NELSON'S COMMAND OF A DETACHED SQUADRON ON THE RIVIERA OF GENOA, UNTIL
THE DEFEAT OF THE AUSTRIANS AT THE BATTLE OF LOANO.--SIR JOHN JERVIS
APPOINTED COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF IN THE MEDITERRANEAN.
JULY-DECEMBER, 1795. AGE, 37.
After the action of July 13, Nelson was again despatched upon his
mission to co-operate with the Austrians on the Riviera. His orders,
dated July 15, were to confer first with the British minister at
Genoa, and thence to proceed with his squadron to the Austrian
headquarters at Vado Bay. The seniority he had now attained made his
selection for this detached and responsible service less evidently
flattering than Hood's preferment of him to such positions when he was
junior in rank; but the duty had the distinction of being not only
arduous from the purely naval standpoint, but delicate in the
diplomatic management and tact required. Although Great Britain at
that period was rarely slack in resorting to strong and arbitrary
measures in dealing with neutrals, when her interests seemed to demand
it, she was always exceedingly desirous to avoid causes of needless
offence. The exigencies of Southern France, and of both the opposing
armies in the Riviera, had created a busy neutral trade, occupied in
supplying all parties to the war, as well as the inhabitants of
Genoese towns then in military occupation by the French. Although the
latter and the Austrians had both openly disregarded the neutrality of
Genoa, it was the policy of Great Britain now to manifest respect for
it as far as possible, and at the same time not to raise causes of
diplomatic contention over the neutral trade, although this was well
known to be supporting the enemy's army.
When Nelson left the fleet, he had, besides his special orders for his
own mission, a circular letter from the admiral to all vessels under
his command, framed upon instructions received from England a month
before, directing special care "not to give any just cause of offence
to the foreign powers in amity with his Majesty, and whenever any
ships or vessels belonging to the subjects of those powers shall be
detained, or brought by you into port, you are to transmit to the
Secretary of the Admiralty a complete specification of their cargoes,
and not to institute any legal process against such ships or vessels
until their lordships' further pleasure shall be known."
To the naval officers on the spot this order was calculated to
increase vastly the perplexities, which necessarily arose from the
occupation of the Genoese coast by French troops. But, besides
questions of trade, the weaker States, Genoa and Tuscany,--the latter
of which had recently made peace with France,--were driven to manifold
shifts and compromises, in order to maintain in their ports such
semblance of impartial neutrality as would save them from reprisals by
either party. These measures, while insuring to some extent the end in
view, gave rise also to a good deal of friction and recrimination
between the neutral and the belligerents. The vessels of the latter
were admitted, under certain limitations as to number, into the
neutral port, where they lay nearly side by side, jealously watching
each other, and taking note of every swerving, real or presumed, from
an exact and even balance. Each sailed from the neutral port to carry
on war, but it is obvious that the shelter of such a port was far more
useful to the belligerent who did not control the water, who moved
upon it only by evasion and stealth, and who was therefore tempted, in
order to improve such advantages, to stretch to the verge of abuse
the privileges permitted to him by the neutral. "The Genoese allow the
French," wrote Nelson, "to have some small vessels in the port of
Genoa, that I have seen towed out of the port, and board vessels
coming in, and afterwards return into the mole; the conduct of the
English is very different." He elsewhere allows, however, that, "in
the opinion of the Genoese, my squadron is constantly offending; so
that it almost appears a trial between us, who shall first be tired,
they of complaining, or me of answering them."
After the first successes of the Austrians and Sardinians, in the
previous June, the French commander-in-chief, Kellerman, feeling his
inferiority to be such as compelled him to a defensive attitude, had
carefully selected the most advanced line that he thought could be
held. His right rested upon the sea, near the village of Borghetto,
some fifty or sixty miles east of Nice, extending thence to and across
the mountains, to Ormea. The Austrian front was parallel, in a general
sense, to that of the enemy, and a couple of leagues to the eastward;
thus securing for the British Vado Bay, considered the best anchorage
between Genoa and Nice. In rear of Vado, to the eastward, and on the
coast road, lay the fortress of Savona, esteemed by Bonaparte of the
first importance to an army operating in the Riviera and dependent
upon the control of the road. The town was occupied by the Austrians,
but they were excluded from the citadel by Genoese troops,--a
condition of weakness in case of sudden retreat. It ought, said
Bonaparte, to be the object of all the enemy's efforts. In these
positions, both armies depended for supplies partly upon the sea,
partly upon the land road along the Riviera. Across the mountains, in
Piedmont, lay the Sardinian forces, extending perpendicularly to the
main front of the French operations, and, so far as position went,
threatening their communications by the narrow land road. The
character of the ground intervening between the French and Austrians
rendered an attack upon either line, once fairly established, very
difficult; and it was doubtless a fault in the Austrian commander, De
Vins, while superior in force, to allow the enemy to strengthen
himself in a position which at the first had its weak points; the more
so as the plainly approaching peace between Spain and France foretold
that the Army of Italy would soon be reinforced. Having, however, made
this mistake, the Austrian settled himself in his works, shrugged the
responsibility off his own shoulders, and awaited that either the
Sardinians by land, or the British by sea, should, by choking the
communications of the French, compel them to abandon their lines.
