DISAPPOINTMENT AT RESULTS OF THE GEORGIA CAMPAIGN--HOW FAR IT WAS
PARALLEL WITH THE VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN--DIFFERENT TACTICS ON BOTH
SIDES--REMOVAL OF GENERAL JOHNSTON--THE EXPLANATION OF THAT STEP--A
QUESTION FOR MILITARY JUDGMENT--THE NEGATIVE VINDICATION OF GENERAL
JOHNSTON--DIFFERENT THEORIES OF WAR--THE REAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE
SOUTHERN FAILURE--THE ODDS IN NUMBERS AND RESOURCES AGAINST THE
SOUTH--WATER FACILITIES OF THE ENEMY--STRATEGIC DIFFICULTIES OF THE
SOUTH--THE BLOCKADE--INSIGNIFICANCE OF MINOR QUESTIONS--JEFFERSON
DAVIS THE WASHINGTON OF THE SOUTH--GENERAL JOHN B. HOOD--HIS
DISTINGUISHED CAREER--HOPE OF THE SOUTH RENEWED--HOOD'S OPERATIONS--
LOSS OF ATLANTA--IMPORTANT QUESTIONS--PRESIDENT DAVIS IN GEORGIA--
PERVERSE CONDUCT OF GOVERNOR BROWN--MR. DAVIS IN MACON--AT HOOD'S
HEAD-QUARTERS--HOW HOOD'S TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN VARIED FROM MR. DAVIS'
INTENTIONS--SHERMAN'S PROMPT AND BOLD CONDUCT--HOOD'S MAGNANIMOUS
ACKNOWLEDGMENT--DESTRUCTION OF THE CONFEDERATE POWER IN THE
SOUTH-WEST.
General Johnston had failed to realize either the expectations of the
public, or the hope of the Government, in his direction of the campaign in
Georgia. His tactics were those uniformly illustrated by this officer in
all his operations, of falling back before the enemy, and seeking to
obviate the disadvantage of inferior numbers by partial engagements in
positions favorable to himself. There was, indeed, some parallel between
his campaign and that of Lee, between the Rapidan and James, but the
results in Virginia and Georgia were altogether disproportionate. The
advance of Sherman was slow and cautious, but nevertheless steady; and
when the campaign had lasted seventy days, he was before Atlanta, the
objective point of his designs, and in secure occupation of an extensive
and important section of country, heretofore inaccessible to the Federal
armies. Not only were Sherman's losses small, as compared with those of
Grant, but his force was relatively much weaker.
There can be no just comparison of these two campaigns, either as
illustrating the same system of tactics, or as yielding the same results.
The aggregate of Federal forces in Georgia did not exceed, at the
beginning of the campaign, one hundred thousand men, if indeed it reached
that figure. To oppose this, Johnston had forty-five thousand. We have
already stated the aggregate of Federal forces in Virginia to have been at
least four times the force that, under any circumstances, Lee could have
made available. The public did not interpret as _retreats_, the parallel
movements by which Lee successively threw himself in the front of Grant,
wherever the latter made a demonstration. Not once had Lee turned his back
upon the enemy, nor abandoned a position, save when the baffled foe, after
enormous losses, sought a new field of operations. At its conclusion,
Grant had sustained losses in excess of the whole of Lee's army, abandoned
altogether his original design, and sought a base of operations, which he
might have reached in the beginning, not only without loss, but without
even opposition.
Some explanation of the widely disproportionate results achieved in
Virginia and Georgia, is to be found in the different tactics of the
Federal commanders. Sherman, whose nature is thoroughly aggressive, yet
developed great skill and caution. Instead of fruitlessly dashing his army
against fortifications, upon ground of the enemy's choosing, he treated
the positions of Johnston as fortresses, from which his antagonist was to
be flanked.
But while this explanation was appreciated, the public was much disposed
to accept the two campaigns as illustrations of the different systems of
tactics accredited to the two Confederate commanders. It was seen that in
Virginia the enemy occupied no new territory, and, at the end of three
months, was upon ground which he might easily have occupied at the
beginning of the campaign, but to reach which, by the means selected, had
cost him nearly eighty thousand men.[76] In Georgia, on the other hand,
Sherman had advanced one hundred miles upon soil heretofore firmly held by
the Confederacy, and without a general engagement of the opposing forces.
In Virginia, the enemy had no difficulty as to his transportation, and the
farther Grant advanced towards James River, the more secure and abundant
became his means of supply. In Georgia, Sherman drew his supplies over
miles of hostile territory, and was nowhere aided by the proximity of
navigable streams.
