European force superior to that of the English, the Nabob appeared to
falter in his resolution. He had paid Clive a visit at Calcutta, and on
his return (as stated in the narrative) saw the principal persons of the
Dutch settlement at Chinsura; but instead of commanding them to send away
their ships (as he had promised) he treated them with such marked favour
and distinction, that Mr. Hastings, who accompanied him, wrote Clive[74],
that every day's transactions confirmed him more and more in his opinion,
that the Nabob was acting a treacherous part.
This communication, added to some suspicious circumstances, determined
Clive to take the strongest measures, with the primary view of recalling
the Nabob to a better understanding of his own interests; and, if that
failed, of counteracting his evil designs. He wrote to Mr. Amyate[75] to
acquaint Ram Narrain of the situation in which affairs stood, that he
might be prepared to act, if occasion required. He also directed Mr. Sykes
to seize the persons of Cajah Wazeed and his son before they reached
Moorshedabad, to which they were proceeding; having had full proof of
their combination with the enemies of the English. Cajah Wazeed has been
before mentioned as the agent of the French. He had for a period
transferred his allegiance to the English; but disappointed of the high
reward he anticipated, had subsequently directed all his influence and
ability (which were considerable) to their overthrow, through the means of
their European rivals. When the French cause appeared hopeless, he had
attached himself to the Dutch, and was no doubt the principal agent of all
their intrigues at the Court of Moorshedabad. The strongest presumptive
proof of Meer Jaffier's concern in this plot, was, the favour and
distinction with which he had recently treated Cajah Wazeed. Though that
person was employed by the Dutch, he was the subject of Meer Jaffier, who,
both on that account, and from his partiality to the man, was likely to
resent his seizure as an indignity and insult. Clive was quite aware of
this feeling, but he thought himself justified by the emergency of the
case. He expected that one of the effects of this decided measure would be
to alarm the Nabob in such a degree, as to arrest his progress in any plan
hostile to the English, in which he might have engaged; and, to add to
this effect, he wrote to Meer Jaffier, disclaiming all future connection
with him, unless he changed his course of action. Clive's object,
throughout this affair, was not to inculpate the Nabob, but to save him
from the consequences of his weakness and want of faith. With a thorough
knowledge of his character, he addressed himself to his fears, and the
result proved the correctness of his judgment. Mr. Hastings writes from
Moorshedabad on the 18th of November:—
"The particulars of my conversation with the old Nabob," he observes, "I
will acquaint you with, after I have seen him again to-morrow. He appeared
(and I am convinced was) extremely disturbed in mind, during the whole
time I was with him. He changed colour upon the receipt of your letter;
and when he had read it, he turned to me and told me, that you had broke
off all connection with him. He declared himself innocent of any deceitful
intention towards you, and offered to give every proof that you could
require of his friendship and sincerity."
In his letter of the 21st of November, Mr. Hastings observes, "Every thing
goes on in this quarter as it ought. The Nabob appears as zealous in the
cause as he was before remiss in it, nor will, I hope, give you any
further cause for complaining, at least in this affair. He has desired me
to endeavour to accommodate the misunderstanding which has risen betwixt
you and him, which office I cannot undertake more effectually than by
assuring you, that I do believe him now to be sincere. I have already
acquainted you fully with what has lately passed, nor need I trouble you
with a repetition of it. The Chuta Nabob[76] has lately written to me upon
the same subject, and has called upon Mr. Sykes and myself to declare how
earnest he was, from the beginning of these troubles, to join you, which I
know to be fact (so far as his word in that instance could be credited),
and Mr. Sykes' letters to you will sufficiently testify the same.
"The firmness which you have shown, and your resentment of the Nabob's
cold behaviour, have had every effect that could be wished for; and pardon
me, Sir, if I offer it as my opinion, that it would be proper so far to
change the style of your letters, as to show that you are satisfied with
his present conduct. The Nabob really wants that encouragement: whenever
you forsake him, his ruin will be inevitable; and he must shut his eyes
against the most glaring conviction, if he does not perceive it himself."
