity will
become and at length consciousness will be habitually attached to the
result of the sensation alone, i. e., to its interpretation.
In the same way, every one who learns to play an instrument will first
feel that part only which his hand touches. By and by, however, he
will acquire a consciousness of the effects produced by the slightest
touch. Constant practice forms in the brain of an expert certain living
structures which are correspondent to the action of the instrument
and represent it with great accuracy. Whenever these structures are
stimulated, the action of the instrument is felt to take place. In
this way consciousness is projected into the work performed by the
instrument. The touch of the hand has become purely automatic, and
the operator now feels the full effects of his manipulation although
he is not in direct contact with all the parts of his instrument.
The instrument becomes as if alive under his treatment, he feels it
as a part of himself; for its action stands _en rapport_ with his
brain-activity.
* * * * *
#The subject-superstition and agnosticism.#
States of consciousness, collectively considered, have been termed
"subject," and we have also employed the phrase "subjective world." But
we must not forget the fact, that the adoption of the name "subject"
is based upon a misconception. Subject means "that which underlies,"
and the subject was supposed to be that something which formed the
basis of all the states of consciousness present in any one special
case—in you or in me, or in any person like you and me. The subject
was considered as a being that was in possession of sense-impressions,
of feelings, of thoughts, of intentions, etc.; and the existence of
this subject was proved by Descartes's famous syllogism _Cogito ergo
sum_. The subject was supposed to produce the states of consciousness,
while in fact (as we have explained above) it is exactly the opposite.
Feelings change into mind, they produce the subject which thinks. The
subject is nothing underlying but rather overlying. It is the growth
out of and upon feelings. It is the sum of many feelings in a state of
organisation.
The fallacy of Descartes's dictum has been pointed out by Kant. The
existence of states of consciousness, or the fact _cogito_, does
not prove the existence of something that underlies the states of
consciousness. It simply proves the existence of feelings and thoughts.
There are certain sense-impressions, there are perceptions, there
are ideas. Ideas develop from perceptions, and perceptions develop
from sense-impressions. States of consciousness are nothing but the
awareness or the feeling that is connected with certain perceptions and
ideas.
Descartes's subjectivism is a transitory phase leading from the
authoritative objectivism of the middle ages to the critical
objectivism of modern times. The authoritative philosophy of the
Schoolmen yielded to the arbitrary philosophy of metaphysical
subjectivity, commencing as a matter of principle with doubt, instead
of commencing with positive data, and establishing anarchy through lack
of any objective method of arriving at truth. The reaction against
the arbitrary authority of scholasticism was indispensable to further
progress. But we must not rest satisfied with its negative result. We
cannot commence a business without capital and without making a start.
So we cannot begin philosophy with nothing. Knowledge is not possible
without positive facts to serve as a basis to stand upon.
The negative features of Descartes's philosophy naturally found their
ultimate completion in agnosticism. The assumption of the existence
of a subject led to the doctrine, that this subject is unknowable.
Moreover, the assumption of something that underlies the acts of
thought leads to the assumption of something that underlies objective
existence, and thus it begets the theory of things in themselves. This
theory involves us in innumerable contradictions and thus it ends
ultimately in the proposition that things in themselves are unknowable.
There are few who know the historical meaning of agnosticism; but those
who can survey philosophical thought in its evolution, its growth, and
decay, know that agnosticism means failure in philosophy. The word is a
foreign-sounding name for "knownothingism," denoting a half-concealed
confession of bankruptcy. The philosophy of the future, in order to
escape from the fatal consequences of agnosticism, has to discard the
subject-superstition inherited from Descartes. Descartes was a great
thinker, a star of first magnitude in the realm of thought, but it is
time that, without returning to the authoritative philosophy of the
Schoolmen, we should free ourselves from the errors of his one-sided
subjectivism.
Let us not forget, that all subjective states contain an objective
element. Objectivity is no chimera, and we are very well enabled to
establish the truth or untruth of objective facts. The philosophy of
the future, accordingly, will be a philosophy of facts, it will be
_positivism_; and in so far as a unitary systematisation of facts is
the aim and ideal of all science, it will be MONISM.
From the standpoint of positivism, the subject, in the old sense,
does not exist, and things in themselves do not exist either.
Their existence is an unwarranted assumption, a superstition of
philosophy, and we can retain the word subject only on the condition
of a complete change of its meaning. The word subject, accordingly,
(which has acquired a place in philosophical language and is for
several purposes quite an appropriate expression,) must be corrected
so as to mean, not an underlying substratum, nor an agent which does
the thinking, but simply a collective term designating a certain
group of sense-impressions, perceptions, ideas, and volitions. These
sense-impressions, perceptions, ideas, and volitions, which form,
simultaneously as well as successively, the elements of soul-life,
carrying consciousness upon the waves of many subconscious states, make
up the reality of the subject; they are the facts of its existence, and
it is the states of consciousness only, not an underlying something,
the existence of which is beyond all doubt. They form the basis of all
knowledge.
