CHAPTER VIII

AESCHINES

§ 1. _Life_

Aeschines was for twenty years a bitter enemy of Demosthenes. This

enmity was perhaps the chief interest in his life; at any rate it is the

dominant motive of his extant speeches. Demosthenes on his side could not

afford to despise an enemy whose biting wit and real gift of eloquence

assured him an attentive hearing, whether in the courts or before the

ecclesia, and thus gave him an influence which the vagueness of his

political views and the instability of his personal character could

never entirely dissipate. Aeschines had no constructive policy, but he

had just the talents which are requisite for the leader of a captious

and malicious opposition. To the fact of the long-maintained hostility

between these two men we owe a good deal of first-hand information about

each of them, both as regards public and private life. It is true that we

cannot accept without reservation the statements and criticisms made by

either speaker about his rival; but in many cases they agree about facts,

though they put different interpretations on them, and so, with care, we

may arrive at a substratum of truth.

Aeschines was born about 390 B.C.[220] His father Atrometus, an Athenian

citizen of pure descent,[221] was exiled by the Thirty, and fled to

Corinth, with his wife. He served for some time as a mercenary soldier in

Asia, and finally returned to Athens, where he kept a school. His wife,

Glaucothea, filled some minor religious office, initiating the neophytes

in certain mysteries, apparently connected with Orphism. Aeschines seems

to have helped both his parents in their work, if we may suppose that

there is a grain of truth mixed with the malice of Demosthenes:

‘You used to fill the ink-pots, sponge the benches, and sweep

the schoolroom, like a slave, not like a gentleman’s son. When

you grew up you helped your mother in her initiations, reciting

the formulas, and making yourself generally useful. All night

long you were wrapping the celebrants in fawn-skins, preparing

their drink-offerings, smearing them with clay and bran,’

etc.[222]

The whole of the description from which the foregoing passage is taken is

an obvious caricature, and its chief value is to show that Demosthenes,

if circumstances had not made him a statesman, might have been a

successful writer of mediocre comedy; but it seems to point to the fact

that Aeschines’ parents were in humble circumstances, that he himself

had a hard life as a boy, and did not enjoy the usual opportunities of

obtaining the kind of education desirable for a statesman.[223] After

this, at an age when other aspirants to public life would have been

studying under teachers of rhetoric, he was forced to earn his living.

He was first clerk to some minor officials, then an actor—according to

Demosthenes he played small parts in an inferior company, and lived

chiefly on the figs and olives with which the spectators pelted him.[224]

He also served as a hoplite, and, by his own account, distinguished

himself at Mantinea and Tamynae. In 357 B.C. he obtained political

employment, first under Aristophon of Azenia, then under Eubulus, and

later we find him acting as clerk of the ecclesia.

He married into a respectable family about 350 B.C., and in 348 B.C. he

first appears in a position of public trust, being appointed a member

of the embassy to Megalopolis in Arcadia. On this occasion he went out

admittedly as an opponent of Philip, but came back a partisan of peace.

The reasons for this change of view will be discussed later. His own

explanation, that he realized war to be impracticable, is reasonable

in itself.[225] Two years later he was associated with Demosthenes in

the famous embassies to Philip, which, after serious delays, resulted

in the unsatisfactory peace of Philocrates. The peace was pronounced by

Demosthenes to be unworthy of Athens,[226] though he urged that, good

or bad, it must be upheld; and besides uttering insinuations against

the conduct of Aeschines as an ambassador, he prepared to prosecute him

for betraying his trust by taking bribes from Philip. He associated

with himself as a prosecutor one Timarchus. Aeschines prepared a

counter-stroke. He prosecuted Timarchus on the ground that he was a

person of notorious immorality, and, as such, debarred from speaking

in public. Timarchus appears to have been found guilty. In 343 B.C.

Demosthenes brought the action in which his speech _de Falsa Legatione_

and that of Aeschines bearing the same title were delivered, and

Aeschines was acquitted by the rather small majority of thirty votes. In

the next year Aeschines prepared for reprisals, but when on the point of

impeaching Demosthenes he in his turn was thwarted by a counter-move on

his rival’s part.[227]

In 339 B.C. Aeschines was a _pylagorus_ at the Amphictyonic Council, and

an inflammatory speech which he made there led to the outbreak of the

Sacred War.

In 337 B.C., the year after the battle of Chaeronea, the proposal of

Ctesiphon to confer a crown on Demosthenes for his services to Athens

gave Aeschines a new weapon with which to strike at his enemy. He

impeached Ctesiphon for illegality. The case was not actually tried

till 330 B.C., when Aeschines, failing to obtain a fifth of the votes,

was fined a thousand drachmae, and, being unable or unwilling to pay,

went into exile. He retired to Asia Minor, and lived either in Ephesus

or Rhodes. He is said by Plutarch to have spent the rest of his life

as a professional Sophist, that is to say, no doubt, as a teacher of

rhetoric;[228] but we have no further information about his life or the

manner or date of his death.

§ 2. _Public Character_

Aeschines cannot be considered as a statesman, since he had no definite

policy. He was, as he admitted himself, an opportunist. ‘Both individual

and state,’ he says, ‘must shift their ground according to change of

circumstances, and aim at what is best for the time’;[229] and though he

claims to be ‘the adviser of the greatest of all cities,’[230] he never

had in public matters any higher principle than this following of the

line of least resistance.

It is necessary, however, to consider whether he was actually the corrupt

politician that Demosthenes makes him out to be.

Athenian opinion with regard to corrupt practices was less strict than

ours; Hyperides admits that there are various degrees of guiltiness in

the matter of receiving bribes; the worst offence is to receive bribes

from improper quarters, _i.e._ from an enemy of the State, and to the

detriment of the State.[231]

This principle implies a corollary that to receive bribes for doing

one’s duty and acting in the best interests of one’s country is a venial

offence, if indeed it is an offence at all; in which case a man’s guilt

or innocence may be a matter for his individual conscience to determine.

