THE
LIFE
OF
ROBERT, LORD CLIVE:
COLLECTED FROM THE FAMILY PAPERS
COMMUNICATED BY
THE EARL OF POWIS.
BY
MAJOR-GENERAL
SIR JOHN MALCOLM, G.C.B. F.R.S. &c.
IN THREE VOLUMES.
WITH A PORTRAIT AND MAP.
VOL. II.
LONDON:
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET.
MDCCCXXXVI.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
LONDON:
Printed by A. SPOTTISWOODE,
New-Street-Square.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
LIFE
OF
ROBERT, LORD CLIVE:
=CONTENTS=
OF
THE SECOND VOLUME.
----------
CHAPTER IX.
Success of the Expedition sent to the Northern Circars under Colonel
Forde, 1758.—Transactions at Madras.—Siege of that Place by Lally
page 1
CHAP. X.
Dutch Armament against Bengal, 1759, destroyed by Clive.—Proceedings in
England regarding the Government of Bengal.—Clive's Letter to
Pitt.—Clive returns to England, 1760
69
CHAP. XI.
Clive in England.—His private Life and Character
114
CHAP. XII.
Clive in England.—His Politics.—His Quarrel with Mr. Sulivan.—His
Right to the Jaghire disputed.—Parties at the India House.—Disasters
in India.—Clive called upon to resume the Government of
Bengal—Consents—Sets out for India, 1764
188
CHAP. XIII.
State of India during Lord Clive's absence, 1760-5.—Mr. Vansittart's
Government.—Deposition of Meer Jaffier.—Elevation of Meer
Cossim.—Massacre of Patna.—Restoration of Meer Jaffier.—Disorders in
Bengal
261
CHAP. XIV.
Clive assumes the Government of Bengal, 1765.—State of the Country and
of the various Services.—Military Arrangements.—Negotiations with the
Nabob of Bengal.—Treaty with the Nabob-Visier.—Settlement with the
King.—The Duannee acquired for the Company.—Discontents in the Civil
Service, and Reforms effected
317
Footnotes are located at the end of each chapter.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MEMOIRS
OF
LORD CLIVE.
----------
CHAPTER IX.
In the commencement of the last chapter mention was made of the sailing
of the expedition which Clive detached to the Northern Circars under
Colonel Forde, in September, 1758. Before narrating the operations of
that force, it will be necessary to take a short retrospect of the
affairs of the Deckan.
We have already seen[1] the success of Bussy in defeating the
combination formed against him at the Court of Salabut Jung. When he was
surrounded in the post he had taken at Hyderabad, Ibrahim Khan, to whom
he had intrusted the management of the Northern Circars, threw off his
allegiance. Bussy, sensible of the great value of the newly acquired
possessions, obtained the Subah's permission to march with the greater
part of his force to punish Ibrahim Khan, and settle the countries ceded
to him. He proceeded by the route of Bezoara to Rajahmundry. Ibrahim
Khan fled at his approach; but Vizeram Raz, the Hindu zemindar, or
ruler, of the country of Chicacole, joined him from his capital of
Vizianagur with a considerable body of men. Bussy thought it politic to
give Vizeram Raz every support; and the French troops were employed in
compelling the submission of his refractory chiefs, each of whom had his
petty fastness, and, relying on its natural or artificial strength, and
the devoted attachment and valour of his followers, yielded but an
imperfect obedience to his acknowledged lord, and seldom paid his
tribute until compelled by superior force.
The French arms were first directed by Vizeram Raz to the attack of
Rangarow, Rajah of Boobilee, against whom he cherished a deadly hatred.
The fort of this chief could not resist European artillery; but its
defenders scorned to yield. They fought to the last; and the Rajah, with
all those capable of bearing arms, except four who reserved their lives
for a deed of vengeance, fell during the siege or on the breach. A more
appalling spectacle than that of the carnage of these brave men awaited
the successful assailants. In the interior of this stronghold, they
found only the smoking ruins of houses, and the mangled and burnt bodies
of all who were its late inhabitants; neither age nor sex was spared in
the dreadful sacrifice: not a human being seemed to be left over whom
his enemies could triumph. As the horror-struck victors were
contemplating this scene of desolation and of death, an old man rushed
from the smoking ruins with a child in his arms. He was conducted to M.
Law, who commanded the party: "This is the son of Rangarow," said the
old man, "whom I have preserved against his father's will." The safety
of this boy was felt as some alleviation of the horrid catastrophe. He
was carried to Bussy, who received and treated him with that humanity
and generosity which belonged to his character[2], constituting himself
his guardian, and securing to him the terms offered to his father,
before his fort was attacked.
