INCIDENTS ON THE LINES OF RICHMOND AND PETERSBURG DURING THE SUMMER
AND AUTUMN--CAPTURE OF FORT HARRISON--OTHER DEMONSTRATIONS BY
GRANT--THE SITUATION NEAR THE CONFEDERATE CAPITAL--EARLY'S VALLEY
CAMPAIGN--POPULAR CENSURE OF EARLY--INFLUENCE OF THE VALLEY CAMPAIGN
UPON THE SITUATION NEAR RICHMOND--WHAT THE AGGREGATE OF CONFEDERATE
DISASTERS SIGNIFIED--DESPONDENCY OF THE SOUTH--THE INJURIOUS EXAMPLES
OF PROMINENT MEN--THE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL LEE--MR. DAVIS'
POPULARITY--WHY HE DID NOT FULLY COMPREHEND THE DEMORALIZATION OF THE
PEOPLE--HE HOPES FOR POPULAR REANIMATION--WAS THE CASE OF THE
CONFEDERACY HOPELESS?--VACILLATING CONDUCT OF CONGRESS--THE
CONFEDERATE CONGRESS A WEAK BODY--MR. DAVIS' RELATIONS WITH
CONGRESS--PROPOSED CONSCRIPTION OF SLAVES--FAVORED BY DAVIS AND
LEE--DEFEATED BY CONGRESS--LEGISLATION DIRECTED AGAINST THE
PRESIDENT--DAVIS' OPINION OF LEE--RUMORS OF PEACE--HAMPTON ROADS
CONFERENCE--THE FEDERAL ULTIMATUM--THE ABSURD CHARGE AGAINST MR. DAVIS
OF OBSTRUCTING NEGOTIATIONS--HIS RECORD ON THE SUBJECT OF PEACE--A
RICHMOND NEWSPAPER ON THE FEDERAL ULTIMATUM--DELUSIVE SIGNS OF PUBLIC
SPIRIT--NO ALTERNATIVE BUT CONTINUED RESISTANCE--REPORT OF THE HAMPTON
ROADS CONFERENCE.
Meanwhile the siege of Petersburg had progressed drearily through the
months of summer and autumn. The "hammering" principle was abandoned by
General Grant, for a series of maneuvres having in view the possession of
the railroads extending southward and eastward.
About the middle of August a portion of Grant's army was established upon
the Weldon road. This was by no means a line of communication vital to
General Lee, though several heavy engagements ensued from its disputed
possession. The Federal losses in these engagements were very heavy, and
were hardly compensated by any immediate advantage following the permanent
acquisition, by General Grant, of the Weldon Railroad. The location of the
Federal army gave ample opportunity for the transfer of forces to either
side of the river, and General Grant did not fail to avail himself of his
facilities, for aiding the more important operations before Petersburg, by
numerous diversions in the direction of Richmond. One of these movements
upon the north side of James River, in the last days of September,
resulted disastrously to the Confederates, in the loss of Fort Harrison, a
position of great importance in the defense of that portion of the
Confederate line. Efforts to recapture it were unavailing, and attended
with heavy loss. The enemy was left in secure possession of a position
from which Richmond could be seriously menaced. The last serious
demonstration by General Grant, before winter, was the movement of a heavy
force, with the view of turning the Confederate position, and obtaining
the possession of Lee's communications with Lynchburg and Danville. Though
sustained by a strong diversion on other portions of the line, this
demonstration was barren of results.
Thus, the beginning of winter found the Confederate forces still safely
holding the lines of Richmond and Petersburg. The situation near the
Confederate capital was encouraging, and indicated an almost indefinite
resistance. But nearly every other quarter of the Confederacy was darkened
by the shadow of disaster.
The campaign of Hood in Tennessee had its counterpart in the Valley
campaign of General Early. This campaign, the original design of which was
the expulsion of Hunter, was doubly important afterwards in the design to
secure the harvests of the Shenandoah Valley, and to continue the
diversion of a large Federal force from the front of Richmond. The earlier
movements of General Early were attended with success, and the Confederacy
had the promise of a campaign, which should renew the glories of Stonewall
Jackson, in a district which his exploits had made forever famous. In its
conclusion was revealed, perhaps more strikingly than upon any other
theatre of the war, the overwhelming odds and obstacles, with which the
Confederacy contended in this desperate stage of its history. The activity
of General Early in the summer months, and his well-earned reputation as
an officer of skill and daring, induced the enemy to concentrate a heavy
force to protect the Potomac frontier, and, if possible, to overwhelm the
Confederate army in the Valley. In the months of September and October,
several engagements occurred, in which General Early was badly defeated,
and his army at the close of autumn exhibited so many evidences of
demoralization, as to occasion apprehension for its future efficiency.