Such was the situation when Nelson, on the 21st of July, had his first
interview with De Vins; on the 22d peace between Spain and France was
formally concluded. Within a month, Bonaparte, who then occupied a
prominent position in Paris, as military adviser to the Government,
was writing: "Peace with Spain makes offensive war in Piedmont
certain; my plan is being discussed; Vado will soon be taken;" and a
few days later, on the 25th of August, "Troops from Spain are marching
to Italy." It was incumbent upon the French to repossess Vado, for, by
affording safe anchorage to small hostile cruisers, it effectually
stopped the trade with Genoa. De Vins had there equipped several
privateers, under the Austrian flag. Of it Bonaparte said: "By
intercepting the coasters from Italy, it has suspended our commerce,
stopped the arrival of provisions, and obliged us to supply Toulon
from the interior of the Republic. It is recognized that our commerce
and subsistence require that communication with Genoa be promptly
opened." Having in view Bonaparte's remarkable campaign of the
following year, and the fact that Vado was now held in force by the
Austrians, the importance of British co-operation by the fleet, at
this critical moment, becomes strikingly apparent. The future thus
throws back a ray of illuminating significance upon the otherwise
paltry and obscure campaign of 1795, dragging out into broad daylight
the full meaning of lost opportunities in the early year, and of
Nelson's strenuous efforts in his detached command.
Immediately upon his arrival in Genoa, on July 17, the effect of the
neutral trade, if unchecked, upon the operations of both armies, was
brought before him by the British minister. Unless the supplies thus
received by the French could be stopped, the Austrian general would
not only be unable to advance, but feared he could not hold his
present position. If, on the other hand, the forage and grain thus
brought to them could be intercepted, they would be forced to retreat,
and there were hopes that the Austrians might reach Nice before
winter, thus covering the excellent and advanced harbor of
Villefranche as an anchorage for their British allies. Nelson readily
understood the situation, and admitted the necessity of the service
demanded of his squadron, which was simply a blow at the enemy's
communications; but he pointed out to the minister that the circular
instructions, before quoted, tied his hands. Not only would the
ordinary difficulties of proving the ownership and destination of a
cargo give rise to the usual vexatious disputes, and irritate
neutrals, contrary to the spirit of the order; but there was a
particular complication in this instance, arising from the occupation
of Genoese towns by French troops, and from the close proximity of the
neutral and hostile seaboards. These embarrassments might be met, were
it permissible to sell the cargoes, and hold the money value, subject
to the decision of an admiralty court upon the propriety of the
seizure; but this the circular explicitly forbade, until the case was
referred to England. If the decision there was adverse to the captors,
the other party would look to the responsible naval officer for
pecuniary redress, and as, during the delay, the cargo would be
spoiled, costs could come only out of the captor's pocket. Nelson's
experiences in the West Indies, ten years before, naturally made him
cautious about further legal annoyances.
All this he stated with his usual lucidity; but the case was one in
which his course could have been safely predicted by a person familiar
with his character. The need for the proposed action was evident. "The
whole of the necessity of stopping all the vessels is comprised in a
very few words: that, if we will not stop supplies of corn, etc.,
going to France, the armies will return from whence they came, and the
failure of this campaign, from which so much is expected, will be laid
to our want of energy; for the only use of the naval co-operation is
the keeping out a supply of provisions." He therefore, after a night's
reflection, told the minister that if he would tell him, officially,
that it was for the benefit of his Majesty's service that he should
stop all trade between the neutral towns and France, and places
occupied by the armies of France, he would give the proper directions
for that purpose. It would have been possible for him, though with
some delay, to refer the matter to Hotham, but he knew the latter's
temperament, and distrusted it. "Our admiral has no political courage
whatever," he wrote to Collingwood, "and is alarmed at the mention of
any strong measure; but, in other respects, he is as good a man as can
possibly be." With a superior so little decided, it was better, by his
own independent initiative, to create a situation, which the former
would be as backward to reverse as he would have been to change the
previous and wholly different state of things. Like the American
frontiersman, whose motto was, "Be sure you're right, then go ahead,"
Nelson, when convinced, knew no hesitations; but further, he
unquestionably derived keen enjoyment from the sense that the thing
done involved risk to himself, appealed to and brought into play his
physical or moral courage, in the conscious exercise of which he
delighted. "I am acting, not only without the orders of my
commander-in-chief, but in some measure contrary to them. However, I
have not only the support of his Majesty's ministers, both at Turin
and Genoa, but a consciousness that I am doing what is right and
proper for the service of our King and Country. Political courage in
an officer abroad is as highly necessary as military courage." "The
orders I have given are strong, and I know not how my admiral will
approve of them, for they are, in a great measure, contrary to those
he gave me; but the service requires strong and vigorous measures to
bring the war to a conclusion."
