and the service you have at all times been ready to show them; but give me
leave to observe, Sir, that good offices have always been reciprocal
between the two nations: and, indeed, this is no more than we mutually owe
each other, considering the close alliance and union of interests that
have so long subsisted between us. It gives me, therefore, much concern
that you should do me the injustice to reproach me with being in any shape
accessory to the obstruction which the Subah has thought proper to lay
upon your trade. I have, indeed, heard him make frequent complaints of the
ill behaviour of your government towards him; and was really much amazed
at his patience, in putting up so long with indignities which you would
not have ventured to offer either to Mohabit Jung[69] or Suraj-u-Dowlah. I
shall not pretend to inquire into your reasons for not acknowledging Meer
Jaffier, in the same manner as the preceding Subahs have always been, more
especially as you cannot be ignorant that he has received his sunnud from
the Mogul; but, for my own part, I cannot conceive how you and your
Council will be able to exculpate yourselves to your superiors for the
present stoppage of their trade, since it appears evident to me that you
have brought it upon yourselves, by your disrespect to a person of his
high station."
The act which gave rise to stopping the trade was one of public disrespect
to the Nabob, to whom the Dutch factory did not even pay the compliment of
a salute, when he passed Chinsura on his way to Calcutta. The mode in
which he resented this insult had its full effect. The Governor and
Council of Chinsura made a very humble apology, which was accepted, and
the prohibition on their commerce removed.
The chief complaints of the Dutch against the English were, the latter
having the monopoly of saltpetre at Patna, and their insisting that Dutch
vessels, coming into the river, should take English pilots. To the first
it was answered, that saltpetre had always been a monopoly, and that,
since the English obtained it, the Dutch had even bought the article
cheaper[70] than they had ever done before. With regard to the insisting
upon no pilot being employed in the river but English, it was stated to be
a measure forced on the Committee of Calcutta, by considerations of their
own safety; and that, until the danger was over, they could not allow
those of any other nation to be employed. These facts should have been
satisfactory to the Dutch, could the Superior Government at Batavia have
been contented to abandon, without a struggle, to another European power
the political pre-eminence in India: calculating, however, upon the
encouragement given them at the court of Moorshedabad, previous to the
expedition to Patna, they determined to make a bold effort to establish
such a force at Chinsura as might enable them to balance the predominating
power of the English in Bengal. I find among Clive's papers an account[71]
of this transaction; and as it exhibits, in a very clear manner, the
progress of this serious difference between the two nations, from its
commencement to its conclusion, I shall insert it at length. It is
entitled "A Narrative of the Disputes with the Dutch in Bengal," and is as
follows:—
"About the month of November, 1758, a prevailing party at the Nabob
Jaffier Aly Khan's Durbar, headed by Meeran his son, had prejudiced him to
look with an evil and jealous eye on the power and influence of the
English in the provinces, and taught him to think and look upon himself as
a cipher, bearing the name of Subah only. From subsequent concurring
circumstances, it must have been at that period, and from this cause,
that, we imagine, a private negotiation was set on foot between the Nabob
and the Dutch, that the latter should bring a military force into the
provinces to join the former, and balance our power and sway. The Dutch,
stimulated by envy at our very advantageous situation, and a sense of
their own very small importance, readily embraced the overture, and hoped
another Plassey affair for themselves.
Actuated by these golden dreams, and encouraged by the absence of our
troops on the Golconda expedition, the Director and his Council at
Chinsura forwarded remonstrances to Batavia, for this purpose, where, by
the event, it appears they had the intended effect. Subsequent to this
private negotiation was the advance of the Shah-Zada, and Governor Clive's
march to Patna in support of the Nabob and his Government, which perfectly
convinced him and his son of our faithfulness, affection, and attachment,
and struck an iniquitous party at the Durbar dumb, who were ever
insinuating to them that the English were aiming to be Subahs of the
country in breach of their treaty.
