A MACHIAVELLIAN TRICK BY WHICH RUSSIA'S HAND WAS FORCED
The world is now aware, although it can hardly be said to realize, how
closely journalism approaches to being a recognized organ of the
Imperial German Government. One of the most influential of the Berlin
journals during the past ten years has been the _Lokal-Anzeiger_. This
paper was founded by Herr Scherl, one of those clever enterprising
business men who have been so numerous, active and successful in the
Fatherland during the past quarter of a century. His journal was a
purely business concern, carried on congruously with the law of supply
and demand and keeping pace with the shifting requirements of the
public and the strongest currents in the Government. It had long
enjoyed the reputation of being a semi-official organ, and it was Herr
Scherl's ambition that it should be formally promoted to that rank. In
February 1914 he sold the paper to a group of four persons, two of
whom were Herr Schorlmeyer and Count T. Winckler, and all four were
members of the political party which looked for light and leading to
the Crown Prince and his military environment. Thus the
_Lokal-Anzeiger_ became the organ of the progressive military party,
which was exerting itself to the utmost to force the pace of the
Government towards the one consummation from which the realization of
Germany's dream of world-power was confidently expected. Among the
privileges accorded to the _Lokal-Anzeiger_ from the date of its
purchase for the behoof of the Crown Prince onward, was that of
publishing official military news before all other papers, and not
later even than the _Militaer-Wochenblatt_. Consequently, it thus
became the most trustworthy source of military news in the Empire.
This fact is worth bearing in mind, for the sake of the light which it
diffuses on what follows.
War being foreseen and arranged for, much careful thought was bestowed
on the staging of the last act of the diplomatic drama in such a way
as to create abroad an impression favourable to Germany. The scheme
finally hit upon was simple. Russia was to be confronted with a
dilemma which would force her into an attitude that would stir
misgivings even in her friends and drive a wedge between her and her
ally or else would involve her complete withdrawal from the Balkans.
The latter alternative would have contented Germany for the moment,
who would then have dispensed with a breach of the peace. For it would
have enabled the two Central Empires to weld together the Balkan
States and Turkey in a powerful federation under their joint
protectorate, and would not only have simplified Germany's remaining
task, but have supplied her with adequate means of accomplishing it
against Russia and France combined. Great Britain's neutrality was
postulated as a matter of course.
Congruously with this plan, Russia was from the very outset declared
to be the Power on which alone depended the outcome of the crisis.
Upon her decision hung peace and war. On July 24, telegraphing from
Vienna, I announced this on the highest authority,[52] with a degree
of force and clearness which left no room for doubt as to the aims,
intentions and preliminary accords of the two Central Empires. I
stated that if in the course of the Austro-Serbian quarrel Russia were
to mobilize, Germany would at once answer by general mobilization and
war. For there will, then, I added, be no demobilization but an armed
conflict. Before making that grave announcement, I had had convincing
assurances and proofs that I was setting forth an absolute and
irrevocable decision arrived at by the Central Empires on grounds
wholly alien to the interests and issues which were then engaging the
Austrian and Serbian Governments, and that a bellicose mood had gained
a firm hold on the minds of the statesmen of Berlin and Vienna. Had
that deliberate statement been subjected to adequate instead of the
ordinary partial tests, the full significance of the crisis would have
been realized by the Governments of the Entente.
[52] On 24th July I received this official information. It
was published on Monday, 27th.
In the course of the negotiations which were then hastily improvised,
Germany, who strove hard to gain credit for the role of disinterested
peacemaker, gradually revealed herself as the chief protagonist,
whereas Austria was little more than a pawn in the game. Disguising
her eagerness to provoke one of the two desired solutions, Russia's
abandonment of Serbia or her declaration of war, Germany succeeded in
misleading the Governments of France and Britain as to her real
intentions.
While M. Poincare was in the Russian capital proposing toasts and
drawing roseate forecasts of the future, the German Ambassador in
Paris, von Schoen, was constantly in attendance at the Quai d'Orsay,
endeavouring to impress on the minds of the Acting Minister and the
permanent officials there, the sincerity of the Kaiser's eagerness for
peace and the growing danger of Russia's aggressiveness. "You and we,"
he kept saying, "are the only Continental Governments which are aware
of the magnitude of the issues and the imminence of the danger. You
and we perceive the utter folly, the sheer criminality, of plunging
Europe in the horrors of a sanguinary war for the sake of a petty
state governed by regicides and assassins. What interests have you or
we to risk the welfare of our respective nations for the behoof of the
Serbian military party whose dreams of greatness border on mania? No,
it behoves us both to do all that lies in us to calm Russia's passion
and induce her to listen to the promptings of reason and
self-interest. You, with the powerful influence which your friendship
and alliance impart to your counsels, and we by dint of example, ought
to succeed in averting this awful peril." In this tone, Herr von Schoen
delivered his daily exhortations and found some willing listeners. His
specious pleading made a deep and favourable impression, and would
perhaps have led to representations by the French Government
calculated to wound the susceptibilities and perhaps estrange the
sympathies of France's ally at the most critical hour of the alliance,
had it not been for the presence at the Foreign Office of a man whose
eye was sure and whose measurement of forces, political and personal,
was accurate. That man was M. Berthelot. Gauging aright this
insidious appeal to the centrifugal forces of the political mind, he
turned a deaf ear to von Schoen's suasive efforts and kept the ship of
state on its course, without swerving. In this way what seemed to the
Berlin politicians the line of least resistance was adequately
reinforced and a formidable, because crafty, attack repulsed.