Demosthenes definitely accused Aeschines of changing his policy in

consequence of bribes received from Philip. It is known that at the

beginning of his public life he was an opponent of Macedon, and we have

his own account of his conversion on the occasion of the embassy to

Megalopolis:

‘You reproach me for the speech which I made, as an envoy,

before ten thousand people in Arcadia; you say that I have

changed sides, you abject creature, who were nearly branded as

a deserter. The truth is that during the war I tried to the

best of my ability to unite the Arcadians and the rest of the

Greeks against Philip; but when I found that nobody would give

help to Athens, but some were waiting to see what happened and

others were marching against us, and the orators in the city

were using the war as a means of meeting their daily expenses,

I admit that I advised the people to come to terms with Philip,

and make the peace which you, who have never drawn a sword, now

say is disgraceful, though I say that it is far more honourable

than the war.’[232]

After the conclusion of the peace of Philocrates the accusations were

more definite. Demosthenes asserts that Aeschines had private interviews

with Philip when on the second embassy, and that for his services he

received certain lands in Boeotia;[233] he recurs to this charge in the

_de Corona_, many years later. Aeschines does not deny or even mention

this charge either in the speech _On the Embassy_ or in the accusation

of Ctesiphon. Demosthenes, having, apparently, little direct evidence,

tries to establish his case by emphasizing the relations of Aeschines

with the traitor Philocrates; but this is a weak argument, for though

Aeschines at one time boasted of these relations, on a later occasion

he repudiated them, and even ventured to rank Demosthenes himself with

Philocrates.[234] Perhaps we should attach more importance to the

other fact urged by Demosthenes, that Aeschines from time to time urged

the city to accept Philip’s vague promises of good-will; but before we

condemn him on this ground we must recollect that Isocrates, a man of

far greater intelligence than Aeschines, and of undoubted honesty, had

come so completely under the spell of Philip’s personality as to place a

thorough belief in the sincerity of his professions.[235] Aeschines may

have been duped in the same manner.

But the most severe condemnation of Aeschines’ policy is contained in his

own speeches.

During a visit to the Macedonian army in Phocis he was guilty of a

gross piece of bad taste by joining with Philip in dancing the paean to

celebrate the defeat of Phocis. He admits the charge, and maintains that

it was even a proper thing to do.[236] His conduct at the Amphictyonic

Council was far more serious.[237] He was invited to make a speech, and

as he began, was rudely interrupted by a Locrian of Amphissa. In revenge

it ‘occurred to him’[238] to recall the impiety of the Amphissians in

occupying the Cirrhaean plain. He caused to be read aloud the curse

pronounced after the first Sacred War, and by recalling the forgotten

events of past generations worked up his audience to such a pitch of

excitement that on the following morning—for it was too late to take

action that night—the whole population of Delphi marched down to Cirrha,

destroyed the harbour buildings, and set fire to the town. Though this

action undoubtedly plunged Greece into an Amphictyonic War, Aeschines,

quite regardless of the awful consequences, can only dwell upon the

remarkable effects of his own oratory.

§ 3. _Personality_

Something of the personal characteristics of Aeschines may be gathered

from his own writings and those of Demosthenes. He must have been a

man of dignified presence, for even if he only played minor parts,

as Demosthenes so frequently asserts, he acted, on occasion, in good

company, as his enemy, in an unguarded moment, admitted. The conditions

under which Greek tragedy was performed required a majestic bearing even

in a tritagonist, and the taunt of Demosthenes, who calls him ‘a noble

statue,’ makes it certain that Aeschines did not fall short of these

requirements.[239] The words of Demosthenes probably imply that the

dignity was overdone, that the statuesque pose of the ex-actor appeared

pompous and exaggerated in a law-court. Aeschines himself condemned the

use of excited gestures by orators. He urged the necessity of restraint,

and often insisted that an orator should, while speaking, hold his

hand within his robe.[240] This declared prejudice on his part gave

Demosthenes his opportunity for a neat retort—‘You should keep your hand

there, not when you are speaking, but when you go on an embassy.’[241] On

this occasion Demosthenes scored a point, but where wit and repartee were

in question, the honours generally rested with Aeschines.

Another striking characteristic of Aeschines was his magnificent voice,

which he used with practised skill; Demosthenes, who had serious natural

disabilities as a speaker, envied him bitterly, and in consequence was

always trying to ridicule his delivery.[242] Conscious, no doubt, of his

natural advantages, to which Demosthenes had once paid a more or less

sincere tribute,[243] Aeschines was apparently unmoved by these taunts;

but he seems to have been deeply injured when Demosthenes compared him to

the Sirens, whose voices charm men to their destruction. His indignation

can find no repartee; he can only expostulate that the charge is

indecent, and even if it were true, Demosthenes is not a fit man to bring

it; only a man of deeds would be a worthy accuser; his rival is nothing

but a bundle of words. Here, recovering himself a little, he delivers

himself of the idea that Demosthenes is as empty as a flute—no good for

anything if you take away the mouthpiece.[244]

In the case of other orators I have laid but little stress on personal

characteristics, because as a rule the orator must be judged apart from

his qualities as a man. In considering Isaeus, for instance—an extreme

case, certainly—personal qualities and peculiarities are of no importance

at all. But so many personal traits appear in the writings of Aeschines

that we cannot afford to neglect them; they form important data for our

estimate of him, both as a speaker and a public character. There is some

excuse, then, for dealing at greater length with his personality than

with that of any other of the Attic orators. The question of his public

morality has already to some extent been discussed;[245] an examination

of his more private qualities may possibly throw further light on the

question of his culpability.

