fatigued, I got into an omnibus just as another gentleman appeared
at the other end. "What degenerated pedagogue is that, who has just
entered," thought I. It was myself: opposite me hung a large mirror.
My ordinary dress, accordingly, was more familiar to me than my
travelling attire.
The ego is as little absolutely permanent as bodies. That which we so
greatly fear in death, the annihilation of our permanency, actually
occurs in life in abundant measure. That which is most valued by us,
remains preserved in countless copies, or, in cases of exceptional
excellence, as a rule preserves itself. In the best human being,
however, there are individual traits the loss of which neither he
himself nor others need regret. Indeed, at times, death, viewed as
liberation from individuality, can even become a pleasant thought.
* * * * *
After the first survey has been obtained, by the formation of the
concepts of substance, "body" "ego" (matter, soul), the will is
impelled to a more exact examination of the _changes_ that take place
in this relatively permanent existence. The changeable element in
bodies and in the ego, indeed, is the very thing that moves the will.
Now, for the first time, do the constituent elements of the complex
stand forth as properties of the same. A fruit is sweet; but it can
also be bitter. So, too, other fruits can be sweet. The red color that
is sought is found in many bodies. The neighborhood of some bodies is
pleasant, that of others unpleasant. Thus, gradually, do different
complexes appear to be composed of common constituent elements. The
visible, the audible, the tangible, are separated from bodies. The
visible is broken up into color and into form. Out of the manifold
constitution of colors issue, again, in lesser numbers, certain other
constituent elements—the primary colors, and so forth. The complexes
are disintegrated into _elements_.
III.
The proper and useful habit of designating that which is permanent by
a _single_ name, and of comprehending the same in a _single_ thought,
without analysing at each operation its constituent parts, is liable
to come into singular conflict with the tendency to separate these
constituent parts. The obscure image formed of the permanent, which
does not perceptibly change when one or another constituent part is
taken away, appears to be something existent _by itself_. Inasmuch as
it is possible to take away _singly_ every constituent part without
effecting the capacity of the image formed to _represent_ the totality
involved, or effecting its subsequent recognition, it is imagined that
it is possible to take away _all_ these parts and yet have something
remaining. Thus arises the monstrous idea of a _thing of itself_,
different from, and incognisable with relation to, its "phenomenal"
existence.
Thing, body, matter, are nothing apart from this complex of
colors, sounds, and so forth—apart from their so-called marks, or
characteristics. That Protean, illusory philosophical problem of
a _single_ independent thing with _many_ properties, arises from
the misunderstanding of the fact, that extensive comprehension and
accurate separation, although both are temporarily justifiable and
profitable for a number of purposes, can not and must not be employed
_simultaneously_. A body is _single_ and unchangeable so long as it
is not required to take details into consideration. Thus both the
earth and a billiard ball are _spheres_ so long as we disregard all
minor deviations from the spherical form, and greater exactitude is
not necessary. But if we are compelled to carry on investigations in
orography or microscopy both bodies cease to be spheres.
IV.
Man possesses in pre-eminence the power to determine arbitrarily
and consciously his point of view. He can at one time disregard the
most salient features, and immediately afterwards take into account
the smallest trifles; now regard a current of electricity as fixed,
without consideration of its contents, and now determine the width of
a Frauenhofer line in the solar spectrum; he can rise, at will, to the
most general abstractions, or bury himself in the minutest particulars.
The animal possesses this capacity in a much less degree. It does not
assume a point of view, but usually is brought to it by impressions.
The baby that does not recognise its father with his hat on, the dog
that is perplexed at the new coat of its master, have succumbed in the
conflict of points of view. Who has not been thus worsted in similar
cases? Even the man of philosophy at times succumbs, as the fantastic
problem above referred to, shows.
