the mental composition of the American railroad man there is no such
idea or faculty as _dogged obedience_. And yet it must be evident to
the most superficial thinker on this subject that never can there be
any prospect for, or approach to, safety in railroad travel, without
this indispensable ingredient of personal character. It is the _sine
qua non_ of successful railroad operation. “Theirs not to reason why”
is the solution of the safety problem in a single forceful expression.
And yet in a lifetime of railroad service, I can honestly affirm
that I never met more than half a dozen railroad men who had any
conception, either in theory or practice, of this principle of dogged
obedience. Furthermore, I never came across a manager who was big
enough to preach the doctrine, and I am equally certain I have never
read in the newspapers or magazines any widespread expression of public
opinion that would lead a railroad manager to expect public support
and approval of any such principle. Consequently, my argument is an
arraignment not only of the men, the unions, and the managements, but
of the manifest opinion and public policy of the American people. The
price that is being paid in tribute to this lack of dogged obedience
and its attendant evils is graphically emphasized in the Twenty-first
Annual Report of the Interstate Commerce Commission, issued December
23, 1907, as follows:--
“Accidents to trains on the railroads in the United States continue to
occur in such large numbers that the record, as has been repeatedly
declared by conservative judges, is a world-wide reproach to the
railroad profession in America.”
That the men should lack the faculty I speak of is not, under the
circumstances, so very surprising; but that a great many railroad
managers, as well, should remain uncertain and doubtful as to its
fundamental importance, is by no means so easy to understand. Some time
ago the writer of this essay received in writing, from the head of
the operating department of one of our largest railroad systems, the
following question:--
“Is it not equally essential that the meaning of and reason for a rule
should be evident on its face as that the rule itself, that is, its
wording, should be plain and unmistakable?”
My reply was as follows:--
“By no means. From the safety standpoint the order itself is primary;
the reason for its being in the time-table is secondary. Is it not very
significant that the principle of dogged obedience should be open to
question on a railroad, while, in the case of a city ordinance or a
state law, no liberty of thought or action in such matters is tolerated
for a minute?”
The following illustration is interesting and well to the point:--
In our time-tables we have a rule for the guidance of enginemen on
what are called “helping engines,” which reads something like this:
“Never hang up the numbers of the train you are going to help on your
headlight, until you are actually hitched on to said train.” The reason
for this rule does not appear on its face, and yet the rigid necessity
for dogged obedience in regard to it will at once be understood, when
we study its origin.
About twenty years ago, while working as telegraph operator at East
Deerfield, Mass., I received a telegram ordering an extra engine out
of the round-house to help a regular freight train, No. 94, which was
expected in from the east. Meanwhile the helping engine stood waiting
on a siding with “94” displayed on its headlight. Before long an extra
or “wild” freight train from the west, with orders to meet No. 94 at
East Deerfield on single track, came along, and, mistaking the engine
with “94” on its headlight for the regular train, kept on its way
without stopping. No. 94 and this wild freight met in a cut, and “piled
up” in probably the worst “head-on” freight collision in the history of
the old Fitchburg Railroad.
Every rule in the time-table has its history written in suffering and
dollars; and while, of course, it is advisable for employees to be
conversant with their meaning and significance, it is evident that the
principle of dogged obedience is the only safe method for employees to
pursue in regard to them. An inflexible enforcement of this principle
would be looked upon as little short of tyranny; and yet, seriously
and fairly considered, it is nothing but the subordination which
every railroad man owes to the community in the interest of safety
and general efficiency. That the organizations of railroad men do
not insist upon, or even countenance, this absolute subordination
to authority, is thoroughly understood by every man and manager in
the service. We are all tarred with the same brush, and rather than
acknowledge the weakness of our position, we prefer to keep calling
on the public to pay the penalty. It is time to call a halt when the
liberty and liberal views of a few endanger the safety of the many.