He was, as we saw, to some extent a self-made man; he had at least risen

far above the station in which he was born. All through his speeches we

find traces of his pride in the position and the culture which he has

attained—his _vanité de parvenu_, as M. Croiset styles it. He is proud

of his education, and boasts of it to excess, not realizing that he thus

lays himself open to the charge of having missed the best that education

can give. Demosthenes is just, though on the side of severity:

‘What right have you,’ he asks, ‘to speak of education? No

man who really had received a liberal education would ever

talk about himself in such a tone as you do; he would have the

modesty to blush if any one else said such things about him;

but people who have missed a proper education, as you have, and

are stupid enough to pretend that they possess it, only succeed

in offending their hearers when they talk about it, and fail

completely to produce the desired impression.’[246]

Aeschines considered ἀπαιδευσία, want of education, almost as a cardinal

sin, and could never conceive that he himself was guilty of it.[247]

He displays his learning by quotations from the poets, which are

sometimes, it must be admitted, very appropriate to his argument, and

by references to mythology and legend, which are sometimes frigid. His

use of history betrays a rather superficial knowledge of the subject; it

is hardly probable that he had studied Thucydides, for instance. Still,

he possessed a fair portion of learning; what leads him astray is really

his lack of taste. He is at his best in the use of quotation when he

adduces the lines of Hesiod on the man whose guilt involves a whole city

in his own ruin—the passage will be quoted later.[248] The verses give

a real sting to his denunciations, and the opinion which he expresses

on the educational influence of poetry is both solemn and sincere.

But he cannot keep to this level. His much boasted education! results

generally in an affectation of a sort of artificial propriety in action

and language, and a profession of prudery which is really foreign to

his nature. He professes an admiration for the self-restraint of public

speakers in Solon’s time, and during the greatness of the republic, and

speaks with disgust of Timarchus, who ‘threw off his cloak and performed

a _pancration_ naked in the assembly.’[249] In the opening of the same

speech he makes a strong claim to the merit of ‘moderation’; in the

prosecution of Timarchus his moderation consists in hinting at certain

abominable practices, which he does not describe by name.

‘I pray you, Gentlemen, to forgive me if, when forced to speak

of certain practices which are not honourable by nature,

but are the established habits of the defendant, I am led

away into using any expression which resembles the actions of

Timarchus.... The blame should rest on him rather than on me.

It will be impossible to avoid all use of such expressions, ...

but I shall try to avoid it as far as possible.’[250]

Notice again the hypocritical reticence or ‘omission’ (_paraleipsis_)—a

rhetorical device familiar to readers of Cicero—which insinuates what it

cannot prove:

‘Mark, men of Athens, how moderate I intend to be in my attack

on Timarchus. I omit all the abuses of which he was guilty

as a boy. So far as I am concerned they may be no more valid

than, say, the actions of the Thirty, the events before the

archonship of Euclides, or any other limitation which may ever

have been established.’[251]

‘I hear that this creature’ (an associate of Timarchus) ‘has

committed certain abominable offences, which, I swear by Zeus

of Olympus, I should never dare to mention in your presence; he

was not ashamed of doing these things, but I could not bear to

live if I had even named them to you explicitly.’[252]

In spite of the prosecutor’s modesty, particular references to the

offences of Timarchus are frequent enough throughout the speech; the

reticence is assumed for the purpose of insinuating that only a tithe of

the offences are really named. The whole tone of the speech, therefore,

is disingenuous and dishonest.

On the other hand, the orator’s tribute to the judges’ respectability is

at times overdrawn. They are informed that ‘Timarchus used to spend his

days in a gambling-house, where there is a pit in which cock-fights are

held, and games of chance are played—I imagine there are some of you who

have seen the things I refer to, or if not, have heard of them.’[253] No

large assembly could ever take quite seriously such a compliment to its

innocence, and it must have been meant as a lighter touch to relieve the

dark hues around it. Such playful sallies are not infrequent, and, like

this one, are often quite inoffensive.[254]

A far more serious arraignment of the character of Aeschines is brought

by Blass, who, having made a very careful study of the speech against

Timarchus, finds a strong presumption, on chronological grounds, that

the majority of the charges are false. It is certainly remarkable that

the charges of immorality rest almost entirely on the statements of the

prosecutor. He expresses an apprehension that Misgolas, a most important

witness, will either refuse to give evidence altogether, or will not

tell the truth. To meet trouble half-way like this is a very serious

confession of weakness, which is confirmed by the orator’s further

comment on the state of the case. He has, he says, other witnesses,

but ‘if the defendant and his supporters persuade them also to refuse

to give evidence—I think they will not persuade them; at any rate not

all of them—there is one thing which they never can do, and that is to

abolish the truth and the reputation which Timarchus bears in the city,

a reputation which I have not secured for him; he has earned it for

himself. For the life of a respectable man should be so spotless as not

to admit even the suspicion of offence.’[255]

Blass considers that the minor charges, directed against the reckless

extravagance with which Timarchus had dissipated his inherited property,

are better substantiated; but these alone would have been hardly enough

to secure his condemnation.

Against Blass’ theories we must set the little that we know about the

facts. Timarchus was certainly condemned and disfranchised.[256] Now

an Athenian jury was not infallible, and whether in an ordinary court

of justice or, as for this case, in the high court of the ecclesia,

political convictions might triumph over partiality; nevertheless, a

man who was innocent of the charge specifically brought against him,

especially if he had not only committed no real political offence, but

had played no part in political affairs—a man, moreover, who had the

powerful influence of Demosthenes behind him—might reasonably expect to

have a fair chance of being acquitted. Aeschines himself was acquitted

a few years later on a political charge, though his political conduct

required a good deal of explanation, and he had all the weight of

Demosthenes not for him, but against him.

