was governor at the time of the elevation of Nujum-ud-Dowla, and
participated in the money[237] that was distributed on that occasion.
These presents have been justly arraigned, as furnishing powerful motives
to the Company's servants for making revolutions by which they were
enriched; and it is one of the heaviest charges against Clive, that his
example was the origin of this baneful practice. The fact is not disputed;
but it happened in this case, as in most others, where small men attempt
to imitate great, that they reach only the defects, and fail in every
other part.
The princely presents which Clive merited and received were the rewards of
great services rendered to the parties by whom they were given, and in
which his first efforts were prompted by considerations that were
decidedly uninfluenced by sordid motives. Add to this, that whatever he
undertook prospered, and that all the individuals whom he elevated he
preserved, not only from their native enemies, but from the still more
galling encroachments and rapacity of the Company's servants. By such acts
he won the good opinion of all ranks in India. From the King to the
peasant the name of Clive inspired sentiments of respect and confidence.
What a contrast was presented by his successors in power! Money for
themselves was, in every engagement, one of the stipulations, and
_appeared_, though in some cases it might not have _been_, the leading
motive of their measures. All their measures failed: every one connected
with them was ruined. The character for good faith, which at Clive's
departure stood so high, was lost. No one trusted the word of an
Englishman. Many of those who engaged in these scenes were able and
virtuous; but there was no leading genius among them. The jealousy and
party spirit that pervaded the government at home multiplied checks and
cherished insubordination in those abroad; till nothing was heard but
accusations and recriminations.
The army, both European and native, had fallen into a very insubordinate
and mutinous state. The officers evinced this spirit on almost every
occasion where they deemed their personal interests affected; and many of
the privates deserted to the native powers. A most serious mutiny occurred
at the period when Major Munro took the command of the army[238] at Patna.
A battalion of sepoys left camp to join the enemy: they were intercepted
by a body of troops, and twenty-four of the ringleaders were brought
before a native court-martial, and sentenced to death. They were all
executed; and we are informed by an officer who was present, that an
incident occurred on this occasion, which not only created a great
sensation at the moment, but left a lasting impression on the native
soldiers of Bengal, being truly characteristic of their proud and
dauntless spirit.
When the orders were given to tie four of these men to the guns, from
which they were to be blown, four grenadiers stept out and demanded the
priority of suffering, as "a right," they said, "which belonged to men who
had always been first in the post of danger." The calm manner in which
this request was made, and the anxiety that it should be granted, excited
great sympathy in all who beheld it. The officer[239] on whose authority
this fact is stated, and who was an eye-witness of the scene, observes; "I
belonged on this occasion to a detachment of marines. They were hardened
fellows, and some of them had been of the execution party that shot
Admiral Byng; yet they could not refrain from tears at the fate and
conduct of these gallant grenadier sepoys."
When a strong sense of imminent danger, and a fear of total ruin to the
affairs of the Company and of the English nation in Bengal, excited
universal attention and alarm, all eyes were naturally turned on Clive, as
the only human being who could restore the reputation and interests of
this nation in India. He was in consequence, as has been stated, called
upon to proceed once more to that country, and he had courage to obey the
call, though convinced that the scene presented difficulties which were
almost insurmountable, and that he would have to perform duties that were
personally invidious, and calculated not only to interrupt but to destroy
all his prospects of future enjoyment.
There can be no doubt that Clive, in consenting, under such circumstances,
to return to India, was chiefly, if not solely, actuated by an honourable
ambition, and by an ardent desire to promote the interests and glory of
his country. His first stipulation, however, was, that his stay should be
limited to a very short period; and he pledged himself (and the pledge, as
will be shown hereafter, was nobly redeemed) not to enrich himself one
farthing by any pay or emoluments he might receive from the high station
to which he was nominated.
Though Clive had been restrained by many considerations, as well as by the
rapidity of events, from taking personally any decided part in the
disputes in Bengal, he had not been an unconcerned observer of those
scenes. Each party had addressed him with an equal solicitude that he
should approve and support them; but we do not meet in his private
correspondence with any full expression of his sentiments. He regretted,
it appears from his letters, the removal of Meer Jaffier from the throne;
but uninformed of the minute circumstances that had produced that measure,
he did not withdraw his confidence in the wisdom of the administration of
one, whom he so highly valued as Mr. Vansittart, till he saw him depart
step by step from all those maxims of policy he had laid down as the rules
of his own conduct, both in regard to native princes and other men of rank
and consequence in India.
The opposition of his views to those of his successor, as well as his own
difficulties, are clearly expressed in a letter he wrote to the Court of
Directors immediately before his embarkation.
"In obedience to your commands," Lord Clive observes[240], "I now transmit
the purport of what I had the honour to represent to you by word of mouth
at the last Court of Directors, with some other particulars which slipped
my memory at that time.