The only subject of complaint Meer Jaffier had now left was the seizure of
Cajah Wazeed, which he was too conscious indicated suspicion of himself.
Mr. Hastings, referring to this feeling, writes to Clive[77]:—
"I had a long conversation with the Nabob yesterday morning; the
particulars I need not acquaint you with, as it consisted of little more
than a repetition of his complaint of the distrust you have shown him. He
mentioned the affair of Cajah Wazeed yesterday, for the first time. I
excused your proceedings therein, from the necessity there was of seizing
him immediately, as he was the prime instigator of these troubles; and it
appeared from the long consultation held between him and the Dutch, the
evening before his departure, and their letter of defiance immediately
following it, that he was going up to strengthen their cause at the city,
where the Nabob was sensible he had many enemies. I added, that though it
was no time to stand upon the strictness of ceremony, when the enemy were
almost at our gates, yet that you had only given orders that Cajah Wazeed
should be seized on the way; but that no attempt should be made upon him,
if he was arrived within the districts of the city of Moorshedabad.
"I believe he was not satisfied with my reasons: he ascribed this event
entirely to your suspicions of himself, which I did not attempt to deny.
"The enclosed letter is in answer to your last. This is the last letter
the Nabob will write, till he hears what your present sentiments are with
respect to himself."
Clive, on receiving these assurances, readily forgave what had passed; and
the Nabob showed every disposition to give his aid. A few of his troops
co-operated in the attack upon the Dutch, but the young Nabob did not
arrive at Hooghley till after the armament had been destroyed.[78]
The strength of the small force which Clive had with him on this occasion
is stated in the narrative. It was divided into parties; some of which
were directed to stop and search the boats of the Dutch coming up the
river, and others to intercept any small bodies of men that might attempt
to reach Chinsura by land. Every line of orders or instructions on this
delicate and alarming occasion appears to have been written by Clive
himself. He, indeed, had at first no person of any distinction to aid him,
till Colonel Forde arrived from Masulipatam. This officer was in bad
health; and accounts had reached Bengal that the Directors had not
confirmed his nomination to the service; but neither indisposition, nor
disgust at this treatment, prevented him from offering his valuable
services to his friend and patron, at a crisis when they were so much
required. His skill and gallantry were alike conspicuous in attacking and
defeating so superior a force. This is shown by the narrative. According
to other accounts, his success was greatly to be attributed to the
position of the enemy at the period of the attack. It is stated upon good
authority, that foreseeing this advantage, but acting with the caution
which the attack upon the troops of a European nation not in a state of
war required, Colonel Forde wrote a note, stating, "that if he had the
Order in Council, he could attack the Dutch, with a fair prospect of
destroying them." Clive, to whom this note was addressed, received it when
playing at cards. Without quitting the table, he wrote an answer in
pencil, "Dear Forde, fight them immediately. I will send you the Order of
Council to-morrow."
Clive appears to have been upon the best footing with several of the
principal inhabitants of Chinsura, particularly their Governor, Mr. Adrian
Bisdom, who, though his name (as he stated) was often and freely used, had
been throughout hostile to the violent proceedings of his countrymen. We
find, indeed, in his letters during these differences, a tone of deep
regret at the violent measures resorted to by both parties, mixed with the
strongest expressions of personal regard for Clive, and gratitude for his
kindness both in his private and official station.[79] We discovered,
also, from his letters to Clive[80], that the large remittances the latter
had made through Batavia or Holland were not settled, and that the Dutch
East India Company were discontented, and had deferred the payment of the
bills, expressing their displeasure at the terms their local government
had granted. The conduct Clive pursued towards their armament was not
likely to make them view any transaction in which he was concerned in a
more favourable light; but the thoughts of himself, or his fortune, had no
weight in a question where the interests of his country were so deeply
involved.