Three nights after this event the camp was surprised by a tumult, and
Bussy soon learned that two[3] of the four followers of Rangarow before
mentioned had made their way to the tent of Vizeram Raz, and stabbed the
inveterate enemy of their race[4] in thirty-two places. They might have
escaped, but they disdained flight. "Look here," they said to the guards
by whom they were attacked, "we are satisfied." Bussy, happy to leave
such a scene of horror and bloodshed, continued his march north to
Ganjam, where he received letters from his countrymen in Bengal, and
from the Nabob Suraj-u-Dowlah, urging his march to that country to
destroy the English. While waiting in expectation of persons from
Moorshedabad to arrange for his advance through Cuttack, he heard of the
fall of Chandernagore; on which he appears to have abandoned all
thoughts of proceeding to Bengal, though he no doubt contrived to feed
Meer Jaffier with hopes which might stimulate him to acts of hostility
against the enemies of France.
Bussy's next effort was against Vizagapatam, which was compelled to
surrender. His treatment of the English, whom he made prisoners, was
more than humane; it was kind[5] and liberal. From thence he went to
Rajahmundry, where he heard of a change at the court of the Subah very
unfavourable to the views and interests of the French in the Deckan.
In consequence of an intrigue between Shahnavaze Khan, the prime
minister, and the Subah's brothers, Nizam Ali Khan and Basalut Jung, the
latter two princes had come into power; and, having compelled the weak
Salabut Jung to intrust them with his great seal, had reduced him to a
cipher in his own dominions. The French officer left in charge of the
body of men which remained in the Subah's camp, had neither the talent
nor the influence to counteract these intrigues, and limited himself to
the guarding of Salabut Jung's person, and reporting to Bussy events as
they occurred. That experienced commander saw that no time was to be
lost. He immediately left Rajahmundry, and accomplished the march to
Aurungabad, a distance of more than four hundred miles, in twenty-one
days. He found on his arrival three separate armies; for Nizam Ali Khan
and Basalut Jung had each his own encampment, and the Paishwah Ballajee
Bajerow was in the vicinity; that ruler being, it was believed,
concerned in the plot laid to deprive the Subah of his power.
The force of Bussy, which consisted of nine hundred Europeans (two
hundred of which were cavalry) and five thousand five hundred sepoys,
with ten field-pieces, was more than equal to any of the armies, or
indeed to any two combined. All waited, therefore, to see the part he
would take. He was aided by Hyder Jung, who, having some claims[6] upon
the French, and being a man of ability, was raised in consequence by
Bussy, who obtained him a title from the Emperor of Delhi. This person
was consulted on all occasions, and displayed both talent and address:
but his influence made him many enemies, and these were increased by his
success in their own arts of intrigue, particularly in corrupting the
Governor of Dowlatabad, and gaining that impregnable fortress[7] for the
French, by whom it was kept as a place of security for Salabut Jung,
instead of being his prison, the purpose for which it is believed to
have been destined by the conspirators against his liberty, if not his
life.
The Nizam's brothers were compelled to give up the great seal of the
Deckan, which was not surrendered without undisguised marks of their
indignation, and loud protestations against the European influence which
now swayed the councils of their elder brother. Nizam Ali Khan, who
showed at this period both ability and boldness, was directed to proceed
to his government of Berar, and Basalut Jung to the charge of Adoni.
Before his departure Nizam Ali received the ceremonious visits of all
the chiefs and nobles in camp. Among others, Hyder Jung paid his
respects. When that Omrah was seated, Nizam Ali arose; but made a signal
for the former not to move, as he would immediately return. The moment,
however, that he left the apartment, his visitor was stabbed to the
heart. Letters, which had been previously prepared, were sent to Salabut
Jung, Ballajee Row, Basalut Jung, and Bussy; ascribing the death of the
French dewan or minister (for such Hyder Jung was termed) to accident;
but the truth could not long be concealed, and Nizam Ali fled with some
of his best horse to the city of Burhampore[8] in Berar.
Bussy directed a party to seize Shahnavaze Khan, who was believed to be
concerned in the murder; and that minister, with one of his sons, was
killed in an affray which took place from his followers opposing the
troops of Salabut Jung and the French, that were sent to make him
prisoner.
All was for some time in confusion. The principal chiefs in the army
hastened to disown any participation in the crime that had been
committed; and the Paishwah Ballajee Bajerow sent to Bussy to assure him
that he viewed the murder of Hyder Jung with detestation.
Salabut Jung was so greatly enraged with his brother, that Bussy could
not prevent his making some marches towards Burhampore; but he soon
succeeded in convincing him that the pursuit of Nizam Ali was as
impolitic as it would be useless. The fact was, that Bussy did not wish
that his nation should appear as the cause of discord in the Subah's
family; and he had, also, some anticipation, from the accounts which he
had received from Pondicherry, of the changes about to occur in the
councils of that settlement. With these impressions, his object was to
lead Salabut Jung to Golconda, where he would be conveniently situated
for any event which might occur. During this march, M. Conflans arrived
in camp with a letter from M. Lally, appointing him second in command to
Bussy, and announcing to the latter his intended recall. Bussy, on
receiving this intelligence, adopted measures to secure the garrison he
had left in Dowlatabad reaching him in safety. This accomplished, he
proceeded with the Subah to Hyderabad, where the commands of Lally were
received, directing him to abandon all his projects in the Deckan, and
to hasten with part of his troops to Pondicherry, leaving the remainder
under Conflans to protect the Northern Circars, and to garrison
Masulipatam, the able chief of which (Moracin) was also recalled.
