EVENTS CONSEQUENT UPON THE BOMBARDMENT OF FORT SUMTER--MR. LINCOLN
BEGINS THE WAR BY USURPATION--THE BORDER STATES--CONTINUED DUPLICITY
OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT--VIRGINIA JOINS THE COTTON STATES--AFFAIRS
IN MARYLAND, MISSOURI, AND KENTUCKY--UNPROMISING PHASES OF THE
SITUATION, AFFECTING THE PROSPECTS OF THE SOUTH--DIVISIONS IN SOUTHERN
SENTIMENT--THE NORTHERN DEMOCRACY--PRESIDENT DAVIS' ANTICIPATIONS
REALIZED--HIS RESPONSE TO MR. LINCOLN'S PROCLAMATION OF WAR--PUBLIC
ENTHUSIASM IN THE SOUTH--PRESIDENT DAVIS' MESSAGE--VIRGINIA THE
FLANDERS OF THE WAR--REMOVAL OF THE CONFEDERATE CAPITAL TO
RICHMOND--POLICY OF THAT STEP CONSIDERED--POPULAR REGARD FOR MR. DAVIS
IN VIRGINIA--ACTION OF THE VIRGINIAN AUTHORITIES--NORTH CAROLINA; HER
NOBLE CONDUCT, AND EFFICIENT AID TO THE CONFEDERACY--MILITARY
PREPARATIONS IN VIRGINIA--GENERAL LEE--HIS SERVICES IN THE EARLY
MONTHS OF THE WAR--MINOR ENGAGEMENTS--PREPARATIONS FOR THE GREAT
STRUGGLE IN VIRGINIA--AN IMPORTANT HISTORICAL QUESTION--CHARGES
AGAINST MR. DAVIS CONSIDERED--HIS STATESMAN-LIKE PREVISION--DID HE
ANTICIPATE AND PROVIDE FOR WAR?--WHEN MR. DAVIS' RESPONSIBILITY
BEGAN--HIS ENERGETIC PREPARATION--THE PREVAILING SENTIMENT AT
MONTGOMERY AS TO THE WAR--QUOTATIONS FROM GENERAL EARLY AND GENERAL
VON MOLKTE.
Events quickly followed the surrender of Fort Sumter, foreshadowing the
violence and magnitude of the strife about to be joined between the
sundered sections of America. If the North showed itself prompt and
enthusiastic to recognize the signal of conquest and spoliation, the South
was tenfold more resolute and confident in its triple armor of right. If
the adroit appeals of Mr. Lincoln's adherents, in behalf of an "insulted
flag," and an "outraged national dignity," broke down the barriers of
party, and united the Northern masses in an imagined crusade of patriotism
for the rescue of the Union, the occasion brought to the Confederacy
accessions of strength, which, if they did not ensure a successful
defense, established the fact of protracted resistance.
Mr. Lincoln and his advisers promptly seized upon the favorable
opportunity presented by the fanatical excitement prevalent throughout the
North. Within forty-eight hours after the intelligence of the bloodless
encounter of Sumter was flashed over the land, his proclamation of war
against the seceded States was read by thousands of excited people.[27] A
flimsy and indefensible perversion of an act, passed by Congress, in 1795,
which simply provided the raising of armed _posses_ "in aid of the civil
authorities," was the shallow pretext, under which was masked the real
design of a war which was to terminate in the destruction of the
sovereignty of the States. Beginning with this clear usurpation of the
power of Congress, which is alone authorized to declare war, and
proclaiming a purpose to "maintain the honor, the integrity, and
existence" of the Union, "and the perpetuity of popular government," the
work of conquest was begun.
The _role_ undertaken by the Federal government was embarrassed by many
difficulties. It had not yet relinquished the hope of retaining the Border
States firm in their adhesion to the Union. As yet the action of those
States had indicated no purpose of separation from the North, unless in
the event of direct interference by the Federal authorities with their
domestic concerns, or in the event of a war of subjugation against the
seceded States. Popular feeling in all the Border States was unmistakably
resolved against the policy of coercion, and in several instances State
Legislatures had declared a purpose to make common cause with the seceded
States, whenever the Federal authorities should appeal to force against
them. It was difficult indeed for the latter to reconcile their hostile
purposes against the Confederate States with the professions of peaceful
intentions which they so freely tendered to the Border States. Well
pleased, however, with the uniform success of its policy of duplicity, the
Federal administration adhered to its "treacherous amusement of double and
triple negotiations," hoping to amuse the Border States, by pacifying
assurances, until its schemes of coercion could be thoroughly
prepared.[28] But the sham was too transparent to deceive. Friendly
assurances and protestations of a desire to avoid the effusion of blood
were not to be accepted in the face of gigantic martial preparations.