"Early in August we received advice that a powerful armament was fitting
out and embarking at Batavia, its destination not perfectly known, but
rumoured to be for Bengal. The Governor sent early notice of this to Meer
Jaffier, who immediately sent a Purwannah to the Dutch Governor, a copy of
which he forwarded to Governor Clive, demanding withal, by virtue of the
treaty subsisting with the English, that he should join his forces to
oppose and prevent any foreign troops being brought into his country.
"About this time a Dutch ship arrived in the river with European troops
and buggoses, of which the Governor advised the Nabob, who was much
embarrassed at the news; he, however, despatched a second Purwannah to the
Dutch, and ordered Omarbeg Khan Fouzdaar of Hooghley, immediately to join
the Governor with a body of troops, and repeated his demand of our
assistance, to prevent the Dutch troops or ships advancing up the river.
To the Nabob's first Purwannah, the Dutch sent a reply and solemn promise
of obedience to his orders; to the second, they as solemnly assured him,
the ship which was arrived came in by accident for water and provisions;
that she was drove from her destined port of Nagapatam by stress of
weather, and that she and her troops should leave the river as soon as
they were supplied.
"Notwithstanding these solemn assurances from the Dutch, it was judged
expedient to send a detachment of troops, joined with one of the Subah's,
under the command of the Fouzdaar's officer, to take possession of Tanna
Fort and Charnoc's Battery opposite to it, with orders to stop and search
all boats and vessels that passed, without giving them further
molestation; and parties were likewise sent out on each side of the river
to prevent any foreign troops advancing by land. In consequence of these
orders, every Dutch boat and budgerow was brought to, and those that had
no troops suffered to pass; amongst others, Mynheer Suydland, the Dutch
master-attendant, not only refused for sometime being either brought to or
searched, but struck the commanding officer at Charnoc's Battery. Himself
and another Dutch gentleman with him were made prisoners for a few hours,
until an order from the Governor went down for releasing them and the
budgerow, on board of which were found concealed eighteen buggoses, which
were conducted down under a guard by land, until within sight of their
ship at Fulta, and released. On these transactions, we received very long
remonstrances from the gentlemen at Chinsura, to which we replied, that,
as principals, we had, by the custom and laws of nations, a right to
search all vessels whatever, advancing up this river, not knowing but they
might introduce French troops into the country; and that as auxiliaries to
the Mogul, we were under a necessity, by solemn treaty, to join his
Viceroy in opposing the introduction of any European or foreign troops
whatever into Bengal; and that we should absolutely and religiously do our
duty to the utmost of our strength and power in both capacities.
"Early in October, Jaffier Ally Khan arrived here on a visit to the
Governor. During his stay with us, advice came from below, of the arrival
of six or seven more Dutch capital ships, crammed with soldiers and
buggoses. Now the Dutch mask fell off, and the Nabob (conscious of having
given his assent to their coming, and at the same time of our attachment
and his own unfaithful dealings with us,) was greatly confused and
disconcerted. He, however, seemed to make light of it; told the Governor
he was going to reside three or four days at his Fort of Hooghley, where
he would chastise the insolence and disobedience of the Dutch, and drive
them soon out of the river again.
"On the 19th of October he left Calcutta; and in place of his going to his
Fort at Hooghley, he took up his residence at Cajah Wazeed's garden, about
half way between that and Chinsura; a plain indication that he had no
apprehensions from the Dutch, whom he received there in the most gracious
manner he could, more like friends and allies than as enemies to him and
his country. In three or four days after his departure from Calcutta, the
Governor received a letter from him, wherein he informed him of 'some
indulgence he had granted the Dutch in their trade, and that they had
engaged to leave the river with their ships and troops as soon as the
season would permit.' The season permitting their immediate departure with
the greatest safety and propriety, the last condition in the Nabob's
letter, joined to his whole behaviour, convinced us, that leaving the
river was no part of their intention, but that, on the contrary, they had
his assent to bring up their troops if they could; which Colonel Clive was
determined they should not, as the Nabob had not withdrawn his orders to
oppose them, and in this he was heartily joined by his Council. Ruin to
the Company, if not to the country, must have been the inevitable
consequences of their junction with the troops they had in garrison at
Chinsura; which once accomplished, would have been beyond all doubt
attended with a declaration from the Government in their favour, and as
probably a union between them, which must have ended in our destruction. A
very few days justified our suspicions and resolutions; for in place of
the Dutch leaving the river, we received certain intelligence of their
moving up, and that they were enlisting troops under every denomination,
at Chinsura, Cossimbazar, and Patna, and this plainly with connivance of
the Nabob.