The case bore some resemblance to that in which he had disobeyed
Hughes in the West Indies; but the disregard of the superior's orders
on the earlier occasion was more direct, and the necessity for it less
urgent. In both he disobeyed first, and referred afterwards, and in
both his action was practically sustained; for, whatever the technical
fault, the course taken was the one demanded by the needs of the
situation. It is possible to recognize the sound policy, the moral
courage, and the correctness of such a step in the particular
instance, without at all sanctioning the idea that an officer may be
justified in violating orders, because he thinks it right. The
justification rests not upon what he thinks, but upon the attendant
circumstances which prove that he _is_ right; and, if he is mistaken,
if the conditions have not warranted the infraction of the fundamental
principle of military efficiency,--obedience,--he must take the full
consequences of his error, however honest he may have been. Nor can
the justification of disobedience fairly rest upon any happy
consequences that follow upon it, though it is a commonplace to say
that the result is very apt to determine the question of reward or
blame. There is a certain confusion of thought prevalent on this
matter, most holding the rule of obedience too absolutely, others
tending to the disorganizing view that the integrity of the intention
is sufficient; the practical result, and for the average man the
better result, being to shun the grave responsibility of departing
from the letter of the order. But all this only shows more clearly the
great professional courage and professional sagacity of Nelson, that
he so often assumed such a responsibility, and so generally--with,
perhaps, but a single exception--was demonstrably correct in his
action.
Hotham in this case very heartily approved what had been done, and
issued, to the fleet in general, orders similar to those given by
Nelson; but he did not like the difficulties that surrounded the
question of co-operation, and left the conduct of affairs on the spot
wholly to his eager and enterprising subordinate. The latter directed
the seizure of all vessels laden with corn for France or the French
armies, an order that was construed to apply to the Genoese towns
occupied by them. The cargoes appear to have been sold and the money
held. The cruisers in his command were stationed along the Riviera,
east and west of Genoa itself. Those to the eastward, in the
neighborhood of Spezia, where no French were, gave great offence to
the Government of the Republic, which claimed that their chief city
was blockaded; but Nelson refused to remove them. They are not
blockading Genoa, he said, but simply occupying the station best
suited to intercept a contraband trade. The various British vessels
displayed the full activity that might have been expected from the
character of their leader, and the pressure was speedily felt by the
enemy, and by the neutrals whose lucrative trade was summarily
interrupted. The traffic in vessels of any considerable size,
sea-going vessels, soon ceased, and Nelson entertained at first great
hopes of decisive results from the course adopted by him. "We have
much power here at present to do great things, if we know how to apply
it," he wrote, after being ten days on the ground; and at the end of a
month, "The strong orders which I judged it proper to give on my first
arrival, have had an extraordinary good effect; the French army is now
supplied with almost daily bread from Marseilles; not a single boat
has passed with corn." The enemy themselves admitted the stringency of
their situation. But Nelson had yet to learn how ingenuity and
enterprise could find a way of eluding his care. The coasting-trade
soon began to take on a large development. The Spaniards, now at peace
with France, supplied Marseilles, and from both that port and Genoa
grain was carried by small boats, that could be moved by oar as well
as sail, could hug closely the rocky shore, and run readily under the
batteries with which the French had covered the small bays of the
western Riviera, whither the cruisers could not follow. The operations
of the latter, dependent only upon their canvas, could not always be
extended to within easy gunshot of the beach, along which the
blockade-runners kept, usually under cover of night.
Hence, although seriously inconvenienced, the French did not find
their position untenable. There were two ways by which the pressure
might be increased. A flotilla of small vessels, similar to the
coasters themselves, but armed and heavily manned, might keep close in
with the points which the latter had to round, and prevent their
passage; but the British had no such vessels at their disposal, and,
even if they had, the operations would be exposed to danger from the
weather upon a hostile, iron-bound coast, whose shelter was forbidden
them by the enemy's guns. The Neapolitans had such a flotilla, and it
seems probable that its co-operation was asked, for Nelson speaks of
it as a desirable aid on the 23d of August; but it did not actually
join him until the 15th of September, when the season for its acting
was almost past. "Had I the flotilla," wrote he, "nothing should be on
this coast. A few weeks more and they will not stay a night at sea to
save an empire." Prior to its arrival the British attempted to harass
the traffic with their ships' boats, but these were undecked, and of
limited capacity compared to those against which they were to act.
They were occasionally successful, but the results were too uncertain
and hazardous to warrant perseverance, although Bonaparte had to admit
that "The audacity of the English boats and the indolence of the
Genoese, who allow their own vessels to be taken in their own roads,
make it necessary to erect a battery for hot shot at a proper point,
which you will exact shall be done by the governor of San Remo."
Nelson's active mind, clinging with its usual accurate insight to the
decisive factor in the situation, now fixed upon the idea of seizing a
suitable point upon the Riviera to the westward of the French, upon
their line of communication with Nice. A body of troops there, strong
enough to hold the position, would stop the passage of supplies by
land, and, if they controlled an anchorage, a condition indispensable
to their support,--and to their retreat, if necessary to retire,--the
small vessels based upon that could better interrupt the coasting
business. In pursuance of this plan, he in the first week of September
made a cruise with the "Agamemnon" as far to the westward as Nice,
reconnoitring carefully all recesses of the shore line that seemed
available for the purpose. Upon his return, he wrote to De Vins what
he had done, and described San Remo as the only available spot. He
mentioned its disadvantages as well as its advantages, but undertook
positively to land there five thousand men with field-guns, and
provisions for a few days, to maintain their supplies by sea, and to
cover their embarkation in case retreat became imperative. In short,
he guaranteed to land such a force safely, and to be responsible for
its communications; for both which he practically pledged his
professional reputation. He added, what was indisputable, that the
French army must abandon its present lines for want of supplies, if
San Remo were held for some time.