"Having taken into consideration your letter sent me by the Secretary, as
also the request of the General Court of Proprietors, I think myself bound
in honour to accept the charge of your affairs in Bengal, provided you
will co-operate with, and assist me in such a manner that I may be able to
answer the expectations and intentions of the General Court.
"As an individual, I can have no temptation to undertake this arduous
task, and nothing but the desire I have to be useful to my country, and to
manifest my gratitude to this Company, could make me embark in this
service, attended as it is with so many inconveniences to myself and my
family. I cannot avoid acknowledging that I quit my native country with
some degree of regret and diffidence, on leaving behind me (as I certainly
do) a very divided and distracted Direction, at a time, too, when
unanimity is more than ever requisite for the carrying into execution such
plans as are absolutely necessary to the well-being of the Company.
"I shall now enter into a short discussion of your political, commercial,
and military affairs in Bengal. Without searching into the causes of the
unhappy revolution in favour of Cossim Ali Khan, I shall only remark, that
if the same plan of politics had been pursued, after he was placed upon
the throne, as that which I had observed towards his predecessor, he might
with great ease have remained there to this day, without having it in his
power to injure either himself or the Company in the manner he has lately
done. Indeed, Mr. Vansittart's ideas in politics have differed so widely
from mine, that either the one or the other must have been totally in the
wrong. Soon after Cossim Ali Khan was raised to his new dignity, he was
suffered to retire to a very great distance from his capital, that our
influence might be felt and dreaded as little as possible by him:—he was
suffered to dismiss all those old officers who had any connection with, or
dependence upon us; and, what was the worst of all, our faithful friend
and ally, Ram Narrain, the Nabob of Patna, was given up; the doctrine of
the Subadar's independency was adopted, and every method was put in
practice to confirm him in it. We need seek for no other causes of the
war, for it is now some time that things have been carried to such lengths
abroad, that either the princes of the country must, in a great measure,
be dependent on us, or we totally so on them.[241] That the public and
continued disapprobation of Cossim Ali Khan's advancement to the
government, expressed by the gentlemen of Calcutta, increased the Nabob's
jealousy, is most true; and that it was the duty of every one, after the
revolution was once effected, to concur heartily in every measure to
support it, cannot be denied. It is likewise true, that the encroachments
made upon the Nabob's prescriptive rights by the Governor and Council, and
the rest of the servants trading in the articles of salt, beetle, and
tobacco, together with the power given by Mr. Vansittart to subject our
gomastahs (or agents) to the jurisdiction and inspection of the country
government, all concurred to hasten and bring on the late troubles; but
still the groundwork of the whole was the Nabob's independency. It is
impossible to rely on the moderation and justice of Mussulmen. Strict and
impartial justice should ever be observed; but let that justice come from
ourselves. The trade, therefore, of salt, betle, and tobacco having been
one cause of the present disputes, I hope these articles will be restored
to the Nabob, and your servants absolutely forbid to trade in them. This
will be striking at the root of the evil. The prohibition of dustucks to
your junior servants will, I hope, tend to restore that economy which is
so necessary in your service. Indeed, if some method be not thought of,
and your Council do not heartily co-operate with your Governor to prevent
the sudden acquisition of fortunes, which has taken place of late, the
Company's affairs must greatly suffer. What power it may be proper to vest
me with, to remedy those great and growing evils, will merit your serious
consideration. As a means to alleviate in some measure the dissatisfaction
that such restrictions upon the commercial advantages of your servants may
occasion in them, it is my full intention not to engage in any kind of
trade myself; so that they will divide amongst them what used to be the
Governor's portion of commercial advantages, which was always very
considerable."
Clive then proceeds to offer some observations upon the state of the
Company's military affairs in Bengal; and suggests the necessity of
keeping up an European force of four, or, at least, three thousand
men.[242] While he pays a just tribute to the high character of the Indian
army, and to the honour they had gained by their gallant exploits, he
laments the want of due obedience and subordination, so essential to the
interests of the service. To remedy this (which was rendered more
necessary by the removal of the King's troops at this time), he recommends
an immediate increase of field officers; and points out to the Court the
different individuals, who, from their character and services, had the
strongest claims upon their notice.