When in a censorious mood, the popular mind is not over-careful of the
aptness of the parallels and analogies, wherewith to justify its carping
judgments. Without denying his skill, or questioning his possession of the
higher qualities of generalship, people complained that "Johnston was a
retreating general." Whatever judgment may have arisen from subsequent
events, it can not be fairly denied that when Johnston reached Atlanta,
there was a very perceptible loss of popular confidence, not less in the
issue of the campaign than in General Johnston himself. It was in
deference to popular sentiment, as much as in accordance with his views of
the necessity of the military situation, that President Davis, about the
middle of July, relieved General Johnston from command. Sympathizing
largely with the popular aspiration for a more bold, ample, and
comprehensive policy, and appreciating the value of unlimited public
confidence, Mr. Davis had lost much of his hope of those decisive results,
which he believed the Western army competent to achieve.
The dispatch relieving General Johnston was as follows:
"RICHMOND, VA., July 17, 1864.
"_To General J. E. Johnston_:
"Lieutenant-General J. B. Hood has been commissioned to the temporary
rank of General, under the law of Congress. I am directed by the
Secretary of War to inform you, that as you have failed to arrest the
advance of the enemy to the vicinity of Atlanta, and _express no
confidence that you can defeat or repel him_, you are hereby relieved
from the command of the Army and Department of Tennessee, which you
will immediately turn over to General Hood.
"S. COOPER,
"_Adjutant and Inspector-General_."
This order sufficiently explains the immediate motive of Johnston's
removal, but there was a train of circumstances which, at length, brought
the President reluctantly to this conclusion. The progress of events in
Georgia, from the beginning of spring, had developed a marked difference
in the views of General Johnston and the President. Early in the year Mr.
Davis had warmly approved an offensive campaign against the Federal army,
while its various wings were not yet united. The Federal force, then in
the neighborhood of Dalton, did not greatly exceed the Confederate
strength, and Mr. Davis, foreseeing the concentration of forces for the
capture of Atlanta, believed the opportunity for a decisive stroke to
exist before this concentration should ensue. General Hood likewise
favored this view of the situation. He urged that the enemy would
certainly concentrate forces to such an extent, if permitted, as would
gradually force the Southern army back into the interior, where a defeat
would be irreparable, with no new defensive line, and without the hope of
rallying either the army or the people. General Johnston opposed these
views, on the ground that the enemy, if defeated, had strong positions
where they could take refuge, while a defeat of the Confederate force
would be fatal. This difference of opinion is to be appropriately decided
only by military criticism, but it can not be fairly adjudged that an
offensive in the spring would not have succeeded, because it failed in the
following autumn. Circumstances were altogether different.
General Johnston's operations between Dalton and Atlanta were
unsatisfactory to Mr. Davis. Here again arises a military question, which
we shall not seek to decide, in the evident difference as to the capacity
of the Army of Tennessee, for any other than purely defensive operations.
It was, indeed, not so much an opposition on the part of the President, to
Johnston's operations, as the apprehension of a want of ultimate aim in
his movements. Whatever the plans of General Johnston may have been, they
were not communicated to Mr. Davis, at least in such a shape as to
indicate the hope of early and decisive execution. Alarmed for the results
of a policy having seemingly the characteristics of drifting, of waiting
upon events, and of hoping for, instead of _creating opportunity_, Mr.
Davis yet felt the necessity of giving General Johnston an ample trial.
During all this period strong influences were brought to bear against
Johnston, and upon the other hand, he was warmly sustained by influences
friendly both to himself and the President.
For weeks the President was importuned by these conflicting counsels, the
natural effect of which was to aggravate his grave doubts as to the
existence of any matured ultimate object in General Johnston's movements.
Upon one occasion, while still anxiously deliberating the subject, an
eminent politician, a thorough patriot, a supporter of Mr. Davis, and
having to an unlimited extent his confidence, called at the office of the
President, with a view to explain the situation in Georgia, whence he had
just arrived. This gentleman had been with the army, knew its condition,
its enthusiasm and confidence. He was confident that General Johnston
would destroy Sherman, and did not believe that the Federal army would
ever be permitted to reach even the neighborhood of Atlanta. Mr. Davis,
having quietly heard this explanation, replied by handing to his visitor a
dispatch just received from Johnston, and _dated at Atlanta_. The army had
already reached Atlanta, before the gentleman could reach Richmond, and he
acknowledged himself equally amazed and disappointed.