Indeed, do not certain circumstances actually appear to furnish a
justification of that problem? Colors, sounds, the odors of bodies
are evanescent. But the tangible part, as a sort of constant, durable
nucleus, not easily liable to annihilation, remains behind; appearing
as the vehicle of the more fugitive properties annexed to it. Habit
firmly affixes our thought to this central nucleus, even where the
knowledge has found its way, that seeing, hearing, smelling, and
_touching_ are intimately akin in character. Added to this, also, comes
the fact, that in consequence of the singularly extensive development
of mechanical physics a kind of _higher reality_ is ascribed to Space
and Time than to colors, sounds, and odors. Agreeably to which, the
junction in space and time of colors, sounds, and odors appears _more
real_ than colors, sounds, and odors themselves. The physiology of the
senses, however, demonstrates, that spaces and times can with as much
justice be termed sensations, as colors and sounds.
V.
Also the ego, as well as the relation of bodies to the ego, occasions
the rise of analogous seeming-problems, the character of which may be
briefly presented in the following manner.
The complexes of colors, sounds, and so forth, that are commonly called
bodies, we shall designate for the sake of simplicity by _A B C_ ...;
the complex that is known as our own body, and which constitutes a
part of the former, we shall call _K L M_ ...; the complex composed
of volitions, memory-images, and the like, we shall represent by α β
γ. Usually, now, the complex α β γ ... _K L M_ ... is opposed as ego,
to the complex _A B C_ ... regarded as world of substance; sometimes,
too, α β γ ... is comprehended as ego, and _K L M_ ... _A B C_ ...
comprehended as world of substance. Now _A B C_ ... first appears as
independent of the ego. But this independence is only relative, and
gives way before closer inspection. Much, it is true, may change in
the complex α β γ ... without much becoming noticeable in _A B C_ ...;
and so _vice versa_. But many changes in α β γ ... pass, by way of
changes in _K L M_ ..., over to _A B C_ ...; and _vice versa_. (As,
for example, when vivid ideas break forth into acts, or our environment
brings about perceptible changes in our body.) At the same time _K L M_
... appears to be more closely connected with α β γ ... and _A B C_ ...
respectively, than the latter do with one another; relations that find
their commonest expression in thought and speech.
Closely examined, however, it appears that _A B C_ ... is _always_
determined with and by _K L M_. A die, when seen close at hand,
looks large; when seen at a distance, small; it looks different with
the right eye from what it does with the left; sometimes it appears
double; with closed eyes it is invisible. The properties of the same
body, therefore, appear as modified by our own body; they appear
as conditioned by it. But where, pray, is this _same_ body that
phenomenally appears so _different_? All that can be said is, that
different _A B C_ ... are annexed to different _K L M_.[18]
[18] I expressed this thought many years ago (in the
_Vierteljahrsschrift für Psychiatrie_, Leipsic and Neuwied,
1868: _Ueber die Abhängigkeit der Netzhautstellen von
einander_) as follows: The expressions "sense-deception"
and "illusion of the senses" prove, that we are not yet
fully conscious, or at least that we have not yet found it
necessary to incorporate this consciousness into our ordinary
terminology, _that the senses represent things neither
wrongly nor correctly_. All that can be truly said of the
sensory organs is, that, _under different circumstances they
produce different sensations and perceptions_. Since these
"circumstances" are of so extremely manifold a character,
being partly external (inherent in the objects), partly
internal (inherent in the sensory organs), and partly interior
(having the seat of their activity in the central organs), it
would naturally seem, especially when attention is paid only
to external circumstances, that an organ acts differently
under like conditions. And it is customary to call the unusual
effects, deceptions or illusions.
We see an object with a point _S_. If we touch _S_, that is bring
it into relation with our body, we receive a prick. We can see _S_,
without feeling the prick. But as soon as we feel the prick we find
_S_. The visible point therefore is a _permanent fact_ or _nucleus_, to
which the prick is annexed, according to circumstances, as something
accidental. From the frequency of occurrences analogous to this we
ultimately accustom ourselves to regard _all_ properties of bodies as
"effects" proceeding from permanent persistent nuclei and conveyed
to the ego through the mediation of the body; which effects we call
_sensations_. By this very operation, however, these imagined nuclei
lose their entire sensory content, and become mere mental symbols.
