NELSON'S SERVICES WITH THE FLEET IN THE MEDITERRANEAN UNDER ADMIRAL
HOTHAM.--PARTIAL FLEET ACTIONS OF MARCH 13 AND 14, AND JULY
13.--NELSON ORDERED TO COMMAND A DETACHED SQUADRON CO-OPERATING WITH
THE AUSTRIAN ARMY IN THE RIVIERA OF GENOA.
JANUARY-JULY, 1795. AGE, 36.
From the naval point of view, as a strategic measure, the acquisition
of Corsica by the British was a matter of great importance. It was,
however, only one among several factors, which went to make up the
general military and political situation in the Mediterranean at the
end of the year 1794. Hitherto the exigencies of the well-nigh
universal hostilities in which France had been engaged, and the
anarchical internal state of that country, had prevented any decisive
operations by her on the side of Italy, although she had, since 1792,
been formally at war with the Kingdom of Sardinia, of which Piedmont
was a province.
At the close of 1794 the conditions were greatly modified. In the
north, the combined forces of Great Britain, Austria, and Holland had
been driven out of France and Belgium, and the United Provinces were
on the point of submission. On the east, the Austrians and Prussians
had retreated to the far bank of the Rhine, and Prussia was about to
withdraw from the coalition, which, three years before, she had been
so eager to form. On the south, even greater success had attended the
French armies, which had crossed the Pyrenees into Spain, driving
before them the forces of the enemy, who also was soon to ask for
peace. It was therefore probable that operations in Italy would assume
greatly increased activity, from the number of French soldiers
released elsewhere, as well as from the fact that the Austrians
themselves, though they continued the war in Germany, had abandoned
other portions of the continent which they had hitherto contested.
The political and military conditions in Italy were, briefly, as
follows. The region north of the Maritime Alps and in the valley of
the Po was, for the most part, in arms against France,--the western
province, Piedmont, as part of the Kingdom of Sardinia, whose capital
was at Turin, and, to the eastward of it, the duchies of Milan and
Mantua, as belonging to Austria. The governments of the numerous small
states into which Northern and Central Italy were then
divided--Venice, Genoa, Tuscany, the States of the Church, and
others--sympathized generally with the opponents of France, but, as
far as possible, sought to maintain a formal though difficult
neutrality. The position of Genoa was the most embarrassing, because
in direct contact with all the principal parties to the war. To the
westward, her territory along the Riviera included Vintimiglia,
bordering there on the county of Nice, and contained Vado Bay, the
best anchorage between Nice and Genoa. To the eastward, it embraced
the Gulf of Spezia, continually mentioned by Nelson as Porto Especia.
The occupation of the Riviera was of particular moment to the French,
for it offered a road by which to enter Italy,--bad, indeed, but
better far than those through the passes of the upper Alps. Skirting
the sea, it afforded a double line of communications, by land and by
water; for the various detachments of their army, posted along it,
could in great degree be supplied by the small coasting-vessels of the
Mediterranean. So long, also, as it was in their possession, and they
held passes of the Maritime Alps and Apennines, as they did in 1794,
there was the possibility of their penetrating through them, to turn
the left flank of the Sardinian army in Piedmont, which was, in fact,
what Bonaparte accomplished two years later. These inducements had led
the French to advance into the county of Nice, then belonging to
Sardinia, which in the existing state of war it was perfectly proper
for them to do; but, not stopping there, they had pushed on past the
Sardinian boundary into the neutral Riviera of Genoa, as far as Vado
Bay, which they occupied, and where they still were at the end of
1794.
Genoa submitted under protest to this breach of her neutrality, as she
did both before[25] and after to similar insults from parties to the
war. She derived some pecuniary benefit from the condition of
affairs,--her ports, as well as those of Tuscany, immediately to the
southward, becoming depots of a trade in grain, which supplied both
the French army and the southern provinces of France. These food
stuffs, absolutely essential to the French, were drawn chiefly from
Sicily and the Barbary States, and could not be freely taken into
French ports by the larger class of sea-going vessels, in face of the
British fleet. They were, therefore, commonly transshipped in Leghorn
or Genoa, and carried on by coasters. As so much Genoese sea-coast was
occupied by French divisions, it was practically impossible for
British cruisers to distinguish between vessels carrying corn for the
inhabitants and those laden for the armies, and entirely impossible to
know that what was intended for one object would not be diverted to
another. If, too, a vessel's papers showed her to be destined for
Vintimiglia, near the extreme of the Genoese line, there could be no
certainty that, having got so far, she might not quietly slip by into
a French port, either Nice or beyond. The tenure of the neutral
Riviera of Genoa by the French army was a threat to the allies of
Great Britain in Piedmont and Lombardy, as well as to the
quasi-neutrals in Genoa, Tuscany, Venice, and the Papal States. Its
further advance or successes would imperil the latter, and seriously
affect the attitude of Naples, hostile to the Republic, but weak,
timid, and unstable of purpose. On the other hand, the retention of
its position, and much more any further advance, depended upon
continuing to receive supplies by way of the sea. To do so by the
shore route alone was not possible. Southern France itself depended
upon the sea for grain, and could send nothing, even if the then
miserable Corniche road could have sufficed, as the sole line of
communications for forty thousand troops.