Despite his doubts and apprehensions, however, Mr. Davis resisted the
applications of members of Congress and leading politicians from the
section in which General Johnston was operating, for a change of
commanders, until he felt himself no longer justified in hazarding the
loss of Atlanta without a struggle. There appeared little ground for the
belief that Johnston would hold Atlanta, nor did there appear any reason
why his arrival there should occasion a departure from his previous
retrograde policy. Of the purpose of General Johnston to evacuate Atlanta
the President felt that he had abundant evidence. Not until he felt fully
satisfied upon this point, was the removal of that officer determined
upon. Indeed, the order removing Johnston sets forth as its justification,
that he had expressed no confidence in his ability to "repel the enemy."
If Atlanta should be surrendered, where would General Johnston expect to
give battle?[77]
Subsequently to his removal, General Johnston avowed that his purpose was
to hold Atlanta; and, therefore, we are not at liberty to question his
purpose. But this does not alter the legitimate inference drawn by Mr.
Davis at the time of his removal. Can it be believed that the President
would have taken that step, if satisfied of Johnston's purpose to deliver
battle for Atlanta?
This entire subject belongs appropriately only to military discussion, and
no decision from other sources can possibly affect the ultimate sentence
of that tribunal. Yet the most serious disparagement of Mr. Davis, by
civilian writers, has been based upon the removal of Johnston from the
command of the Western army. Granting that General Johnston would have
sought to hold Atlanta, can it be believed that the ultimate result would
have been different? When Sherman invested Atlanta, the North found some
compensation for Grant's failures in Virginia; and even though his force
should have been inadequate for a siege, can it now be doubted that he
would have been reënforced to any needed extent? The mere presence of
Sherman at Atlanta was justly viewed by the North as an important success.
He had followed his antagonist to the very heart of the Confederacy, and
was master of innumerable strong positions held by the Confederates at the
outset of the campaign. To suppose that he would, at such a moment, be
permitted to fail from a lack of means, is a hypothesis at variance with
the conduct of the North throughout the war.
General Johnston has that sort of negative vindication which arises from
the disasters of his successor, though, as we shall presently show, Mr.
Davis was nowise responsible for the misfortunes of General Hood.[78] The
question is one which must some day arise as between the general military
policy of the Confederacy, and the antagonistic views which have been so
freely ascribed to General Johnston by his admirers. We have no desire to
pursue that antagonism, which, if it really existed, can hardly yet be a
theme for impartial discussion. Towards the close of the war, it was usual
to accredit Johnston with the theory that the Confederacy could better
afford to _lose territory than men_, and that hence the true policy of the
South was to avoid general engagements, unless under such circumstances as
should totally neutralize the enemy's advantage in numbers. We are not
prepared to say to what extent these announcements of his views were
authorized by General Johnston, or to what extent they were based upon
retrospection. Some confirmation of their authenticity would seem to be
deducible from General Johnston's declaration since the war, that the
"Confederacy was too weak for offensive war." Certainly there could be no
theory more utterly antagonistic to the genius of the Southern people, and
that is a consideration, to which the great commanders of history have not
usually been indifferent. Nor was it the theory which inspired those
achievements of Southern valor, which will ring through the centuries. It
was not the theory which Lee and Jackson adopted, nor, we need hardly
add, that which Jefferson Davis approved.
Indeed, the philosophy of the Southern failure is not to be sought in the
discussion of opposing theories among Confederate leaders. The conclusion
of history will be, not that the South accomplished less than was to be
anticipated, but far more than have any other people under similar
circumstances. Southern men hardly yet comprehend the real odds in numbers
and resources which for four years they successfully resisted. Other
questions than those merely of aggregate populations and material wealth,
enter into the solution of the problem.
By the census of 1860, the aggregate free population of the thirteen
States, which the Confederacy claimed, was 7,500,000, leaving in the
remaining States of the Union a free population of over twenty millions.
This statement includes Kentucky and Missouri as members of the
Confederacy; yet, by the compulsion of Federal bayonets, these States, not
less than Maryland and Delaware, were virtually on the side of the North.
Kentucky proclaimed neutrality, but during the whole war was overrun by
the Federal armies, and, with her State government and large numbers of
her people favoring the North, despite the Southern sympathies of the
majority, her moral influence, as well as her physical strength, sustained
the Union. The legitimate government of Missouri, and a majority of her
people, sided with the South; but early occupied and held by the Federal
army, her legitimate government was subverted, and her moral and physical
resources were thrown into the scale against the Confederacy.
