States, and the Brown system of discipline is accounted for. From the
safety point of view, the greater the “irritation” the more evident
becomes the necessity for some system calculated to control and put a
stop to the negligence that produces the irritation. The Brown system
very effectively allays this irritation at the expense of the public
safety, by treating the negligence as a matter of secondary importance.
But although the Brown system and its modifications may reasonably
be termed the American method, nevertheless here and there one comes
across an instance of an American railroad that has discarded it and
adopted a radically different method, with exceedingly satisfactory
results. One of the roads that has broken away from the Brown system is
the Chicago & Alton.
A few months ago, while in Bloomington, Ill., the writer paid a visit
to what is termed “The C. & A. Stereopticon Car.” So far as I am aware,
there are only two or three of these cars on American railroads. The
car is, in fact, a training school and lecture hall for the benefit of
the employees. Mr. Perdue, the man in charge, is a veteran employee
of over thirty years’ experience, extending over practically every
department of railroad life. In order to enter the service of the
Chicago & Alton, every man has to pass through this car and take the
necessary examinations. In this way Mr. Perdue has become personally
acquainted with practically every man in the operating department of
the Chicago & Alton. He knows the weak men and the strong men, and his
watchful eye is over them all. He has the necessary authority to call
any man into the car for reëxamination, and to withhold him from duty
if necessary, in the interests of the service.
Mr. Perdue kindly allowed me to remain in the car while he was
conducting the exercises. There were some twenty or thirty railroad
men seated before him. The lecturer held in his hand a small bundle of
papers. They were the record of the disciplines for the month. Some of
the wrong-doers had been called into the car to listen to a description
and an analysis of their mistakes. Mr. Perdue is very kindly, yet
forceful, both in manner and speech. He talks vigorously to the men in
their own everyday language. He takes one accident after another, and
by the actual representation of it on his screen he demonstrates just
how it happened and how to avoid it for the future. He then tells a
certain man to stand up, and questions him closely as to what he would
do under such and such circumstances. Finally, he turns to his screen
and shows his audience how to smash a carload of household goods by
rough handling and by giving careless motions, and, on the other hand,
how to be loyal to the road and at the same time true to themselves by
rendering careful and efficient service.
Altogether Mr. Perdue’s work and story are so interesting that I am
tempted to give a part in his own words:--
“I have kept a record of the men handled during the past two or three
years. I promoted 148 brakemen to be conductors, 264 firemen to be
engineers, and instructed in all 3839 men. Practically all the men
passed, because if they failed to begin with, they kept coming to me
until I had educated them up to my standard. I believe the Chicago &
Alton has the finest and most loyal body of employees on any railroad
in the United States. I may be accused of blowing my own trumpet, but
I honestly believe it is nearly all due to my method of training and
discipline. By the way, this method is copyrighted by President Murphy
of the Cincinnati Southern Railroad. Of course the method is one thing,
and the man who handles the method is another, and a most important
consideration. That is why I point with pride to my record with the
boys on the Chicago & Alton. I want them to get the credit for it, for
without their coöperation my work would be thrown away. To begin with,
I make a point of getting the men interested, not only in their own
records, but in the records and reputation of the Chicago & Alton. I
tell you one thing, and that is, you cannot, with impunity, malign or
abuse the Chicago & Alton Railroad in the hearing of one of my boys.
“Then, again, I have no favorites. I make it a point to work with
absolute impartiality and uniformity. Every man knows he must stand or
fall on his own merits, that is, on his record as a flagman, a fireman,
or an engineer; and when he gets into trouble, his character as a man
is taken into account. Please don’t lose sight of the fact that I made
these Chicago & Alton boys. I made good men out of them because I
aroused an interest in every man. We are all proud to be able to say
that we work for the Chicago & Alton, and we point to our road as the
best, safest, and most comfortable in the country to-day. To give you
an idea of our splendid service, you should take a ride on our ‘Red
Train,’ on ‘The Prairie Express’ or ‘The Hummer.’
“In 1904, during the World’s Fair at St. Louis, we carried thousands
more passengers than any other road, and we neither killed nor injured
a single passenger. I spent two thirds of my time riding round with the
boys during the Fair season. We heard of numerous accidents happening
on other roads, and one thing leading to another, the word was finally
passed around, ‘Boys, not a scratch to a passenger on the Chicago &
Alton.’ And we lived up to our motto, I can tell you. This kind of work
is part of my method. It is a system of personal effort and personal
direction, and I can tell you it pays. If you don’t think so, just
take a look at the accident records of the other roads during the same
period.