The censure of General Early by the public and the newspapers was
unsparing. Most unworthy allegations, totally unsupported, were circulated
in explanation of his disasters. That such a man as Early, whose every
promotion had been won by a heroism and efficiency inferior to those of
none of Lee's subordinates, should have been recklessly condemned for
reverses, which were clearly the results of no errors or misconduct of his
own, is now a striking commentary upon that sullen despondency into which
the Southern mind was fast settling. A victory, in any quarter, was now
almost the last expectation of the public, and still Early was recklessly
abused for not winning victories, with a demoralized army, against forces
having four times his own strength. Neither President Davis nor General
Lee ever doubted General Early's efficiency; and the letter of the
commanding general to Early, written in the last hours of the Confederacy,
constitutes a tribute to patriotic and distinguished services, which the
old hero may well cherish in his exile, as a worthy title to the esteem of
posterity.
The defeat of Early at Cedar Creek, late in October, was the decisive
event of the last campaign in the Shenandoah Valley. In December nearly
all Early's forces were transferred to General Lee's lines, and the bulk
of the Federal army in the Valley returned to General Grant. General Early
remained in the Valley with a fragmentary command, which Sheridan easily
overran on his march from Winchester to the front of Petersburg.
Events in the Valley had a marked influence upon the situation near
Richmond. The Confederate authorities had hoped for such a successful
issue in the Valley as should relieve Richmond of much of Grant's
pressure. The disappointment of this hope left the Federal frontier
secure, and gave Grant a large accession of strength, for which Lee had no
compensation, except the _débris_ of a defeated and dispirited army.
The aggregate of military disasters with which the year 1864 terminated,
established the inevitable failure of the Confederacy, unless more
vigorous measures than the Government had ever yet attempted should be
adopted, and unless the people were prepared for sacrifices which had not
yet been exacted. The reserves of men, which the various acts of
conscription were designed to place in the field, were exhausted, or
beyond the reach of the Government, and the supplies of the army became
more and more precarious each day. There was, indeed, nothing fatal as
affecting the ultimate decision of the contest, in the military events of
the past year, if unattended by a decay of public spirit. It was not
until the winter of 1864-1865 that any considerable body of the Southern
people were brought to the conviction that their struggle was a hopeless
one. The waste of war is in nothing more continuous than in its test of
the moral energy of communities. In the last winter of the war the
distrust of the popular mind was painfully apparent. The South began to
read its fate when it saw that the North had converted warfare into
universal destruction and desolation, and when it exchanged the code of
civilized war for the grim butchery of Grant, and the savage measures of
Sherman and Sheridan. It was plain that while the losses of the Federal
army were shocking, and were sufficient to have unnerved the army and the
people of the North, the "attrition" of General Grant had caused a fearful
diminution of the Confederate armies.
The facility of the Federal Government in repairing its losses of men,
baffled all previous calculation in the Confederacy, and it had long since
become evident that the resources of the North, in all other respects,
were equal to an indefinite endurance. Indeed, it has been justly said
that the material resources of the North were not seriously tested, but
merely developed by the war. Peculiarly disheartening to the South was the
triumph of the Republican party in the reëlection of Mr. Lincoln--an event
plainly portending a protraction of the war upon a scale, which should
adequately employ the inexhaustible means at the command of the Federal
Government.
It would be needless to speculate now as to the material capacity of the
South to have met the demands of another campaign. The military capacity
of the Confederacy in the last months of the war, is not to be measured by
the number of men that still might have been brought to the field, or by
the material means which yet survived the consumption and waste of war.
These considerations are admissible only in connection with that moral
condition of the public, which fitted or disqualified it for longer
endurance of the privations and sacrifices of the war. Long before the
close of winter, popular feeling assumed a phase of sullen indifference
which, while yet averse to unconditional submission to the North,
manifestly despaired of ultimate success, viewed additional sacrifices as
hopeless, and anticipated the _worst_.