To say nothing of the large numbers of recruits obtained by the Federal
armies from Kentucky, Maryland and Missouri, (chiefly from their large
foreign populations,) their contributions to the Confederate army were
nearly, if not quite, compensated by the accessions to Federal strength
from East Tennessee, Western Virginia, and other portions of the seceded
States. It would be fair, therefore, to deduct the population of these two
States from that of the South, and this would leave the Confederacy five
and one-half millions. Dividing their free populations between the two
sections, and the odds were six and a half millions against twenty and a
half millions. This is a liberal statement for the North, and embraces
only the original populations of the two sections at the beginning of
hostilities. There can hardly be a reasonable doubt, that had the struggle
been confined to these numerical forces, the South would have triumphed.
But hordes of foreign mercenaries, incited by high bounty and the promise
of booty, flocked to the Federal army, and thus was the North enabled to
recruit its armies to any needed standard, while the South depended solely
upon its original population. As the South was overrun, too, negroes were
forced or enticed into the Federal service, and thus, by these
inexhaustible reserves of foreign mercenaries and negro recruits, the
Confederate army was finally exhausted.
The following exhibition of the strength of the Federal armies is from the
report of the Secretary of War, at the beginning of the session of
Congress in December, 1865:
Official reports show that on the 1st of May, 1864, the aggregate
national military force of all arms, officers and men, was nine
hundred and seventy thousand seven hundred and ten, to-wit:
Available force present for duty 662,345
On detached service in the different military departments 109,348
In field hospitals or unfit for duty 41,266
In general hospitals or on sick leave at home 75,978
Absent on furlough or as prisoners of war 66,290
Absent without leave 15,483
-------
Grand aggregate 970,710
The aggregate available force present for duty May 1st, 1864, was
distributed in the different commands as follows:
Department of Washington 42,124
Army of the Potomac 120,386
Department of Virginia and North Carolina 59,139
Department of the South 18,165
Department of the Gulf 61,866
Department of Arkansas 23,666
Department of the Tennessee 74,174
Department of the Missouri 15,770
Department of the North-west 5,295
Department of Kansas 4,798
Head-quarters Military Division of the Mississippi 476
Department of the Cumberland 119,948
Department of the Ohio 35,416
Northern Department 9,540
Department of West Virginia 30,782
Department of the East 2,828
Department of the Susquehanna 2,970
Middle Department 5,627
Ninth Army Corps 20,780
Department of New Mexico 3,454
Department of the Pacific 5,141
-------
Total 662,345
And again:
Official reports show that on the 1st of March, 1865, the aggregate
military force of all arms, officers and men, was nine hundred and
sixty-five thousand five hundred and ninety-one, to-wit:
Available forces present for duty 602,598
On detached service in the different military departments 132,538
In field hospitals and unfit for duty 35,628
In general hospitals or on sick leave 143,419
Absent on furlough or as prisoners of war 31,695
Absent without leave 19,683
-------
Grand aggregate 965,591
This force was augmented on the 1st of May, 1865, by enlistments, to
the number of one million five hundred and sixteen, of all arms,
officers and men (1,000,516).
And again he says:
The aggregate quotas charged against the several States
under all calls made by the President of the United
States, from the 15th day of April, 1861, to the 14th
day of April, 1865, at which time drafting and
recruiting ceased, was 2,759,049
The aggregate number of men credited on the several
calls, and put into service of the United States, in
the army, navy, and marine corps, during the above
period, was 2,656,553
Leaving a deficiency on all calls, when the war closed,
of 102,596
This statement does not include the regular army, nor the negro troops
raised in the Southern States, which were not raised by calls on the
States. It may be safely asserted that the "available force present for
duty," of the Federal armies at the beginning or close of the last year of
the war, exceeded the entire force called into the service of the
Confederacy during the four years. The aggregate of Federal forces raised
during the war numbered more than one-third of the free population of the
Confederate States, including men, women, and children.[79]
But this disparity of numbers, apparently sufficient of itself to decide
the issue against the South, was by no means the greatest advantage of the
North. When it is asserted that the naval superiority of the North decided
the contest in its favor, we are not limited to the consideration merely
of that absolute command of the water, which prevented the South from
importing munitions of war, except at enormous expense and hazard, which
made the defense of the sea-coast and contiguous territory impossible, and
which so disorganized the Confederate finances. The Confederacy
encountered strategic difficulties, by reason of the naval superiority of
the North, which, at an early period of the war, counter-balanced the
advantages of its defensive position.