But in passing from this branch of my subject, I wish to call attention
to an almost unnoticed fact in regard to the efficiency of railroad
service. Taking an accident bulletin, issued by the Interstate Commerce
Commission, at random, I copy the following:--
“The total number of collisions and derailments during April, May,
and June, 1907, was 3777, of which 220 collisions and 221 derailments
affected passenger trains. The damage to cars, engine, and roadway by
these accidents amounted to $3,232,673.”
This report, treating as it does exclusively of collisions and
derailments, is serious enough, but the note that is appended to it is
the significant feature of the situation:--
“Collisions and derailments which cause no death or personal injury,
and which cause not over $150.00 damage to the property of the
railroad, are not reported.”
Seeing that the public should be in possession of all the facts in
regard to efficiency of service, it occurs to me that a list of narrow
escapes and of collisions and derailments which cause no deaths or
personal injury, would make very interesting reading. These are the
very “trifles” to which I have already called attention. They are the
seed from which we reap our crop of disasters. They are well worth
reporting and paying attention to, and no annual or other statement of
the situation on the railroad is worth much if it fails to recognize
the significance of this feature.
But apart from the influence and power of the railroad organization
upon the individuality and personal conduct of its members in relation
to train wrecks and discipline, there is another branch of the topic
that is perhaps still more interesting, from a human and national point
of view.
Comparatively speaking, public attention has been but slightly directed
in any specific way to the matter of accidents to employees on American
railroads. It is certainly one of the most distressing features to be
studied in connection with the safety problem. Collisions, derailments,
defective hand-holds and brake apparatus, and the like, cause injuries
to great numbers of employees. For example, at Haverhill, N. H., the
other day, five employees were instantly killed, through the alleged
carelessness or oversight of a fellow employee. Such instances, of
course, are particularly painful topics for discussion among railroad
men, and yet this is the kind of an accident one reads about in the
newspapers almost daily. But in twenty-four hours the reading public
will forget the very worst of these accidents to employees. Their
frequency takes the edge off their significance. During the year 1907,
on a single American railroad, 104 employees were killed outright,
and 3575 were injured. The cost of these accidents to the railroad in
question was something like $285,000. With an employers’ liability law
in force and operation, as in countries abroad, the increase in total
paid to employees alone on this road would have carried the aggregate
to half a million dollars. The magnitude and importance of the safety
problem in relation to employees is still more evident when we consider
that for the year ending June 30, 1907, the casualty list on American
railroads shows a total of all persons killed, from all causes, of
5000, and injured 72,286; the totals for employees alone being 4353
killed and 62,687 injured.
The following figures in regard to actual train accidents and the
casualties resulting therefrom show a rather discouraging state of
affairs, from the fact that the employees themselves were in the main
responsible for them. In 1904 the killed and injured employees in train
accidents numbered 7834; in 1905, 7850; in 1906, 8362; and in 1907,
9935. As with all other items, so with accidents to employees, the
total of casualties has largely increased year by year.
But one of the most distressing features to be considered in connection
with accidents to employees, whether caused by their own carelessness
or otherwise, is the absolute indifference with which news and
statistics of such casualties _appear_ to be received by the average
railroad man. So far as an impartial investigator would be able to
discover, “It’s too bad” is about the limit of criticism and action in
such matters. The indifference I call attention to, so far as the minds
of the employees are concerned, is not real, and the actual reason and
history of the seeming neglect can easily be located and analyzed.
[Illustration: WHAT COMES FROM A MISPLACED SWITCH]
The railroad employee, as a unit, is whole-souled and sympathetic; not
a suspicion of indifference can be imputed to him, either as a man or
as a brother. Individually speaking, when a passenger or an employee
is injured, there is no sorrow like his sorrow; but, unfortunately,
the organizations or machines through which alone his desires and
sympathies can be expressed, have never shown any disposition to
interest themselves in any practical way in matters relating to the
safety of the public, or of the employees, _whenever such interest is
liable to develop into a probe of the conduct and efficiency of the
railroad man_. The heads of the national organizations of railroad
men, with particular reference to those connected with the operating
department, occupy positions that are usually three-quarters political.