Only a hasty and ill-informed judgment could condemn the Southern people
for the decay of its spirit in this last stage of the war. No people ever
endured with more heroism the trials and privations incidental to their
situation. Yet these sacrifices appeared to have been to no purpose; a
cruel and inexorable fate seemed to pursue them, and to taunt them with
the futility of exertion to escape its decree. Victories, which had amazed
the world, and again and again stunned a powerful adversary, and which the
South felt that, under ordinary circumstances, should have secured the
reward of independence, were recurred to only as making more bitter the
chagrin of the present. Previous defeats, at the time seeming fatal, had
been patiently encountered, and bravely surmounted, so long as victory
appeared to offer a reward which should compensate for the sacrifice
necessary to obtain it. But, now, even the hope of victory had almost
ceased to be a source of encouragement, since any probable success would
only tend to a postponement of the inevitable catastrophe, which, perhaps,
it would be better to invite than to defer.
It must be confessed, too, that the people and the army of the
Confederacy, in this crisis, found but little source of reanimation in
the example of a majority of its public men. Long before the taint of
demoralization reached the heart of the masses, the Confederate cause had
been despaired of by men whose influence and position determined the
convictions of whole communities. In President Davis and General Lee the
South saw conspicuous examples of resolution, fortitude, and
self-abnegation. It is not to be denied that the impatient and almost
despairing temper of the public was visibly influenced by the persistent
crimination of Mr. Davis, by the faction which sought to thwart him even
at the hazard of the public welfare. But when it was discovered that the
unity of counsel and purpose which had animated the President and General
Lee at every stage of the struggle, was still maintained, popular sympathy
still clung to the leader, whose unselfish devotion and unshaken fortitude
should have been a sufficient rebuke to his accusers.
A vast deal of misrepresentation has been indulged to show that Mr. Davis
had become unpopular in the last stage of the war, and that he was the
object of popular reproach as chiefly responsible for the condition of the
country. To the contrary, there were many evidences of the sympathy which
embraced Mr. Davis as probably the chief sufferer from apprehended
calamities. His appearance in public in Richmond, was always the occasion
of unrestrained popular enthusiasm. Even but a few weeks before the final
catastrophe, there were signal instances of the popular affection for him,
and it was painfully evident to those who knew his character, that these
demonstrations were accepted by him as an exhibition of popular confidence
in the success of the cause. Indeed, the very confidence which these
exhibitions of popular sympathy produced in the mind of Mr. Davis, has
been urged as an evidence of a want of sagacity, which disqualified him
for a clear appreciation of the situation of affairs.
Perhaps with more color of truth than usual, this view of Mr. Davis'
character has been presented. That he did not fully comprehend the
wide-spread demoralization of the South in the last months of the war, is
hardly to be questioned. Judging men by his own exalted nature, he
conceived it impossible that the South could ever abandon its hope of
independence. He did not realize how men could cherish an aspiration for
the future, which did not embrace the liberty of their country. No
sacrifice of personal interests or hopes were, in his view, too great to
be demanded of the country in behalf of a cause, for which he was at all
times ready to surrender his life. Of such devotion and self-abnegation, a
sanguine and resolute spirit was the natural product, and it is a paltry
view of such qualities to characterize them as the proof of defective
intellect. Just such qualities have won the battles of liberty in all
ages. Washington, at Valley Forge, with a wretched remnant of an army,
which was yet the last hope of the country, and with even a more gloomy
future immediately before him, declared that in the last emergency he
would retreat to the mountains of Virginia, and there continue the
struggle in the hope that he would "yet lift the flag of his bleeding
country from the dust." In the same spirit Jefferson Davis would never
have abandoned the Confederate cause so long as it had even a semblance of
popular support.
Almost to the last moment of the Confederacy, he continued to cherish the
hope of a reaction in the public mind, which he believed would be
immediately kindled to its old enthusiasm by a decided success. It was in
recognition of this quality of inflexible purpose, as much as of any other
trait of his character, that the South originally intrusted Davis with
leadership. Fit leaders of revolutions are not usually found in men of
half-hearted purpose, wanting in resolution themselves, and doubting the
fidelity of those whom they govern. Desperate trial is the occasion which
calls forth the courage of those truly great men, who, while ordinary men
despair, confront agony itself with sublime resolution.
If ingenuity and malignity have combined to exaggerate the faults of Mr.