Thus the transfer of Corsica to Great Britain had a very important
bearing upon the military and political conditions. At the moment when
Italy was about to become the scene of operations which might, and in
the event actually did, exercise a decisive influence upon the course
of the general war, the British position was solidified by the
acquisition of a naval base, unassailable while the sea remained in
their control and the Corsicans attached to their cause, and centrally
situated with reference to the probable scenes of hostilities, as well
as to the points of political interest, on the mainland of Italy. The
fleet resting upon it, no longer dependent upon the reluctant
hospitality of Genoese or Tuscan ports, or upon the far distant
Kingdom of Naples, was secure to keep in its station, whence it
menaced the entire seaboard trade of France and the Riviera, as well
as the tenure of the French army in the latter, and exerted a strong
influence upon the attitude of both Genoa and Tuscany, who yielded
only too easily to the nearest or most urgent pressure. The fleet to
which Nelson belonged had spent the greater part of the year 1794 in
securing for itself, as a base of operations, this position, by far
the most suitable among those that could be considered at all. It
remained now to utilize the advantage obtained, to make the situation
of the French army in Italy untenable, by establishing an indisputable
control of the sea. To this the holding of Corsica also contributed,
indirectly; for the loss of the island forced the French fleet to go
to sea, in order, if possible, to expedite its re-conquest. In all the
operations resulting from these various motives, Nelson bore a part as
conspicuous and characteristic as he had done in the reduction of
Corsica. Almost always on detached service, in positions approaching
independent command, he was continually adding to his reputation, and,
what was far more important, maturing the professional character, the
seeds of which had been so bountifully bestowed upon him by nature.
His reputation, won hard and step by step, obtained for him
opportunity; but it was to character, ripened by experience and
reflection, that he owed his transcendent successes.
The scheme for the government of the island as a British dependency,
stated broadly, was that it should be administered by the Corsicans
themselves, under a viceroy appointed by the British crown. Its
military security was provided for by the control of the sea, and by
British soldiers holding the fortified ports,--a duty for which the
Corsicans themselves had not then the necessary training. Nelson, who
did not yet feel the impossibility of sustaining a successful over-sea
invasion, when control of the sea was not had, was anxious about the
expected attempts of the French against the island, and urged the
viceroy, by private letter, to see that Ajaccio, which he regarded as
the point most favorable to a descent, was garrisoned sufficiently to
keep the gates shut for a few days. This caution did not then proceed
from a distrust of the Corsicans' fidelity, without which neither
France nor England could hold the island, as was shown by the
quickness of its transfer two years later, when the inhabitants again
revolted to France. "With this defence," he wrote, "I am confident
Ajaccio, and I believe I may say the island of Corsica, would be
perfectly safe until our fleet could get to the enemy, when I have no
doubt the event would be what every Briton might expect."
The repairs of the "Agamemnon" were completed before Nelson's anxious
apprehensions of a battle taking place in his absence could be
fulfilled. On the 21st of December, 1794, he sailed from Leghorn with
the fleet, in company with which he remained from that time until the
following July, when he was sent to the Riviera of Genoa on special
detached service. He thus shared the severe cruising of that winter,
as well as the abortive actions of the spring and early summer, where
the admiral again contrived to lose opportunities of settling the sea
campaign, and with it, not improbably, that of the land also. There
were plain indications in the port of Toulon that a maritime
enterprise of some importance was in contemplation. In the outer road
lay fifteen sail-of-the-line, the British having then fourteen; but
more significant of the enemy's purpose was the presence at Marseilles
of fifty large transports, said to be ready. "I have no doubt," wrote
Nelson, "but Porto Especia is their object." This was a mistake,
interesting as indicating the slight weight that Nelson at that time
attributed to the deterrent effect of the British fleet "in being"
upon such an enterprise, involving an open-sea passage of over a
hundred miles, though he neither expressed nor entertained any
uncertainty as to the result of a meeting, if the enemy were
encountered. The French Government, not yet appreciating the
inefficiency to which its navy had been reduced by many concurrent
circumstances, was ready to dispute the control of the Mediterranean,
and it contemplated, among other things, a demonstration at Leghorn,
similar to that successfully practised at Naples in 1792, which might
compel the Court of Tuscany to renounce the formally hostile attitude
it had assumed at the bidding of Great Britain; but it does not appear
that there was any serious purpose of exposing a large detachment, in
the attempt to hold upon the Continent a position, such as Spezia,
with which secure communication by land could not be had.
Though none too careful to proportion its projects to the force at its
disposal, the Directory sufficiently understood that a detachment at
Spezia could not be self-dependent, nor could, with any certainty,
combine its operations with those of the army in the Riviera; and also
that, to be properly supported at all, there must be reasonably secure
and unbroken communication, either by land or water, neither of which
was possible until the British fleet was neutralized. The same
consideration dictated to it the necessity of a naval victory, before
sending out the expedition, of whose assembling the British were now
hearing, and which was actually intended for Corsica; although it was
known that in the island there had already begun the revulsion against
the British rule, which culminated in open revolt the following year.
Owing to the dearth of seamen, the crews of the French ships were
largely composed of soldiers, and it was thought that, after beating
the enemy, four or five thousand of these might be at once thrown on
shore at Ajaccio, and that afterwards the main body could be sent
across in safety. First of all, however, control of the sea must be
established by a battle, more or less decisive.
On the 24th of February, 1795, the British fleet arrived at Leghorn,
after a very severe cruise of over a fortnight. On the 2d of March
Nelson mentioned, in a letter to his wife, that the French were said
then to have a hundred and twenty-four transports full of troops, from
which he naturally argued that they must mean to attempt something. On
the evening of the 8th, an express from Genoa brought Hotham word that
they were actually at sea, fifteen ships-of-the-line, with half a
dozen or more smaller vessels. He sailed in pursuit early the next
morning, having with him thirteen[26] British ships-of-the-line and
one Neapolitan seventy-four. Of the former, four were three-decked
ships, carrying ninety-eight to one hundred guns, a class of vessel of
which the French had but one, the "Sans Culottes," of one hundred and
twenty, which, under the more dignified name of "L'Orient,"
afterwards, met so tragic a fate at the Battle of the Nile; but they
had, in compensation, three powerful ships of eighty guns, much
superior to the British seventy-fours. As, however, only partial
engagements followed, the aggregate of force on either side is a
matter of comparatively little importance in a Life of Nelson.