The enemies of the French in the Deckan, and those who dreaded their
rise, saw Bussy's preparations to depart with surprise and delight.
None, however, could account for this sudden abandonment of an influence
and strength which had been established with such labour and ability.
Salabut Jung had very different feelings; he viewed the departure of
Bussy with deep despondency. It was the loss, as he said, to him, of his
friend and preserver; and his mind presented sad forebodings of his
future fate. These he communicated to Bussy, who supported him by an
assurance that he would return; and in that expectation he was no doubt
sincere; for, notwithstanding what he had heard of the character of
Lally, he could not have anticipated that any individual in M. Lally's
situation could have been so blinded by prejudice, and so misled by his
passions, as to abandon the advantages which a commanding influence in
the councils of the Deckan must have given to the French, at a period so
critical to their interests in India.
When Bussy had been compelled to march to Aurungabad, he left but a
small body of men in the Northern Circars; and Anunderauze, the
successor of Vizeram Raz, no longer overawed by the presence of a French
force, and desiring to throw off his dependence upon that nation,
courted the alliance of the British Government.[9] Clive appears at this
period to have been well-informed of the situation of parties at the
court of the Subah of the Deckan. He had received an overture from Nizam
Ali Khan, who, prompted by his hostility to Bussy, solicited the aid of
the English. In his answer to this letter[10], Clive gives that Prince
every assurance of friendship; and about two months[11] afterwards, he
informs him of his having sent Colonel Forde into the Circars, to retake
settlements in the Subah's dominions from which the English had been
expelled by the French; and requests Nizam Ali to aid him, and to obtain
the assistance of his brother the Subah in accomplishing that just
object.
To Anunderauze, Clive wrote[12] in terms calculated to conciliate his
continued friendship: he congratulated him on the advantages he had
gained over the French, and desired him to consult with Colonel Forde on
the operations necessary to expel that nation from the Northern Circars.
He also stated his expectation of the Rajah's benefiting so much by the
aid of this force, that he would contribute to defray its expenses. It
was a serious error[13] to repose such confidence on this source of
supply. It failed; and its failure caused great delays, and had nearly
defeated the whole object of the expedition.
Colonel Forde, after retaking Vizagapatam, marched towards Rajahmundry,
near which he engaged and completely defeated M. Conflans, who retired
rapidly towards Masulipatam, leaving his guns and camp equipage in the
hands of the English. Anunderauze, who remained in the rear, and either
from caution or fear took no part in this contest, appeared averse to
proceed any further south; nor was it until Colonel Forde had signed an
engagement which secured him great advantages, that he consented to give
him a small sum of money to relieve the urgent distresses of the English
troops, and to accompany him in his march. Fifty days were thus lost;
and the French had not only recovered from their panic, but their ally
Salabut Jung was advancing, and a small French corps of observation had
begun to plunder the countries in the rear of the English; while M.
Conflans, with his main body, prepared to defend Masulipatam, scarcely
expecting, however, that the English would attempt to attack a fortress
the garrison of which outnumbered the troops of the assailants. But the
result proved he was unacquainted with the bold character of the British
commander.
To increase the embarrassments of Colonel Forde, the treasure sent from
Bengal being prevented from reaching him by the operations of the French
corps of observation, the distress for want of money, added to other
grievances, caused the European part of his force to mutiny and leave
their lines, threatening to march away. Being desired to state
specifically their complaints, they demanded, through deputies, the
immediate payment of the prize-money due to them, and an assurance that,
if Masulipatam fell, they should have the whole of the prize-money, and
not half, as was the usage with the Company's troops, the other half
being reserved as the right of Government. The commander promised that
the prize-money due should be paid from the first treasure received; and
added, that he would recommend the full prize-money to be given them
should their valour be crowned with success. Satisfied with these
assurances, they returned to their duty, and the siege was prosecuted
with vigour.
Salabut Jung, with a large army, was now within forty miles; and his
mandates were issued to all Zemindars and others, to aid the French and
to act against the English. The alarmed Anunderauze, on hearing this
order, struck his tents, and marched sixteen miles towards his own
country. Colonel Forde sent after him, to represent the extreme folly of
his conduct: he could not (he directed his agent to explain to the
Rajah) expect to escape the numerous parties of horse of the Subah; and,
if he did, he had to encounter the French corps of observation, which
was in the neighbourhood of Rajahmundry: the capture of Masulipatam,
therefore, was the only chance he had for safety. The good sense of this
remonstrance had its effect: the Rajah returned; and Colonel Forde, in
order to inspire him and other natives with confidence, solicited and
obtained leave to send a person to the camp of the Subah to explain the
cause of the expedition, and its limited object of recovering the
English factories, and taking those of the French upon the sea-coast.