Aeschines might well feel a legitimate pride at the high position to

which he had climbed from a comparatively humble starting-point; but to

reiterate the reasons for this pride is a display of vanity. He likes to

talk of himself as ‘the counsellor of this the greatest of cities,’ as

the friend of Alexander and Philip. ‘Demosthenes,’ he says, ‘brings up

against me the fact of my friendship with Alexander.’[257] Demosthenes

retorts that he has done nothing of the sort. ‘I reproach you, you say,

with Alexander’s friendship? How in the world could you have gained it

or deserved it? I should never be so mad as to call you the friend of

either Philip or Alexander, unless we are to say that our harvesters and

hirelings of other sorts are “friends” and “guests” of those who have

hired their services.’[258]

And again—‘On what just or reasonable grounds could Aeschines, the son of

Glaucothea, the tambourine-player, have as his host, or his friend, or

his acquaintance, Philip?’[259] Demosthenes’ estimate of the position is

probably the truer one; Aeschines, with all his cleverness, was not the

man, as Isocrates was, to meet princes on terms of equality.

His vanity about his speeches and the effect which they produced is

attested by the various occasions on which he quotes them, or refers

to them. He gives a summary of a speech which he made as an envoy to

Philip;[260] a speech delivered before the ecclesia is epitomized;[261]

a speech made before ‘thousands and thousands of Arcadians’ is

mentioned.[262] The notorious speech delivered to the Amphictyons is

quoted at some length,[263] and its disastrous effect described, the

speaker’s delight in his own powers blinding him completely to the

serious and far-reaching consequences of his criminal indiscretion.

His private life, in spite of some damaging admissions in the

_Timarchus_, seems to have been satisfactory according to Athenian

standards. Demosthenes accused him of offering a gross insult to an

Olynthian lady. Whether or not the statement was an entire fiction, we

are not in a position to judge. Aeschines indignantly denies the charge,

and asserts that the Athenian people, when it was made, refused to listen

to it, in view of their confirmed respect for his own character:

‘Only consider the folly, the vulgarity of the man, who has

invented so monstrous a lie against me as the one about the

Olynthian woman. You hissed him down in the middle of the

story, for the slander was quite out of keeping with my

character, and you knew me well.’[264]

Whatever his origin may have been, he was not ashamed of it. He more than

once refers with affectionate respect to his father.[265] His love for

his wife and children is on one occasion ingeniously introduced in an

eloquent passage to influence the feelings of his hearers. This use of

‘pathos’ was familiar enough to Greek audiences, but Aeschines shows his

originality by the form in which he puts the appeal—aiming directly at

the feelings of individual hearers for their own families, rather than

asking the assembly collectively to pity the victims of misfortune:

‘I have by my wife, the daughter of Philodemus and sister of

Philon and Echecrates, three children, a daughter and two sons.

I have brought them here with the rest of my family in order

that I may put one question and prove one point to my judges;

and this I shall now proceed to do. I ask you, men of Athens,

whether you think it likely that, in addition to sacrificing

my country and the companionship of my friends and my right to

a share in the worship and the burial-place of my fathers, I

could betray to Philip these whom I love more than anything in

the world, and value his friendship higher than their safety?

Have I ever become so far the slave of base pleasures? Have I

ever yet done anything so base for the sake of money? No; it is

not Macedon that makes a man good or bad, but nature; and when

we return from an embassy we are the same men that we were when

you sent us out.’[266]

Lastly, he could speak of himself with dignity, as in the passage, quoted

above,[267] where he rebuts a charge against his private character, and

in the following:

‘My silence, Demosthenes, is due to the moderation of my

life; I am content with a little; I have no base desire

for greatness; and so my silence or my speech is due to

careful deliberation, not to necessity imposed by habits of

extravagance. You, I imagine, are habitually silent when you

have got what you want; when you have spent it, you raise your

voice.’[268]

§ 4. _Style_

The vocabulary of Aeschines consists mostly of words in ordinary use

which require no comment. Though he was a great admirer of poetry, his

ordinary writing does not display more poetical or unusual words than

that of any other orator.

The difference between his style and that of a writer such as Lysias

is, essentially, a difference not of vocabulary but of tone; the tones

of Aeschines are raised. He tends to use words which are stronger

than they need be, to be ‘angry’ when only surprise is called for;

to be ‘excessively indignant’ when a moderate resentment would meet

the case, to ‘detest’ when to dislike would be enough.[269] He makes

unnecessary appeals to the gods more frequently than any other orator

except Demosthenes. Exaggeration is part of the secret of his _splendor

verborum_, as the Roman critic described it; but by far the greatest part

is his instinct for using quite ordinary words in the most effective

combinations. His best passages, if analysed, contain hardly any words

which are at all out of the common, and yet their vigour and dignity are

unquestionable.[270] The ancients, however, denied purity of diction to

Aeschines, perhaps on account of the characteristics just described.

He is, as Blass observes, occasionally obscure; that is, it is possible

to find sentences which are not quite easy to understand; but on the

whole these are very rare. No writer, even a Lysias, can be at all

times perfectly lucid.[271] As a rule Aeschines is as simple in the

construction of his sentences as he is in the arrangement of his

speeches, and he is much easier to understand than, for instance,

Demosthenes.

He has not the consummate grace and terseness which critics admire as

the chief beauties of Lysias; sometimes unnecessary repetitions of a

word are to be found, sometimes two synonyms are used where one word

would suffice; but such repetitions often give us lucidity, though at the

expense of strict form, and the accumulation of synonyms increases the

emphasis.[272] Only the great artist, who is perfectly confident that

he has found the right word to express adequately his whole meaning in

exactly the right way, can afford to do without all superfluous strokes.

Aeschines is not a perfect artist in language; he aims not at artistic

beauty but effect, to which style is nothing but a subordinate aid. The

composition of artistic prose is, for him, far from being an end in

itself.

His speeches were designed not to be read by literary experts, but

to be delivered from the platform, and he aimed, not at pleasing the

critics’ taste but at working on the passions of the ordinary citizen.