“In regard to discipline, I don’t believe in being too severe. It’s
what you hold up your sleeve and have the power to use periodically,
that counts. Yet we are severe enough on the Chicago & Alton. No merit
or demerit marks for us. For minor offenses, from five to ten days’
lay-off, with loss of pay. For neglecting to have your watch inspected,
we give as many as fifteen days’ lay-off; and once in a great while,
the penalty for serious offenses goes up to thirty days. But discipline
to any great extent is uncalled for. When a man has been through my
car, he may need it once, but very seldom a second time. If you will
compare the number of preventable accidents on the Chicago & Alton
during the years 1897, 1898, and 1899 with any year or period since I
took charge of this system in 1900, you will get a very good idea of
what the ‘Stereopticon Car’ and all that it stands for has done for the
Chicago & Alton Railroad.”
But now, making an end in this way of our survey of conditions on
American railroads, there is yet one topic of another nature that
should prove unusually interesting to the general public.
To the writer of this book it has always seemed strange that the
public interest and anxiety in regard to these distressing railroad
accidents should never yet have taken the form of a very natural
curiosity to find out to what extent and by whom these matters have
been systematically studied and thought out. Doubtless the public
has the impression that its interests are being cared for somehow
by somebody. But impressions of this kind must not be mistaken for
evidence. What, for instance, are the names of the employees, the
managers, the politicians, or the legislators who have studied these
railroad accidents at close range and given the public the benefit
of their investigations? If these authorities have given little time
and no thought to the subject, the public should be informed why they
have avoided the discussion. As a matter of fact, the investigation
has been avoided, practically by all hands, for the reason that no man
can honestly apply any kind of a probe to a serious railroad accident
without running the risk of a clash with the labor organizations. No
such neglect, for this or other reasons, of a great public issue can be
pointed to in any other department of American industry or civilization.
For instance, from time to time we read in the public prints of prizes
being offered by cities and states, and sometimes by the national
government, for the best designs for some public building or memorial.
Without delay architects and artists all over the country concentrate
their minds on the subject. Those who are capable of submitting
valuable opinions and plans are invited and encouraged to do so. Money
and brains and professional pride are enlisted in the undertaking, and
thus we actually secure the best results that the concentrated thought
and talent of the profession is capable of producing.
Now it will certainly occur to most of us that it is quite as serious
and important an undertaking to try to save thousands of lives on the
railroads as it is to provide commodious and artistic public buildings.
Upon examination at close range, however, it soon becomes evident that
no concentration of thought whatever is being directed to this safety
problem, such as all other questions of national importance immediately
bring into play. If this point is well taken, it surely must result
in bringing to light a most unusual and almost incomprehensible state
of affairs. From my point of view, then, neither money, brains, nor
professional pride are in any way enlisted in the undertaking, except
along the lines of least resistance. The lines of least resistance in
these railroad problems are concerned with and embrace all manner of
signals and safety devices for the protection of life and property.
The thought and money that are being lavished on this side of the
problem can be realized by a glance at any or all of the scientific
periodicals. But the lines of greatest resistance, and at the same
time of the greatest importance, which call for a study of the human
element, that is to say of the conduct of the men in relation to
efficiency of service, have as yet failed to receive the attention and
thought which the importance of the problem undeniably calls for.
Undoubtedly this view of the matter will meet with considerable
criticism. It is a distinct reflection on the policies and methods of
the officials and the authorities to whom the public is in the habit
of looking for assistance and enlightenment. Nevertheless, a short
consideration of the subject will, I think, be sufficient to sustain
my contention, and at the same time it will serve as an introduction
to a chapter in the railroad business that is replete with interesting
particulars, as well from the industrial as from the sociological point
of view.
From the nature of the railroad business, with its multiplicity of
rules, signals, and customs, which constitute the mysteries of the
operating department, little assistance is to be expected, in a direct
way, from the ideas and opinions of the general public in the devising
or initiating of improved methods of operation. Public opinion,
however, has its proper function and influence, which can be profitably
utilized in other directions.
In the same way, judging from experience and our knowledge of the
past, little assistance in the way of thought or coöperation is to be
anticipated from the rank and file of the men. No amount of public
stimulation or official encouragement has so far had any effect in
rousing the average engineman, conductor, or station-agent, and
inducing him to devote any part of his spare time or his talents to a
fearless discussion of these railroad problems, which are so intimately
related to the safety of the traveling public. Neither in the railroad
magazines nor in the newspapers, will you ever come across an article
or any kind of appeal calling upon the organizations to take a hand,
in any public way, by coöperation with managers or otherwise, in
improving the scandalous accident record, which at the present day is
the distinguishing feature of the American railroad service. Every
railroad man seems to be a specialist in his own department, and up to
date there is no suspicion of a social conscience in any way connected
with his job or his schedules. In a word, the employee has not devoted
to the subject of railroad accidents any systematic thought or
consideration whatever.