Davis, the love of his countrymen, the candor of honorable enemies, and
the intelligence of mankind have recognized his intellectual and moral
greatness. The world to-day does not afford such an example of those
blended qualities which constitute the title to universal excellence. For
one in his position, the leader of a bold, warlike, intelligent, and
discerning people, there was demanded that union of ardor and deliberation
which he so peculiarly illustrated. Revolutionary periods imperatively
demand this union of capacities for thought and action. The peculiar charm
of Mr. Davis is the perfect poise of his faculties; an almost exact
adjustment of qualities; of indomitable energy and winning grace; heroic
courage and tender affection; strength of character, and almost excessive
compassion; of calculating judgment and knightly sentiment; acute
penetration and analysis; comprehensive perception; laborious habits, and
almost universal knowledge. Of him it may be said as of Hamilton: "He wore
the blended wreath of arms, of law, of statesmanship, of oratory, of
letters, of scholarship, of practical affairs;" and in most of these
fields of distinction, Mr. Davis has few rivals among the public men of
America.
But it is altogether a fallacious supposition that the military situation
of the Confederacy, in the last winter of the war, was beyond
reclamation. The most hasty glance at the situation revealed the
feasibility of destroying Sherman, when he turned northward from Savannah,
with a proper concentration of the forces yet available. President Davis
anxiously sought to secure this concentration, but was disappointed by
causes which need not here be related. With Sherman defeated, the
Confederacy must have obtained a new lease of life, as all the territory
which he had overrun, would immediately be recovered, and the worthless
title of his conquests would be apparent, even to the North. There were
indeed many aspects of the situation encouraging to enterprise, could an
adequate army be obtained, and the heart of the country reanimated.
President Davis was not alone in the indulgence of hope of better fortune.
Again he had the sanction of Lee's name in confirmation of his hopes, and
in support of the measures which he recommended.
But the resolution of the President was not sustained by the coöperation
of Congress. The last session of that body was commemorated by a signal
display of timidity and vacillation. Congress assembled in November, and
at the beginning of its session its nerve was visibly shaken. Before its
adjournment in March, there was no longer even a pretense of organized
opinion and systematic legislation. Its occupation during the winter was
mainly crimination of the President, and a contemptible frivolity, which
at last provoked the hearty disgust of the public. The calibre of the last
Confederate Congress may be correctly estimated, when it is stated that as
late as the 22d of February, 1865, less than sixty days before the fall of
Richmond, that body was earnestly engaged in devising a _new flag for the
Confederacy_.
Not a single measure of importance was adopted without some emasculating
clause, or without such postponement as made it practically inoperative.
Of all the vigorous suggestions of Mr. Davis for recruiting the army,
mobilizing the subsistence, and renovating the material condition of the
country, hardly one was adopted in a practicable shape. Congress had
clearly despaired of the cause. It had not the courage to counsel the
submission, of which it secretly felt the necessity, and left the capital
with a declaration that the "conquest of the Confederacy was
geographically impossible," yet clearly attesting by its flight a very
different view of the situation.
The history of the Congress of the Confederate States is a record of
singular imbecility and irresolution. It was a body without leaders,
without popular sympathy, without a single one of those heroic attributes
which are usually evoked in periods of revolution. It may safely be
asserted that in the history of no other great revolution does the
statesmanship of its legislators appear so contemptible, when compared
with the military administration which guided its armies. Whatever may be
the estimate of the executive ability of the Confederate administration,
it can not be denied that its courage was abundant; nor can it be
questioned that the courage of Congress often required the spur of popular
sentiment. In the wholesale condemnation of Mr. Davis by a class of
writers, it is remarkable that the defective legislation of the
Confederacy should be accredited with so little influence in producing its
failure. If he was so grossly incompetent, what must be the verdict of
history upon a body which, for four years, submitted to a ruinous
administration when the corrective means were in its own hands?
Of Mr. Davis' relations with Congress, Ex-Secretary Mallory writes as
follows:
"I have said that his relations with members of Congress were not what
they should have been, nor were they what they might have been.
Towards them, as towards the world generally, he wore his personal
opinions very openly. Position and opportunity presented him every
means of cultivating the personal good-will of members by little acts
of attention, courtesy, or deference, which no man, however high in
his position, who has to work by means of his fellows, can dispense
with. Great minds can, in spite of the absence of these demonstrations
towards them in a leader--nay, in the face of neglect or apparent
disrespect--go on steadily and bravely, with a single eye to the
public welfare; but the number of these in comparison to those who are
more or less governed by personal considerations in the discharge of
their public duties is small. While he was ever frank and cordial to
his friends, and to all whom he believed to be embarked heart and soul
in the cause of Southern independence, he would not, and, we think,
could not, sacrifice a smile, an inflection of the voice, or a
demonstration of attention to flatter the self-love of any man, in or
out of Congress, who did not stand in this relation. Acting himself
for the public welfare, regardless of self or the opinions of others,
he placed too light a value upon the thousand nameless influences by
which he might have brought others up, apparently, to his own high
moral standard. By members of Congress, who had to see him on
business, his reception of them was frequently complained of as
ungracious. They frequently, in their anxiety amidst public disaster,
called upon him to urge plans, suggestions, or views on the conduct of
the war, or for the attainment of peace, and often pressed matters
upon him which he had very carefully considered, and for which he
alone was responsible.