In the beginning the enemy had easy, speedy, and secure access to the
Southern coast, and wherever there was a harbor or inlet, was to be found
a base of operations for a Federal army. Thus, at the outset, the
Confederacy presented on every side an exposed frontier. In every quarter,
the Federal armies had bases of operations at right angles, each to the
other, and thus, wherever the Confederate army established a defensive
line, it was assailable by a second Federal army advancing from a second
base. The advantage of rapid concentration of forces, usually belonging to
an interior line, was obviated by the easy and rapid conveyance of large
masses by water.
Probably the most serious strategic disadvantage of the South was its
territorial configuration, through the intersection of its soil in nearly
every quarter by navigable rivers, either emptying into the ocean, of
which the North, at all times, had undisputed control, or opening upon the
Federal frontier. In all the Atlantic States of the Confederacy navigable
streams penetrate far into the interior, and empty into the sea. The
Mississippi, aptly termed an "inland sea," flowing through the
Confederacy, was, both in its upper waters and at its mouth, held by the
North. The Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers, with their mouths upon the
Federal frontiers, navigable in winter for transports and gunboats, in the
first twelve months of the war, brought the Federal armies to the centre
of the South-west. In the Trans-Mississippi region, the Arkansas and Red
Rivers gave the enemy convenient and secure bases of operations along
their margins. Each one of these streams having inevitably, sooner or
later, become subject to the control of the Federal navy, afforded bases
of operations against the interior of the South, while it was likewise
threatened from the Northern frontier.
The difficulty of _space_, which defeated Napoleon in his invasion of
Russia, and which has baffled the largest armies led by the ablest
commanders, had an easy solution for the North. Remarkable illustrations
of the extent to which these water facilities aided the North, were
afforded by the signal failure attending every overland advance of the
Federal armies so long as the Confederates could raise even the semblance
of an opposing force. Besides the innumerable Federal failures in the
Appalachian region of Virginia, Sherman and Grant, the most successful of
Northern commanders, illustrated this military principle in instances
already noted. When Sherman finally marched from the Confederate frontier
to the ocean, General Grant's policy of "attrition" had virtually
destroyed the military strength of the South, and Sherman simply
accomplished an unopposed march through an undefended country. There can
be no better illustration of these strategic difficulties of the
Confederacy, than that afforded by the train of disasters in the beginning
of 1862, each of which was directly and mainly attributable to the naval
advantages of the enemy and the geographical configuration.
A candid review of the events of the first two years of the war will
demonstrate the inevitable failure of subjugation of the South, but for
these advantages of her invaders. Not only are the facilities of
transportation possessed by the North to be considered, but the further
advantage extended by its fleet in the event of military reverse. The
shipping constituted an invulnerable defense and convenient shelter for
the fugitive Federals. Upon at least two occasions, the two main Federal
armies were rescued from destruction by the gunboats--in the case of Grant
at Shiloh, and of McClellan on James River.
Nor was it possible for the South to make adequate provision to meet the
naval advantages of the North. The Federal Government retained the whole
of the navy. The North was manufacturing and commercial, while the South
was purely agricultural in its means; hence the incomparable rapidity with
which the Federal Government accumulated shipping of every character. The
initial superiority of the North in naval resources prevented the South
from obtaining from foreign sources the men and the material for the
equipment of vessels of war. Then, again, the disputed question of the
capacity of shore batteries to resist vessels of war, had a most
inopportune solution for the South, and in cases where great interests
were involved. We have already noted one instance where this question had
a fatal solution--that of New Orleans. And in this instance, too, the want
of time for preparation was a fatal difficulty. But for the unfinished
condition of the iron-clads at New Orleans, the possession of the
Mississippi by the enemy would have been greatly deferred, though, with
the headwaters and mouth of the great river in Federal control, it was
hardly more than a question of time, should the North skillfully employ
its superior manufacturing resources and preponderant population.
The special weapon of the North, from which no amount of victories ever
brought the Confederacy one moment's relief, was the blockade--a weapon
which the injustice of foreign powers placed in the grasp of our
adversaries. The blockade ruined the Confederate finances and, by
preventing the importation of military material, weakened the Confederate
armies to the extent of thousands of men who were detailed for
manufacturing and other purposes. It was the blockade, too, which caused
the derangement of the internal economy of the South, creating the painful
contrast in the effects of the war upon the two sections. The North, with
its ports open, the abundant gold of California, and petroleum stimulating
speculation, found in the war a mine of wealth. Patriotism and profit went
hand in hand. The vast expenditures of Government created a lucrative
market; the enormous transportation demanded made the railroads prosperous
beyond parallel; and the sources of popular prosperity and exhilaration
were inexhaustible. The condition of the South was the exact reverse. With
its commerce almost totally suspended; frequently in peril of famine;
whole States, one after another, occupied or devastated by the enemy, so
that when the Confederate armies expelled the enemy they could not
maintain themselves, and were compelled to retreat; deprived of every
comfort, and nearly of all the necessaries of life, the history of the war
in the South is a record of universal and unrelieved suffering.