Some of his most important orations were not written at all, though he

probably preserved notes of them,[273] and the three which he did write

out in full were preserved not for their literary beauty but for their

subject-matter. The time for the rhetoric of culture was past; the course

of events required the kind of oratory that would stir men to action. As

to the effectiveness of his speeches, there can be no doubt. We know—on

his own authority, certainly; but it has never been disputed—how his

harangue moved the Amphictyons; and we know that, without any conspicuous

moral qualities, with no advantages from family influence and no definite

political principles, he became a power in Athens solely by virtue of his

eloquence.

Aeschines varies the length of his sentences very considerably; some

of them are long, and consist of strings of participial and relative

clauses. These, however, occur mostly in narrative passages, where

such discursive style is excusable: for instance, the long sentences

in the _de Legatione_, §§ 26-27, §§ 75-77, and § 115, contain reports

of Aeschines’ own earlier speeches. The first of these (§§ 26-27) is

monotonous owing to the series of genitives absolute which compose an

inordinately long protasis, the main verb not occurring till near the end

of the sentence, and then being followed by another genitive clause.

A long sentence early in the _Ctesiphon_ gives a _résumé_ of the

circumstances by which the orator is impelled to speak; the clauses

are mostly connected by καί, though all depend on a relative at the

beginning. No skill is displayed in the structure of such sentences,

and their possible length is limited only by the amount of water in the

_clepsydra_. Up to a certain length, they are forcible, but if the limit

is exceeded, the effect is lost, for the point which the orator wishes

to make is too long deferred, since the main clause, containing the

statement which the preceding relative clauses illustrate or explain, is

not reached until the heavy accumulation of relative clauses has wearied

the perception.

In general, however, Aeschines is moderate in length; his sentences, on

the average, are shorter than those of Isocrates, and he tacitly adheres

to the rule that a period should not be so long that it cannot be uttered

in one breath.

Though not pedantic, he was far from being without a taste for

composition. In all the speeches we find examples of the deliberate

avoidance of hiatus, and in the _de Legatione_ he bestowed some care on

the matter.

The avoidance may generally, though not always, be traced in an unusual

order of words.[274] Examples of harsh hiatus are rare, though there

are many unimportant instances. Quite apart from theoretical rules, a

good orator will instinctively avoid awkward combinations of letters,

for euphony is necessary for fluent speaking. Aeschines, secure in the

possession of a perfect delivery, might admit sounds which Isocrates and

other theorists considered harsh; it was with practical declamation that

he was concerned.

The use of the rhetorical ‘figures’ is a prominent characteristic of

Aeschines. The verbal contrasts which Gorgias and the Sophists affected,

many of which seem to us so frigid and tedious, have too much honour from

Aeschines; for instance, the purely formal antithesis—‘He mentions the

names of those whose bodies he has never seen.’[275] where the sound of

the jingle—ὀνόματα, σώματα—is more important than the sense. The effect

of such ‘like endings’ (_homoeoteleute_) cannot as a rule be reproduced,

though sometimes a play upon words will indicate it: _e.g._ οὐ τὸν

τρόπον ἀλλὰ τὸν τόπον μόνον μετήλλαξεν—‘he has changed, not his habits,

but only his habitation.’[276] In such assonance there is an undoubted

aiming at comic effect. A forcible repetition of words is found in such

sentences as the following: ‘What I saw, I reported to you as I saw

it; what I heard, as I heard it; now what was it that I saw and heard

about Cersobleptes? I saw ...’ etc.[277] Repetitions of this and similar

kinds seem to break at times from the speaker’s control, and pass all

measure.[278]

Aeschines does not seem to have paid any attention to rhythmical writing;

his style is too free to be bound by unnecessary restrictions; verses

and metrical passages occur sporadically, but they are rare. He seems to

have fallen into them by accident, since they occur in positions where no

special point is marked by an unusual rhythm.[279]

Direct quotations of poetry, for which he had a great liking, are,

on the other hand, very frequent. No other orator, except Lycurgus,

is comparable to him in this respect, and Lycurgus uses his power of

quotation with much less force than Aeschines, who often employs it

aptly. He gives us the impression that serious religious conviction is at

the back of his quotation from Hesiod:

‘Often the whole of a city must suffer for one man’s sin.’[280]

In other cases the quotations are excessively long and, like those of

Lycurgus, have hardly any bearing on the point.

His metaphors are sometimes vivid and well chosen—ἀμπελουργεῖν τὴν

πόλιν—‘to strip the city like a vineyard’; ἔναυλον ἦν πᾶσιν—‘it was

dinned into everybody’s ears.’ Some of the most forcible occur in

passages which purport to be quotations or paraphrases of Demosthenes:

_e.g._ ἐπιστομίσαι, ‘to bridle’ the war-party; ἀπορράψειν τὸ Φιλίππου

στόμα, ‘to sew up Philip’s mouth.’[281] These are probably caricatures

of Demosthenes’ daring phrases.

Turning now from the consideration of the materials to the finished

product, we find that Aeschines can attain a high level of style. His

denunciation of the sharp practices prevailing in the course of his day

is impressive; we know that he is speaking the truth, and he does not

make the mistake of exaggerating. The seriousness is relieved, but not

impaired, by the light thread of sarcasm which runs through the whole

fabric:

‘The hearing of such cases, as my father used to tell me, was

conducted in a way very different from ours. The judges were

much more severe with those who proposed illegal measures than

the prosecutor was, and they would often interrupt the clerk

and ask him to read over again the laws and the decree; and

the proposers of illegal measures were found guilty not if

they had ridden over all the laws, but if they had subverted

one single clause. The present procedure is ridiculous beyond

words; the clerk reads the illegal decree, and the judges, as

if they were listening to an incantation or something that did

not concern them, keep their minds fixed on something else. And

already, through the devices of Demosthenes, you are admitting

a disgraceful practice; you have allowed the course of justice

to be changed, for the prosecutor is on his defence, and the

defendant conducts his prosecution; and the judges sometimes

forget the matter of which they are called on to be arbiters,

and are compelled to vote on questions which they ought not

to be judging. The defendant, if he ever refers to the facts

at all, tells you, not that his proposal was legal, but that

somebody else has proposed similar measures before his time,

and has been acquitted.’[282]