"Often, in such cases, though he listened to all they had to say--why,
for example, some man should be made a brigadier, major or
lieutenant-general, or placed at the head of an army, etc.--and in
return calmly and precisely stated his reasons against the measure,
he at times failed to satisfy or convince them, simply because, in his
manner and language combined, there was just an indescribable
something which offended their self-esteem. Some of his best friends
left him at times with feelings bordering closely upon anger from this
cause, and with a determination, hastily formed, of calling no more
upon him; and some of the most sensible and patriotic men of both
Houses were alienated from him more or less from this cause. The
counsel of judicious friends upon this subject, and as to more
unrestrained intercourse between him and the members of the Senate and
the House, was vainly exerted. His manly, fearless, true, and noble
nature turned from what to him wore the faintest approach to seeking
popularity, and he scorned to believe it necessary to coax men to do
their duty to their country in her darkest hour of need."
When Congress assembled in November it was plain that the army must have
other means of recruiting than from the remnant yet left by the
conscription. There was but one measure by which the requisite numbers
could be supplied, and that was the extension of the conscription to the
slave population. Public sentiment was at first much divided upon this
subject, but gradually the propriety of the measure was made evident, and
something like a renewal of hope was manifested at the prospect of making
use of an element which the enemy so efficiently employed. President Davis
had, for months previous, contemplated the enlistment of the slaves for
service in various capacities in the field. In the last winter of the war
he strongly urged a negro enrollment, as did General Lee, whose letter to
a member of Congress eventually convinced the country of its necessity.
Whatever may have been the merits of the proposition to arm the slaves, as
a means of renovating the military condition of the Confederacy, the
dilatory action of Congress left no hope of its practical execution. The
discussion upon this subject continued during the entire session, and was
at last terminated by the adoption of a bill providing for the reception
of such slaves into the service as might be tendered by their masters. Mr.
Davis and General Lee both advocated the extension of freedom to such of
the slaves as would volunteer, and this was clearly the only system of
enrollment upon which they could be efficiently employed. But even though
the slave-holding interest had not thus emasculated the measure, by
refusing emancipation, it was too late to hope for any results of
importance. The bill was not passed until three weeks before the fall of
Richmond.
But Congress found congenial employment in giving vent to its partisan
malignity, by the adoption of measures plainly designed to humiliate the
Executive, and with no expectation of improving the condition of the
Confederacy, which most of its members believed to be already beyond
reclamation. In this spirit was dictated the measure making General Lee
virtually a military dictator, and that expressing want of confidence in
the cabinet. All of this action of Congress was extra-official, and
subversive of the constitutional authority of the Executive, but it
utterly failed in its obvious design.
President Davis never made a more noble display of feeling, than in his
response to the resolution of the Virginia Legislature recommending the
appointment of General Lee to the command of the armies of the
Confederacy. Said he: "The opinion expressed by the General Assembly in
regard to General R. E. Lee has my full concurrence. Virginia can not have
a higher regard for him, or greater confidence in his character and
ability, than is entertained by me. When General Lee took command of the
Army of Northern Virginia, he was in command of all the armies of the
Confederate States by my order of assignment. He continued in this general
command, as well as in the immediate command of the Army of Northern
Virginia, as long as I could resist his opinion that it was necessary for
him to be relieved from one of these two duties. Ready as he has ever
shown himself to be to perform any service that I desired him to render to
his country, he left it for me to choose between his withdrawal from the
command of the army in the field, and relieving him of the general command
of all the armies of the Confederate States. It was only when satisfied of
this necessity that I came to the conclusion to relieve him from the
general command, believing that the safety of the capital and the success
of our cause depended, in a great measure, on then retaining him in the
command in the field of the Army of Northern Virginia. On several
subsequent occasions, the desire on my part to enlarge the sphere of
General Lee's usefulness, has led to renewed consideration of the subject,
and he has always expressed his inability to assume command of other
armies than those now confided to him, unless relieved of the immediate
command in the field of that now opposed to General Grant."