Standing to the northward and westward, with a fresh easterly wind,
the British fleet through its lookouts discovered the enemy on the
evening of the day of sailing, and by the same means kept touch with
them throughout the 10th and 11th; but the baffling airs, frequent in
the Mediterranean, prevented the main body seeing them until the
morning of the 12th. At daylight, then, they were visible from the
"Agamemnon," in company with which were five British ships and the
Neapolitan; the remainder of the fleet being so far to the eastward
that their hulls were just rising out of the water. The British lying
nearly becalmed, the French, who were to windward, bore down to within
three miles; but although, in Nelson's judgment, they had a fair
opportunity to separate the advanced British ships, with which he was,
from the main body, they failed to improve it. Nothing happened that
day, and, a fresh breeze from the west springing up at dusk, both
fleets stood to the southward with it, the French being to windward.
That night one of the latter, a seventy-four, having lost a topmast,
was permitted to return to port.
The next morning the wind was still southwest and squally. Hotham at
daylight ordered a general chase, which allowed each ship a certain
freedom of movement in endeavoring to close with the French. The
"Agamemnon" had been well to the westward, from the start; and being a
very handy, quick-working ship, as well as, originally at least, more
than commonly fast, was early in the day in a position where she had a
fair chance for reaching the enemy. A favorable opportunity soon
occurred, one of those which so often show that, if a man only puts
himself in the way of good luck, good luck is apt to offer. At 8 A.M.
the eighty-gun ship "Ça Ira," third from the rear in the French order,
ran on board the vessel next ahead of her, and by the collision lost
her fore and main topmasts. These falling overboard on the lee
side--in this case the port,[27]--not only deprived her of by far the
greater part of her motive power, but acted as a drag on her progress,
besides for the time preventing the working of the guns on that side.
The "Ça Ira" dropped astern of her fleet. Although this eighty-gun
ship was much bigger than his own,--"absolutely large enough to take
Agamemnon in her hold," Nelson said,--the latter saw his chance, and
instantly seized it with the promptitude characteristic of all his
actions. The "Agamemnon," if she was not already on the port tack,
opposite to that on which the fleets had been during the night, must
have gone about at this time, and probably for this reason. She was
able thus to fetch into the wake of the crippled vessel, which a
frigate had already gallantly attacked, taking advantage of the
uselessness of the Frenchman's lee batteries, encumbered with the
wreckage of the masts.
At 10 A.M., the "Ça Ira" and the "Agamemnon" having passed on opposite
tacks, the latter again went about and stood in pursuit under all
sail, rapidly nearing the enemy, who at this time was taken in tow by
a frigate. But although in this position the French ship could not
train her broadside guns upon her smaller opponent, she could still
work freely the half-dozen stern guns, and did so with much effect.
"So true did she fire," noted Nelson, "that not a shot missed some
part of the ship, and latterly the masts were struck every shot, which
obliged me to open our fire a few minutes sooner than I intended, for
it was my intention to have touched his stern before a shot was
fired." At quarter before eleven, the "Agamemnon" was within a hundred
yards of the "Ça Ira's" stern, and this distance she was able to keep
until I P.M. Here, by the use of the helm and of the sails, the ship
alternately turned her starboard side to the enemy to fire her
batteries, and again resumed her course, to regain the distance
necessarily lost at each deviation. This raking fire not only killed
and wounded many of the "Ça Ira's" crew, and injured the hull, but,
what was tactically of yet greater importance, preventing the
replacing of the lost spars. Thus was entailed upon the French that
night a crippled ship, which they could not in honor abandon, nor yet
could save without fighting for her,--a tactical dilemma which was the
direct cause of the next day's battle.
Brief and cursory as is the notice of this action of the "Agamemnon"
in Hotham's despatches, he mentions no other ship-of-the-line as
engaged at this time, and states that she and the frigate were so far
detached from the fleet, that they were finally obliged to retire on
account of other enemy's vessels approaching. Nelson's journal says
that two French ships, one of one hundred and twenty guns and a
seventy-four, were at gunshot distance on the bow of the "Ça Ira" when
he began to attack her. These, with several others of their fleet,
went about some time before one, at which hour the frigate, towing the
disabled ship, tacked herself, and also got the latter around. The
"Agamemnon" standing on, she and the "Ça Ira" now crossed within half
pistol-range; but, the French guns being too much elevated, the shot
passed over their antagonist, who lost in this day's work only seven
men wounded. Nelson then again tacked to follow, but by this time the
French admiral had apparently decided that his crippled vessel must be
rescued, and his fleet no longer defied by a foe so inferior in
strength. Several of the enemy were approaching, when Hotham made a
signal of recall, which Nelson on this occasion at least had no
hesitation in obeying, and promptly. There was no pursuit, the hostile
commander-in-chief being apparently satisfied to save the "Ça Ira" for
the moment, without bringing on a general engagement.
In this affair, what is mainly to be noted in Nelson is not the
personal courage, nor yet even the professional daring, or the skill
which justified the daring. It may be conceded that all these were
displayed in a high degree, but they can scarcely be claimed to have
exceeded that shown by other officers, not a few, when equally tried.