"Whatever may have been the joint or separate views of the Dutch and Nabob
against us, it is most certain they never could have had a more favourable
conjuncture to carry them into execution; for what with the unforeseen and
inevitable long stay of our troops on the Golconda expedition, the
detention on the coast of Coromandel of the forces appointed for this
settlement, and the necessity the Governor was under of leaving a
considerable party at Patna, in May last, our garrison here was
inconsiderable. Our Governor, with indefatigable despatch, made every
necessary disposition to circumvent the designs of our enemies; the
'Calcutta,' 'Duke of Dorset,' and 'Hardwicke' (the only ships we had in
the river), were ordered to proceed immediately to town; the detachments
at Tanna and Charnoc's were strengthened, and heavy cannon mounted at
each, as also on two faces of our new fort commanding the river. The Patna
party was recalled, and the militia put under arms. The Governor wrote
likewise to the Nabob in strong and peremptory terms, to send his son down
with his army to invest Chinsura; but the politics of the Durbar at this
period, we believe, ran counter, where we judge it was determined to let
the English and Dutch weaken and destroy one another, when they would
probably have attempted to reduce both, or join with the strongest.
"Soon as the Dutch thought their schemes ripe for action, they sent us an
immense remonstrance, recapitulating the whole of all their former ones,
and vowing vengeance and reprisals if we persisted in searching their
boats, and obstructing the advance of their troops up the river. To this
we replied, once for all, that we had given no insult to their colours, or
attacked or touched their property, or infringed their privileges; that
with respect to their bringing troops into Bengal, the Nabob knew best how
far it was incumbent on him to preserve the peace and tranquillity of his
country; that their boats had been stopped and searched, and the advance
of their troops opposed, by orders from the Viceroy, and under the Emperor
his master's colours, and by his troops; that they must apply therefore to
him, and that we were ready to interpose our friendly offices to mitigate
his resentment. This, it may be thought, savoured a little of audacity,
but facts vindicated us; as the Fouzdaar had neither withdrawn his troops
(which consisted of four or five hundred horse), nor the Nabob his orders;
and all that was done below was under the Government's colours.
Notwithstanding which, on receipt of the last Dutch remonstrance, we found
our sentiments a good deal embarrassed, doubting whether we should stand
justified to our country and employers, in commencing hostilities against
an ally of England, supposing they should persist in passing the batteries
below with their ships and troops. In this situation, we anxiously wished
the next hour would bring us news of a declaration of war with Holland;
which we had indeed some reason to expect by our last advices from
England. Another strong reason which determined us to oppose them, and on
which subject we had been guarded against by the Court of Directors, who
had intimated that in all likelihood the Dutch would first commence
hostilities against us in India.
"Thus circumstanced, the Dutch themselves removed all our difficulties by
beginning hostilities below, attacking with shot, and seizing seven of our
vessels, grain-boats, &c., tearing down our colours, disembarking our
guns, military stores, &c., from our vessels to their own ships, making
prisoners of the captains, officers, &c. They also began hostilities on
shore in our Purgunnahs off Fulta and Riapore, where they tore down our
colours, and burnt the houses and effects of the Company's tenants in
those parts. Amongst the vessels they attacked and seized was the 'Leopard
Snow,' Captain Barclay, whom we had despatched with expresses to Admiral
Cornish, to hasten his coming to our succour, which we judged would meet
him somewhere on the Arracan coast.