A striking indication of the feverish condition of the public mind of both
sections, during the last winter of the war, was the ready credence given
to the most extravagant and improbable rumors. Washington correspondents
of Northern newspapers declared that the air of the Federal capital was
"thick with rumors of negotiation." At Richmond this credulous disposition
was even more marked. Men were found as late as the middle of March, who
believed that President Davis had actually formed an alliance, offensive
and defensive, with the French Emperor. In the month of January the
rumors as to peace negotiations assumed a more definite shape, in the
arrival of Mr. Francis P. Blair at the Confederate capital.
It is remarkable that the "Blair mission" and its sequel, the Hampton
Roads conference, though palpably contemplating only the discussion of
such mere generalities as belong to other efforts at peace at different
stages of the war, and, indeed, introducing nothing in the shape of formal
negotiation, should have been dignified as a most important episode.
Equally remarkable, in view of the published proceedings of the Hampton
Roads conference, is the disposition to censure President Davis for having
designedly interposed obstacles to the consummation of peace. Mr. Blair
visited Richmond by the permission of President Lincoln, but without any
official authority, and without having the objects of his mission
committed to paper. In short, Mr. Blair's mission had no official
character, and he came to Richmond to prevail upon Mr. Davis to encourage,
in some manner, preliminary steps to negotiation. In his interviews with
the Confederate President, Mr. Blair disclaimed the official countenance
of the Federal authorities for the objects of his visit. It was known to
the world, that Mr. Davis, upon repeated occasions, had avowed his desire
for peace upon any terms consistent with the honor of his country, and
that he would not present difficulties as to forms in the attainment of
that object, at this critical period. Hence, despite the unauthorized
nature of Mr. Blair's conciliatory efforts, Mr. Davis gave him a letter,
addressed to himself, avowing the willingness of the Confederate
authorities to begin negotiations, to send or receive commissioners
authorized to treat, and to "renew the effort to enter into a conference,
with a view to secure peace between the two countries."
Mr. Lincoln, in a letter to Mr. Blair, acknowledged having read Mr. Davis'
note, and avowed his readiness to receive an agent from Mr. Davis, or from
the authority resisting the Federal Government, to confer with him
informally, with the view of restoring peace to the people of "our common
country."
The commissioners appointed by Mr. Davis, after this notification, were
Vice-President Stephens, Senator Hunter, and Judge Campbell. The
conference was held on a steamer lying in Hampton Roads, between the three
Confederate commissioners and Messrs. Lincoln and Seward. By both sides
the interview was treated as informal; there were neither notes nor
secretaries, nor did the interview assume any other shape than an
irregular conversation. During the four hours of desultory discussion,
there was developed no basis of negotiation, no ground of possible
agreement. Mr. Lincoln declared that he would consent to no truce or
suspension of hostilities, except upon the single condition of the
disbandment of the Confederate forces, and the submission of the revolted
States to the authority of the Union. The result was simply the assertion,
in a more arrogant form, of the Federal _ultimatum_--the unconditional
submission of the South, its acquiescence in all the unconstitutional
legislation of the Federal Congress respecting slavery, including
emancipation, and the right to legislate upon the subject of the relations
between the white and black populations of each State. Mr. Lincoln,
moreover, refused to treat with the authorities of the Confederate States,
or with the States separately; declared that the consequences of the
establishment of the Federal authority would have to be accepted, and
declined giving any guarantee whatever, except an indefinite assurance of
a liberal use of the pardoning power, towards those who were assumed to
have made themselves liable to the pains and penalties of the laws of the
United States.
The statement of the Confederate commissioners, and all the known facts of
the transaction, demonstrate, without argument, the injustice of holding
Mr. Davis responsible, to any extent, for the results of the Hampton Roads
conference. With one voice the South accepted the result as establishing
the purpose of the Federal Government to exact "unconditional submission,"
as the only condition of peace, and scorned the insolent demand of the
enemy. If the South had shown itself willing to accept the terms of the
Federal Government, or if Mr. Lincoln had suggested other propositions
than that of unconditional submission, then only could Mr. Davis be
charged with having presented obstacles to the termination of the war.