What is rather striking, account for it how we will, is that Nelson,
here as always, was on hand when opportunity offered; that after three
days of chase he, and he only, was so far to the front as to be able
to snatch the fleeting moment. "On looking round," he says at ten
o'clock, when about to begin the action, "I saw no ship-of-the-line
within several miles to support me; the Captain was the nearest on our
lee-quarter." With the looseness and lack of particularity which
characterize most logs and despatches remaining from those days, and
make the comprehension of naval engagements, other than the greatest,
a matter of painful and uncertain inference, it is impossible
accurately to realize the entire situation; but it seems difficult to
imagine that among all the other thirteen captains, "where emulation
was common to all and zeal for his Majesty's service the general
description of the fleet," to use Hotham's words, none could have been
on the spot to support so promising an attempt, had there been
"common" that sort of emulation which takes a man ever to the front,
not merely in battle but at all times,--the spirit that will not and
cannot rest while anything remains to be done, ever pressing onward to
the mark. To this unquestionably must be added the rapid comprehension
of a situation, and the exceeding promptitude with which Nelson seized
his opportunity, as well as the tenacious intrepidity with which he
held to his position of advantage, despite the imminent threat to his
safety from the uninjured and gigantic "Sans Culottes," barely out of
gunshot to windward. It is right also to note the accessibility to
advice, a feature of his genial and kindly temperament, to which he
admitted much of the success was due. The trait is not rare in mankind
in general, but it is exceptional in men of a character so
self-reliant and decided as Nelson. "If the conduct of the Agamemnon
on the 13th," he generously wrote, "was by any means the cause of our
success on the 14th, Lieutenant Andrews has a principal share in the
merit, for a more proper opinion was never given by an officer than
the one he gave me on the 13th, in a situation of great difficulty."
The same hot spirit, the same unwearying energy, made itself still
more manifest the next day, when were to be garnered the results of
his own partial, yet, in its degree, decisive action of the 13th.
"Sure I am," said he afterwards, "had I commanded our fleet on the
14th, that either the whole French fleet would have graced my triumph,
or I should have been in a confounded scrape." A confounded scrape he
would have been in on the 13th, and on other days also, great and
small, had there been a different issue to the risks he dared, and
rightly dared, to take. Of what man eminent in war, indeed, is not the
like true? It is the price of fame, which he who dare not pay must
forfeit; and not fame only, but repute.
During the following night the "Sans Culottes" quitted the French
fleet. The wind continued southerly, both fleets standing to the
westward, the crippled "Ça Ira" being taken in tow by the "Censeur,"
of seventy-four guns. At daylight of March 14, being about twenty
miles southwest from Genoa, these two were found to be much astern and
to leeward, of their main body,--that is, northeast from it. The
British lay in the same direction, and were estimated by Nelson to be
three and a half miles from the disabled ship and her consort, five
miles from the rest of the French. At 5.30 A.M. a smart breeze sprang
up from the northwest, which took the British aback, but enabled them
afterwards to head for the two separated French ships. Apparently,
from Nelson's log, this wind did not reach the main body of the enemy,
a circumstance not uncommon in the Mediterranean. Two British
seventy-fours, the "Captain" and the "Bedford," in obedience to
signals, stood down to attack the "Censeur" and the "Ça Ira;" and,
having in this to undergo for twenty minutes a fire to which they
could not reply, were then and afterwards pretty roughly handled. They
were eventually left behind, crippled, as their own fleet advanced.
The rest of the British were meantime forming in line and moving down
to sustain them. The French main body, keeping the southerly wind,
wore in succession to support their separated ships, and headed to
pass between them and their enemies. The latter, having formed, stood
also towards these two, which now lay between the contestants as the
prize to the victor.
Apparently, in these manoeuvres, the leading British ships ran again
into the belt of southerly wind,--which the French kept
throughout,--while part of the centre and rear were left becalmed, and
had little or no share in the cannonade that followed. Under these
conditions the resolution of the French admiral seems to have
faltered, for instead of passing to leeward--north--of his endangered
ships, which was quite in his power, and so covering them from the
enemy, he allowed the latter to cut them off, thus insuring their
surrender. His fleet kept to windward of the British, passing fairly
near the two leading ships, the "Illustrious" and the "Courageux," who
thus underwent a "concentration by defiling," that took the main and
mizzen masts out of both, besides killing and wounding many of their
people. The "Princess Royal" and "Agamemnon," which came next, could
only engage at long range. "The enemy's fleet kept the southerly
wind," wrote Nelson in his journal, "which enabled them to keep their
distance, which was very great. At 8 A.M. they began to pass our line
to windward, and the Ça Ira and Le Censeur were on our lee side;
therefore the Illustrious, Courageux, Princess Royal, and Agamemnon
were obliged to fight on both sides of the ship." At five minutes past
ten A.M. both the French vessels struck, the "Ça Ira" having lost her
three masts, and the "Censeur" her mainmast. It was past one P.M. when
firing wholly ceased; and the enemy then crowded all possible sail to
the westward, the British fleet lying with their heads to the
southeast.
When the British line was forming, between seven and eight in the
morning, Nelson was directed by Vice-Admiral Goodall, the second in
command, to take his station astern of his flagship, the "Princess
Royal," of ninety guns. Immediately behind the "Agamemnon" came the
"Britannia," carrying Hotham's flag. This position, and the lightness
of the wind, serve to explain how Nelson came to take the step he
mentions in several letters; going on board the "Britannia," after the
two French vessels struck, and urging the commander-in-chief to leave
the prizes in charge of the British frigates and crippled
ships-of-the-line, and vigorously to pursue the French, who having
lost four ships out of their fleet, by casualty or capture, were now
reduced to eleven sail. "I went on board Admiral Hotham as soon as our
firing grew slack in the van, and the Ça Ira and the Censeur had
struck, to propose to him leaving our two crippled ships, the two
prizes, and four frigates, to themselves, and to pursue the enemy;
but he, much cooler than myself, said, 'We must be contented, we have
done very well.' Now, had we taken ten sail, and had allowed the
eleventh to escape, when it had been possible to have got at her, I
could never have called it well done. Goodall backed me; I got him to
write to the admiral, but it would not do: we should have had such a
day as I believe the annals of England never produced."