Mr. John Johnstone of the Civil Service, who had been the active
co-adjutor of Colonel Forde throughout this expedition, was deputed to
Salabut Jung; and the delay of a few days, which it was expected his
mission would create, was deemed of ultimate importance to the success
of the siege.
The situation of Colonel Forde was at this moment truly critical. Though
the principal breach appeared practicable, the advance to the attack was
over a deep morass, and the ditch of the fort could only be passed at
ebb tide: a garrison superior to the besiegers was within the walls; and
the army of the Subah was near Masulipatam, and on the point of forming
a junction with the French corps of observation. To add to these
difficulties, the ammunition for the heavy guns was nearly expended.
Under these circumstances, and having no hope of being able to effect a
retreat by land, Colonel Forde had only the choice between saving his
troops by embarking them, or immediately storming the fort. He
determined on the latter; and made a disposition for three attacks, one
of which was a false one, for the purpose of distracting the attention
of the enemy from the main attack on the north-east angle of the fort.
In addition to this disposition of his own force, the troops of
Anunderauze were directed to move along the causeway that crossed the
morass, and, by their skirmishing, to alarm the enemy at the principal
gateway, and to keep a part of the garrison employed in the ravelin and
outworks near it. To the Rajah's people was also entrusted the care of
the camp; for every man of the English force was engaged in the storm.
The attack commenced at midnight; and though a great proportion of the
troops soon forced their way into the interior of the place, a
straggling fire was kept up for some hours, when M. Conflans
surrendered, and the English found, in the morning, that their prisoners
amounted to five hundred Europeans, and two thousand five hundred and
thirty-seven Caffres, Topasses[14], and sepoys; being, altogether, far
more numerous than those by whom they were captured. The loss of the
French was small: the assailants had twenty-two Europeans killed, and
sixty-two wounded; fifty sepoys were killed, and a hundred and fifty
wounded.[15]
The French commander and his garrison had, from the first, treated too
slightingly the efforts of their besiegers. Their confidence, which was
increased by an expected re-enforcement from Pondicherry, was one of the
chief causes of the loss of the place. Few precautionary measures appear
to have been taken to give combination to the points of defence; and the
attack being made at night, and on so many quarters, distracted those in
the different works[16], whose contradictory and exaggerated reports so
embarrassed M. Conflans, that he remained in the centre of the fort with
his most select men, undecided where to direct relief, till he was so
surrounded as to be obliged to surrender at discretion.
Though these circumstances promoted the success of the English, they
only reflected higher honour upon the British commander and his gallant
soldiers. The irregularity and extent of the fortifications made Colonel
Forde foresee the confusion that must result from dividing his troops
both before and after they entered the place. He also calculated upon
that confidence with which the enemy's superior numbers were likely to
inspire their commander; and he anticipated the success which so
frequently crowns those daring attempts, which are made in contempt of
all the ordinary maxims of war.
The able and bold plans of their commander were admirably carried into
execution by his brave troops. The English soldiers, by their conduct,
well redeemed the crime of their recent mutiny; and we are informed, by
a contemporary historian[17], that "the sepoys behaved with equal
gallantry to the Europeans!"
M. Moracin, with a re-enforcement of three hundred men from Pondicherry,
arrived a few days after the place had fallen. On discovering what had
occurred, he sailed to the northward, where the attempt he made to
injure the English interests in the Vizagapatam and Ganjam districts
altogether failed, though he continued, for some period, to excite
considerable alarm.
Salabut Jung was encamped within fifteen miles of Masulipatam when the
fort was taken. He and his ministers were alike astonished at the
unexpected result of the siege; and, reproaching themselves as in part
the cause of the misfortune to their ally, they refused to negotiate
with Colonel Forde while there appeared a hope of their being joined by
the corps under Moracin; but finding that he had proceeded north, the
Subah evinced a wish to contract an alliance with the English. To this
he was induced by another and more powerful motive. Nizam Ali Khan had,
on the receipt of Clive's letters regarding Colonel Forde's expedition,
not only written to Clive[18] expressing his desire to co-operate
against the French, and his wish that Colonel Forde's force should join
him; but had also addressed Colonel Forde to the same purport, in answer
to a letter received from that officer. This correspondence with a
brother whom he had just cause to dread, combined with the movement of
Nizam Ali in the direction of Hyderabad, turned the scale of the Subah's
court in favour of the English; and, notwithstanding the remonstrances
of the leader of the French corps of observation, Salabut Jung concluded
a treaty with Colonel Forde, by which he ceded Masulipatam and eight
districts in its vicinity. The second article of this engagement
stipulated, not only that he was to have no French troops in his
service, but that he was not to allow that nation any settlement in his
dominions; the third article was in favour of Anunderauze; and by the
fourth Salabut Jung engaged never to give aid or protection to the
enemies of the English; who, on their part, stipulated not to aid or
protect those who were hostile to his person or government.
I have entered more minutely upon the progress and results of this
expedition, from its being solely and exclusively the measure of Clive.