It must be apparent that we have here given but a superficial review and
imperfect statement of the obstacles with which the South contended. But,
assuredly, before even this array of odds, such minor questions as the
removal of one officer and the retention of another sink into utter
insignificance. As we have before intimated, many of the most important
incidents in the conduct of the war must be reserved for the decision of
impartial military judgment. What if it should be granted that the
appointment of Pemberton and the removal of Johnston were fatal blunders,
were they compensated by no acts of judicious selection of other officers
for promotion and reward? Is the firm and constant support of Lee, of
Sidney Johnston, of Jackson, and of Early to be accounted as nothing? Are
we to accept the imputation of error to Mr. Davis alone? We need not
pursue the career of General Johnston much farther than its beginning to
discover what his countrymen unanimously deplored as an error, what
Stonewall Jackson declared a fatal blunder. General Lee confessed his
error at Gettysburg. Beauregard, too, has been generally adjudged to have
seriously erred at Shiloh. Yet how easy would it be to construct a
plausible theory, demonstrating the seriously adverse influence upon the
fortunes of the Confederacy, from each one of those errors. And we could
extend the parallel much farther. Napoleon estimated the merits of
different generals by the comparative number of their faults and virtues.
Perhaps that is even a better philosophy which urges us to measure the
reputations of men, "not by their exemption from fault, but by the size of
the virtues of which they are possessed." Assuredly, the South can never
demur to the application of this test either to herself or her late
leader. Judged by such a standard of merit, neither can be apprehensive
for the award of posterity. Two generations hence, if not sooner,
Jefferson Davis, not less for his wisdom than for his virtues, will be
commemorated as the Washington of the South.
With a view to dramatic unity, we shall disregard somewhat of
chronological order, and follow, with a rapid summary, the movements of
the ill-starred Western army of the Confederacy, to the point where its
existence virtually terminated. The successor of General Johnston, General
John B. Hood, embodied a rare union of the characteristics of the popular
ideal of a soldier. He was the noblest contribution of Kentucky chivalry
to the armies of the South, and his record throughout the war, even though
ending in terrible disaster, was that of a gallant, dashing, and skillful
leader. Identified with the Army of Northern Virginia from an early period
of its history, he shared its dangers, its trials, and its most thrilling
triumphs. "Hood and his Texans" were household words in the Confederacy,
and the bulletins from every battle-field in Virginia were emblazoned with
their exploits. Few commanders have possessed to a greater extent than
Hood that magnetic mastery over troops, which imbues them with the
consciousness of irresistible resolution. Of conspicuous personal
gallantry and commanding _physique_, he united to fiery energy,
consummate self-possession and excellent tactical ability. A favorite
with General Lee and President Davis, he had also received the warm
commendation of Stonewall Jackson for his distinguished services at Cold
Harbor, in 1862.
Painfully wounded and disabled at Gettysburg, he accompanied his old
division to Georgia, and, while his previous wound was yet unhealed, he
lost a leg at Chickamauga. After months of painful confinement, he was
again in Richmond, soliciting the privilege of additional service to his
country. His conspicuous devotion challenged equally the admiration of the
people and the Government, and President Davis was universally declared
never to have conferred a more deserved promotion than that by which he
made Hood a Lieutenant-General. General Hood was assigned to the command
of a _corps_ under Johnston, and accompanied the army in its movements
from Dalton to Atlanta.
The appointment of Hood as the successor of Johnston was the occasion of
renewed anticipation to the South. His aggressive qualities, it was
thought, would supply that bold and energetic policy which the country
believed to be the great need of the situation in Georgia. Nor was there
any thing in the record of Hood, to cause apprehension that his possession
of these qualities excluded such an equipoise of mental faculties, as
should ensure a sound and discreet system of operations.
We shall not discuss in detail the operations which General Hood so
speedily inaugurated. They were necessitated, to a large extent, by a
situation of affairs for which he was not responsible. The one object of
Hood, and the one hope and necessity of the Confederacy, was the expulsion
of Sherman from a vital section. Sherman had not delayed an hour in his
purpose of securing possession of the Macon road, and severing the
communications of Atlanta. Already he was preparing operations similar to
those by which Grant sought the isolation of Petersburg; and if his
strength was not then adequate, there could be no question of his capacity
to obtain ample means from his Government to secure the great results of
his skillfully conducted and successful campaign. The situation required
precisely that immediate execution of a vigorous policy by which Lee had
relieved Richmond of the presence of McClellan.