De Vins replied on the 14th of September, expressing his interest in
the matter thus broached to him, but carefully evading the issue. He
addressed his remarks to the comparative merits of Vado and San Remo
as anchorages, upon which Nelson had touched barely, and only
incidentally, for the gist of his proposal was simply to intercept the
enemy's communications; if this were feasible, all other
considerations were subsidiary and matters of detail. San Remo was
admitted to be the poorer anchorage, unfit for the fleet, but open to
small vessels, which could carry the supplies to the Austrian
detachment, and stop those of the enemy. The move proposed was
intended to effect by sea, substantially, the object which De Vins
himself had told Nelson, three weeks before, that he was trying to
secure through the co-operation of the Sardinian land forces. "He has
been long expecting," wrote Nelson on the 13th of August, "an attack
by General Colli with the Piedmontese near Ormea, directly back from
Vintimiglia. This is the great point to be carried, as the Piedmontese
army would then get Vintimiglia, and ... probably, unless the enemy
are very active, their retreat to Nice will be cut off. De Vins says
he has flattered and abused the Piedmontese and Neapolitans, but
nothing will induce them to act." Colli was a good soldier, but his
relations with the Austrian were very strained, and coalitions rarely
act cordially. This plan, however, becoming known to the French, was
commended by Bonaparte as well conceived. "We have examined
attentively the project attributed to the enemy in the enclosed note.
We have found it conformable to his real interests, and to the present
distribution of his troops. The heights of Briga are in truth the key
to the Department of the Maritime Alps, since from there the high-road
may be intercepted and we be obliged to evacuate Tende. We charge you
to pay serious attention to this matter."[32] Disappointed in
Sardinian support, Nelson and De Vins had then discussed a plan, of
which the former's present proposal was the very clear and practical
outcome. Some risk must be run, he said; but De Vins, when it came to
the point, saw the dangers too plainly. He did not distinctly refuse,
but talked only, and instead of San Remo proposed to land west of
Nice, between it and the Var. Nothing, however, was done, or even
attempted, and Hotham refused co-operation.
Having regard to the decisive effect exercised upon any strategic
position, or movement, by a valid threat against the
communications,--considering, for example, the vital influence which
the French occupation of Genoa in 1800 had upon the campaign which
terminated at Marengo,--it is impossible to speak otherwise than with
respect of this proposal of Nelson's. Nevertheless, serious reflection
can scarcely fail to affirm that it was not really practicable. There
is an immeasurable difference between the holding of a strongly
fortified city with an army corps, and the mere seizure of a
comparatively open position by a detachment, which, if it means to
remain, must have time to fortify itself, in order to withstand the
overwhelming numbers that the enemy must at once throw upon it. The
time element, too, is of the utmost importance. It is one thing to
grasp a strong position with a few men, expecting to hold it for some
hours, to delay an advance or a retreat until other forces can come
into play, and quite another to attempt to remain permanently and
unsupported in such a situation. In the case before us, De Vins would
have landed five thousand men in a comparatively exposed position;
for, although the town of San Remo was in possession of the French,
who might be driven out for the moment, the only strong point, the
citadel, was occupied--as in the case of Savona, to the eastward of
the Austrians--by the Genoese, who would doubtless have refused
admission. Before his main body would still lie the works which the
French had been diligently strengthening for more than two months, and
which, with his whole force in hand, he did not care to assail. The
enemy, knowing him thus weakened, could well afford to spare a number
greatly superior to the detachment he had adventured, certain that,
while they were dislodging it, he could make no serious impression
upon their lines. As for retreat and embarkation under cover of the
guns of a squadron, when pressed by an enemy, the operation is too
critical to be hazarded for less than the greatest ends, and with at
least a fair possibility of success for the undertaking whose failure
would entail it.
Nelson's confidence in himself and in his profession, and his accurate
instinct that war cannot be made without running risks, combined with
his lack of experience in the difficulties of land operations to
mislead his judgment in the particular instance. In a converse sense,
there may be applied to him the remark of the French naval critic,
that Napoleon lacked "le sentiment exact des difficultés de la
marine." It was not only to British seamen, and to the assured control
of the sea, that Nelson thought such an attempt offered reasonable
prospect of success. He feared a like thing might be effected by the
French,--by evasion. "If the enemy's squadron comes on this coast, and
lands from three to four thousand men between Genoa and Savona, I am
confident that either the whole Austrian army will be defeated, or
must inevitably retreat into Piedmont, and abandon their artillery and
stores." These words, the substance of which he frequently repeats,
though written immediately before the disastrous Battle of Loano, do
not apply to the purpose entertained by the French on that occasion,
of endeavoring, by a small detachment at Voltri, to check the Austrian
retreat till their pursuers came up. He is contemplating a much more
considerable and sustained effort, strategic in character, and
identical in aim with his own proposal to De Vins about San Remo. It
is clear that Nelson, in his day, did not attach absolute deterrent
effect to a fleet in being, even to such an one as the British then
had in the Mediterranean. Important a factor as it was, it might
conceivably be disregarded, by a leader who recognized that the end in
view justified the risk.