Nelson here evidently assumes that it was possible to have got at the
French fleet. After a man's reputation has been established, there is
always the danger of giving undue weight to his opinions, expressed at
an earlier time, somewhat casually, and not under the sobering sense
of responsibility. Hotham may have questioned the possibility of
getting at the French effectively, having regard to the fickle
lightness of the wind then prevalent, and to the fact that, besides
the two ships partially dismasted and for the moment useless, two
others, the "Captain" and the "Bedford," had suffered severely in
sails and rigging. He would also doubtless consider that the
three-decked ships, of which he had four, were notoriously bad
sailers, and sure to drop behind if the chase lasted long, leaving to
eight ships, including the "Neapolitan," the burden of arresting the
enemy, who had shown very fair offensive powers in the morning. Nelson
was not blind to these facts, and not infrequently alludes to them.
"Had we only a breeze, I have no doubt we should have given a
destructive blow to the enemy's fleet." "Sure I am, that had the
breeze continued, so as to have allowed us to close with the enemy, we
should have destroyed their whole fleet." Whether these remarks apply
to the heat of the engagement, or to the proposed chase, which Hotham
declined to permit, is not perfectly clear; but inasmuch as the second
part of the action of the 14th consisted, actually, in the French
filing by the "Courageux" and the "Illustrious," upon whom their fire
was thus concentrated, while the rest of the British were becalmed
out of gunshot, it is very possible he was thinking of that incident
only, which doubtless would have taken a very different turn had the
main body been able to come down. His wish to pursue is
unquestionable, both from his assertion and from the whole character
of his career before and after; and a casual remark, written ten days
after the affair, shows his opinion confirmed by time. "Had our good
admiral followed the blow, we should probably have done more, but the
risk was thought too great."
The question attracts attention, both impersonally, as of military
interest, and also as bearing upon Nelson's correctness of judgment,
and professional characteristics, at this time. As regards the amount
of wind, it is sufficient to say that the French fleet, having borne
away to the westward in the afternoon, was next day out of sight.[28]
Most of the British might equally have been out of sight from the
position in which they remained. As for the risk--of course there was
risk; but the whole idea of a general chase rests upon the fact that,
for one reason or another, the extreme speed of the ships in each
fleet will vary, and that it is always probable that the fastest of
the pursuers can overtake the slowest of the pursued. The resulting
combats compel the latter either to abandon his ships, or to incur a
general action, which, from the fact of his flight, it is evident he
has reason to avoid. In this case many of the retreating French were
crippled,--some went off towed by frigates, and some without
bowsprits. Unquestionably, the pursuers who thus engage may be
overpowered before those following them come up; but the balance of
chances is generally in their favor, and in the particular instance
would have been markedly so, as was shown by the results of the two
days' fighting, which had proved the superior quality of the British
ships' companies.
The fact is, neither Hotham nor his opponent, Martin, was willing to
hazard a decisive naval action, but wished merely to obtain a
temporary advantage,--the moment's safety, no risks. "I have good
reason," wrote Hotham in his despatch, "to hope, from the enemy's
steering to the westward after having passed our fleet, that whatever
might have been their design, _their intentions are for the present
frustrated_." It is scarcely necessary to say that a man who looks no
further ahead than this, who fails to realize that the destruction of
the enemy's fleet is the one condition of permanent safety to his
cause, will not rise to the conception presented to him on his
quarter-deck by Nelson. The latter, whether by the sheer intuition of
genius, which is most probable, or by the result of well-ordered
reasoning, which is less likely, realized fully that to destroy the
French fleet was the one thing for which the British fleet was there,
and the one thing by doing which it could decisively affect the war.
As he wrote four years later to St. Vincent, "Not one moment shall be
lost in bringing the enemy to battle; for I consider the best defence
for his Sicilian Majesty's dominions is to place myself alongside the
French."
Yet Nelson was far from unconscious of the difficulties of Hotham's
position, or from failing duly to allow for them. "Admiral Hotham has
had much to contend with, a fleet half-manned, and in every respect
inferior to the enemy; Italy calling him to her defence, our newly
acquired kingdom[29] calling might and main, our reinforcements and
convoy hourly expected; and all to be done without a force by any
means adequate to it." Add to this the protection of British trade, of
whose needs Nelson was always duly sensible. Yet, as one scans this
list of troubles, with the query how to meet them running in his mind,
it is scarcely possible not to see that each and every difficulty
would have been solved by a crushing pursuit of the beaten French,
preventing their again taking the sea. The British admiral had in his
control no means to force them out of port. Therefore, when out, he
should by no means have allowed them to get back. It is only just to
Hotham, who had been a capable as well as gallant captain, to say that
he had objected to take the chief command, on account of his health.
Nelson was delighted with his own share in these affairs, and with the
praise he received from others for his conduct,--especially that on
the 13th. He was satisfied, and justly, that his sustained and daring
grapple with the "Ça Ira," in the teeth of her fleet, had been the
effective cause of the next day's action and consequent success. It
was so, in truth, and it presented an epitome of what the 14th and
15th ought to have witnessed,--a persistent clinging to the crippled
ships, in order to force their consorts again into battle. "You will
participate," he wrote to his uncle, "in the pleasure I must have felt
in being the great cause of our success. Could I have been supported,
I would have had Ça Ira on the 13th." Elliot, the Viceroy of Corsica,
wrote to him: "I certainly consider the business of the 13th of March
as a very capital feature in the late successful contest with the
French fleet; and the part which the Agamemnon had in it must be felt
by every one to be one of the circumstances that gave lustre to this
event, and rendered it not only useful, but peculiarly honourable to
the British arms." "So far," added Nelson, in quoting this to his
wife, "all hands agree in giving me the praises which cannot but be
comfortable to me to the last moment of my life." He adds then a
reflection, evincing that he was assimilating some of the philosophy
of life as well as of fighting. "The time of my being left out here by
Lord Hood," which he had so much regretted, "I may call well spent;
had I been absent, how mortified should I now be. What has happened
may never happen to any one again, that only one ship-of-the-line out
of fourteen should get into action with the French fleet for so long
a time as two hours and a half, and with such a ship as the Ça Ira."