The wishes and sentiments of great majorities of employees on certain
railroads can be, and have been, set aside by the political shake of
the head of one man in Washington or Chicago. The acquiescence of the
rank and file in this state of affairs is paid for in legislation and
concessions. Nevertheless, from the human and social point of view,
it would seem as if the organizations, or men-machines as we may call
them, should bestir themselves in this matter of accidents to their
members. In order to do this, coöperation with the management is
necessary; so the following questions very naturally arise:--
By consultation, or otherwise, has any personality been put into the
business? Have our organizations ever said to their members, “Come,
boys, let us reason together: when a man runs a signal, or disobeys
orders, it is a disgrace to our machine. In reality we, the employees,
are the principal stock-holders in a railroad. When passengers, or our
own members, are killed or injured, we have to pay a large proportion
of the bill. We pay in loss of prestige and character, and every time
one of us makes a mistake, it is a blot on our ’scutcheon. We should
see to it that this matter is made personal to every member of our
organization. We should coöperate with managers in locating the blame
for these accidents, and, without regard to consequences, we should
insist upon the removal of offenders.”
Is there any evidence to show that this is the actual state of affairs?
If so, I have yet to meet a man who is aware of it. But, on the other
hand, if no such influence is being exerted by the organizations,
in all candor, and in the name of public safety, I ask, why not?
For, right here, the public puts in its appearance and the following
additional question must forthwith be answered:--
Are our organizations prepared to say to the public, “We are sorry,
but the fact is, our machine is constructed purely upon selfish
principles. Our time and efforts are exclusively occupied in fencing
with the management. When passengers, even our own brothers, are
killed, it is up to the superintendent every time. Let him change the
rules if he thinks fit, but according to precedent and the rules of our
organization in such cases, we are not expected to show any signs of
sympathy or humanity. Consequently, to all interests apart from what
may be called the political welfare of the whole machine, we are deaf,
dumb, and blind?”
Is this an overdrawn picture? I think not. It is simply a truthful
matter-of-fact description of railroad organizations, from whose
calculations and behavior the personal and sympathetic element in
regard to these safety questions has been eliminated.
But now, widening our horizon a little, we have next to take note
that these questions of personal character, personal responsibility,
and unhampered personal effort, are real and intense problems for
thoughtful people to study, not only in relation to preventable
accidents, but in every department of railroad life.
Some time ago, in an issue of the “Engineering Magazine,” a note
of warning was sounded against the result of certain American
manufacturing methods. It was pointed out that the principle of
securing the largest output of uniform character, at minimum cost,
made automata of the operatives, and discouraged skilled and trained
artisans to so great an extent that the quality of the men to-day,
for lack of proper inspiration, was generally poor and unreliable.
According to the opinion expressed in the article that I refer to,
many American manufacturers are beginning to realize the necessity of
attracting men of high character to their employ, of surrounding them
with an environment tending towards sobriety, integrity, and industry,
and rewarding them according to their efforts, in order to avoid the
effects of this so-called “American tendency.”
That American methods of conducting business should be considered
retrogressive, on account of lack or poverty of inspiration, certainly
points to unhealthy conditions somewhere. If these American tendencies
can be shown to have the effect of discouraging individual effort
and the natural growth and ambition of the worker on railroads or
elsewhere, the matter certainly calls for serious attention. To say
the least of it, it betokens a very peculiar state of affairs, for
the reason that if there be one characteristic that more than another
distinguishes the American citizen from the rest of the world, it is
his freedom of personal action, his propensity for striking new and
unexplored trails in almost every branch of research, industry, and
invention. The American is _par excellence_ the world’s inventor. And
yet, without the utmost liberty of thought and action, an inventor
would cut but a sorry figure. It follows, therefore, that any
curtailment of or interference with these distinctively American gifts
and instincts will, as they say, bear watching.