There was yet another motive actuating Nelson in his present
proposals. Justly impatient of the delays and colorless policy of both
De Vins and the British leaders, he foresaw that the latter would be
made to take the blame, if the campaign proved abortive or disastrous.
The Austrians had at least something to show. They had advanced, and
they had seized Vado Bay, cutting off the intercourse between Genoa
and France, which Bonaparte deemed so important, and at the same time
securing an anchorage for the fleet. The latter had done nothing,
although its co-operation had been promised; except Nelson's little
squadron, in which was but one small ship-of-the-line out of the
twenty-three under Hotham's command, it had not been seen.[33] Nelson
was determined, as far as in him lay, to remove all grounds for
reproach. He urged the admiral to send him more ships, and abounded in
willingness towards De Vins. For the latter he had at first felt the
esteem and confidence which he almost invariably showed, even to the
point of weakness, towards those associated with him; but he now
became distrustful, and devoted himself to stopping every loophole of
excuse which might afterwards be converted into reproaches to the
navy.
The cause for the inadequacy of the force left under his command, of
which he often complains, is not apparent. The question was put direct
to the admiral whether he would co-operate with the fleet in the
proposed descent of the Austrians. He said that he could not, owing to
the nature of his instructions from home; but that he would answer
for it that the French navy should not interfere. Six weeks later the
question was repeated; but the admiral replied that, after a
consultation with the flag-officers under his command, he refused
co-operation in what he considered a wild scheme. In this opinion he
was probably right, though Nelson possibly was reminded of Dundas's
objections to besieging Bastia. Nelson then went in person to Leghorn,
and saw Hotham. He asked to be given two seventy-fours and the
transports, to make the attempt himself. Hotham again refused a single
ship; but not only so, reduced Nelson's squadron, and ordered him, in
addition to his present duties, to reconnoitre Toulon continually,
"whilst he," said Nelson, scornfully, "lies quiet in Leghorn Roads."
It would almost seem as if the admiral thought that the time had come
for a little judicious snubbing, and repression of ardor in the
uncomfortable subordinate, whose restless energy conflicted so much
with his repose of mind. The fleet spent its time chiefly in San
Fiorenzo Bay or in Leghorn, making occasional cruises off Toulon to
observe the French navy in that port. The latter was undoubtedly its
principal care; but, being distinctly inferior to the British, it is
impossible to say why Nelson should not have been reinforced. If it
was due to the wish to continue so largely superior in numbers, it
certainly illustrates with singular appositeness the deterrent effect
of an inferior "fleet in being," and that that effect lies less in the
nature of things than in the character of the officer upon whom it is
produced. Moreover, the employment of adequate force upon the Riviera,
in active aggressive work under Nelson during the summer, when it was
practicable to do so, would have compelled the French fleet to come
out and fight, or the French army to fall back.
On the 1st of November Hotham struck his flag in Genoa, and departed,
bequeathing to his successors a military estate encumbered by the old
mortgage of the French fleet, still in being, which he might have
cleared off, and by a new one in the numerous and powerful batteries
of the Riviera, built and controlled by troops whose presence to erect
them might have been prevented by a timely action on his part. The
harm, being done, was thenceforth irreparable. As time passed, the
situation became more and more favorable to the French. The
reinforcements from Spain arrived, and gunboats and flatboats, fitted
out at Toulon, began to come upon the scene. Their appearance revived,
in Nelson the apprehension, so consonant to his military ideas at this
time, of an attempt upon the coast road in rear of the Austrians. He
even feared for Genoa itself, and for the "Agamemnon," while she lay
there, as the result of such a dash. The recurrence of this
prepossession is illustrative of his view of possibilities. The true
and primary object of the French was to consolidate their
communications; nor, with Bonaparte in the influential position he
then occupied, was any such ex-centric movement likely. For useful
purposes, Genoa was already at his disposal; the French subsistence
department was, by his plans, to collect there rations of corn for
sixty thousand men for three months, preparatory to an advance. For
the same object the coasting activity redoubled along the Riviera,
from Toulon to the French front. By November 1st a hundred
sail--transports and small ships of war--had assembled fifteen miles
behind Borghetto, in Alassio Bay, whither Nelson had chased them.
Depots and supplies were collecting there for the prospective
movement. Nelson offered to enter the bay with three
ships-of-the-line, specified by name, and to destroy them; but this
was declined by Sir Hyde Parker, who had temporarily succeeded Hotham
in command, and who at a later day, in the Baltic, was to check some
of Nelson's finest inspirations. "I pretend not to say," wrote the
latter, a month afterwards, when the Austrians had been driven from
their lines, "that the Austrians would not have been beat had not the
gunboats harassed them, for, on my conscience, I believe they would;
but I believe the French would not have attacked had we destroyed all
the vessels of war, transports, etc." As to the practicability of
destroying them, Nelson's judgment can safely be accepted, subject
only to the chances which are inseparable from war.