The following passage has been many times pointed out, and justly,

as a fine example of the higher style of Aeschines’ rhetoric. Taken

apart from its context, and without any consideration of the truth of

the insinuations which it makes, it is a notable piece of ‘pathetic’

pleading. The Romans, with a fondness for epigrammatic contrast,

attributed to Aeschines more of sound and less of strength than to

Demosthenes. This is true if we regard their works as a whole; but in

isolated passages like this, Aeschines finds his level with the best of

Attic orators:

‘Thebes, our neighbour Thebes, in the course of a single day

has been torn from the midst of Greece; justly, perhaps, for in

general she followed a mistaken policy; yet it was not human

judgment but divine ordinance that led her into error. And

the poor Lacedaemonians, who only interfered in this matter

originally in connection with the seizure of the sanctuary,

they who once could claim to be the leaders of the Greeks, must

now be sent up to Alexander to offer themselves as hostages

and advertise their disaster; they and their country must

submit to any treatment on which he decides, and be judged by

the clemency of the conqueror who was the injured party. And

our city, the common asylum of all Greeks, to whom formerly

embassies used to come from Greece to obtain their safety from

us, city by city, is struggling now not for the leadership

of the Greeks but for the very soil of her fatherland. And

this has befallen us since Demosthenes took the direction of

our policy. A passage in Hesiod contains a solemn warning

appropriate to such a case. He speaks, I believe, with the

intention of educating the people, and advising the cities not

to take to themselves evil leaders.

‘I shall quote the lines, for I conceive that we learn by heart

the maxims of the poets in childhood, so that in manhood we may

apply them:—

‘“Often the whole of a city must suffer for one man’s sin,

Who plotteth infatuate counsel, and walketh in evil ways,

On such God sendeth destruction, by famine and wasting plague,

And razeth their walls and armies, and shatters their ships at

sea.”’[283]

We know that Aeschines took education very seriously—more seriously,

in fact, than anything else—and his reference here to the educative

influence of the poets gives proof of his earnestness, which may have

been a transient emotion, but was, for the moment, a strong one.

Setting apart a few such serious passages, Aeschines is at his best

when he is directly accusing Demosthenes. His attacks are nearly always

characterized by a humorous manner which does not make them any the less

forcible, and they generally contain just enough truth to make their

malice effective. The fact that Aeschines himself had too deep a respect

for the truth to be prodigal in the use of it does not diminish the

virulence of his attack on his rival’s veracity, while any question as

to the exactitude of his statements would be drowned in the laugh that

followed the concluding paragraph:

‘The fellow has one characteristic peculiarly his own when

other impostors tell a lie, they try to speak vaguely and

indefinitely, for fear of being convicted of falsehood; but

when Demosthenes seeks to impose upon you, he first of all

enforces his lie with an oath, invoking eternal ruin on

himself; secondly, though he knows that a thing never can

happen at all, he dares to speak with a nice calculation of the

day when it is going to happen; he utters the names of people

whose faces he has never seen, thus cheating you into hearing

him, and assuming an air of truthfulness; and so he thoroughly

merits your detestation, since, being such a scoundrel as he

is, he discredits the usual proofs of honesty.

‘After talking in this way he gives the clerk a decree to

read—something longer than the _Iliad_, and more empty than

the speeches he makes or the life he has led; full of hopes

that can never be realized, and armies that will never be

mustered.’[284]

The pleasing custom followed by the orators of antiquity, whether Greek

or Roman, of defiling the graves of the ancestors of their political

opponents, and defaming their private lives, can be as well exemplified

from Aeschines as from his rival. Aeschines shows no great originality in

particular terms of abuse—Dinarchus has a greater variety of offensive

words—but the following extract from his circumstantial fictions about

Demosthenes is more effective, because more moderate in tone, than

the incredible insults with which the latter described the family

circumstances and the career of Aeschines:[285]

‘So, on his grandfather’s account, he must be an enemy of the

people, for you condemned his ancestors to death; but through

his mother’s family he is a Scythian, a barbarian, though he

speaks Greek; so that even his wickedness is not of native

growth. And what of his daily life? Once a trierarch, he

appeared again as a speech-writer, having in some ridiculous

fashion thrown away his patrimony; but as in this profession he

came under suspicion of disclosing the speeches to the other

side, he bounded up on to the tribunal; and though he took

great sums of money from his administration, he saved very

little for himself. Now, however, the king’s treasure has

drowned his extravagance—but even that will not be enough; for

no conceivable wealth can survive evil habits.

‘Worst of all, he makes a living not out of his private sources

of income, but out of your danger.’[286]

But he is really at his best where some slight slip on the part of his

opponent gives him the opportunity of magnifying a trivial incident into

importance. In the following caricature the indecision of Demosthenes is

better expressed by the vacillating language thrust into his mouth than

it could have been by the most eloquent description in the third person:

‘While I was in the middle of this speech, Demosthenes

shouted out at the top of his voice—all our fellow-envoys can

support my statement—for in addition to his other vices he

is a partisan of Boeotia. What he said was something to this

purpose:—“This fellow is full of a spirit of turbulence and

recklessness; I admit that I am made of softer stuff, and

fear dangers afar off. However, I would forbid him to raise

disturbances between the States, for I think that the right

course is for us ambassadors not to meddle with anything.