Its consequences were very important, as tending to distract the enemy
at the period of the siege of Madras[19], and materially to weaken his
actual strength for subsequent operations[20]; but more so as they
destroyed (Clive's great object) the French connection with Salabut
Jung, and raised the military reputation of the English in the Deckan
above that of their European rivals. Besides all these advantages, the
occupation of the fort and dependent districts of Masulipatam was of
itself a valuable object. This possession was annexed to the presidency
of Fort St. George.
The government of Madras, anxious to add to the army in the field
against the French, desired that Colonel Forde should leave Masulipatam
with a garrison of five hundred sepoys, and send his remaining Europeans
(about two hundred) to Madras. This he objected to, upon the ground of
its exposing this important acquisition to recapture by the French
fleet. Clive approved of this, as of every part of Colonel Forde's
conduct throughout the late service. Besides those public thanks which,
as head of the government, he gave to this able officer and his gallant
troops, we meet, in Clive's private letters, with frequent and strong
expressions of his sense of the importance of the defeat of Conflans
near Rajahmundry, and the capture of Masulipatam. He justly concluded
that these achievements, independent of their immediate consequences,
were calculated to promote our permanent interests in the Deckan; a
point to which he always gave great importance, and to which he upbraids
his friends in the government of Madras for being too inattentive.
In a private letter to Mr. Pigot of the 21st of August, in which he
congratulates him on the raising of the siege of Madras, he observes, "I
know there are many in England, especially the envious, who have
endeavoured to persuade others, as well as themselves, that our wars in
India are trifling and insignificant; but our late exploits will, I
believe, induce another way of thinking, and add lustre to our quondam
victories.
"Colonel Forde may, I think, step forth, and very justly claim his share
of the laurels gained. His defeat of Conflans, with a great inferiority
of numbers, was an important stroke; but his taking by storm such a
place as Masulipatam, with a garrison within superior to the force which
attacked it, is what we seldom hear of in these our modern times.
"I cannot add much to what has been represented to you in our general
letter; only let me beg of you not to neglect the affairs of the Deckan;
they are of great importance, and I know the gentlemen at home think
them so. Besides, we never could be safe in Bengal, while the enemy is
so near at hand, and a strong squadron, which may give ours the slip,
and co-operate with them. If Colonel Forde had left Masulipatam with
only a garrison of five hundred sepoys, and it had been afterwards lost
(which I really believe would have been the case), what a load of
disgrace would have fallen upon us, for putting the Company to so great
an expense, and for losing all the fruits of our eminent successes in
these parts."
In another letter[21] upon the same subject to his friend Mr.
Vansittart, who was a member of council at Fort St. George, Clive
expresses similar sentiments. "The news from the coast," he observes,
"this year has been very important and interesting. The defence of
Madras will do much honour to our arms in India, and greatly heighten
our reputation as soldiers in these parts. I would gladly have given
some of my riches to share some of your reputation. I know it has been a
conceived opinion among the old soldiers in England, that our exploits
in India have been much of the same nature as those of Ferdinando
Cortez; but your foiling such a man as M. Lally, and two of the oldest
regiments of France, will induce another way of thinking, and add a
fresh lustre to all our former victories. Neither do I think Colonel
Forde's successes fall short of those of Madras. His victory over the
Marquis de Conflans was but one of the many we have gained over our
enemies in the like circumstances; but his taking such a place as
Masulipatam, with a garrison within superior to the force which attacked
it, is, I think, one of those extraordinary actions which we seldom hear
of in these modern times, and must gain him great honour when it comes
to be known at home. And now I have said thus much, I cannot help
thinking there has not been quite that attention bestowed on the affairs
of the Deckan their importance deserves. Much has been risked in not
sending Colonel Forde even a small assistance of money, which I think
might have been done without greatly distressing yourselves; and still
much more in not providing sea conveyances, or timely and sufficient
land escorts for the French prisoners.
"This expedition was undertaken more with a view to benefit the coast
than Bengal; and most of the Deckan forces would certainly have been at
the siege of Madras, if not prevented by the diversion given from hence.
Much I fear all our successes in the Deckan would have come to nothing,
if Colonel Forde had complied with the late order sent him, of leaving
only five hundred sepoys in Masulipatam, and coming, with the rest of
the forces, to Madras. Excuse me in thinking the gentlemen in council
have had too much at heart the securing to themselves Colonel Forde's
detachment, without sufficiently considering the consequences; for I can
never be persuaded that the addition of two hundred infantry would
either have lost or gained us a battle over M. Lally; but the
withdrawing them from the Deckan would certainly have rendered fruitless
all that has been done. You will be surprised at hearing the French have
landed upwards of five hundred Europeans at Ganjam with M. Moracin; but
it is really matter of fact, and has been confirmed to us by no less
than forty-seven deserters from thence, most of them English taken at
St. David's, and forced into the service. By the latest advices, they
were reduced, by death and desertion, to four hundred. I need say no
more on this subject, as the board will write very fully on this and
other matters of importance."