It may be of interest to mention that the French fleet, upon this
occasion, was largely composed of the vessels which three years later
were destroyed by him at the Battle of the Nile.
In all his interests, ambitions, and gratification with success and
praise, he at this period writes fully and intimately to his wife,
between whom and himself there evidently still existed, after these
two years of absence, a tender and affectionate confidence. "It is
with an inexpressible pleasure I have received your letters, with our
father's. I rejoice that my conduct gives you pleasure, and I trust I
shall never do anything which will bring a blush on your face. Rest
assured you are never absent from my thoughts." When looking forward
to the action of March 14, he tells her: "Whatever may be my fate, I
have no doubt in my own mind but that my conduct will be such as will
not bring a blush on the face of my friends: the lives of all are in
the hands of Him who knows best whether to preserve mine or not; to
His will do I resign myself. My character and good name are in my own
keeping. Life with disgrace is dreadful. A glorious death is to be
envied;" and he signs himself with unwonted tenderness, "Ever your
most faithful and affectionate husband." Save of the solemn hours
before Trafalgar, when another image occupied his thoughts, this is
the only personal record we have of the feelings with which this man,
dauntless above his fellows, went into battle. He refrains
thoughtfully from any mention of his health that may cause her
anxiety, which she had shown herself over weak and worrying to bear;
but he speaks freely of all that passes, confiding that with her he
need have no reserves, even in a natural self-praise. "This I can say,
that all I have obtained I owe to myself, and to no one else, and _to
you_ I may add, that my character stands high with almost all Europe.
Even the Austrians knew my name perfectly." While silent on the
subject of illness, he admits now that his eye had grown worse, and
was in almost total darkness, besides being very painful at times;
"but never mind," he adds cheeringly, "I can see very well with the
other."
It is instructive to note, in view of some modern debated questions,
that, despite the recent success, Nelson was by no means sure that the
British fleet could defend Corsica. "I am not even now certain Corsica
is safe," he wrote on the 25th of March, "if they undertake the
expedition with proper spirit." The threat, never absent while the
French fleet remained, was emphasized by the arrival of six
ships-of-the-line from Brest, which reached Toulon on the 4th of
April, materially altering the complexion of affairs in the
Mediterranean, and furnishing an instructive instance of the probable
punishment for opportunity imperfectly utilized, as on the 14th of
March. Great discontent was felt at the apparent failure of the
Admiralty to provide against this chance. "Hotham is very much
displeased with them," wrote Nelson, "and certainly with reason;" and
doubtless it is satisfactory to believe, rightly or wrongly, that our
disadvantages are due to the neglect of others, and not to our own
shortcomings.
Although the nominal force of the French was thus raised to twenty of
the line, the want of seamen, and the absence of discipline, prevented
their seizing the opportunity offered by the temporary inferiority of
the British, reduced to thirteen besides two Neapolitans, in whose
efficiency, whether justly or not, Nelson placed little confidence. At
this critical moment, with a large British military convoy expected,
and the fleet, to use his impatient expression, "skulking in port," a
Jacobin outbreak occurred in Toulon, and the seamen assumed the
_opéra-bouffe_ rôle of going ashore to assist in deliberations upon
the measures necessary to save the country. Before they were again
ready to go to sea, the convoy had arrived. On the 7th of June,
however, the French again sailed from Toulon, seventeen
ships-of-the-line; and the following day Nelson, writing to his
brother, thus gave vent to the bitterness of his feelings: "We have
been cruising off Minorca for a long month, every moment in
expectation of reinforcements from England. Great good fortune has
hitherto saved us, what none in this fleet could have expected for so
long a time. Near two months we have been skulking from them. Had they
not got so much cut up on the 14th of March, Corsica, Rome, and Naples
would, at this moment, have been in their possession, and may yet, if
these people [the Admiralty] do not make haste to help us. I am out of
spirits, although never better in health."
His depression was due less to the inadequacy of the British fleet
than to the dismissal of Lord Hood from the command, news of which was
at this time received. When about to sail from England, to resume his
duty as commander-in-chief, he got into a controversy with the
Government about the force necessary in the Mediterranean, and, giving
offence by the sharpness of his language, was ordered to haul down his
flag. He never again went to sea. Nelson deplored his loss in terms
unusually vivacious: "Oh, miserable Board of Admiralty! They have
forced the first officer in our service away from his command." In
more temperate but well-weighed words, he said: "This fleet must
regret the loss of Lord Hood, the best officer, take him altogether,
that England has to boast of. Lord Howe is certainly a great officer
in the management of a fleet, but that is all. Lord Hood is equally
great in all situations which an admiral can be placed in." In the
judgment of the present writer, this estimate of Hood is as accurate
as it is moderate in expression. It was nothing less than providential
for the French that he was not in command on the 14th of March, or in
the yet more trivial and discreditable affair of July 13th, when, to
use again Nelson's words, "To say how much we wanted Lord Hood at
that time, is to say, will you have all the French fleet or no
action?"
On the 14th of June the expected reinforcement from England, nine
ships-of-the-line, joined the fleet off Minorca; and a few days later
a large convoy also arrived, with which the whole body of ships of war
put into San Fiorenzo Bay on the 29th. This concluded for Nelson a
period of three months, counting from the action of March 14th, of
pretty monotonous cruising with the fleet, the last in which he was to
take part until his admiral's flag was hoisted, two years later.