An immediate consequence of Mr. Lincoln's proclamation of war, and
invocation of an army of seventy-five thousand men, for the subjugation of
the Cotton States, was to throw the mighty energies and heroic spirit of
Virginia, hitherto neutral and hesitating, into hearty sympathy with the
Confederacy. The sublime courage and devotion of this noble State,
manifested by the circumstances of her accession to the cause of her
sister States, have been the theme of repeated, but not extravagant
eulogy. With a full conviction of her own peculiar perils in a war which
she had zealously striven to prevent; from which, whatever its
eventualities, she had little to hope, and with a perfect prevision of
the ruin which was to ravage her bosom, Virginia proudly assumed the post
of leadership and of peril in the struggle for those immortal principles,
of which her soil was the nursery and her illustrious sons the foremost
champions. The historic _prestige_ of Virginia was heightened by this act
of supreme devotion, and the value of her influence was speedily
demonstrated by the enthusiastic accession of other States to the cause
which she had espoused. The ordinance of secession, adopted by the
Virginia Convention, was followed immediately by a temporary alliance[29]
with the Confederate States, and in a few weeks afterward the Confederacy
embraced, in addition to its original members, Virginia, North Carolina,
Tennessee, and Arkansas, each of which, by formal State action, ratified
the Confederate constitution.
The arbitrary acts of the Federal government, in Maryland and Missouri,
not only vindicated the course of those States which had interpreted its
policy as one of subjugation, but greatly strengthened the already
preponderant Southern sympathies of those two commonwealths. Increasing by
consecutive proclamations his demands for troops, Mr. Lincoln soon had
nearly two hundred thousand men under arms. These troops assembled under
false pretenses at different points, were used for purposes of glaring
despotism; overawing the pronounced Southern feeling of the people by
military arrests, by licentious and violent demonstrations of the
soldiery. Missouri was soon in open revolt against the Federal
authorities, and in Maryland a general uprising was prevented by the
thorough precautions which had been adopted, rendering clearly hopeless
such an undertaking. The Legislature of Missouri, unquestionably
representing a large majority of her citizens, eventually adopted an
ordinance of secession and ratified the constitution of the Confederate
States. Kentucky, vainly attempting a policy of neutrality, was divided in
sentiment and in strength between the contestants. A portion of her
citizens, residing within the Confederate lines, several months after the
beginning of the war, declared the State out of the Union, and associated
Kentucky with the Confederacy.
Such were the immediate consequences resulting from the capture of Fort
Sumter. All hopes of peace vanished in the rush of events which daily
contributed new elements to the incipient strife, and with constant
reinforcements of strength and feeling to each of the contending parties,
there was wanting no omen of a struggle bloody and exhaustive beyond all
previous example.
There were phases of the situation not to be lightly appreciated by so
thoughtful a statesman as President Davis, which did not encourage that
sanguine conviction, so extravagantly indulged in by many popular leaders,
of an overwhelming and immediate triumph of the Southern cause. The
immense disparity of physical resources, as was abundantly shown by the
lessons of history, could be neutralized by a wise public administration,
by superior valor, and by that high sense of public virtue, in its
original Roman sense of fortitude, endurance, and willing sacrifice in the
cause of country, which is the last and sure defense of a nation's
liberties. Nor were those important advantages of the South, to the value
of which historical precedents have so conclusively testified--a conscious
rectitude of purpose--a supreme conviction that theirs was the better
cause, and that, besides, it was a war for home and family, to be fought
mainly upon their own soil--to be overlooked in an intelligent estimate of
the relative strength of the belligerents.
It was not a failure to recognize these great advantages which forbade
wise and reflective Southern statesmen to indulge in those grotesque
exhibitions of braggadocio, with which demagogues amused excited crowds at
railway stations and upon street-corners. There was an element of weakness
in the South, which, looking to the contingencies of the future, and
remembering the incertitude of war, might prove the source of serious
danger. This was the absence of that unity in the South, to which all her
statesmen had looked forward, whenever actual battle should be joined
between the defenders and assailants of Southern liberties. To see a
"UNITED SOUTH," had been for years the dream of Calhoun's noble intellect.