Nor is it to be assumed that the terms of his letter to Mr. Blair,
referring to his desire for peace between the "two countries," precluded
negotiation upon the basis of reunion. His language was that of a proper
diplomacy, which should not commit the error of yielding in advance to the
demands of an enemy, then insolent in what he regarded as the assurance of
certain victory. The period was opportune for magnanimity on the part of
the North, but not propitious for the display of over-anxious concession
by the South. Mr. Davis was at this time anxious for propositions from the
Federal Government, for, while he had not despaired of the Confederacy, he
was deeply impressed with the increasing obstacles to its success. His
frequent declaration, at this time, was: "I am solicitous only for the
good of the people, and am indifferent as to the forms by which the
public interests are to be subserved." Indeed, the Federal authorities had
ample assurance that Mr. Davis would present any basis of settlement,
which might be offered, to the several States of the Confederacy for their
individual action. Nor did he doubt the acceptance of reconstruction,
without slavery even, by several of the States--an event which would have
left the Confederacy too weak for further resistance.
In view of the consistent record of Mr. Davis, during the entire period of
the war, to promote the attainment of peace, it is remarkable that there
should ever have been an allegation of a contrary disposition. In a
letter, written in 1864, to Governor Vance, of North Carolina, he
conclusively stated his course upon the subject of peace. Said Mr. Davis,
in this letter:
"We have made three distinct efforts to communicate with the
authorities at Washington, and have been invariably unsuccessful.
Commissioners were sent before hostilities were begun, and the
Washington Government refused to receive them or hear what they had to
say. A second time, I sent a military officer with a communication
addressed by myself to President Lincoln. The letter was received by
General Scott, who did not permit the officer to see Mr. Lincoln, but
promised that an answer would be sent. No answer has ever been
received. The third time, a few months ago, a gentleman was sent,
whose position, character, and reputation were such as to ensure his
reception, if the enemy were not determined to receive no proposals
whatever from the Government. Vice-President Stephens made a patriotic
tender of his services in the hope of being able to promote the cause
of humanity, and, although little belief was entertained of his
success, I cheerfully yielded to his suggestions, that the experiment
should be tried. The enemy refused to let him pass through their
lines or hold any conference with them. He was stopped before he ever
reached Fortress Monroe, on his way to Washington....
"If we will break up our Government, dissolve the Confederacy, disband
our armies, emancipate our slaves, take an oath of allegiance, binding
ourselves to obedience to him and of disloyalty to our own States, he
proposes to pardon us, and not to plunder us of any thing more than
the property already stolen from us, and such slaves as still remain.
In order to render his proposals so insulting as to secure their
rejection, he joins to them a promise to support with his army
one-tenth of the people of any State who will attempt to set up a
government over the other nine-tenths, thus seeking to sow discord and
suspicion among the people of the several States, and to excite them
to civil war in furtherance of his ends. I know well it would be
impossible to get your people, if they possessed full knowledge of
these facts, to consent that proposals should now be made by us to
those who control the Government at Washington. Your own well-known
devotion to the great cause of liberty and independence, to which we
have all committed whatever we have of earthly possessions, would
induce you to take the lead in repelling the bare thought of abject
submission to the enemy. Yet peace on other terms is now impossible."
The spirit in which the South received the results of the Hampton Roads
conference is to be correctly estimated by the following extract from a
Richmond newspaper, of date February 15, 1865:
"The world can again, for the hundredth time, see conclusive evidence
in the history and sequel of the 'Blair mission,' the blood-guiltiness
of the enemy, and their responsibility for the ruin, desolation, and
suffering which have followed, and will yet follow, their heartless
attempts to subjugate and destroy an innocent people. The South again
wins honor from the good, the magnanimous, the truly brave every-where
by her efforts to stop the effusion of blood, save the lives and the
property of her own citizens, and to stop, too, the slaughter of the
victims of the enemy's cruelty, which has forced or deceived them into
the ranks of his armies. We have lost nothing by our efforts in behalf
of peace; for, waiving all consideration of the reanimation and
reunion of our people, occasioned by Lincoln's haughty rejection of
our commissioners, we have added new claims upon the sympathy and
respect of the world and posterity, which will not fail to be
remembered to our honor, in the history of this struggle, even though
we should finally perish in it. The position of the South at this
moment is indeed one which should stamp her as the champion, not only
of popular rights and self-government, which Americans have so much
cherished, but as the champion of the spirit of humanity in both
sections; for it can not be supposed that we have all the sorrows as
well as sufferings of this war to endure, and that there are no
desolate homes, no widows and orphans, no weeds nor cypress in the
enemy's country....
"One fact is certain, that whatever Seward's design may have been, and
whatever its success may be, the Confederacy has derived an immediate
advantage from the visit of our commissioners to Fortress Monroe.