The assertion is correct then that the world consists only of our
sensations. In which case we have knowledge _only_ of sensations, and
the assumption of the nuclei mentioned, as well as of a reciprocal
action between the same, from which sensations might be supposed
originally to proceed, turns out to be wholly idle and superfluous.
Such a view can only suit a halting realism or a half-matured
philosophic criticism.
VI.
Ordinarily the complex α β γ ... _K L M_ ... is opposed as ego to the
complex _A B C_. Those elements only of _A B C_ ... that more actively
alter α β γ ..., as a prick, a pain, are we accustomed to comprehend in
the ego. Afterwards, however, through observations of the kind above
mentioned, it appears that the right to annex _A B C_ ... to the ego at
no point ceases. In conformity to which the ego can be so extended as
ultimately to comprehend the entire world.
* * * * *
When I say that the table, the tree, and so forth, are sensations of
mine, there is contained in this, as contrasted with the method of
representation of the ordinary man, an actual extension of my ego. And
so, too, upon the emotional side, such extensions actually occur; as
for the virtuoso, who possesses as perfect a mastery of his instrument
as he does of his own body; for the skilful orator in whom the eyes of
an audience converge, and who controls the thoughts of his hearers; for
the energetic politician who directs with ease his party; and so on.
In conditions of depression, on the other hand, such as nervous people
often have to endure, the ego contracts and shrinks. A wall seems to
separate it from the world.
* * * * *
The ego is not sharply defined, its limits are very indefinite, and
arbitrarily displaceable. Only by mistaking this, and by unconsciously
narrowing these limits, as well also as by enlarging them, do
metaphysical difficulties, in the conflict of points of view, arise.
As soon as we have recognised that the supposed unities "body" and
"ego" are only make-shifts for a _provisional_ survey and for certain
practical ends (that we may apprehend bodies, protect _ourselves_ from
pain, and so forth), we are obliged, in many thorough-going scientific
investigations, to abandon them as insufficient and inappropriate. The
opposition between ego and world, sensation (or phenomenon) and thing,
then vanishes, and we are brought to deal simply with the _connection
and relation of the elements_ α β γ ... _A B C_ ... _K L M_ ..., for
which indeed this very opposition was only a partially appropriate,
imperfect expression. This connection is nothing more than the
combination of those elements with other homologous elements (time and
space). This connection science has simply to _accept_, and set itself
aright with regard to it, without attempting to explain its existence.
Upon superficial examination the complex α β γ ... appears to consist
of much more _evanescent_ elements than _A B C_ ... and _K L M_ ..., in
which two last the elements appear to be joined with _more stability_
and _in a more permanent manner_ (being joined to solid nuclei as it
were). Although upon closer inspection the elements of all complexes
appear as _homologous_, yet even in spite of the recognition of
this fact, the ancient notion of an opposition of body and spirit
easily creeps in. The spiritualist feels, at times, the difficulty of
imparting the necessary solidity to his world of substance created
by mind: the materialist is at a loss what to do when called upon to
animate and endow with sensation the world of matter. The _monistic_
point of view that reflection and reason have evolved, is easily
overcast by the older and more powerful instinctive notions.
VII.
The difficulty described is especially felt in the following
considerations. In the complex _A B C_ ... which we have designated
as the material world, we find as part, not only our own body _K L M_
..., but also the bodies of other persons (or animals) _K' L' M'_ ...,
_K" L" M"_ ..., annexed to which, after the analogy of the complex α
β γ ..., we conceive similar α' β' γ' ..., α" β" γ". As long as we
deal with _K' L' M'_ ..., we find ourselves in a thoroughly familiar
province, at every point sensorially accessible to us. But when we
inquire after the sensations or feelings that belong to the body _K'
L' M'_ ..., we no longer find in the province of sense the elements we
seek: but we add them in thought. Not only is the domain into which we
now enter much less familiar to us, but also the transition to it is
relatively unsafe. We are possessed of a feeling as if we were about to
plunge into an abyss. They that always pursue this direction of thought
and this direction _only_, will never get completely rid of the feeling
of insecurity that is very productive as a source of apparent problems.