Davis, with equal energy and ability, had striven for such united action
by the South as would command peace and security in the Union, or
independence beyond its limits. But now the battle was joined, and the
dream was not to be realized.
Kentucky was hopelessly divided, and though, from the overwhelming
majority of her people in sympathy with the South, were to come thousands
of gallant soldiers, the Confederacy was to be denied the powerful aid
which the brave heart and mighty resources of united Kentucky should have
thrown into the scale. Missouri, in consequence of her geographical
position, peculiarly assailable by the North-western States, and by
divisions among her population, was similarly situated; while Maryland, a
gallant and patriotic State, not less than South Carolina devoted to the
independence of the South, was securely shackled at the first
demonstration, by her people, of sympathy with their invaded countrymen.
But not only was there a failure to realize united action by those States,
which, by geographical contiguity, no less than by identity of political
institutions, constituted what was designated as THE SOUTH. There was by
no means a thoroughly harmonious sentiment among the people of those
States which had joined the Southern alliance. This was conspicuously the
case in Western Virginia and Eastern Tennessee.[30] Though apparently
insignificant in the midst of the general enthusiasm which prevailed in
the early months of the war, these and other instances of local
disaffection were to prove, at more than one critical period, fruitful of
embarrassment. Intelligence of Confederate disasters was always the signal
for exhibitions of that covert disloyalty which Confederate success
compelled to concealment. Always ready to assist the invaders of their
country, the so-called "Union men" of the South were valuable auxiliaries
to the Federal armies as spies, and as secret enemies to the cause of the
patriots; but they were not more hurtful and insidious in these capacities
than as the nucleus around which crystallized, under the direction of
disappointed demagogues, the various elements of discontent which were
subsequently developed.
Yet in both sections was the outward seeming at least of an undivided war
sentiment. The Union party of the South, as it had previously existed--a
powerful political organization, embracing a majority of the people of the
Border States--did not more immediately disappear, as the certainty of war
was developed, than did the party of peace at the North. The Northern
Democracy did not, for a moment, strive to breast the popular current, but
its leaders, the life-long allies of the South, committed, by a thousand
declarations to the cause of States' Rights, eagerly vied with the
Republican leaders in threats of vengeance against the South. The
Dickinsons, Everetts, Cochranes, Logans, and Butlers--hitherto the
professed friends and advocates of the South--with that pliant
accommodation to circumstances, so befitting the instincts of the
demagogue, in their harangues to howling mobs, proclaimed themselves the
advocates of a ruthless and indiscriminate warfare upon a people who had
been driven, by intolerable wrongs, into patriotic resistance.
We have already described the attitude and condition of the Confederate
Government at Montgomery previous to the attack upon Fort Sumter. The
honorable exertions of President Davis, cordially approved by Congress and
the people, to avoid a collision of arms, were disappointed, and events
had now verified his life-long conviction, that the exercise of their
sovereignty, by the States, would be attended by a war involving their
existence. Sustained by an unlimited popular confidence, with a
comparatively perfected organization, and with every possible preparation
that the difficulties of its situation would permit, the Government met,
with commendable composure, the shock of arms which its chief had foreseen
to be inevitable.
The proclamation of President Lincoln, declaring war upon the Confederate
States, was promptly responded to by President Davis, in official
announcements, appropriately recognizing the condition of public affairs,
and inviting energetic preparations for immediate hostilities. He at once
called upon the various States for quotas of volunteers for the public
defense. By public proclamation, he invited applications for privateering
service, in which armed vessels might assist in the public defense on the
high seas; under letters of marque and reprisal granted by Congress.[31]
In every instance, and by all classes of citizens, an enthusiastic
response was given to the demands of the Government. Individuals and
corporations entered into a generous and patriotic rivalry in the tender
of aid to the cause. Wealthy citizens donated large sums of money or
supplies, while railroad and transportation companies tendered valuable
assistance in the conveyance of troops and stores. An enthusiastic desire
to enter the public service was manifested in every community. Men
decrepit from age, or infirm from disease, were importunate in demanding
any service suitable to their condition. Volunteering progressed so
actively that a few weeks only sufficed to show that the Confederacy--for
the present at least--would not want soldiers. In all the States the
responses to the call for volunteers exceeded the quotas.