I shall now shortly refer to the occurrences at Madras, subsequent to
the great effort made to restore the British interests in Bengal. It
would be as unnecessary as it is foreign to my object to enter into a
detail of events which have been minutely described by several able
writers; but a general notice of them is required, not only to elucidate
the grounds of Clive's conduct, as far as relates to the aid he gave or
refused to Fort St. George, but as it is calculated to exhibit the
character of his mind, which, amid all those critical and important
events in which he was engaged in Bengal, appears to have dwelt with an
earnest fondness upon the scenes of his first efforts, and to have
retained the most anxious solicitude for the continued success of those
who were the friends of his youth, and his early associates in danger.
Absence appears, indeed, to have increased the interest he took in the
affairs of the coast of Coromandel; and from the period of his
proceeding to Calcutta till his departure for England, no occurrence of
any magnitude took place in the Madras Presidency, on which we do not
find numerous letters from Clive, which convey his opinion with equal
freedom upon the measures of the government, and upon the conduct of
individuals.
In 1757, the events of most magnitude on the coast were the capture of
Madura by Captain Caillaud[22], who commanded the British troops south
of the Coleroon; and the defeat of a party[23] which attacked Nellore,
where the brother[24] of the Nabob Mahommed Ali Khan continued in
rebellion. The fortress of Chittaput was taken by the French, owing to
aid being refused to Nazir Mahommed[25], the killadar (or governor) who,
holding this fortress independent of the Nabob, was an object of
jealousy, and he succeeded in instilling into the minds of the English
government a belief that the gallant defender of this important post was
in league with the French. Succour was delayed till too late. The brave
killadar resisted to the last; and, by his death on the breach, silenced
his calumniators, and left the rulers of Madras to regret their
unfortunate credulity and prejudice.
The capture of Chittaput was followed by the reduction of a number of
small fortresses in the Carnatic. The successes of the French in this
province balanced those of the English to the southward, where the
gallantry and judgment of Captain Caillaud, and the indefatigable
activity of Mahommed Esoof[26], the celebrated commandant of sepoys,
supported the cause of the English, and of the Nabob Mahommed Ali,
against the French and the rebel Maphuze Khan. The latter were aided by
several polygars, or petty Hindu chiefs, who possess the wild
mountainous tracts of this part of India; and who, from the attachment
and habits of their rude followers, are the most troublesome of all
enemies to the internal peace of the country.
These indecisive operations had no effect beyond keeping up the flame of
war between the French and English, through whom every native power in
India that they could influence became engaged in hostilities, in which
their interests were deemed subordinate to the primary object which the
two rival European nations alike cherished, of expelling each other from
the eastern hemisphere.
The French government in Europe appear, at this period, to have
determined on an effort to reduce the British settlements on the coast
of Coromandel; and the armament they prepared seemed adequate to the
object. Fortunately for the English, those who presided in the councils
of Louis 15th were either so completely ignorant of Indian policy, or so
inveterately prejudiced against their East India Company and its
servants, as not only to overlook the advantages that these had gained,
but to put aside as useless all who were acquainted with the scene, and
to substitute a commander and officers, who, whatever experience they
might have had in other quarters of the world, were profoundly ignorant
of that to which they were sent, with the expressed hope that, while
they reformed the gross abuses of the local government, they would
restore the tarnished lustre of the French arms.
The bold and extensive, though, perhaps, premature, schemes of Dupleix
had, at first, excited great expectations in France; but when, instead
of those successes which his sanguine mind had led his government to
anticipate, every despatch brought accounts of some failure or disaster,
national vanity, combined with prejudice and ignorance, induced the
ministers of that country to throw the whole blame on the Company and on
the individuals whom they had employed to manage their affairs abroad.
Their political and military conduct underwent equal condemnation; their
operations in the field were deemed unskilful, and their connections
with native princes, particularly that with the Subah of the Deckan,
were pronounced altogether chimerical, and calculated for no object but
that of feeding the ambition, or adding to the wealth, of those by whom
they were planned or conducted.
Though the form of the local government was not changed, controlling
powers were vested in Lieutenant-General Count Lally, who was sent in
command of this force, aided by a large staff of officers of high rank
and reputation.
The character of Lally, from former services, stood high as a gallant
soldier. He was, perhaps, skilled in European warfare, but he was wholly
ignorant of the different modes and usages of that science in India;
added to which, he was not of a temper to benefit by the experience of
others; and his mind appears, before he left France, to have been imbued
with the deepest prejudices against his own countrymen in India, as well
as the most sovereign contempt for the natives of that country. He was,
in consequence, alike indisposed to receive aid from the experience and
knowledge of the one, or from the alliance of the other; and evidently
expected to subdue all obstacles at the point of the bayonet.