Though unmarked by any event of importance, the time was passed not
unprofitably to himself, for his correspondence bears marks of
fruitful reflection, not merely upon the evident inadequacy of his
commander-in-chief to the position he unwillingly occupied, but upon
the character of the operations and the line of conduct that ought to
be followed. If he does criticise the former's want of head for
enterprise, he formulates for himself a general principle which showed
its vital influence in his future career. "After all my complaints, I
have no doubt but, if we can get close to the enemy, we shall defeat
any plan of theirs; _but we ought to have our ideas beyond mere
defensive measures_."
Among other matters for reflection, he had at this time a curious
cause of anxiety, lest he should be promoted to flag rank, or rather
that, being promoted, he should be obliged to return to England at
once, as there would be too many admirals in the Mediterranean to
permit his retention. A rumor was current, which proved to be correct,
that there would be a large promotion on the 1st of June, the first
anniversary of the victory celebrated by that name. Being then
forty-six on the list of captains, Nelson feared that it might include
him; in which case, if not permitted to hoist his flag where he was,
not only would he lose his ardently desired opportunities for
distinction,--"not an hour this war will I, if possible, be out of
active service,"--but he would be put to much inconvenience and loss.
"If they give me my flag, I shall be half ruined: unless I am
immediately employed in this country, I should, by the time I landed
in England, be a loser, several hundred pounds out of pocket." To be
taken "from actual service would distress me much, more especially as
I almost believe these people will be mad enough to come out." He
escaped this disappointment, however, for the promotion left him still
on the post-captains' list, seven from its head; but he received, what
was both complimentary and profitable, the honorary rank of Colonel of
Marines,--a sinecure appointment, of which there were then four, given
to post-captains of distinguished services, and vacated by them upon
promotion. These are now discontinued, and replaced, as a matter of
emolument, by Good Service Pensions. Nelson heard later that this
reward had been conferred upon him, not merely as a favor, but with a
full recognition of all his claims to it. "The Marines have been given
to me in the handsomest manner. The answer given to many was, the King
knew no officer who had served so much for them as myself."
These promotions came timely to insure for him an employment
particularly suited to his active temperament and fearlessness of
responsibility, but which, though the fittest man for it, he might,
with less seniority, not have received from Hotham, despite the
well-known confidence in him shown by Hood. Since the spring opened,
the Austrians and their allies, the Sardinians, had been waiting,
ostensibly at least, for assistance from the Navy, to begin a forward
movement, the first object of which was the possession of Vado Bay as
a safe anchorage for the fleet. Until the arrival of Man and the
convoy, Hotham had not felt strong enough to spare the required force;
but now, after the ships had filled their wants from the transports,
he, on the 4th of July, detached Nelson, with the "Agamemnon" and six
smaller vessels, to co-operate with the Austrian commander-in-chief.
The latter had begun his movement on the 13th of June, passing through
Genoese territory despite the remonstrances of the Republic, whose
neutrality could claim but slight regard from one belligerent, when
she had already permitted the occupation of so much of her shore line
by the other. The French had fallen back, when attacked, abandoning
Vado Bay to the enemy, whose headquarters were established at that
point.
Nelson, having sailed with four of his squadron, fell in with the
French fleet of seventeen of the line, off the Riviera, on the 6th of
July. He had, of course, to retreat, which he did upon San Fiorenzo,
to join the body of the fleet. On the morning of the 7th the
"Agamemnon" and her followers, with the French in close pursuit, were
sighted from the anchorage, much to the surprise of the admiral, who
knew the enemy had come out, but, upon the information of the Austrian
general, believed them returned to Toulon. Why he had not more
accurate news from lookout frigates is not clear; but, as Nelson said,
he took things easy, and he had persuaded himself that they had left
harbor only to exercise their men. As it was, the "Agamemnon" was hard
pressed, but escaped, chiefly through the enemy's lack of seamanship.
The fleet, when she arrived, was in the midst of refitting and
watering, but succeeded in getting to sea the following morning in
search of the enemy, who meantime had disappeared.
Precise information of the French whereabouts could not be obtained
until the evening of the 12th, when two of the British lookout ships
reported that they had been seen a few hours before to the southwest,
south of the Hyères Islands. The fleet made sail in that direction.
During the night a heavy gale came on from west-northwest, out of the
Gulf of Lyons, which split the main-topsails of several British ships.
At daybreak the enemy were discovered in the southeast, standing
north to close the land. After some elaborate manoeuvring--to reach
one of those formal orders, often most useful, but which the irregular
Mediterranean winds are prone to disarrange as soon as completed--the
admiral at 8 A.M. signalled a general chase. The British being to
windward, and the breeze fresh, the half-dozen leading ships had at
noon closed the enemy's rear within three-quarters of a mile; but,
from their relative positions, as then steering, the guns of neither
could be used effectively. At this time a shift of wind to north
headed off both fleets, which put their bows to the eastward, throwing
the British advanced vessels, to use Nelson's expression, into line
abreast, and bringing to bear the broadsides of the ships, of both
fleets, that were within range. The action then began, the British
fire being directed mainly upon the French rear ship, the "Alcide,"
which surrendered at about 2 P.M., and soon afterwards blew up. The
wind had meanwhile changed again to the eastward, giving the
weather-gage to the French, most of whom were considerably nearer the
shore than their opponents, and better sailers.
Up to this time Nelson, who in the forenoon had thought there was
every prospect of taking every ship in the French fleet, still felt
almost certain that six would be secured; but, to use his own words,
it was now "impossible to close." In the space between the ships
engaged, and to leeward, the light air seems to have been killed by
the cannonading; whereas the French, who were now to windward, still
received enough to draw slowly away. Hotham, being in one of the very
worst sailers in the fleet, if not in the Navy, had fallen eight miles
astern, and not seeing clearly how things were going, made at this
time a signal of recall, which was certainly premature. It seems a not
improper comment that, in light and baffling weather, such as that of
the Mediterranean, the commander-in-chief should have been in a fast
and handy ship, able at the least to keep him within eyeshot of the
decisive scene. Remaining in the "Britannia" may have been due to the
natural unwillingness of an invalid to quit his well-ordered
surroundings, by which even St. Vincent was led to take a first-rate
ship away with himself at a critical moment; but, if so, it only
emphasizes the absolute necessity of physical vigor to a
commander-in-chief.