Philip is marching to Thermopylae; I cover my face. No man will

judge me because Philip takes up arms; I shall be judged for

any unnecessary word that I utter, or for any action in which I

exceed my instructions.”’[287]

The failure of Demosthenes to rise to the occasion when he had the

opportunity of delivering an impressive speech before Philip, during

the first embassy, forms the groundwork for excellent comedy on the

part of Aeschines. Demosthenes, by his rival’s account, was usually so

intolerable as a companion that his colleagues refused to stay in the

same lodging with him whenever another was obtainable; but he had found

opportunity to impress them with his own sense of his importance as an

orator. These professions are well indicated in a few words. The account

of his failure, of Philip’s patronizing encouragement, of the fiasco in

which the whole proceedings terminated, are sketched with a delicate

malice that must have made any defence or explanation impossible; indeed

Demosthenes seems to have attempted no reply:

‘When these and other speeches had been made, it was

Demosthenes’ turn to play his part in the embassy, and

everybody was most attentive, expecting to hear a speech of

exceptional power; for, as we gathered later, even Philip and

his companions had heard the report of his ambitious promises.

When everybody was thus prepared to listen to him, the brute

gave utterance to some sort of obscure exordium, half-dead

with nervousness, and having made a little progress over the

surface of the subject he suddenly halted and hesitated, and at

last completely lost his way. Philip, seeing the state he was

in, urged him to take courage, and not to think he had failed

because, like an actor, he had forgotten his part; but to try

quietly and little by little to recollect himself and make the

speech as he intended it. But he, having once been flurried,

and lost the thread of his written speech, could not recover

himself again; he tried once more, and failed in the same

way. A silence followed, after which the herald dismissed the

embassy.’[288]

Aeschines not only excelled in this class of circumstantial caricature,

but he could win a laugh by a single phrase. It is well known that

Midias, after various discreditable quarrels, put the final touch to his

insolence by a public assault on Demosthenes, whose face he slapped

in the theatre. Demosthenes on many occasions made capital out of this

assault; which fact inspires the remark of Aeschines, ‘His face is his

fortune.’[289] Of his dexterity in repartee a single instance may be

quoted: Demosthenes, in an outburst of indignation, had suggested that

the court should refuse to be impressed by the oratory of a man who

was notoriously corrupt, but should rather be prejudiced by it against

him.[290] Aeschines, catching at the words, rather than the spirit,

retorted, ‘Though you, gentlemen, have taken a solemn oath to give an

impartial hearing to both parties, he has dared to urge you not to listen

to the voice of the defendant.’[291]

§ 5. _Treatment of subjects: general estimate_

During his tenure of the office of γραμματεύς—clerk to the

ecclesia—Aeschines must have gained a thorough knowledge of the procedure

of that assembly, and of law. This comes out in his general treatment of

his subjects, and particularly in his legal arguments, which are clear

and convincing. In the speech against Ctesiphon, where the irregularities

of the proceedings about Demosthenes’ crown gave him a good subject for

argument, he makes out a very strong case.

In the structure of his speeches he follows a chronological order. He

realized well that the style of his eloquence lent itself naturally

to bright and attractive narrative. His versatility saves him from

becoming tedious; at one time he can speak with a noble solemnity which

reminds M. Croiset of the eloquence of the pulpit,[292] at another, the

lightness of his touch almost conceals the bitterness of his sentiments

and the seriousness of his purpose.[293] He can speak of himself with

dignity, of his family with true feeling; careful argument succeeds to

lucid narrative; crisp interrogation, reinforced by powerful sarcasm, to

masterly exposition. He can awaken his hearers’ interest by an indication

of the course which he intends to follow, and this interest is sustained

by all the resources of an eloquence which, though at times sophistical,

and though disfigured by occasional blemishes, has more of naturalness

and shows less traces of scholastic elaboration, than that of any other

great orator. He is abler than Andocides, more varied than Lysias, more

alive than Isaeus.

His natural gifts place him above Lycurgus, though our insight into the

latter’s high character gives him a powerful claim to our consideration.

Blass ranks him below Hyperides, but a study of the lighter passages

in Aeschines leads us to believe that, had he turned his attention to

private cases, he might have equalled or surpassed that polished orator

on his own chosen ground. The unanimous judgment of ancient and modern

times places him far below Demosthenes, who stands apart without a rival;

but in one quality, at least, he surpasses the paragon. Demosthenes,

according to the opinion of Longinus, is apt to make his hearers

laugh not with him but at him;[294] Aeschines never turns the laugh

against himself. Aeschines is perhaps less read than he deserves; he

has suffered from historical bias, and the prevalent contempt for his

qualities as a statesman has led to an undue disregard of his virtues as

an orator. There is nothing unfamiliar in this judgment; other orators

have suffered in the same way at the hands of prejudiced historians.[295]

It is interesting to read the account of Aeschines in Blass’ _Attische

Beredsamkeit_; the gifted scholar apparently starts with a strong

prejudice against his author, and is almost too ready to insist on his

faults; but time after time he is obliged to admit the existence of

positive merits, and in the end he seems, almost against his will, to

have been forced to modify his judgment; while the care and impartiality

with which he has detailed all points, good and bad alike, provides

material for a more favourable estimate such as that of Croiset.

§ 6. _Contents of Speeches_

A short account of the subject-matter of the three speeches may conclude

this chapter.

1. _Against Timarchus._

The speech begins (§§ 1-2) with a statement of the prosecutor’s motives;

§ 3 states the position which he intends to assume—that Timarchus, by

breaking the laws, has made the bringing of this action inevitable. Laws

relating to the matter are read and fully discussed (§§ 4-36).

This preliminary legal statement, apart from the particular case, puts

the prosecution on a sounder footing than if the speech had begun at once

with the narrative.

§§ 37-76. _The first charge_ (immorality). Narrative of the private life

of Timarchus, interspersed with evidence and argument as to his political

disabilities.

§§ 77-93. Examples of disability imposed on other grounds. Precedents for

a verdict in accordance with general knowledge even when the evidence is

defective.