Turning now to the officials of our railroads, to the train-masters,
superintendents, and managers, the evidence is even less satisfactory;
for it must be allowed that any systematic and persistent study of
these matters on the part of the railroad officials would sooner or
later become known to the public, through the press. But there is
absolutely no evidence of the kind in existence. The press of the
country can be carefully scrutinized and watched for an account of a
railroad accident that has been fearlessly and thoroughly analyzed by
railroad officials and published for the information of the public.
Personally, after carefully watching the outcome of a score of cases,
I am of the opinion that the investigation of a railroad accident by
the management of an American railroad is neither more nor less than a
hushing-up process, in which the officials are assisted by the railroad
commissioners, who frequently dodge main issues by taking circuitous
routes.
For instance, it cannot be denied that railroad commissioners in
general are aware that interference with discipline in aggravated
form is a recognized principle on our railroads. The Massachusetts
Commissioners, for example, found themselves face to face with the
issue, a few years ago, during their investigation of what is known
as the Baker Bridge disaster. In their report of this accident, they
characterized the principle as vicious and let it go at that; and
yet they are just as well aware as I am of the duties and habits of
a grievance committee, as well as of the fact that the privilege of
unlimited appeal from the discipline of the superintendent is to be
found in almost every agreement between men and management.
I am not presuming, in any way, to define the functions or duties
of the railroad commissioners; my object is simply to discover, if
possible, by whom and in what manner these railroad accidents are
being studied and analyzed in the interests of the traveling public.
All our evidence, therefore, points to the fact that train-masters,
superintendents, and managers--that is to say, the only men in the
country who are thoroughly posted in all the details of railroad life,
and therefore the only men with the ability and equipment to think
out these problems to successful solution--are absolutely tongue-tied
and pen-paralyzed on the subject. Occasionally, perhaps, one of these
gentlemen may emerge from his seclusion with an interesting essay on
certain phases of railroad life. In a general way he may call attention
to the importance of certain cardinal characteristics and virtues. He
may emphasize a sermon on the absolute necessity of obedience to the
rules, with numerous and interesting illustrations; but when it comes
to a question of enlightening the public in regard to the actual
working arrangements that exist between the management and men, he
immediately draws a wide black line.
If a superintendent should have the temerity to come out in the open
and describe, for the benefit of the public, the process of running
his division by a combination of rules, schedules, and grievance
committees, with himself as an almost impersonal factor in the midst
of it all, turning the crank merely as director of the machinery, he
would in short order be called upon to back up his story with his
resignation. This would be a perfectly natural consequence of his
loyalty to the public interests and of his lack of consideration for
the traditions and etiquette of his office. Not only is this true, but
his usefulness as a superintendent would be at an end; he would be
placed on the unfair list by the employees, and thus he would quickly
become _persona non grata_ to his superiors, whose harmonious relations
with the organizations he would constantly be in danger of upsetting.
But if the public should think fit to follow up the investigation
suggested and initiated by the superintendent in this way, it would
quickly find itself face to face with the fundamental antagonism that
exists in the highest railroad circles between the _rival interests of
harmony and efficiency_. So far as our railroads are concerned, this
is the “land’s end” of discussion on the safety problem. Harmony is the
altar upon which the interests of the traveling public are continually
being sacrificed. Harmony is the final adjuster, arbitrator, and
referee. Harmony dictates the policy of the railroad, the nature and
severity of its discipline, while efficiency follows in the rear, as
best it can. Just as soon as the public gets interested sufficiently in
preventable railroad accidents to call for all the facts in relation
to them, then, and not until then, will harmony be dethroned from its
dictatorship. So I think I am justified in repeating the statement
that these preventable railroad accidents and the causes which lead
up to them have not yet received proper attention and thought at the
hands either of the public, of the employees, or of the managing bodies
of the railroads. The superintendent allows the public to remain in
ignorance out of regard for his job, and the manager does the same in
the interest of harmony.
It must not be imagined, however, that the management is alone to blame
in the matter. Only too often, in the past, when a railroad manager,
in the interests of good service, has made a test case of his power,
he has had the public as well as the men to contend against. As a
matter of fact, even at the present day, the public is not in a mood
to give much credit or attention to explanations and statements that
emanate from railroad headquarters. It is an uncomfortable truth that
public opinion, as a rule, looks upon official announcements or reports
of railroad accidents as being more or less tainted, and the idea is
deeply imbedded in the public mind that a superintendent is open to the
same suspicion that is commonly attached to a manipulator of stocks in
Wall Street.