Such was the man whom the French government sent to India. How different
was the conduct of the great Chatham! When the troops of his sovereign
were ordered to that country to support the national interests, he at
once decided[27] that neither Lawrence nor Clive should be superseded in
their command. Had the ministers of France been endowed with his wisdom,
and the troops they so judiciously sent to India been placed under
Bussy, there is every ground to conclude that the result of the ensuing
campaigns would have been very different. But such was the infatuation
or prejudice of the French ministers, that Bussy, slighted in the new
arrangements, was left, unnoticed and unhonoured, to submit to the
commands and bear the insults of an arrogant superior, whose jealousy of
his fame and popularity was increased into perfect fury at the
attentions shown him by all ranks, and by a memorial from the six
colonels[28] who had accompanied him from France, praying he would
nominate Bussy, yet only a Lieutenant-Colonel, a Brigadier General, that
he might command them, and that their sovereign might derive those
benefits which were to be expected from his name and experience.
Lally could not refuse compliance with such a request; but he
endeavoured, by bitter sarcasms as to their motives, to detract from the
just merits of those by whom it was made.
On the same evening that Lally landed with his troops from the fleet of
M. D'Aché, he ordered one thousand Europeans and as many sepoys to move
towards Fort St. David. They were led astray by their guides, and
arrived at the end of their first march, harassed, and without
provisions. To supply them, and to enable the remainder of his force to
follow, Lally resorted to means which filled the natives with alarm and
indignation. He pressed men of all castes and descriptions to carry
baggage, and derided the remonstrances of the Company's Governor, M.
Deleyrit, who was forced to submit; for, though he and his councils
retained their stations, they were placed completely under the control
of the Lieutenant-General.
Cuddalore could make no resistance. But a very different result from
what occurred was expected from Fort St. David. Its fortifications had
been greatly improved, and its garrison was efficient: if it did not
repel the assailants, no doubt was entertained but it would, for a
considerable period, employ all their means and arrest their operations.
But this hope was disappointed, and the place was surrendered before the
enemy's works were so advanced as to enable them to storm it. Mr. Call,
the chief engineer at Madras, in a letter[29] to Clive says, that he
considers "the place to have been lost rather through want of conduct
and proper management, than of bravery or the means of defending it."
Clive, as has been shown in the case of Colonel Forde and others, was
warm and even enthusiastic in his encomiums of those who were
distinguished in the service of their country. They not only became
entitled to his notice in his official capacity, but received every mark
of his private regard; and his utmost efforts were used to promote their
advancement. But, on the other hand, he held no terms with any man whom
he considered to have failed in this duty. His condemnation of such was
undisguised and unqualified. Neither the ties of friendship, the
suggestion of self-interest, nor the fear of resentment, had the
slightest effect in preventing the open expression of his opinions, when
there appeared a dereliction of those principles which he thought should
actuate every individual in the public employ.
Many examples will occur to illustrate this part of his character; but
none are stronger than we find in the letters he wrote to Madras, upon
hearing of the capture of Fort St. David. The thought of the easy
triumph of the French on a spot which had been ennobled by so many
gallant achievements of the English, pained him (as he states[30]) to
the soul, and he gives full vent to his indignation at those by whom
this feeling had been produced. Whatever justice there may be in the
sentence he passes on their conduct, the tone of elevated sentiment, and
the excellence of the military maxims which we find in these letters,
render them very valuable.
In a private letter[31] to Mr. Pigot, which expresses the deep interest
he takes in the affairs of the coast, Clive states concisely, but
strongly, his opinion upon the fall of Fort St. David.
"After waiting," he observes, "with much impatience, I have at last
received your favour of the 10th of July. Let me request of my friend,
if he has too much business upon his hands, that he will order one of
his secretaries to write me a few lines, for I am always doubtful of the
news I may receive from any other quarter.
"I cannot express to you my resentment and concern at the infamous
surrender of St. David. Had there been no powder at all left but for the
musketry, where was the excuse for giving up the place till a breach was
made, the covered way stormed, and the ditch filled? Were our enemies
supplied with wings, that they could fly into the place? I am fully
persuaded that, had M. Lally been obliged to make approaches to the top
of the glacis, the climate would have done him more injury than all the
powder and ball in the East Indies. I could wish, for the honour and
welfare of our nation, that a court-martial would make the severest
examples of the guilty in these cases. For the future, I would not leave
it in the power of a commanding officer to forfeit his trust, but give
him positive orders not to surrender any fort till a breach was made in
the body of the place, and one assault at least sustained."
In a letter to Mr. Orme of a similar date[32], he enters upon the same
subject.
"The advices," he observes, "you received of the bad condition of St.
David was nothing less than an introduction to the infamous surrender of
the place. I know not in what light you gentlemen of Madras may look
upon that inglorious transaction: for my part, I have seen the council
of war, and, from that only, think the severest example ought to be made
of those who have set their hands to that base capitulation.
"They say they had not above three days' powder! Where was the necessity
of throwing it so idly away? Had they no bayonets? Or, had they not
powder sufficient for small arms? I fondly flattered myself that the
hero[33] at Chittaput would, in some measure, have been an example for
us at St. David.