A more critical situation than that in which Clive was placed by the
arrival of the Dutch armament can hardly be conceived. The responsibility
he took upon himself, in determining to oppose it, was great; but his mind
never faltered when the public welfare was to be promoted by his personal
hazard. When some of his friends remonstrated with him on the danger which
he incurred, in opposing, during the existence of peace, the passage of
the armament of a friendly power up the Ganges, he is said to have
answered, that "a public man may occasionally be called upon to act with a
halter round his neck." The inadequacy of his means was to him the most
appalling circumstance; but this was remedied by the wisdom of his plans,
and the vigour of their execution. The moderation he showed after victory
was calculated to allay, as far as possible, that feeling of hostility
which these proceedings must have excited. A very minute investigation of
the whole subject took place in Europe: but the Dutch Local Government, in
the treaty into which they entered with the English, had acknowledged
themselves the aggressors, and Clive had been so cautious in every step he
took, that his conduct could not be impugned; and he received, as he
merited, unqualified approbation for this last act of his government,
which terminated, as it was meant to do, all attempts of the Dutch to
rival the political power of the English in Bengal. Their views in that
country were thenceforward limited to objects of commerce.
By the events (A. D. 1759) narrated in the preceding chapter, Mahommed Ali
Khan, whom the Government of Fort St. George had so long supported, became
the undisputed Nabob of the Carnatic. Salabut Jung, the Soubahdar of the
Deckan, had entered into an alliance with the Company; and his brother
Nizam Ali, who was rising rapidly into power, was most favourably disposed
to cultivate their friendship.
The affairs of the small but important settlement of Bombay appeared as
prosperous as those of Madras. Surat, one of the principal sea-ports and
richest towns on the western side of India, had fallen into decay, as the
power of the Mogul government declined. This city, independent of its
wealth, had great value with the Mahommedans, from being the port at which
the pilgrims annually assembled on their way to the sacred tombs of their
prophet or of his descendants. The Emperor furnished the vessel which
conveyed to Jidda (a port in the Red Sea) those pilgrims who went to
Mecca. The convoy of this vessel, as well as the protection of the
commerce of Surat, had been for some time intrusted to the chief of
Jinjeera, who was styled the Admiral of the Emperor, and had, in virtue of
that office, an assignment on the revenues of Surat, amounting to the sum
of three lacs of rupees per annum. On the ground of this amount not being
regularly paid Seedee Massoud, the ruling chief of Jinjeera, had first
seized the castle of Surat, and afterwards greatly encroached upon the
other local authorities of that place. He died in 1756; and his son not
only retained this usurpation, but demanded one third of the revenues of
the city; another third was paid to the Mahrattas, as the price of their
abstaining from hostilities, and the remaining third was divided among
those officers who governed in the name of the Emperor of Delhi.
This division of authority, together with the intrigues and disputes to
which it gave rise, was ruinous to the prosperity of the town, and
attended with continual alarm and danger to the inhabitants. The English
factory, which had been settled at Surat for a century and a half,
suffered considerably during this distracted state of affairs, and the
Government of Bombay, consequently, listened with approbation to an
overture made by the principal officers and merchants of Surat, inviting
them to take the castle, to expel the Seedee, and on receiving an
assignment of two lacs of rupees, to become the future protectors of the
commerce of the port. An expedition was sent, which, after a short
opposition from the Seedee, completely succeeded; and the garrison of the
castle were compelled to surrender to the English, who acted throughout
with the sanction and aid of the officers of the Emperor.
An account of the events which had occurred was sent by Mr. Spencer (the
chief of Surat) to Delhi; from whence he obtained sunnuds[81], or deeds,
appointing the English Company governors of Surat Castle, and admirals of
the Emperor's fleet, and granting them an assignment upon the revenues of
the city for two lacs of rupees per annum.
These events added both to the strength and the fame of the settlement of
Bombay, and rendered it better able to cope with its predatory neighbours
the Mahrattas. The principal chiefs of that nation, however, were at this
period more occupied with the affairs of the northern than of the western
parts of India.