Quite a number of years ago an American firm secured a contract for
the erection of a large factory somewhere near Manchester, England.
The contractor soon discovered that no persuasion or encouragement
would induce the British workman to lay more than a certain number of
bricks per hour, according to the fixed law and schedule of his union.
In order to complete the work within the allotted time, the contractor
was compelled to send for American bricklayers. These men, who were
paid according to their industry and personal effort, were able to
lay four bricks to the Englishman’s one. The American could beat the
Englishman four to one, not because he was, to that extent, a cleverer
and quicker workman, but because at that time and place he was a free
man. Transferred to American shops and factories, and in a different
atmosphere, the foreign workman easily adapts himself to conditions and
is able to hold his own.
According to the writer in the “Engineering Magazine,” American
manufacturers are taking measures to stimulate and revive the principle
of individual effort, in order to secure excellence in workmanship;
but, according to other authorities, these efforts are being
counteracted by the labor unions on the railroads and elsewhere, which
appear to be following in the footsteps and adopting the methods of the
British organizations. However, the ideas and ideals of many wide-awake
manufacturers and managers have found practical exemplification in
various manufacturing establishments, as well as in railroad shops in
different parts of the country.
Perhaps the best field for a short consideration of this interesting
subject, so far as railroads are concerned, is to be found on the Santa
Fé Railroad system. The introduction of the individual-effort reward or
bonus system of stimulating employees to extra or unusual effort, and
of compensating them suitably therefor, is probably the most important
of all the betterment work on this railroad. The inauguration of the
system followed the strike of the machinists, boiler-makers, and
blacksmiths, in May, 1904. The credit for its introduction on the Santa
Fé is due to Mr. J. W. Kendrick, Second Vice-President. Mr. Charles
H. Fry, associate editor of the “Railroad Gazette,” who has written a
valuable and comprehensive report of this betterment work, gives the
following as its principal features and objects:--
“To restore and promote cordial relations, based on mutual respect and
confidence, between employer and employee;
“To restore the worker to himself by freeing him from the small and
debasing tyrannies of petty and arbitrary officials on the one side,
and from individuality-destroying union domination on the other;
“To give the company better, more reliable, and more trustworthy
employees;
“To increase automatically, and without fixed limit, the pay of good
men, this increase of pay depending on themselves and not on their
immediate superiors;
“To increase the capacity of the shops without adding new equipment;
“To increase the reliability of work turned out and the efficiency of
operation performed;
“To do all these things, not only without cost to the company, but with
a marked reduction in its expenses.”
The programme was certainly ambitious and praiseworthy, and in Mr.
Fry’s report the results, after a thorough trial extending over several
years, are given in the following paragraph:--
“It can safely be said that the betterment work _has_ resulted as
anticipated in restoring harmony between employer and employee, in
restoring self-respect to the latter and increasing his efficiency and
reliability. Also it has raised his wages ten to twenty per cent on
the average. In addition, for every dollar of supervising and special
expense incurred, the company has saved at least ten dollars in reduced
costs.”
But just here two very important points require to be noticed and
emphasized. In the operations of a railroad, efficiency must never
be sacrificed for the sake of economy, and on the Santa Fé Railroad,
when questions arise in which there is even the remote possibility of
impairment of efficiency, all economical propositions or arrangements
are at once postponed or vetoed altogether. Again, it is manifest that
as a result of the improved methods and greater individual effort,
certain reductions in working force will become possible. In regard to
this matter the Santa Fé management claims that such reduction, when
necessary, can easily be effected, simply by not replacing men who
naturally drop out. This has been their uniform policy, and therefore,
from their point of view, there is no possible ground for objection by
employees on that score.
The individual-effort reward system on the Santa Fé thus far has been
limited to the maintenance of equipment and to locomotive operation.