§§ 94-105. _The second charge._ Timarchus is a spendthrift. Narrative and

evidence about his prodigality.

§§ 106-115. _The third charge._ His corruptness in public life.

§ 116, recapitulation. §§ 117-176, anticipation of the defence.

§§ 177-195. Epilogue, announced beforehand (§ 117) as an ‘exhortation to

a virtuous life.’ § 196, a short conclusion—‘I have instructed you in the

laws, I have examined the life of the defendant; I now retire, leaving

the matter in your hands.’

2. _On the Embassy._

Demosthenes had accused Aeschines of treason; his speech, it is to be

noted, dealt really with the second embassy only, and the events in

Athens subsequent to it, though he makes some reference to the third

embassy, and implies that Aeschines was corrupt even before the second.

He follows no chronological order, so that his story is hard to follow.

Aeschines, on the other hand, has a great appearance of lucidity,

treating all events in chronological order; but this is misleading, for,

in order to divert attention from the period in which his conduct was

questionable, he spends a disproportionate time in describing the first

embassy, in connection with which no accusation is made by Demosthenes.

The exordium (§§ 1-11) contains a strong appeal for an impartial hearing.

The events of the first embassy to Philip are the subject of an amusing

narrative at the expense of Demosthenes (§§ 12-39); the return of the

envoys and their reports, etc., occupy §§ 40-55. The same clearness does

not appear in the rest of the speech. Aeschines has to make a defence

on various charges brought against himself, so a plain narrative is not

enough. The chief charges were that Aeschines was in the pay of Philip,

and that he deceived the people as to Philip’s intentions, thus leading

them into actions which proved disastrous. The former charge could not

be proved by Demosthenes, however strong his suspicions were; the facts

relating to the peace of Philocrates and the delay in the ratification of

the agreement with Philip were matters of common knowledge; it was only

a question of intention. The defence of Aeschines is that he deceived

the people because he was himself deceived—a confession of credulity and

incompetence. The narrative is not continuous; details about the embassy

to Philip, the embassy to the Arcadians, and the fate of Cersobleptes,

are to some extent mixed together. Reference is also made to some

specific charges, _e.g._ the case of the Olynthian woman, the speech

before the Amphictyons, the singing of the paean, etc. In the two latter

cases there is no defence, but an attempt at justification (§§ 55-170).

The epilogue begins with an historical survey of Athenian affairs, which

is stolen either from Andocides or from some popular commonplace book,

and contains the usual appeal to the judges to save the speaker from his

adversaries’ malice.

He ends by calling on Eubulus and Phocion to speak for him. (§§ 171-178.)

Stress has been laid in these pages on the somewhat disjointed character

of the sections dealing with the principal charges, and it cannot be

denied that the defence is sometimes vague; that Aeschines seems to aim

not at refuting but eluding the accusations. These imperfections come out

on an analysis; but the speech taken as a whole is a very fine piece of

advocacy, and makes the acquittal of the speaker quite intelligible.

3. _Against Ctesiphon._

The speech opens with an elaboration of a trite commonplace, modelled on

the style of Andocides, about the vicious cleverness of the speaker’s

opponents and his own simple trust in the laws. Aeschines proposes to

prove that the procedure of Ctesiphon was illegal, his statements false,

and his action harmful. (§§ 1-8.)

_First charge_—‘The proposal to grant a crown to Demosthenes was illegal,

because Demosthenes was at the time liable to εὔθυνα (§§ 9-12). All

statements to the contrary notwithstanding, a consideration of the laws

proves conclusively that Demosthenes was so liable.’ (§§ 13-31.)

_Second charge_—‘It was illegal for the proclamation of the crown to be

made in the theatre.’ (§§ 32-48.)

_Third charge_—‘The statements on which the proposal was made, viz. that

the public counsel and public actions of Demosthenes are for the best

interests of the people, are false.’ (§ 49.)

The first two charges are dealt with by means of legal argument, in which

Aeschines, as usual, displays considerable ability. The third and longest

section of the speech (§§ 49-176) is less satisfactory. The orator

proposes to set aside the private life of his enemy, though he hints

that many incidents might be adduced to prove its general worthlessness

(§§ 51-53), and to deal only with his public policy. This he does, in

chronological order and at great length. Numerous occasions are described

on which the policy of Demosthenes was detrimental to Athens. The

arguments with which the narrative is interspersed are often of a trivial

nature, consisting sometimes of appeals to superstition, as when he tells

us that troops were sent to Chaeronea, although the proper sacrifices

had not been performed; and attempts to show that Demosthenes is an

ἀλιτήριος, for whose sin the whole city must suffer. Taken in detail,

some of these passages are impressive; but the weakness of the whole is

that Aeschines himself does not declare any serious or systematic policy.

This section contains incidentally digressions, in the taste of the day,

about the family and character of Demosthenes.[296]

§§ 177-190 contain some references to heroes of antiquity, by way of

invidious comparison; §§ 191-202, the deterioration of procedure in the

courts.[297]

§§ 203-205, recapitulation; §§ 206-212, further incrimination of

Demosthenes, and §§ 213-214, of Ctesiphon. §§ 215-229, chiefly

refutation of charges against Aeschines. §§ 230-259, further general

discussion of the illegality of the measure and the unworthiness

of Demosthenes. The final appeal to the past—‘Think you not that

Themistocles and the heroes who fell at Marathon and Plataea, and the

very graves of our ancestors, will groan aloud if a crown is to be

granted to one who concerts with the barbarians for the ruin of Greece?’

ends abruptly and grotesquely with an invocation to ‘Earth and Sun and

Virtue and Intelligence and Education, through which we distinguish

between the noble and the base.’

It reminds us strangely of the invocations put into the mouth of

Euripides by Aristophanes.[298]

The Greek orators · 第 8 / 12 章