Nelson had again managed to keep the "Agamemnon" well to the front,
for the other ships that succeeded in getting into action were almost
wholly from among those which had recently arrived from England with
Rear-Admiral Man. These, being fresh from home, should naturally
outsail a ship now two and a half years in commission, and which, not
long after, had to be wrapped with hawsers to hold her together. In
his comments on the action he says comparatively little of the signal
of recall, which, though ill-timed, he does not seem to have thought
affected the result materially; but he was utterly dissatisfied with
the previous management of the business, and into the causes of this
dissatisfaction it is desirable to look, as bearing at once upon his
natural military characteristics, and the development they received
from time and thought. "The scrambling distant fire was a farce," he
wrote; "but if one fell by such a fire, what might not have been
expected had our whole fleet engaged? Improperly as the part of the
fleet which fired got into action, we took one ship; but the subject
is unpleasant, and I shall have done with it." The criticism, though
far from explicit, evidently bears upon the manner in which the fleet
was handled, from the moment the enemy was sighted until the firing
began. During the latter, Man was the senior officer on the spot, and
Nelson does not blame him; on the contrary, punning on the name, says,
"He is a good _man_ in every sense of the word."
The precise working of his thought can only be inferred. "The whole
fleet" failed to get into action. Why? Because the signal for a
general chase was delayed from 4 to 8 A.M., pending certain
drill-ground manoeuvres, upon whose results, however well intended, no
dependence could be placed in Mediterranean weather. During these four
hours the wind was fresh,--the heel of a short summer's gale,
invaluable to both sides,--and the enemy were using it to close the
shore, where wind, the sole dependence for motive power, baffles most.
Had the fastest British ships, under a competent flag-officer,
utilized that time and that wind, there was, to put the case most
mildly, the chance that they could repeat, upon the French rear, the
same part the "Agamemnon" alone had played with the "Ça Ira,"--and
such a chance, were it no more, should not have been dawdled with.
"Missed the opportunity,"--the fatal words, "it might have been." Is
it far-fetched to see in his reflections upon "this miserable action,"
as it is styled independently by James and himself, the forecast of
the opening sentence of his celebrated order before
Trafalgar?--"Thinking it almost impossible to bring a fleet of forty
sail-of-the-line[30] into a line of battle in variable winds, thick
weather, and other circumstances which must occur, _without such a
loss of time that the opportunity would probably be lost of bringing
the enemy to battle in such a manner as to make the business
decisive_, I have therefore made up my mind--" Or, again, as he saw
Man dragged off--with too little remonstrance, it may be--by a
superior, who could by no means see what was the state of the action,
is there not traceable a source of the feeling, partly inborn, partly
reasoned, that found expression in the generous and yet most wise
words of the same immortal order?--"The second in command will [in
fact command his line and],[31] after my intentions are made known to
him, have the entire direction of his line to make the attack upon
the enemy, and to follow up the blow until they are captured or
destroyed." Whether such words be regarded as the labored result of
observation and reflection, or whether as the flashes of intuition,
with which genius penetrates at once to the root of a matter, without
the antecedent processes to which lesser minds are subjected,--in
either case they are instructive when linked with the events of his
career here under discussion, as corroborative indications of natural
temperament and insight, which banish altogether the thought of mere
fortuitous valor as the one explanation of Nelson's successes.
With this unsatisfactory affair, Nelson's direct connection with the
main body of the fleet came to an end for the remainder of Hotham's
command. It is scarcely necessary to add that the prime object of the
British fleet at all times, and not least in the Mediterranean in
1795,--the control of the sea,--continued as doubtful as it had been
at the beginning of the year. The dead weight of the admiral's having
upon his mind the Toulon fleet, undiminished in force despite two
occasions for decisive action, was to be clearly seen in the ensuing
operations. On this, also, Nelson did much thinking, as passing events
threw light upon the consequences of missing opportunities. "The
British fleet," he wrote, five years later, and no man better knew the
facts, "could have prevented the invasion of Italy; and, if our friend
Hotham had kept his fleet on that coast, I assert, and you will agree
with me, no army from France could have been furnished with stores or
provisions; even men could not have marched." But how keep the fleet
on the Italian coast, while the French fleet in full vigor remained in
Toulon? What a curb it was appeared again in the next campaign, and
even more clearly, because the British were then commanded by Sir John
Jervis, a man not to be checked by ordinary obstacles. From the decks
of his flagship Nelson, in the following April, watched a convoy
passing close in shore. "To get at them was impossible before they
anchored under such batteries as would have crippled our fleet; and,
had such an event happened, _in the present state of the enemy's
fleet_, Tuscany, Naples, Rome, Sicily, &c., would have fallen as fast
as their ships could have sailed along the coast. Our fleet is the
only saviour at present for those countries."
FOOTNOTES:
[25] In the year 1793 the French frigate "Modeste" had been forcibly taken
from the harbor of Genoa by an English squadron.
[26] The "Berwick," seventy-four, had been left in San Fiorenzo for
repairs. Putting to sea at this time, she fell in with the French fleet,
and was taken.
[27] The port side, or, as it was called in Nelson's day, the larboard
side, is the left, looking from the stem to the bow of a ship.
[28] Nelson to the Duke of Clarence, March 15, 1795. (Nicolas.)
[29] Corsica.
[30] There were twenty-three present on July 13, 1795.
[31] The words in brackets were erased in the rough draft, but are here
inserted, because they emphasize the underlying thought, that the second
was to have real command, not wait nor look for signals, nor yet fear them.