* * * * *
#The objective element in subjective states.#
We must bear in mind that states of feeling are not empty feelings,
but always feelings of a certain kind. There is no consciousness pure
and simple, but only consciousness of a certain state. Let us suppose,
for instance, the consciousness of a certain pressure. What is it but
a feeling of being pressed in a certain direction and with a certain
intensity? If a certain pressure is resisted, the feeling indicates a
state of active reaction against pressure, and experience teaches by
comparison with other pressures how much counterpressure is necessary
to resist or overcome it.
Among the states of consciousness there are accordingly some that
represent an awareness of _receiving_ impressions, and there are others
of _making_ impressions. There are some feelings of a passive nature,
which are felt to be produced by impacts from a something that is not
the subject, and there are other feelings of an active nature, which
are felt to produce effects on something that is not the subject. This
something that is not the subject is called "object." It is represented
as lying outside the subject, although the latter stands in a close
and inseparable relation to the object, which, so far as this relation
is considered, forms a part of the subject. A given subjective state
possesses a definite form; it exists as it is on account of the object
only; for its form has been produced by its relation to the object, and
it represents this relation. The object, therefore, is no unimportant
part of, and indeed is an essential element in, the constitution of the
subjective state.
#All data are states of subject-object-ness.#
Idealist philosophers are apt to say that the subject alone is known
to us, while the existence of the object must forever remain a vague
hypothesis. This, however, is incorrect. It involves an unjustifiable
deprecation of the objective element in the given facts of conscious
states, and is based on a misconception of the entire state of
things. The data of knowledge are not mere subjective states, they are
relations between subject and object. Neither the subject is given,
nor the object; but an interaction between subject and object. From
this interaction we derive by a very complicated process of abstraction
both concepts, the subject as well as the object. It is true that the
subjective world of feelings and of representative feeling is very
different from the objective world of things. Nevertheless they are
one. The subject together with all objects forms one inseparable whole
of subject-object-ness.
Every special object, accordingly, must be conceived as a part of
this inseparable whole—of the All; it is a certain set of facts,
represented in a certain group of experiences, and is to be described
as that something which in a special way affects the subject and can
again in a special way be reacted upon by the subject.
#Idealism and realism.#
Here we have the clue for the proper meaning of objectivity. What is a
piece of lead but something that at a definite distance from the centre
of the earth exerts a certain pressure proportionate to its mass; that
is seen to become liquid at a certain temperature; etc., etc.? If it
is treated in a particular way, it will be observed to suffer certain
changes. What lead is has been established by experience; i. e., by
systematic observation through sense-impressions.
From this standpoint the differences between the schools of idealism
and realism appear as antiquated. The questions whether matter is real,
whether objects exist, and whether there is any reality at all, have
lost their meaning. That which produces effects upon the subject and
against which the subject does or can react, is called object. The
sense-effects produced by the object upon the subject, and also the
reactions of the subject upon the object, are realities; and every name
of a special object signifies a certain group of such effects and their
respective reactions. Thus, for instance, the word lead comprises a
certain set of experiences that have always been found combined with
certain whitish objects.
#Space and Reality.#
Some philosophers have denied not only the existence of objects, but
also the reality of space. What is space but a certain group of
experiences? The conception of space originates by moving and by being
moved about. The conception of space is the consciousness that by
moving, or by being moved, a change is effected; that is, a certain
object serving as a point of reference is either approached or left
at a greater distance. The acts of approach or withdrawal are as much
realities as are any other acts of the subject. Discussions concerning
the reality of space accordingly become mere verbal quibbles as soon as
we understand by space the condition common to all motion-experiences.
* * * * *
#Perception and concepts.#
The mental state in which through contact with external facts one or
several of the senses are affected so as to produce a direct awareness
of their presence, is called perception. The effects of external facts
upon the sense of touch appear as different forms of resistance. To
the other senses they appear as odors, tastes, sounds, and images. All
these sensations are so many subjective methods of representing certain
objective processes. Perceptions represent immediate reality because
the objects perceived, i. e., the objects represented by an image in
the eye, a taste on the tongue, etc., are in an immediate contact
with our senses. The feeling subject is directly conscious of their
existence by their present effects. They are our _Anschauung_, i. e.,
the living presence of objective reality.
Besides this living presence of objective reality, of which our
immediate surroundings consist,—besides our _Anschauung_—, man is
in possession of more general representations, which comprise all the
memories of a certain class of percepts. We call them concepts. Man
alone through the mechanism of word-symbols has been able to form
concepts. Abstract reasoning as well as scientific thought will grow
with the assistance of concepts in the course of a higher development.
#Hallucinations and errors.#
The higher we rise in the evolution of representative feelings, i. e.,
in the development of mind, the more numerous are the opportunities
for going astray. A scientific hypothesis, if erroneous, is more
sweeping in its fallacies than a single hallucination, which is a
misinterpretation merely of certain feelings. The subjective part of an
hallucination, namely the feeling itself, is real; but the objective
part, the representative element of the feeling, is not real; that
which it is supposed to mean, does not exist. The interpretation of the
feeling is erroneous in a hallucination.