While thus foreseeing the fatal result of permitting himself to be
besieged in Atlanta, General Hood did not rashly assail the enemy. A
favorable opportunity was presented, by a gap between two of Sherman's
columns, for a concentrated assault upon that which was most exposed.
Though the Confederate forces were admirably massed and skillfully led,
they were eventually repulsed by the murderous fire of the Federal
artillery, which was concentrated with signal promptitude and served with
rare ability. This demonstration was a failure, though it had promised
favorably, and, for a time, exposed the entire Federal army to serious
danger. A series of subsequent engagements, fought by Hood to prevent the
consummation of Sherman's design to isolate Atlanta, left the enemy in
possession of the Confederate line of supply, and Atlanta was evacuated on
the 1st of September.
Such was the melancholy conclusion, for the Confederacy, of the first
stage of the Georgia campaign. Military judgment must decide, how far an
able offensive policy, at the outset of the campaign would have delayed,
if not entirely checked the march of Sherman to Atlanta; how far an
offensive was then practicable; to what extent Hood's course was imposed
upon him by a situation which he did not create, and whether his accession
to command, either altered or hastened the ultimate fate of Atlanta.
The emergency consequent upon the fall of Atlanta, summoned President
Davis to Georgia. His visit was dictated by the double purpose, of healing
dissensions in that State, and of devising measures for the restoration of
the campaign. The perverse course of Governor Brown had proven successful
in the dissemination of disaffection, and his teachings were beginning to
mature those fruits of demoralization in Georgia, which the subsequent
march of Sherman abundantly developed. It would be impossible to
characterize the conduct of this official in terms of extravagant
severity. Capricious and perverse in his hostility to the Confederate
Government, while yet professing fealty to the cause, he contrived, in the
most distressing exigencies, to paralyze the energies of Georgia, and
finally to create a feeling bordering closely upon open disaffection.
The conduct of Governor Brown, acceptable only to the clique of
malcontents who followed him, was the subject of criticism throughout the
Confederacy, and of suspicion by a large portion of the public. It is a
matter of record that after the fall of Atlanta he refused to coöperate
with the Confederate authorities for the defense of Georgia, and
_demanded_ the return of the Georgia troops in Virginia, unless the
President would send reënforcements. Yet he was perfectly aware that the
Confederate Government then, had not one man to spare in any quarter, and
was in a crisis, produced solely by the want of numbers. His
communications to the Confederate Government were usually splenetic
assaults upon the President, whose military administration he offensively
criticised, and whom he charged with an ambition to destroy every
protection to the reserved rights of the States. There is no point of view
in which the course of Governor Brown is not equally incomprehensible and
indefensible. It was freighted with disaster and defeat to the cause which
he professed to serve. Considered in the aspect of partisan
administration, or the indulgence of personal spleen, its inconsistency
was paralleled only by its folly. It demoralized public sentiment, and
tended largely to that corruption of the public and the army which, in the
last stage of the war, was so palpable. Not the least injurious feature of
Governor Brown's official policy was the unpropitious seasons which he
selected for the indulgence of his capricious and splenetic moods. Upon
the heels of crushing military disasters, and when the Confederate
authorities were most helpless, Governor Brown was most exacting.
The purposes of his persistent and vindictive impeachments of the
Confederate Government, at such periods, must remain a subject of
speculation. Certainly he did not exalt his dignity as a statesman, nor
approve his earnestness as a patriot, by giving precedence to his personal
animosities over his official duties, and by substituting for coöperation
in support of a cause to which he protested his devotion, a system of
malignant controversy with the national authorities.
The interviews of President Davis, with Governor Brown, during his visit
to Georgia, in September, failed, as had all previous efforts to that end,
to effect an accommodation of differences. Governor Brown was determined
not to be satisfied, and though Mr. Davis, having made nearly every
concession demanded, left him under the impression that Brown was at last
prepared to coöperate with him heartily and zealously, he was speedily
convinced of the error of such a calculation.