"On this event, we concluded, with the greatest probability, that the
Dutch had received intelligence of a rupture between them and us in
Europe, or that they were sure of the Nabob joining them, or of his
standing neuter at least; and having the utmost reason to suspect the
Nabob's whole conduct, Governor Clive apprised him of the acts of violence
the Dutch had committed below, adding, that as they had commenced actual
war against us, he should judge the quarrel now subsisted between them and
us only, desiring he would leave chastising the Dutch to us, and desist
from sending either his son or any part of his army to our assistance; but
that, if he would convince us of his sincerity and attachment, he should
directly surround their subordinates, and distress them in the country to
the utmost.
"Hitherto we knew not whether the Dutch intended to pass the batteries
with their ships and troops on board, or whether their intention was to
land the latter as high up as they could, and march them over land. The
Governor, however, made the necessary dispositions against both, as far as
our small body of troops would permit, consisting, on the whole, of about
two hundred and forty Europeans of the battalion, about eighty of the
train, and one thousand two hundred sepoys. The best troops and largest
proportion of these, with many volunteers draughted from the militia, and
part of the independent company, formed into a troop of horse, were
stationed at Charnoc's and Tannas under the command of Captain Knox.
Colonel Forde, on account of his ill state of health and dismission from
the service, had returned to us a few days before these troubles; and,
notwithstanding both, most obligingly and readily, at the Governor's
request, took upon him the command of the remaining troops in the
garrison, which marched to the northward the 19th of November; on which
day Mr. Holwell was ordered to take charge of Fort William with the
militia, consisting of about two hundred and fifty Europeans, besides some
of the Portuguese inhabitants; the Governor dividing his attention and
presence between both divisions, those at Charnoc's and those in the
field.
"The first stroke struck against the Dutch, was possessing ourselves of
Barnagore, from whence Colonel Forde passed over the river with his troops
and four field artillery to Serampore, the Danish factory, and marched
towards Chandernagore; not only with a view of striking terror into
Chinsura, but to be ready to intercept the Dutch troops, in case they
should disembark, and attempt to gain that place by land.
"During this period, the Dutch ships kept advancing with their captures
and prisoners, and our three ships in their rear, whose orders were
peremptorily to pass them and station themselves above the batteries,
where fire-boats and every other needful step was taken to destroy the
Dutch ships if they attempted to pass. The Dutch commodore sent two orders
to Commodore Wilson prohibiting his passing their ships, and that if he
attempted it, he would fire upon him.
"On the 21st of November the Dutch armament came to an anchor in Sankeral
Reach, whose point was within the range of our cannon from the batteries.
On the 23d of November they landed on the opposite shore seven hundred
Europeans, and about eight hundred Buggoses, and dropped down with their
ships to Melancholy Point, the lower end of the reach being near where our
three ships lay; of which advice was immediately despatched to Colonel
Forde, with assurance that he should be reinforced with the utmost
expedition by Captain Knox and the parties at the batteries, who were
accordingly recalled. On the 23d, orders were sent to our commodore to
demand immediate restitution of our ships, subjects, and property; or to
fight, sink, burn, and destroy the Dutch ships on their refusal. The next
day the demand was made and refused. True British spirit was manifested on
this occasion. Notwithstanding the inequality (the Dutch having seven to
three, and four of them capital ships,) we attacked them; and after about
two hours' engagement, the Dutch commodore struck, and the rest followed
the example, except his second, who cut and run down as low as Culpee,
when she was stopped short by the 'Oxford' and 'Royal George,' who arrived
two days before, and had our orders to join the other captains. The Dutch
Commodore had about thirty men killed, and many wounded: she suffered the
most amongst them, as did the 'Duke of Dorset' on our side, who was more
immediately engaged with her.
"On the same day (the 24th) Colonel Forde marched from the French gardens
to the northward, intending to encamp between Chandernagore and Chinsura.
In his march through the former, he was attacked by the Dutch with four
pieces of cannon, and the garrison from Chinsura, which had marched out
and lodged themselves in the houses and ruins of Chandernagore, at the
very time the Colonel entered with his troops at the southernmost end.