"I would recommend," he observes, "the appointing three field officers to
every battalion, a colonel, lieutenant-colonel, and major; and the
officers I would choose to command the battalions should be Majors Carnac,
Richard Smith, and Preston. You have already done justice to Major
Carnac's character by reinstating him in the command of your forces in
Bengal, and by acknowledging his services in the most public manner. This
gentleman will, I flatter myself, stand as high in your esteem as
Brigadier General Caillaud; and will, I hope, have the same rank and
appointments. The military merits of the other two gentlemen you are
likewise well acquainted with, having both received from the Court marks
of approbation for their distinguished services. To command your artillery
I would recommend Sir Robert Barker, whose abilities in that department
have been exceeded by no officer that ever was in your service. Your
sepoys are already commanded by Major Knox, whose merits I could wish to
have rewarded with a lieutenant-colonel's commission. Your horse, when
raised, should be commanded by a lieutenant-colonel, or major.
"I have very strong reasons to wish this idea of regimenting your troops
may take place; for without such a subordination I shall not be able to
enforce your orders for the reduction of your military expenses, which
have been a constant dead-weight, and have swallowed up your revenues. I
could wish, that whatever emoluments are unavoidable may fall to those few
who, having been long, are high in your service, whether civil or
military. Thus will the expense be scarce felt by the Company, in
comparison to what it is at present, when, for want of due subordination,
every one thinks himself entitled to every advantage; and the juniors in
your service be excited to exert themselves, from a certain knowledge that
application and abilities only can restore them to their native country
with fortunes honourably acquired."
In concluding the subject of military affairs, Clive submits to the
consideration of the Court his ideas and opinions on the proper mode of
levying troops in England. The method pursued at this period he considered
to be, in many respects, objectionable. In order that due attention might
be paid to the selection of recruits, and to insure, at all times, a
proper supply of efficient men, to meet any unexpected demands that might
arise in cases of sudden emergency, he suggests, that the Company should
apply to his Majesty for permission to maintain two battalions, of five
hundred men each, in England, with a proper proportion of officers; and,
as a reward to the important services of Colonel Coote and Colonel Forde,
he recommends that these two officers should be nominated to command them.
Clive appears to have referred much of the spirit of opposition that arose
in Bengal to the jealousy among the public servants of that presidency of
appointments, which they deemed supersessions, of civilians from Madras
and Bombay, to be governors of Bengal.
"The heart-burnings and disputes," he observes, "which seem to have spread
and overrun your settlement of Calcutta, arose, I must fear, originally,
from your appointment of Mr. Vansittart to the government of Bengal from
another settlement; although his promotion was the effect of my
recommendation. The appointment, therefore, of Mr. Spencer, from Bombay,
can only tend to inflame these dissensions, and to destroy all those
advantages which the Company only can expect from harmony and unanimity
amongst their servants abroad. The resignation of Messrs. Verelst,
Cartier, and many others of the senior servants, which must be the
consequence of Mr. Spencer's appointment, will deprive me of those very
gentlemen on whose assistance I depend for re-establishing your affairs in
Bengal."
The following letter from Clive relates to the same subjects, and contains
too many sound observations and wise reflections upon the actual state of
the affairs of India at this period to be omitted. Though the Court of
Directors did not comply with the wish of Clive, that he should have the
power (since vested in Indian governors) of acting, when occasion
demanded, upon his own responsibility, they did what was almost
tantamount,—they vested the power required in a select committee[243],
composed of persons from whom he had no opposition to apprehend, and who
were competent to all acts of administration, independent of the other
members of Council.
"I shall not enter," Clive observes, "into the motives which caused the
deposition of Meer Jaffier, nor into the fundamental cause of the present
war with Cossim Ali Khan. It is sufficient to say, that these two events
have lost us all the confidence of the natives. To restore this, ought to
be our principal object; and the best means will, in my opinion, be by
establishing a moderation in the advantages which may be reserved for the
Company, or allotted to individuals in their service.
"If ideas of conquest were to be the rule of our conduct, I foresee that
we should, by necessity, be led from acquisition to acquisition, until we
had the whole empire up in arms against us; and whilst we lay under the
great disadvantage of fighting without a single ally, (for who could wish
us well?) the natives, left without European allies, would find, in their
own resources, means of carrying on war against us in a much more
soldierly manner than they ever thought of when their reliance on European
allies encouraged their natural indolence. The last battle fought against
Cossim Ali Khan is a proof of this assertion, for never did the troops of
India fight so well.
"Nothing, therefore, but extreme necessity, ought to induce us to extend
our ideas of territorial acquisitions beyond the amount of those ceded by
Cossim Ali Khan, in his treaty with Vansittart. This necessity can only
arise from finding that nobody will trust us; and that the people of the
country are determined to try their strength with us to the utmost.
"But by this system of moderation it is not intended that the Nabob should
be left entirely independent of us. The moment he fancies himself in this
situation he will look upon us as enemies who have taken too much from
him, and whom it will be necessary, either to reduce to our ancient state
of mere merchants, or to extirpate. This, therefore, was the error of Mr.