While on his way to Hood's army Mr. Davis addressed the citizens of Macon,
and spoke with great candor, concerning the perils of the situation,
which, though serious, he believed, might be repaired. Alluding to the
demand made upon him for reënforcements from Virginia, he said that the
disparity in Virginia was greater than in Georgia; the army under Early
had been sent to the Valley, because the enemy had penetrated to
Lynchburg; and now should Early be withdrawn, there would be nothing to
prevent the Federal army from forming a complete cordon of men around
Richmond. He had counseled with General Lee upon all these points; his
mind had sought to embrace the entire field, and the necessities of every
quarter, and his conclusion was, that "if one-half of the men now absent
from the field, would return to duty, we can defeat the enemy. With that
hope, I am now going to the front. I may not realize this hope, but I know
that there are men there, who have looked death too often in the face to
despond now."
On the 18th September, the President reached Hood's head-quarters, and on
the following day reviewed the whole army. He addressed the troops in
terms of encouragement, and his promise to them of an advance northward,
was received with unbounded enthusiasm. The situation in Georgia admitted
a very limited consideration of expedients, by which to obtain
compensation for the loss of Atlanta. Sherman's presence, unmolested, in
the interior of Georgia, during the autumn and winter, would be fatal. He
would then be in a position to assail, at leisure, the only remaining
source of supplies for the Confederate armies. His cavalry could safely
penetrate in every direction, destroying communications and supplies, and
producing universal demoralization.
Hood was confident that his army was capable of better fighting than it
had performed against Sherman, provided it could meet the enemy under such
circumstances as should promise the recovery of the ground lost, in the
event of victory. To attack Sherman in Atlanta was not to be considered,
and to await the development of the enemy's plan would be dangerous.
Sherman had already announced his purpose to rest his army at Atlanta,
with a view to its preparation for the arduous enterprises yet before it.
Hence, it became necessary to adopt a plan, which should draw him away
from his defenses, and compel him to fight upon equal ground.
It may be briefly stated that the subsequent operations of General Hood,
when they ceased to menace the enemy's flank, and assumed the character of
a mere detachment upon the Federal rear, was not the plan of campaign
which Mr. Davis expected to be carried into execution. He approved a
concentration upon the Federal flank, which it was not likely Sherman
would permit to be endangered. Seeing, however, the exposed situation of
the country south of Atlanta, in consequence of the movement into Alabama,
Mr. Davis opposed any operations which should place Hood's army _beyond
striking distance of Sherman, should the latter move southward from
Atlanta_.
It is remarkable to what extent the movements of Sherman demonstrated the
judicious character of the Confederate movement, so long as it was in
conformity with these views of Mr. Davis. Puzzled, at first, as to Hood's
purposes, Sherman was no longer perplexed as to what his own course should
be, when it was evident that Hood was making a serious demonstration for
the recovery of Tennessee, meanwhile giving up Georgia entirely to Federal
possession. When these larger and more doubtful enterprises were added to
the original scope of the Confederate movement, Mr. Davis was too remote
from the scene to assume the responsibility of recalling the army from an
enterprise which he felt assured would not be attempted without justifying
information by the commander.[80]
But, after all, the disastrous consequences, following the uncovering of
Georgia, are to be attributed less to the intrinsically erroneous strategy
of Hood, than to the consummate vigor and promptitude of Sherman. Odious
to the South as Sherman is, by reason of his cruelties and barbarities, he
can not be denied the merit of an immediate grasp of the critical
situation, and a no less prompt execution. A commander of less
self-possession, and less audacity, would have been bewildered by the
transfer of an army from his immediate front to his rear, and placed
astride his communications. The "march to the sea" was no military
exploit, and only a brazen charlatanism could exalt it as an illustration
of genius. The proof of Sherman's merit is to be seen in the quick
determination and execution of his purpose, when the real significance of
Hood's operations was revealed. His telegram to Washington fully described
the situation and prophesied the sequel: "Hood has crossed the Tennessee.
Thomas will take care of him and Nashville, while Schofield will not let
him into Chattanooga or Knoxville. _Georgia and South Carolina are at my
mercy, and I shall strike._ Do not be anxious about me. I am all right."
We are not permitted to trace the unfortunate Tennessee campaign of
General Hood, culminating in his disastrous defeat at Nashville, in
December, and in the virtual destruction of the gallant but ill-starred
army, upon whose bayonets the Confederate power, west of the Alleghanies,
was so long upheld. It was the final campaign of the Confederacy in that
quarter, and, with its failure, perished forever the hope of defending the
western and central sections of the South.[81] Meanwhile, Sherman,
unopposed, had marched like Fate through Georgia, to Savannah, realizing
Grant's assertion that the Confederacy was a mere shell, and revealing a
fact, until then not clearly appreciated, of the exhaustion and
demoralization of its people.