So far from reinforcing the squadron on the Riviera, Sir Hyde Parker
first reduced it, and then took away the frigates at this critical
moment, when the indications of the French moving were becoming
apparent in an increase of boldness. Their gunboats, no longer
confining themselves to the convoy of coasters, crept forward at times
to molest the Austrians, where they rested on the sea. Nelson had no
similar force to oppose to them, except the Neapolitans, whom he
ordered to act, but with what result is not clear. At the same time
the French partisans in Genoa became very threatening. On the 10th of
November a party of three hundred, drawn from the ships in the port,
landed at Voltri, about nine miles from Genoa, seized a magazine of
corn, and an Austrian commissary with £10,000 in his charge. The place
was quickly retaken, but the effrontery of the attempt from a neutral
port showed the insecurity of the conditions. At the same time a rumor
spread that a force of between one and two thousand men, partly
carried from Genoa in the French ships of war then lying there, partly
stealing along shore in coasters from Borghetto, was to seize a post
near Voltri, and hold it. Nelson was informed that men were absolutely
being recruited on the Exchange of Genoa for this expedition. When the
attack at Voltri was made, the "Agamemnon" was lying in Vado Bay.
Leaving a frigate there, Nelson started immediately for Genoa, in
order, by the presence of a superior naval force and the fear of
retaliation, both to compel the Republic to have its neutrality
observed, and to check similar undertakings in the future. The
"Agamemnon" was laid across the harbor's mouth, and no French vessel
was allowed to sail. Urgent representations were made to Nelson by
the Austrian minister and commander-in-chief, that, if the ship were
withdrawn, the consequences to the army would be most serious.
Contrary, therefore, to his personal inclinations, which were always
to be at the front, he remained, although the demonstrations of the
gunboats continued, and it was evident that they would at least annoy
the Austrian flank in case of an assault. The latter evil, however,
was much less disquieting than a descent on the army's line of
retreat, at the same moment that it was assailed in front in force;
and it was evident that the Austrian general was feeling an
uneasiness, the full extent of which he did not betray. De Vins had by
this time quitted his command, ill, and had been succeeded by General
Wallis.
In this condition of affairs, a general attack upon the Austrian
positions was made by the French on the morning of November 24. As had
been feared, the gunboats took part, in the absence of any British
ships,--the frigate having been removed, Nelson asserts, without his
knowledge; but the matter was of very secondary importance, for the
weight of the enemy's attack fell upon the positions in the mountains,
the centre and right, which were routed and driven back. Swinging
round to their own right, towards the sea, the victorious French
pushed after the disordered enemy, seeking to intercept their retreat
by the coast. Had there then been established, in a well-chosen point
of that narrow road, a resolute body of men, even though small, they
might well have delayed the fliers until the main body of the pursuers
came up; but the presence of the "Agamemnon" controlled the departure
of the intended expedition from Genoa, upon which alone, as an
organized effort, the projected obstruction depended. Thus she was the
efficient cause, as Nelson claimed, that many thousands of Austrians
escaped capture. As it was, they lost in this affair, known as the
Battle of Loano, seven thousand men, killed, wounded, or prisoners.
The entire Riviera was abandoned, and they retreated across the
Apennines into Piedmont.
When things go wrong, there is always a disposition on the part of
each one concerned to shift the blame. The Austrians had complained
before the action, and still more afterwards, of the failure of the
fleet to aid them. Nelson thought their complaint well founded. "They
say, and true, they were brought on the coast at the express desire of
the English, to co-operate with the fleet, which fleet nor admiral
they never saw." On his own part he said: "Our admirals will have, I
believe, much to answer for in not giving me that force which I so
repeatedly called for, and for at last leaving me with Agamemnon
alone. Admiral Hotham kept my squadron too small for its duty; and the
moment Sir Hyde took the command of the fleet he reduced it to
nothing,--only one frigate and a brig; whereas I demanded two
seventy-four-gun ships and eight or ten frigates and sloops to insure
safety to the army."
It is unnecessary to inquire into the motives of the two admirals for
the distribution of their force. Unquestionably, the first thing for
them to do was to destroy or neutralize the French fleet; and next to
destroy, or at least impede, the communications of the French army.
That it was possible to do this almost wholly may be rested upon the
authority of Nelson, whose matured opinion, given five years later,
has already been quoted. Two opportunities to cripple the Toulon fleet
were lost; but even so, after the junction of Man, in June, the
superiority over it was so great that much might have been spared to
the Riviera squadron. The coast was not at this time so extensively
fortified that coasting could not, in Nelson's active hands, have been
made a very insufficient means of supply. As an illustration of the
operations then possible, on the 26th of August, six weeks after the
naval battle of July 13, the "Agamemnon," with her little squadron,
anchored in the Bay of Alassio, three cables' length from the fort in
the centre of the town, and with her boats took possession of all the
French vessels in the harbor. Two months later, so much had the place
been strengthened, he could not vouch for success with less than three
ships-of-the-line; but had the pressure been consistently applied
during those months, the French position would long before have become
untenable. That a shore line, by great and systematic effort, could be
rendered secure throughout for coasters, was proved by Napoleon's
measures to cover the concentration of the Boulogne flotilla in
1803-5; but such conditions did not obtain between Nice and Vado in
1795.