Alumgeer the Second was still the Emperor of Delhi; but he continued a
prisoner in the hands of his ambitious minister, who, himself surrounded
by Mahratta armies, and expecting another invasion of the Affghauns,
exercised but a precarious authority. The Shah-Zada was still in a state
of hostility; and having lately received countenance from the ruler of
Oude, he again threatened with invasion the territories of Bahar. This
danger would not appear to have been considered serious by Clive: but he
was very uneasy regarding the internal state of Bengal; and the last
months of his stay in India were devoted to arrangements for securing its
tranquillity.
The treasury of the Nabob had been exhausted by the great sums he had paid
as the price of his elevation. His extravagance, that of his son, and,
above all, the maintenance of large bodies of useless troops, aggravated
his distress. The slave of habit, and devoid of energy, Meer Jaffier was
incapable of remedying his condition, which became daily more
embarrassing. The conduct of his son, also, alarmed him; and from his
communications to Mr. Hastings, it evidently appeared that he sometimes
thought the impatient ambition of Meeran would lead him to accelerate, by
an act of violence, the hour of his succession. Yet, notwithstanding the
urgent advice of Clive[82], he would neither diminish the troops of his
son, nor cease to employ him in situations which were calculated to
increase his influence, and add to his power. The Nabob disliked the
superiority and influence of Clive, but he certainly was personally
attached to him.[83] He regarded him with the same dread and apprehension
which a wayward scholar bears his preceptor. Though he feared his anger,
he had complete reliance on his justice and good faith, and from habit
looked to him with hopes of every consideration that was possible for his
errors and weakness. With such sentiments, he was alarmed at the near
prospect of Clive's departure; and his feeling affords strong presumptive
proof, that, into whatever intrigues or plots Jaffier had been hurried or
led, he could not, at this period, have deliberately contemplated any plan
of hostility against the English power. If he had harboured any such
scheme, it is quite evident that Clive's quitting the scene was the only
event that could give it the least prospect of success.
The chief cause which alarmed Meer Jaffier and other natives of rank at
the intended departure of Clive was the fear of his successor not
exercising the same authority in checking and controlling the subordinate
officers of their government. They feared, and with reason, that spirit of
contemptuous superiority, which the extraordinary and sudden rise of the
English in Bengal had engendered among many of the Europeans in the
service of the Company, and still more the assumed influence and power of
the natives in their employment.
The Nabob and his chief managers had, notwithstanding Clive's efforts, too
great reason to complain of the insolent pretensions and fraudulent
practices of Gomastahs (or agents) employed by the gentlemen in office at
Calcutta, and in different parts of the country. Many of Clive's public
and private letters convey his sentiments very strongly upon this subject;
and from one of them we learn, that he had punished most severely a native
in his own service, for using his name as a sanction to some abuses. This
afforded him an opportunity, of which he availed himself, of stating to
the Committee of Fort William, the great importance of continued and
vigilant attention to a point, upon which the temper and good feeling of
their ally and his principal subjects must so much depend.
The alarm at Clive's return to England was not limited to the natives: all
the first civil servants, Mr. Amyatt, Mr. Holwell, Mr. Sykes, Mr.
Hastings, and many others, entreated him to remain some time longer. Their
sentiments are nearly similar. I shall, therefore, content myself with
stating those reasons which Mr. Hastings brought forward in support of his
arguments on this subject.
"I own," Mr. Hastings observes[84], "with great concern I learnt that your
resolution is fixed to return this season to Europe. The disinterested
regard which, without fearing the imputation of flattery, I may declare
you have ever shown for the Company's welfare, convinces me, that you
would not have determined upon this step, were it in the least respect
inconsistent with that principle. Yet permit me, Sir, upon this occasion,
to lay before you such consequences as, from my little experience of the
Durbar affairs, I apprehend may attend your absence.