The labor employed in the shops is, of course, distinctly non-union.
The saving effected under these methods on tools and machinery alone,
at Topeka, was $119,000, and the total economy on 1633 locomotives
(repairs and renewals) for the year 1906 amounted to $1,737,626. These
facts and figures are derived from a comparison of the cost of actual
and identically similar work before and after the inauguration of the
bonus system.
It is impossible at this time to enter into a minute explanation or
description of the system which is to-day in actual operation on
the Santa Fé Railroad, and under which satisfactory results, both
to employer and employee, are being obtained. The work itself is
notable not so much because of its economical results as on account
of its moral and sociological aspects. Without taking any side in the
questions at all, it is evident that the movement and work on the Santa
Fé, from beginning to end, has been an appeal to individual effort and
character, and a protest against the recognized ideals of the labor
unions. But it will not be found necessary to go into details of the
Santa Fé system in order to illustrate and emphasize the principles
that are at stake and the nature of the problem that must, before long,
be settled, one way or the other, by an educated and enlightened public
opinion.
On the Santa Fé Railroad, prior to the installation of the bonus
system, a vast number of time-studies had to be made and schedules
prepared. Every operation or piece of work to be bonused had to be
studied by competent men, to determine, from the machine and other
conditions, a fair or standard time to apply to it. Thousands of such
studies have been made at the Topeka shops, and properly recorded and
preserved on regular blanks.
The following illustrations are only partially descriptive of the
Santa Fé method, but they are sufficiently accurate to cover the
principles involved, the benefits that are derived from them, and some
of the objections which have been advanced by the union men on the
railroads, who are opposed to the bonus system in any form.
You take a certain piece of machinery, say a part of a locomotive. You
make a “study” of this part. After making one hundred tests, under all
sorts of conditions, you make a schedule in your machine-shop for this
particular operation or piece of work. You then fix upon a standard
time for doing this work. Standard time is simply the time which it
ought reasonably to take to do the work without killing effort, but by
eliminating every unnecessary waste. The elimination of waste is the
fair and square proposition you present to your workman. You say to
him, “Make a standard time on this piece of machinery, and I will pay
you twenty per cent above your hourly rate, that is, above your regular
pay. If you take more than standard time, your bonus will diminish
until at fifty per cent above standard time it will simply merge
into your day rate. On the other hand, if less than standard time is
taken, your bonus will increase above twenty per cent. But, under any
conditions or circumstances, you will always receive your full day’s
wage.”
The situation becomes still plainer, if you explain it to your workman
in this way. You say to him, “During the past year I have watched your
work closely, and made hundreds of ‘studies’ in regard to the ‘part’
you turn out with that machine. I find that you have averaged about
six to the hour. Now I am convinced that you can just as well turn out
seven. Your pay is now $2.50 per day; if in the future you can make
seven instead of six of these ‘parts’ in an hour, I will pay you $3.00
per day. In fact, your pay will increase in exact proportion to your
cleverness and industry. Furthermore, if by any manner or means you can
invent a way, such, for instance, as an improvement in the mechanism or
in the operation of your machine whereby you are enabled to turn out a
dozen of these ‘parts’ in an hour, I will see to it that your pay is
increased accordingly, without any limit whatever.”
Continuing our general illustration, we will now take it for granted
that you are able to start this bonus system in your factory or shop,
in which, under ordinary circumstances, you give employment to one
hundred union men. At the end of a certain period you find, on account
of the extra effort put forth by the most ambitious and cleverest men,
that the number of these “parts” which you require in your business,
or on your railroad, can easily be turned out by seventy-five men. So
without delay you reduce the working force in your shop accordingly.
It matters not how you do this, whether by simple discharge or by
omitting to fill vacancies as they occur in a natural way, the fact
remains that at the end of the year you have decreased your force
twenty-five per cent, and besides, without adding to your equipment,
you have made a substantial reduction in your operating expenses.