Despite the abortive and ignominious ending to the campaign, Nelson's
own reputation issued from it not only unscathed, but heightened; and
this is saying much, for, although due public recognition of his
services had scarcely been extended,--except in conferring the Marines
upon him,--he had already, before its beginning, made upon all who
were brought into contact with him that impression of unusual
efficiency, zeal, and sound judgment, to which subsequent employment
and opportunity apply a sure and searching test. As he entered upon
his detached duties, the Viceroy of Corsica, who had necessarily seen
and known much of his past conduct, wrote to him thus: "Give me leave,
my dear Sir, to congratulate you on the Agamemnon's supporting
uniformly, on all occasions, the same reputation which has always
distinguished that ship since I have been in the Mediterranean. It
gives me great pleasure also to see you employed in your present
important service, which requires zeal, activity, and a spirit of
accommodation and co-operation, qualities which will not be wanting in
the Commodore of your squadron. I consider the business you are about,
I mean the expulsion of the enemy from the Genoese and Piedmontese
territories, as the most important feature in the southern campaign."
These anticipations of worthy service and exceptional merit were
confirmed, after all the misfortunes and disappointments of the
campaign, by the singularly competent judgment of the new
commander-in-chief, Sir John Jervis. The latter at his first interview
with Nelson, nearly two months after his arrival on the station, so
that time enough had elapsed to mature his opinion, asked him to
remain under his command, as a junior admiral, when he received his
promotion. Having regard to Jervis's own high endowments, it was not
then in the power of the British Navy to pay an officer of Nelson's
rank a higher compliment.
During these months of service upon the Riviera, there occurred an
incident, which, from the reflection made upon Nelson's integrity,
drew from him a letter, struck off at such white heat, and so
transparently characteristic of his temperament, aspirations, and
habit of thought, as to merit quotation. A report had been spread that
the commanders of the British ships of war connived at the entry of
supply-vessels into the ports held by the French, and a statement to
that effect was forwarded to the Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs. The latter sent the paper, for investigation, to the Minister
to Genoa, who mentioned its tenor to Nelson. The latter, justly
stigmatizing the conduct imputed to him and his officers as
"scandalous and infamous," requested a copy of the accusation, in
order that by his refutation he might convince the King, that he was
"an officer who had ever pursued the road of honour, very different
from that to wealth." Having received the copy, he wrote to the
Secretary as follows:--
AGAMEMNON, GENOA ROAD, 23d November, 1795.
MY LORD,--Having received, from Mr. Drake, a copy of your
Lordship's letter to him of October, enclosing a paper highly
reflecting on the honour of myself and other of His Majesty's
Officers employed on this Coast under my Orders, it well becomes
me, as far as in my power lies, to wipe away this ignominious
stain on our characters. I do, therefore, in behalf of myself,
and much injured Brethren, demand, that the person, whoever he
may be, that wrote, or gave that paper to your Lordship, do
fully, and expressly bring home his charge; which, as he states
that this agreement is made by numbers of people on both sides,
there can be no difficulty in doing. We dare him, my Lord, to
the proof. If he cannot, I do most humbly implore, that His
Majesty will be most graciously pleased to direct his
Attorney-General to prosecute this infamous libeller in His
Courts of Law; and I likewise feel, that, without impropriety, I
may on behalf of my brother Officers, demand the support of His
Majesty's Ministers: for as, if true, no punishment can be too
great for the traitors; so, if false, none can be too heavy for
the villain, who has dared to allow his pen to write such a
paper. Perhaps I ought to stop my letter here; but I feel too
much to rest easy for a moment, when the honour of the Navy, and
our Country, is struck at through us; for if nine [ten]
Captains, whom chance has thrown together, can instantly join in
such a traitorous measure, it is fair to conclude we are all
bad.
As this traitorous agreement could not be carried on but by
concert of all the Captains, if they were on the Stations
allotted them, and as they could only be drawn from those
Stations by orders from me, I do most fully acquit all my
brother Captains from such a combination, and have to request,
that I may be considered as the only responsible person for what
is done under my command, if I approve of the conduct of those
under my orders, which in this most public manner I beg leave to
do: for Officers more alert, and more anxious for the good, and
honour, of their King and Country, can scarcely ever fall to the
lot of any Commanding Officer: their Names I place at the bottom
of this letter.
For myself, from my earliest youth I have been in the Naval
Service; and in two Wars, have been in more than one hundred and
forty Skirmishes and Battles, at Sea and on shore; have lost an
eye, and otherwise blood, in fighting the Enemies of my King and
Country; and, God knows, instead of riches, my little fortune
has been diminished in the Service: but I shall not trouble your
Lordship further at present, than just to say--that at the close
of this Campaign, where I have had the pleasure to receive the
approbation of the Generals of the Allied Powers; of his
Excellency Mr. Drake, who has always been on the spot; of Mr.
Trevor, who has been at a distance; when I expected and hoped,
from the representation of His Majesty's Ministers, that His
Majesty would have most graciously condescended to have
favourably noticed my earnest desire to serve Him, and when,
instead of all my fancied approbation, to receive an accusation
of a most traitorous nature--it has almost been too much for me
to bear. Conscious innocence, I hope, will support me.
I have the honour to be,
My Lord,
Your Lordship's most obedient, humble servant,
HORATIO NELSON.
Except this vexatious but passing cloud, his service upon the Riviera,
despite the procrastinations and final failure of his associates in
the campaign, was pleasant both personally and officially. He earned
the warm esteem of all with whom he acted, notably the British
ministers at Turin and Genoa; and though necessarily in constant
collision with the Genoese authorities upon international questions,
he upheld the interests and policy of his own government, without
entailing upon it serious cause of future reclamations and
disputes.[34] Hotham's very indifference and lethargy, while crippling
his enterprise, increased his independence. "I cannot get Hotham on
the coast," he said, "for he hates this co-operation;" but he owns to
the fear that the admiral, if he came, might overrule his projects.