But besides attack, the Germans had also a problem of defence to
engage their attention. And, curiously enough, it appears to have been
particularly knotty in Austria. At that moment Count Berchtold was
Minister of Foreign Affairs in name, but Count Tisza, the Hungarian
Premier, was the man who thought, planned and acted for the Habsburg
Monarchy. He it was who had drawn up the ultimatum to Serbia and made
all requisite arrangements for co-operation with Germany. He was
backed by the Chief of the General Staff, Konrad von Hoetzendorff,
whose eagerness to provide an opportunity for displaying the martial
qualities of the army was proverbial. But there were others in high
places there who had no wish to see the Dual Monarchy drawn into a
European war, and who would gladly have come to an agreement with
Russia on the basis of such a compromise as Serbia's reply to the
ultimatum promised to afford. Whether, as seems very probable, this
current bade fair to gain the upper hand, it is still too soon to
determine with finality. There are certainly many indications that
this was one of the dangers apprehended in Berlin. Russia's moderation
was another. And the interplay of the two might, had Germany held
aloof, have led to a compromise. For this reason Germany did not stand
aloof.
The date fixed for the German mobilization was July 31. The evidence
for this is to be found in the date printed on the official order
which was posted up in the streets of Berlin, but was crossed out and
replaced by the words "1st of August," in writing, as there was no
time to reprint the text. It had been expected in Berlin that Russia
would have taken a decision by July 30, either mobilizing or knuckling
down. Neither course, however, had been adopted. Thereupon Germany
became nervous and went to work in the following way.
On Thursday, July 30, at 2.25 p.m. a number of newspaper boys appeared
in the streets of Berlin adjoining the Unter den Linden and called out
lustily: "_Lokal-Anzeiger_ Supplement. Grave News. Mobilization
ordered throughout the Empire." Windows were thrown wide open and
stentorian voices called for the Supplement. The boys were surrounded
by eager groups, who bought up the stock of papers and then eagerly
discussed the event that was about to change and probably to end the
lives of many of the readers. It does not appear that the Supplement
was sold anywhere outside that circumscribed district. Now in that
part of the town was situated Wolff's Press Bureau, where the official
representatives of Havas and the Russian Telegraphic Agency sat and
worked.
The correspondent of the latter agency, having read the announcement
of the _Lokal-Anzeiger_, which was definitive and admitted of no
doubt, at once telephoned the news to his Ambassador, M. Zverbeieff.
During the conversation that ensued the correspondent was requested by
the officials of the telephone to speak in German, not in Russian.
This was an unusual procedure. The Ambassador could hardly credit the
tidings, so utterly were they at variance with the information which
he possessed. He requested the correspondent to repeat the contents of
the announcement, and then inquired: "Can I, in your opinion,
telegraph it to the Foreign Office?" The answer being an emphatic
affirmative, the Ambassador despatched a message in cypher to this
effect to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs. For there could be
no doubt about the accuracy of information thus deliberately given to
the public by the journal which possessed a monopoly of military news
and was the organ of the Crown Prince. The Russian correspondent also
forwarded a telegram to the Telegraphic Agency in Petrograd
communicating the fateful tidings.
Within half an hour the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs telephoned
to Wolff's Bureau to the effect that the report about the mobilization
order was not in harmony with fact, and it also summoned the
_Lokal-Anzeiger_ to issue a contradiction of the news on its own
account. This was duly done, and so rapidly that the second Supplement
was issued at about 3 p.m. The explanation given by the newspaper
staff was that they were expecting an order for general mobilization
and had prepared a special Supplement announcing it. This Supplement
was unfortunately left where the vendors saw it, and thinking that it
was meant for circulation seized on all the copies they could find,
rushed into the streets and sold them. On many grounds, however, this
account is unsatisfactory. Copies of a newspaper supplement containing
such momentous news are not usually left where they can be found,
removed and sold by mere street vendors. Moreover, the date, July 30,
was printed on the supplement, so that it was evidently meant to be
issued, as a matter of fact it was circulated only in a very limited
number of copies and in the streets around Wolff's Bureau, where it
was certain to produce the desired effect.
Half an hour later the correspondent of the Russian Agency received a
request to call at the General Telegraph Office at once. On his
arrival he was asked to withdraw his two telegrams which the Censor
refused to transmit. To his plea that so far as he knew there was no
censorship in Germany he received the reply that it had just been
instituted and now declined to pass his telegrams. "In that case," he
said, "my consent is of no importance, seeing that the matter is
already decided." Finally, he asked to have his messages returned to
him, but they would consent only to his reading, not to his retaining,
them.
The Russian Ambassador also despatched an urgent _message en clair_ to
his Government embodying the contradiction communicated by the
Wilhelmstrasse.
Now, the significant circumstance is that the Ambassador's first
telegram stating that general mobilization had been officially ordered
throughout the German Empire was forwarded with speed and accuracy and
reached the Russian Foreign Minister without delay. And this news was
communicated to the Tsar, who by way of counter-measure issued the
order to mobilize the forces of the Russian Empire. But the
Ambassador's second telegram was held back several hours and did not
reach its destination until the mischief was irremediable. That
curious incident is of a piece with the Bismarck's Ems telegram.
It is by such devices that the German Government is wont to launch
into war. The mentality whence they spring cannot be discarded in a
year or a generation, nor will any Peace Treaty, however ingeniously
worded, prevent recourse being had to them in the future. For this,
among other reasons, more trustworthy guarantees than scraps of paper
must be sought and found.