Nothing could have so served to reanimate the courage and patriotism
of our people, as his attempted imposition of humiliation upon us.
Lincoln will hear no more talk of 'peace' and 'negotiation' from the
Southern side, for now we are united as one man in the purpose of
self-preservation and vengeance, and it may not be long before his
people, now rioting in excessive exultation over successes really
valueless, and easily counter-balanced by one week of prosperous
fortune for the South, will tremble at the manifestation of the spirit
which they have aroused."
But the evidences of popular reanimation in the South were delusive. For a
brief moment there was a spirit of fierce and almost desperate resolution.
At a meeting held in the African church, in Richmond, President Davis
delivered one of his most eloquent popular orations, and the enthusiasm
was perhaps greater than upon any similar occasion during the war. But
popular feeling soon lapsed into the sullen despondency, from which it had
been temporarily aroused by the unparalleled insult of the enemy. Yet the
_ultimatum_ of Mr. Lincoln, and the declared will of the South, left
President Davis no other policy than a continuation of the struggle, with
a view to the best attainable results. Upon this course he was now fully
resolved, looking to the future with serious apprehension, not altogether
unrelieved by hope.
The report of the Hampton Roads conference and its results, was made by
President Davis, to Congress, on the 5th February:
"_To the Senate and House of Representatives of the Confederate States
of America_:
"Having recently received a written notification, which satisfied me
that the President of the United States was disposed to confer,
informally, with unofficial agents that might be sent by me, with a
view to the restoration of peace, I requested Hon. Alexander H.
Stephens, Hon. R. M. T. Hunter, and Hon. John A. Campbell, to proceed
through our lines, to hold a conference with Mr. Lincoln, or such
persons as he might depute to represent him.
"I herewith submit, for the information of Congress, the report of the
eminent citizens above named, showing that the enemy refuse to enter
into negotiations with the Confederate States, or any one of them
separately, or to give our people any other terms or guarantees than
those which a conqueror may grant, or permit us to have peace on any
other basis than our unconditional submission to their rule, coupled
with the acceptance of their recent legislation, including an
amendment to the Constitution for the emancipation of negro slaves,
and with the right, on the part of the Federal Congress, to legislate
on the subject of the relations between the white and black population
of each State.
"Such is, as I understand, the effect of the amendment to the
Constitution, which has been adopted by the Congress of the United
States.
"JEFFERSON DAVIS.
"EXECUTIVE OFFICE, Feb. 5, 1865."
"_Richmond, Va._, February 5, 1865.
"_To the President of the Confederate States_--
"SIR: Under your letter of appointment of 28th ult., we proceeded to
seek an informal conference with Abraham Lincoln, President of the
United States, upon the subject mentioned in your letter.
"The conference was granted, and took place on the 3d inst., on board
a steamer anchored in Hampton Roads, where we met President Lincoln
and Hon. Mr. Seward, Secretary of State of the United States. It
continued for several hours, and was both full and explicit.
"We learned from them that the Message of President Lincoln to the
Congress of the United States, in December last, explains clearly and
distinctly, his sentiments as to terms, conditions, and method of
proceeding by which peace can be secured to the people, and we were
not informed that they would be modified or altered to obtain that
end. We understood from him that no terms or proposals of any treaty
or agreement looking to an ultimate settlement would be entertained or
made by him with the authorities of the Confederate States, because
that would be a recognition of their existence as a separate power,
which, under no circumstances, would be done; and, for like reasons,
that no such terms would be entertained by him from States separately;
that no extended truce or armistice, as at present advised, would be
granted or allowed without satisfactory assurance, in advance, of
complete restoration of the authority of the Constitution and laws of
the United States over all places within the States of the
Confederacy; that whatever consequences may follow from the
reëstablishment of that authority must be accepted, but the
individuals subject to pains and penalties, under the laws of the
United States, might rely upon a very liberal use of the power
confided to him to remit those pains and penalties if peace be
restored.
"During the conference the proposed amendments to the Constitution of
the United States, adopted by Congress on the 31st ult., were brought
to our notice. These amendments provide that neither slavery nor
involuntary servitude, except for crime, should exist within the
United States or any place within their jurisdiction, and that
Congress should have the power to enforce this amendment by
appropriate legislation.
"Of all the correspondence that preceded the conference herein
mentioned, and leading to the same, you have heretofore been informed.
"Very respectfully, your obedient servants,
"ALEX. H. STEPHENS,
"R. M. T. HUNTER,
"J. A. CAMPBELL."