The necessity for exertion delighted him. "My command here is so far
pleasant," he wrote to his friend Collingwood, "as it relieves me from
the inactivity of our fleet, which is great indeed, as you will soon
see." "At present," he tells his wife, "I do not write less than from
ten to twenty letters every day; which, with the Austrian general, and
aide-de-camps, and my own little squadron, fully employ my time: this
I like; active service or none." As usual, when given room for the
exercise of his powers, he was, for him, well. He had a severe attack
of illness very soon after assuming the duty--"a complaint in the
breast"--the precursor perhaps of the similar trouble from which he
suffered so much in later years; but it wore off after an acute attack
of a fortnight, and he wrote later that, except being at home, he knew
no country so pleasant to serve in, nor where his health was so good.
This well-grounded preference for the Mediterranean, as best suited to
his naturally frail constitution, remained with him to the end.
Besides his official correspondence, he wrote freely and fully to
those at home, unburdening to them the thoughts, cares, and
disappointments of his career, as well as the commendations he
received, so dear to himself as well as to them. Mrs. Nelson and his
father lived together, and to her most of his home letters were
addressed. "I have been very negligent," he admits to her, "in writing
to my father, but I rest assured he knows I would have done it long
ago, had you not been under the same roof.... Pray draw on me," he
continues, "for £200, my father and myself can settle our accounts
when we meet; at present, I believe I am the richer man, therefore I
desire you will give my dear father that money." One wonders whether,
in the slightly peremptory tone of the last sentence, is to be seen a
trace of the feeling she is said, by one biographer, to have shown,
that he was too liberal to his relatives; an indication of that lack
of sympathy, which, manifested towards other traits of his, no less
marked than openhandedness, struck a jarring note within him, and
possibly paved the way to an indifference which ended so unfortunately
for both. An absent husband, however, very possibly failed to realize
what his extreme generosity might mean, to one who had to meet
household expenses with narrow means.
The political surmises with which his correspondence at this period
abounds were often crude, though not infrequently also characterized
by the native sagacity of his intellect, as yet undisciplined, and to
some extent deficient in data for accurate forecasts. The erroneous
military conception which colored much of his thought, the
propositions for ex-centric movements in an enemy's rear, by bodies
comparatively small, out of supporting distance from the rest of the
army, and resting upon no impregnable base, contributed greatly to the
faulty anticipations entertained and expressed by him from time to
time. When applied to operations directed by the consummate and highly
trained genius of Bonaparte, speculations so swayed naturally flew
wide of the mark. His sanguine disposition to think the best of all
persons and all things--except Frenchmen--made him also a ready prey
to the flattering rumors of which war is ever fertile. These
immaturities will be found to disappear, as his sphere widens and his
responsibilities increase.
After the close of the campaign, Nelson made a short cruise from Genoa
to the westward, seeing the French on November 29 in full possession
of Vado Bay. He then went to Leghorn, where he arrived on the 6th of
December and remained till the middle of January, repairing, to make
the "Agamemnon" "as fit for sea as a rotten ship can be." The longing
for rest and for home, after nearly three years' absence, was again
strong upon him in this moment of relaxation. "I fear our new admiral
is willing to keep me with him," he wrote to his brother. "He has
wrote me, I am sorry to say, a most nattering letter, and I hear I am
to be offered St. George or Zealous [much larger ships], but, in my
present mind, I shall take neither. My wish is to see England once
more, and I want a few weeks' rest." But here again, having regard to
that fame which was to him most dear, he was mistaken, as he now owned
he had been in the wish, a year before, to accompany Lord Hood on his
return. In Sir John Jervis he was to meet, not only one of the most
accomplished and resolute officers of the British Navy, closely akin
to himself in enterprise and fearlessness, though without his
exceptional genius, but also a man capable of appreciating perfectly
the extraordinary powers of his subordinate, and of disregarding every
obstacle and all clamor, in the determination to utilize his qualities
to the full, for the good of the nation.
FOOTNOTES:
[32] Correspondance de Napoléon, August 30, 1795. The letter was from
Bonaparte's hand, though signed by the Committee of Public Safety.
[33] The fleet passed once, August 14, in sight of Vado Bay. Nelson went on
board, and tried to induce Hotham to go in and meet De Vins. He refused,
saying he must go to Leghorn, but would return, and water the fleet in
Vado; but he never came.
[34] A year later, when all his transactions with Genoa as an independent
republic were concluded, Nelson received from the British Minister of
Foreign Affairs, through the Admiralty, the following strong and
comprehensive endorsement of his political conduct:--
"I esteem it an act of justice due to that officer, to inform your
lordships that His Majesty has been graciously pleased entirely to approve
of the conduct of Commodore Nelson in all his transactions with the
Republic of Genoa. I have the honour to be, &c, &c. GRENVILLE."
The First Lord of the Admiralty about the same time expressed "the great
satisfaction derived here from the very spirited, and at the same time
dignified and temperate manner, in which your conduct has been marked both
at Leghorn and Genoa."