As it seems to me, then, the conclusion that little enlightenment
in regard to railroad accidents is to be looked for from management
or men has impressed itself in some way on the public mind, and the
appointment of boards of railroad commissioners to look after the
public interests has been the natural consequence. But when we come
to hunt up the evidence in regard to the study of railroad accidents
by railroad commissioners, a most unlooked-for state of affairs is
disclosed.
[Illustration: THE AFTERMATH]
Undoubtedly most of the problems that come up before the commissioners
for solution are well within the sphere of their talents and business
ability, but a fair and impartial investigation of railroad accidents
calls for a thorough examination and sifting of the evidence by men who
are actually in touch with the working of the rules and the movements
of the trains. It is not sufficient for commissioners to call for the
evidence and to listen to a rehearsal of some of the rules that
apply to the case. A fair-minded and unprejudiced listener at any
“hearing” conducted by these boards would quickly be impressed with the
conclusion that in New England, at any rate, the commissioners are not
fitted by training, study, or experience to furnish the public with
intelligent criticism of the simplest case of a preventable railroad
accident. I have not the slightest hesitation in recording this as the
whispered opinion of all railroad men who have given any thought to the
subject, although, of course, it would be highly imprudent for any one
to say so out loud.
Not only to railroad men, but to the public as well, the following
illustration will be as plain and to the point as words can make it:--
On September 15, 1907, a head-on collision occurred near West Canaan,
N. H., between two passenger trains, in which twenty-five passengers
were killed and about as many more injured. The accident was the result
of an error, either in sending or receiving a train order--possibly
both the sender and receiver were at fault. One of these men was the
train dispatcher in the main office, the other was a telegraph operator
at a way station. With a view of placing the responsibility and
explaining the disaster, an investigation was immediately entered into
by the Board of Railroad Commissioners of the State of New Hampshire.
These gentlemen were assisted in their duties by the attorney-general
of the state, their legal adviser. Replying to the direct question of
the board, “How do you think this accident happened? What occasioned
it?” the general superintendent of the Boston & Maine Railroad, himself
an operator and train dispatcher, testified as follows:--
“I would say, in my thirty years’ experience, closely connected with
the dispatching of trains,--we run something like 700,000 trains a
year,--I have never known a similar error to be made and I never have
heard of it. The error certainly was made, and due, as I believe, to a
failure of the mental process, either in the brain of the dispatcher at
Concord, the operator at Canaan, or both, and _it is utterly impossible
for me to determine which one made the failure, or whether or not they
both made it_.”
Such was the opinion of an expert railroad man, recognized as such by
the commissioners themselves. Thereupon the general superintendent, at
the request and for the benefit of the board, entered into a minute and
exact account of the methods employed in moving and handling trains on
the Boston & Maine Railroad, in so far as this was necessary to explain
the situation at the time of the accident. The narrative of the general
superintendent was interrupted at frequent intervals by questions from
the attorney-general and the commissioners. He, the manager, was called
upon to explain, not only the rules of the road, but the commonest
principles and movements in the train service. “What is a ‘block’?”
“What do you mean by ‘O. K.’ and ‘complete’?” “Explain in detail your
train-order system.” “As a matter of curiosity let me ask how this
signal works.” These questions are not put as a mere legal form or
habit, for many of the points call for reiterated explanation before
they are comprehended by the board. The language is plain enough: they
don’t understand this, they are not familiar with that, and the section
of track on which the accident happened they know nothing about. In a
word, the board goes to school to learn something about the elements
of railroading and the details of train movements by telegraph, and
having in this way been thoroughly drilled into an understanding of the
accident, and having listened to all the evidence, the investigation
comes to an end.
On October 11, 1907, the finding or report of the commissioners was
published. After reviewing the accident, the evidence in relation to
it, and the methods of operation in the train service of the Boston &
Maine Railroad, all of which was, in fact, simply a reproduction of
the testimony of the general superintendent, the board concludes its
analysis by pointing to the train dispatcher at Concord as the “more
than probable” transgressor, and actually undertakes to describe the
train of mental wanderings by means of which the error was arrived at!
In the face of the declaration of the expert railroad manager that
it was impossible to single out the offender, the commissioners, on
the same evidence, but without the expert understanding of it, are
satisfied to send this train dispatcher out into the world with the
stigma of implied guilt and responsibility for the death of twenty-five
people on his head. Train dispatchers all over the country were very
much exercised and indignant at this “finding” of the commissioners,
and I am convinced it would be very difficult to find a telegraph
operator in the United States who would be willing to say a word in its
favor.