"I am, and always have been, of opinion, that the Nabob is, both by
interest and inclination, heartily attached to the English; but I think it
as certain that the people about him, especially his Muttaseddies[85] and
the Seits, who are evidently great sufferers by the large acquisitions of
power which the English have obtained in this Government, would gladly use
every possible means to alienate his affections from us. At present, the
personal obligations which he confessedly lies under to you are sufficient
to intimidate them from any open attempts against us; but as your absence
will encourage these people to throw off the mask, and the Nabob is but of
an irresolute and unsettled temper, I don't think it possible that he can
hold out against the united influence of so many evil counsellors, as will
be perpetually instilling into his mind the necessity of reducing the
English power. I am the more apprehensive of their success, from the
expressions which he has frequently made use of, before the late attempt
of the Shah-Zada, intimating that he knew nobody amongst the English but
yourself to whom he had any obligations, and that nothing but his
friendship for you restrained him from retaliating the many insults which
he pretended to have received from the English.
"As there is nobody to succeed you with the same influence, and other
advantages which you possess, nothing but a large military force will
secure our privileges from being encroached upon, as soon as you quit the
country; not to mention the dangers we are threatened with from our
natural enemies the French, which, by your resignation of the service,
will be doubled upon us, and in which it is very probable the Nabob will
stand neuter. I believe I mentioned to you already, that, in conversation
with one of the Nabob's principal confidants, a day or two before I went
down to Calcutta, he inadvertently dropped, that the French had made some
overtures towards an accommodation with the Nabob through his means, and
seemed, by his discourse, to wish that it might be brought about; but
whether he spoke his own sentiments only, or the Nabob's, I could not
judge, as he would not explain himself further upon the subject. This
much, indeed, he added, that the proposal was at that time rejected. I do
not advance this as an argument that the Nabob is inclinable to favour the
French; but I think it would not be difficult to persuade him, that it
would be for his interest to suffer the French to come into his country
again, both for the increase of his revenues (a very prevailing argument)
and to balance the power of the English; and with regard to his engagement
by the treaty to succour the English against their enemies; I don't
apprehend it will be any further binding, than as it is for his advantage
to abide by it.
"Of the great consequence which a junction of the country forces would
prove to us in case of an invasion from the French, I would not presume to
say any thing in an address to you. If the French attempt any thing
against Bengal before your departure, I think I can answer for the Nabob's
readiness to assist you against them; but that he will exert himself as
zealously in our favour when you are gone, I greatly doubt.
"I know not in what light you may regard the proposal lately made from
Delhi, or whether the consideration of the further advantages that may
result from a nearer connection with that Court (in which your
intervention appears of indispensable necessity) deserve to be thrown into
the scale; though I must own it is my opinion, that nothing can contribute
so much to establish the power of the English in this country on the most
solid and lasting foundation as an interest properly established at that
Court.
"Such other arguments as might be produced for the necessity of your stay,
till affairs are a little more settled in this country, not coming
properly under my province, I shall pass over; nor should I have troubled
you with so much on this subject, but that, as these reflections have been
suggested to me by my particular employ at the Durbar, I thought they
might not so readily occur to, or carry the same weight with, any other
person; to which I may add, that, as I have in common with the whole
settlement an interest in your stay amongst us, I have a particular one
from the difficulties which I well foresee will attend me in my present
situation, as soon as I lose your influence."
Clive's correspondence at this period contains the fullest evidence, that,
independently of other motives, one great object of his return to England
was the hope of being able, by his personal representations and influence,
to obtain the adoption of measures which he thought calculated to preserve
India. He desired to obtain for the Governors of the three Presidencies
commissions from his Majesty as Major-Generals, in order that their
superior rank might put an end to the pretensions and independent powers
of his Majesty's officers, which had been found, on some occasions,
seriously to impede and injure the public service. He was also anxious, as
he stated in several letters, to arrive in England before peace was
concluded with France.