"I must drop this disagreeable subject with the melancholy reflection,
that Fort St. David so lost has given us cause to lament the departure
of the English reputation on the coast of Coromandel. May our future
actions retrieve all!"
In a subsequent part of this letter, Clive gives his opinion, that the
enemy should be met in the field; and, if not, he suggests the measures
that should be taken to promote the success of defensive operations.
"I do not flatter you," he adds, "in saying, I always had the highest
opinion of the strength and activity of your abilities. Let them be
exerted in pursuing vigorous measures; for you may depend upon it, Orme,
if these cautious maxims, which seemed to possess the majority of our
committee when I was with you, still prevail, we shall entail disgrace
upon disgrace on the nation, until we are become the scorn of Hindustan,
and have nothing left us without the walls of Madras. I insist upon it,
victory will not depend upon the trifling odds of a few; good conduct in
the commander, and a determined resolution in the officer and soldier,
will make up for the deficiency, and insure victory to the English over
M. Lally and his rabble—for I can call them by no other name, since I am
well assured the major part of his forces are not much better, being
composed chiefly of foreigners and deserters, raised by subscription:
possibly, the King may have spared the Company some good officers to
head them.
"The China and Bengal ships will bring you a reinforcement of twelve
hundred men, which, added to the garrisons of Madras and Trichinopoly,
will enable you to take the field with two thousand five hundred men.
Our superiority at sea, by the arrival of two seventy-gun ships, and one
fifty, will be beyond dispute. Of consequence, we shall have more
resources than the French: we may remedy the ill consequences of a
check, by having the sea open to us, and the assistance of our squadron.
Our enemies cannot say so much, for, if they should be defeated, they
must be confined within the walls of Pondicherry, and then their
distress for want of money will ruin them, if supplies are not soon
received, which cannot be effected without a superior force at sea, of
which I see but little probability. In the mean time, we can supply you
from hence with every thing you can possibly want. In short, if we look
upon ourselves in any shape a match for our enemies in the field, I am
fully of opinion a battle should be risked: a victory will be of more
consequence than the loss of ten Fort St. Davids. If the old
gentleman[34] take the field, Caillaud should be sent for at all events,
and a commission of Major given him that he may act as second.
"Should an offensive war not be thought prudent, I think methods may be
pursued which will near ruin the enemy without it. A body of Mahrattas
may be taken into pay, which will ravage the country in such a manner as
to prevent the French receiving any revenue from it. This will occasion
them to disband their blacks, and their whites will soon disband
themselves.
"You are acquainted with the disturbances in Golconda, and the
insurrection of the rajahs. I have sent agents there; and you may be
assured, if we remain at peace here (as at present there is the greatest
prospect) I shall send into these parts as large a force as can possibly
be spared, under the command of Colonel Forde. If the country be only
thrown into such confusion as to prevent our enemies collecting the
revenue, the expense and design of the expedition will be answered.
"I have wrote long letters both to Mr. Pocock and Mr. Pigot to enforce
vigorous measures. To the former, I have proposed the destruction of the
French squadron, even if they should be lying under the walls of
Pondicherry."
This letter, probably from the delay of the vessel[35] by which it was
to be forwarded, appears not to have been despatched for twelve days
after it was written; and there is a postscript of the 26th of August
added to it, which is peculiarly illustrative of the uncompromising
character of Clive's mind on those points that related to the duty which
he conceived every individual in the public service owed to the state.
Mr. Orme was his most intimate friend, and, from what he knew him to
have already written, Clive must have viewed him as the person to whose
pen he was to be indebted for his fame with posterity. That he did so,
is proved, indeed, by a letter to Mr. Orme[36] immediately after the
enthronement of Meer Jaffier; in which we find the following paragraph:
"I am possessed of volumes of materials for the continuance of your
History, in which will appear fighting, tricks, chicanery, intrigues,
politics, and the Lord knows what;—in short, there will be a fine field
for you to display your genius in. I shall certainly call at the coast
on my way to England: I have many particulars to explain to you relating
to this said History which must be published." Neither the ties of
friendship, however, nor the expectations of increased fame from the
partial pen of the historian, had sufficient influence to restrain his
free and severe opinion of one of the Council at Madras quitting his
post at such a moment.
"I have learned," Clive states in the postscript, "with great surprise,
from yourself, of your resolution of going home. I suppose it is never
to return. Your leaving the settlement at this juncture of time, when
the service of every individual is wanted, will justly expose you to the
censure and resentment of the Court of Directors."[37]
During these operations on shore, Sir George Pocock had made several
efforts to bring the French fleet to a decisive action; but their
superior sailing, the bad condition of several of the English ships, and
on one occasion the conduct of some of his captains, had always enabled
them to escape. Clive warmly sympathised with his gallant friend, in his
feelings upon these fruitless attempts against the enemy: at the same
time he could not refrain from associating in infamy and disgrace those
who had not supported the Admiral, with those who had surrendered Fort
St. David.