However, he soon dislodged them from their ambush, took their cannon, and
pursued them with some slaughter to the very barriers of Chinsura, which
he prepared to invest, being now joined by Captain Knox and the troops
from the batteries, and Charnoc's and Tannas.
"The next day Colonel Forde received certain intelligence of the near
approach of the Dutch troops from the ships, who had been, in spite of his
vigilance, joined by part of the garrison from Chinsura. He immediately
marched with two field-pieces, and met them on the plains of Bedarra
(about two coss from Chinsura), where they soon came to an action. The
Dutch were commanded by Colonel Roussel, a French soldier of fortune. They
consisted of near seven hundred Europeans, and as many buggoses, besides
country troops: ours of two hundred and forty infantry, and eighty of the
train, and fifty more Europeans composing the troops of horse,
independents and volunteers, and about eight hundred sepoys. The
engagement was short, bloody, and decisive. The Dutch were put to a total
rout in less than half an hour: they had about one hundred and twenty
Europeans, and two hundred buggoses killed, three hundred and fifty
Europeans and about two hundred Buggoses taken prisoners, with M. Roussel
and fourteen officers, and about one hundred and fifty wounded. Our loss
was inconsiderable. After this action, Colonel Forde returned, sat down
before Chinsura, and wrote for further orders. The Dutch were now as
abject in their submission as they had been insolent in their supposed
superiority. They wrote to Colonel Forde, and likewise to the Board here,
requesting he would cease hostilities and propose terms of amity.
"We judged we had sufficiently chastised and humbled them, without taking
their settlement (which must have surrendered on the first summons), and
agreed to enter on a treaty with them. Deputies were appointed, and things
brought to a speedy and amicable conclusion. They disavowed the
proceedings of their ships below, acknowledged themselves the aggressors,
and agreed to pay costs and damages; on which their ships were delivered
up to them.
"Three days after the battle of Bedarra, the young Nabob, with about six
or seven thousand horse, arrived and encamped within a coss of Chinsura:
this struck the Dutch with the deepest terror. Governor Clive was wrote
to, in the most supplicatory terms, to interpose, and not abandon them to
the violence of the Moors. The Governor interposed, and went directly to
the French gardens, that he might be a nearer check upon the young Nabob,
and prevent his proceeding to extremities with them. His friendly
interposition had its proper effect: the young Nabob received their
deputies; and after severe altercation, forgave them, and promised ample
protection in their trade and privileges, on the following terms:—That
they shall never meditate war, introduce or enlist troops, or raise
fortifications in the country; that they shall be allowed to keep up one
hundred and twenty-five European soldiers, and no more, for the service of
their several factories, of Chinsura, Cossimbazar and Patna; that they
shall forthwith send their ships and remaining troops out of the country;
and that a breach of any one of these articles shall be punished with
utter expulsion. These terms, ratified by the council of Hooghley, and the
Nabob (otherwise) satisfied for the trouble and expense of his march, he
broke up his camp and returned to the city."
"Thus ended an affair which, had the event been different, threatened us
in its consequence with utter destruction; for, had the Dutch gained the
same advantage over us, we have now the most convincing proofs to
conclude, that the remembrance of Amboyna would have been lost in their
treatment of this colony. Mr. Bisdom was in a dying condition during these
whole transactions, and opposed, jointly with Messrs. Zuyaland and
Bachracht, the violence of their proceedings; but they were over-ruled by
the rest of their council, led by Messrs. Vernet and Schevichaven, two men
of desperate fortunes and violent and evil principles, who, we doubt not,
will pay severely for their imprudence."
"There appears every reason to conclude from this narrative, as well as
from other accounts, that Meer Jaffier had originally given countenance to
an intrigue with the Dutch, carried on through Cajah Wazeed[72]; but there
can be no doubt that the conduct of Clive, on the subsequent invasion of
the Shah-Zada, had made a change in his sentiments. He readily, therefore,
gave the requisite orders to the Dutch, forbidding them to land any
troops. 'He declared to me,' Mr. Hastings[73] writes to Clive, 'that if
they brought any armed force into his country, he would look upon them as
enemies, and treat them accordingly.'"