Vansittart's conduct: he advised the Nabob to regulate his treasury, save
money, to form and discipline an excellent army, and to pay them well and
regularly, contrary to the practice of all the princes of India. By
following this advice punctually, Cossim Ali, in two years, thought
himself in a condition to bid us defiance, and was near being so.
"It ought, therefore, to be our plan to convince the Nabob that our troops
are his best, his only support against foreign enemies; and that our
friendship will be his best support against the plots and revolutions of
his own officers. Necessitated, by the extent of his dominions, to repose
large governments and great trusts in particular men, jealousies will be
perpetually subsisting. On the nice and disinterested management of these
will depend our importance. The principal officers must be convinced that
we will protect them from any capricious violences of their sovereign;
and, on the other hand, the Nabob must be convinced, that we will give
them up to his just resentment the moment their ambition alone leads them
to strike at him.
"To carry this balance with an even hand, the strictest integrity will be
necessary in every one who shall have a vote in your councils abroad. I
found myself every day assaulted by large offers of presents, from the
principal men of the province, not to support the Nabob in resolutions
contrary to their interests; and from the Nabob, to sacrifice them to his
capricious resentments.
"But even this conduct alone will not be sufficient to keep us from giving
umbrage. During Mr. Vansittart's government, all your servants thought
themselves entitled to take large shares in the monopolies of salt,
beetle, and tobacco, the three articles, next to grain, of greatest
consumption in the empire. The odium of seeing such monopolies in the
hands of foreigners need not be insisted on; but this is not the only
inconvenience: it is productive of another, equally, if not more
prejudicial to the Company's interests; it enables many of your servants
to obtain, very suddenly, fortunes greater than those which in former
times were thought a sufficient reward for a long continuance in your
service. Hence these gentlemen, thus suddenly enriched, think of nothing
but of returning to enjoy their fortunes in England, and leave your
affairs in the hands of young men, whose sanguine expectations are
inflamed by the examples of those who have just left them.
"This, therefore, will be the greatest difficulty which I shall have to
encounter; to persuade, or, if necessary, to oblige your servants to be
content with advantages much inferior to those which, by the prescription
of some years, they may think themselves entitled to. Yet if this is not
done, your affairs can never be settled on a judicious and permanent plan.
My fortunes, my family, and the other advantages I may be possessed of,
will naturally make me wish to accomplish my intentions for the Company's
service abroad as soon as possible, that I may return to my native
country, which, it cannot be imagined, that I quit without some regrets;
but if I should meet in your councils abroad men whom private interest may
render averse to my maxims, I shall, perhaps, instead of settling your
affairs as may be expected from me, find myself harassed and over-ruled in
every measure by a majority against me in council.
"It therefore rests with the Court of Directors to consider, seriously,
whether they should not intrust me with a dispensing power in the civil
and political affairs; so that whensoever I may think proper to take any
resolution entirely upon myself that resolution is to take place. The
French Company gave Mr. Godeheu sole and absolute control over all their
settlements to the east of the Cape of Good Hope, at a time when their
affairs were not in a worse condition than ours are at present. In India
we ourselves have had examples of supervisors. I myself was intrusted with
great powers by the gentlemen of Madras, when I went down to Bengal
against Suraj-u-Dowlah: the use which I made of these powers will, I hope,
justify my opinion, that I may, without danger, be intrusted with an
authority so highly necessary at present. The occasions of exerting it
will rarely happen, but will certainly happen at times, when all may be
lost for want of it. Moderation, I will venture to say, was always a part
of my character in political concerns; and as a means to induce the
gentlemen abroad to contract their views of private advantage within the
bounds essentially necessary to the interests of the Company, the first
step I shall take will be, to give up to them every commercial advantage,
as I did during my last residence in Bengal. I need not mention that these
advantages are, to a Governor, great, and adequate to his station.
"To prevent dissensions, I am willing to receive a military commission
inferior to General Lawrence's; but that gentleman has received from the
Court of Directors so very extensive a power over all their forces in
India, that the presidency, at which he resides, is, in fact, little less
than the residence of a Governor-general over all your settlements in
India. If ever the appointment of such an officer as Governor-general
should become necessary, it is evident that he ought to be established in
Bengal, as the greatest weight of your civil, commercial, political, and
military affairs will always be in that province. It cannot, therefore, be
expected that I should be subject to have any part of the military forces
allotted for that province recalled or withheld from me at the will of an
officer in another part of India; or that even the presence of that
officer in Bengal should, in any way, interfere with my military authority
in that province. It will likewise be necessary (at least until affairs in
Bengal are restored to perfect tranquillity) that whatever troops,
treasures, or other consignments may be destined from England to that
presidency, shall not, as usual, be stopped and employed by any of the
other presidencies at which they may chance to arrive in their passage
towards the Ganges."