But we are not limited to this way of reasoning. Let us consider first
the reciprocal relation of the elements of the complex _A B C_ ...,
without regarding _K L M_ ... (our body). Every physical investigation
is of this kind. A white bullet falls upon a bell; a sound is heard.
The bullet turns yellow before a sodium lamp, red before a lithium
lamp. Here the elements (_A B C_ ...) appear to be connected only
_among each other_ and to be independent of our body (_K L M_ ...).
But if we take santonine the bullet turns yellow again. If we turn one
eye sidewise we see two bullets. If we close our eyes entirely we see
no bullet at all. If we sever our auditory nerve no sound is heard.
The elements _A B C_ ..., therefore, are not only connected among
each other, but also with _K L M_. To this extent and to this extent
_only_ do we call _A B C_ ... _sensations_, and regard _A B C_ ... as
belonging to the ego. In this way, accordingly, we do not meet with
the gap between bodies and sensations before described, between that
which is without and that which is within, between the material and the
spiritual world.[19] All elements _A B C_ ... _K L M_ ... constitute
but _one single_ coherent mass, which when any one element in it is
disturbed _all_ is put in motion; except that a disturbance has a more
extensive and profound action in _K L M_ ..., than in _A B C_. A magnet
in our neighborhood disturbs the particles of iron near it; a falling
boulder shakes the earth; but the severing of a nerve sets in motion
the _entire_ system of elements. Quite involuntarily does this relation
of things suggest the picture of a viscous mass, at certain places (as
in the ego) more firmly coherent than at others.
[19] Compare my _Grundlinien der Lehre von den
Bewegungsempfindungen_. Leipsic, Engelmann, 1875, p. 54.
* * * * *
When I first came to Vienna from the country, as a boy four or five
years of age, and was taken by my father upon the walls of the city's
fortifications, I was very much surprised to see people below in the
moat and could not understand how, regarded from my point of view, they
could have gotten down there; for the thought of another possible way
never occurred to me. I remarked the same amazement, once afterwards
in life, in the case of a three-year old boy of mine, while taking a
walk with him upon the walls about Prague. I recall this feeling to
mind every time I engage myself with the reflection above referred to,
and I frankly confess that this accidental experience of mine greatly
helped to strengthen the opinion upon this point that I adopted a long
time ago. The habit of pursuing the same ways in material and psychical
things operates to confuse greatly our field of survey. A child forcing
its way through a wall in a house in which it has long dwelt, can
experience an actual enlargement of its view of the world, and a slight
scientific hint can bring much enlightenment.
VIII.
Accordingly, the great chasm between physical and psychological
research exists only for the common stereotyped method of observation.
A color is a physical object when, for example, we regard its
dependence upon its luminous source (upon other colors, upon heat,
upon space, and so forth). Regarding however its dependence upon
the retina (the elements _K L M_ ...), it becomes a psychological
object, a sensation. Not the subject-matter, but the direction of our
investigation is different in the two domains.
When, from the observation of the bodies of other men or animals,
we infer their sensations, as well also as when we investigate the
influence of our own body upon our own sensations, we are forced to
complete observed facts by analogy. This work of completion by analogy
is done with much more accuracy and facility, when it relates, let
us say, to nervous processes, which cannot be fully observed in our
own bodies—that is when it occurs in the more familiar physical
domain—than when the completion relates to psychical processes.
Otherwise there is no material difference.
IX.
The thoughts presented gain greatly in fixity and vividness if in
addition to simply expressing them in abstract form we bring ourselves
face to face with the facts from which they arise. For example, I lie
upon my sofa. If I close my right eye the picture represented in the
accompanying cut is presented to my left eye. In a frame formed by the
ridge of my eyebrow, by my nose, and by my moustache, appears a part
of my body, so far as it is visible, and also the things and space
about it. _My_ body differs from other human bodies—leaving out of
account the fact that every vivid motory idea immediately passes into
movement and that contact with it determines more perceptible changes
than contact with other bodies—by the circumstance, that it is only
partly seen, and, especially, is seen without a head. If I observe an
element _A_ within my field of vision, and investigate its connection
with another element _B_ within the same field, I go out of the domain
of physics into that of physiology or psychology, if _B_, to use the
apposite expression that a friend[20] of mine employed upon seeing this
drawing, passes through my skin. Reflections like that for the field
of vision may be made with regard to the province of touch and the
perceptual domains of the other senses.