Hallucinations are possible, and in the more abstract domains of mental
activity errors are possible also; and will be ever more frequent.
Nevertheless the reality of outside facts in the sense stated above can
as little be doubted as the reality of immediate perception; and all
the facts established by science, if they are but true, are as much
realities as is the resistance of the table to the pressure of my hand
or the perception of the sheet of paper by my eye.
#Inferential facts, if true, are real.#
Facts established by science are those observations which are made
with all the necessary exactness as well as completeness from certain
groups of experiences, and formulated with precision. The theory of
atoms, for instance, is true in so far as all elements combine in
certain proportions, which shows that the ultimate particles of which
the elements consist are of a definite mass. Atoms, if the word is
understood in this sense, are realities. The theory of atoms, however,
is not proved in the sense that atoms are ἄτομοι; or single, isolated,
minute bodies of a peculiar individuality—separate, indivisible, and
eternal entities. Whether they are concrete things or certain forms of
motion in a continuous substance, whether they are vortices or whirls
of a certain density and velocity in an ether ocean, or whatever else
be their character, is not yet known. If we exclude from the concept
"atoms" all hypothetical views and confine their meaning strictly to
the formulation of certain experiences, we have to deal with facts that
are real. Theories are true in so far as they comprehend in a formula a
certain group of facts, and a hypothesis becomes reliable to the extent
that it agrees with facts. The slightest actual disagreement with facts
is sufficient to overthrow the most ingenious hypothesis.
* * * * *
This leads us to the question, What is meant by _true_? What is truth?
#Facts and reality. Truth and mind.#
The epitheton "true" has reference to representative states only. A
representation is true, if it conforms to, or agrees with, experience;
in other words, if it is an interpretation of given facts, is free from
contradiction, and nowhere collides with any one of the given facts
and their consistent interpretation. There is no sense in speaking of
mere feelings as being true. We can never meet, in our own experience,
with given facts that are nothing but meaningless feelings; for we
(as thinking beings) are incapable of bringing meaningless feelings
into the scope of consciousness, since in the very act of thinking we
comment upon the given facts of our feelings. But supposing there are
mere given facts, mere meaningless feelings void of any representative
element, the application of the word true to such non-representative
feelings would be improper. States of consciousness become true or
untrue only by being representative of objective conditions or things.
There is no trace of truth in mere feelings, but only in representative
feelings. Truth and error are the privilege of mind. A representation
is true, if all the various experiences concerning a certain thing or
state of things agree with the representation; it is untrue if they do
not agree.
We observe that certain classes of facts, in spite of all variety,
exhibit in one or another respect a sameness, and science attempts to
express the sameness in exact formulas. These formulas we call natural
laws. If a natural law covers all cases of a class that have come or
even that possibly can come within the range of our experience, if it
agrees with every one of them, we call it a truth.
"Truth" accordingly is not at all identical with "fact." These two
words are often used as synonyms, but properly employed they are quite
distinct. Truth is the agreement of a representation with the facts
represented. The fall of a stone is a fact; it is an inferred fact
deduced from certain sense-impressions. In so far as the inference is
made with necessity as the only proper and simplest explanation of a
certain given fact or sense-impression, it must be considered as a
fact or as real. The law of gravitation, however, is not a fact, but a
truth.
Facts are real. There is no sense in speaking of facts as being
true. Representations of facts are true or untrue. Reality is the
characteristic feature of all facts, but truth is a quality that can
reside in mind alone.
#Facts and truth.#
Facts are always single, concrete, and individual. Every fact is a
_hic_ and _nunc_. It is in a special place, and it is as it is, at a
certain time. It is definite and of a particular kind. Yet a truth,
although representing certain objects or their relations, is never
a concrete object, nor is it a _hic_ and a _nunc_. It possesses a
generality applicable to all instances wherever and whenever the
objects in their particular relation appear represented in that truth.
Truth accordingly possesses as it were an ubiquity; it is omnipresent
and eternal.
Truth in one sense is objective; it represents objects or their
relations conceived in their objectivity, in their independence of
the subject. This means that the representation of certain objective
states will under like conditions agree with the experiences of all
subjects—i. e., of all feeling beings having the same channels of
information.
Truth in another sense is subjective. Truth exists in thinking subjects
only. Truth affirms that certain subjective representations of the
objective world can be relied upon, that they are deduced from facts
and agree with facts. Based upon past experience, they can be used as
guides for future experience. If there were no subjective beings, no
feeling and comprehending minds, there would be no truth. Facts in
themselves, whether they are or are not represented in the mind of a
feeling and thinking subject, are real, yet representations alone,
supposing they agree with facts, are true.
* * * * *
#The problem of the origin of mind.#