[20] J. Popper of Vienna.
[Illustration]
X.
Reference has already been made to the different character of the
groups of elements that we have designated by _A B C_ ... and α β
γ. As a matter of reality, when we _see_ a green tree before us, or
_remember_ a green tree, that is _conceive_ a green tree to ourselves,
we know right well how to distinguish these two cases. The imaged tree
has a much less determinate, a much more changeable form; its green
is much paler and more evanescent; and, what is of especial note,
it distinctly appears in a _different_ sphere. A movement that we
_propose_ to execute is always only a _conceived_ movement, and appears
in a different field or sphere from that of the executed movement,
which moreover always takes place where the image becomes vivid enough.
The statement that the elements _A_ or α appear in a different sphere,
means, if we go to the bottom of it, nothing more than that they are
united with divers other elements. To this extent, accordingly, the
_basal component parts_ in _A B C_ ..., α β γ ... would be _the same_
(colors, sounds, spaces, times, motory sensations, innervations ...),
and only the character of their union different.
Pain and pleasure are ordinarily regarded as different from sensory
sensations. Yet not only tactile sensations, but also all other kinds
of sensations, can gradually pass into pleasure and pain. Pleasure and
pain can also justly be called sensations. Only they are not so well
analysed and so familiar as sensory sensations. Sensations of pleasure
and pain, however faint the mode of their appearance, make up indeed
the real content of all so-called feelings. Thus perceptions, as well
as ideas, volition, and feelings, in short the entire inner and outer
world, are composed of a small number of homologous elements united in
relations now more evanescent and now more lasting. These elements are
commonly called sensations. But since vestiges of a one-sided theory
now inhere in this term, we prefer to speak simply of _elements_, as we
have already done. All research aims at the resolution of the union of
these elements.[21]
[21] Compare the remarks appended to my treatise: _Die
Geschichte und die Wurzel des Satzes der Erhaltung der
Arbeit_. Prague. Calve. 1872.
XI.
That out of this complex of elements which at bottom is simply _one_,
the limits of bodies and the ego do not admit of being fixed in a
manner certain and sufficient for all cases, has already been said.
The composition of the elements, intimately connected with pleasure
and pain, into an ideal mental-economical unity, the ego, is a work of
the highest significance for the intellectual functions that act in
the service of the pain-avoiding, pleasure-seeking will. The formation
of the ego by this process of circumscription and delimitation is
therefore instinctively effected, it grows familiar and natural, and
fixes itself perhaps through heredity. By their high _practical_
value, not only for the individual, but also for the entire race, the
composites "ego" and "body" instinctively assert their existence,
and operate with the power of original elements. In _special_
circumstances, however, in which practical ends are not concerned, but
knowledge becomes an object in itself, this delimitation often turns
out to be insufficient, obstructive, and untenable.
Professional _esprit de corps_, and even professional bias, the
sentiment of nationality, the most narrow-minded local patriotism may
also have a high value, for certain _purposes_. But such conceptions
will not characterise the far-sighted investigator, at least not in the
moment of research. All these egoistic conceptions are adequate for
practical purposes only. Of course, even the investigator can succumb
to custom. Trifling scholastic fiddle-faddle, the cunning appropriation
of others' labor and perfidious silence with regard to it, the
numerous objections and complaints when unavoidably compelled to give
recognition, and the scanty illumination of others' performances on
such occasions, abundantly show that the scientist and scholar have
also to fight the battle of existence, that the ways of science yet
lead to the mouth, and that the _pure_ quest of knowledge amid our
present social relations is still an ideal.
* * * * *