Congress assembled in special session, in obedience to a proclamation of
the President, on the 29th of April. The message was an eminently
characteristic document, and made a profound impression both in Europe and
the United States. Its calm and clear statements were in marked contrast
with the wild elements of war convulsing the country. Europe was not less
amazed and delighted with its dignity and force, than was the North
impressed with the earnest terms in which the purpose of resistance was
announced. He reviewed and established the doctrine of secession, detailed
the facts showing the bad faith of the Northern government about Fort
Sumter, and the necessity for its capture; spoke in terms of keen, yet
dignified satire of Lincoln's proclamation, which attempted to treat seven
sovereign States united in a confederacy, and holding five millions of
people and a half million of square miles of territory, as "combinations,"
which he proposed to suppress by a _posse comitatus_ of seventy-five
thousand men; congratulated the Congress on the probable accession of
other slave States; informed them that the State Department had sent three
commissioners to England, France, Russia and Belgium, to seek the
recognition of the Confederate States; advised legislation for the
employment of privateers for measures of defense, and for perfecting the
government organization; and concluded with these impressive words: "We
feel that our cause is just and holy; we protest solemnly in the face of
mankind that we desire peace at any sacrifice save that of honor and
independence; we seek no conquest, no aggrandizement, no concession of any
kind from the States with whom we were lately confederated. All we seek is
to be let alone; that those who never held power over us shall not now
attempt our subjugation by arms. This we will, this we must resist to the
direst extremity. The moment that this pretension is abandoned, the sword
will drop from our grasp, and we shall be ready to enter into treaties of
amity and commerce that can not but be materially beneficial. So long as
this pretension is maintained, with firm reliance on that divine power
which covers with its protection the just cause, we will continue the
struggle for our inherent right to freedom, independence, and
self-government."
The geographical position of Virginia clearly indicated that State as the
Flanders of the war. Within her boundaries was necessarily to be located
the first line of Confederate defense, and also to be found more than one
favorable _point d'appui_ for the invading forces. To the aid of important
geographical and physical considerations, moral and political necessities
were superadded, to urge a prompt and vigorous assistance to Virginia, in
the heroic effort which she was preparing for her deliverance. With the
eye of the soldier and the appreciation of the statesman, President Davis
urged the immediate removal of the seat of government to the neighborhood
of the seat of war. On the 20th of May the seat of the Confederate
Government was transferred from Montgomery to Richmond, the capital of
Virginia, and within a few days afterward Mr. Davis reached the latter
city.[32]
The transfer of the Confederate capital to Richmond was an event affecting
the direction, character, and destinies of the war to such an extent as
entitles it to be considered one of its salient incidents. As a measure of
policy, it has been variously viewed, and has involved some interesting
discussion of military and strategic considerations. In the progress of
events during the war, its wisdom was generally recognized, and in the
calmer judgment of the present there is scarcely a dissenting voice to the
prevailing opinion that it was a master-stroke of political sagacity and
military forecast.
High military authority has been quoted in support of the opinion opposed
to locating the Confederate capital at Richmond. Ingeniously enough it was
alleged that such a step involved fighting on the exterior of the circle
instead of the centre, and that thus the great advantage to the party
conducting operations upon an interior line would be surrendered. It was
also tolerably certain that the North would aim, in its invasion, at the
Confederate capital as the vital objective point of its campaigns; and to
transfer the capital to a point so far north as Richmond, greatly
diminished the enemy's difficulties--first, as to space; and secondly, by
shortening his line of transportation and supply.
But these views were the conclusions of a purely strategic judgment,
overlooking entirely moral and political considerations involved, nor are
they by any means exhaustive of the argument as to the military aspects of
the situation. The courageous and unselfish action of Virginia deserved a
response of similar spirit from the Confederacy. Virginia had voluntarily
become the outpost of the South, and her people needed the presence among
them of that authority which was to wield her great resources, organize
her energies, and give counsel to her courage. Her people invited the
Government to join them and make the battle for the common deliverance of
the South around their homesteads. To accept this invitation was a step no
less characteristic of President Davis than was his prompt, decisive
action in the crisis at Buena Vista. It had the combined advantage of bold
defiance and prudent calculation. This bold courting of the issue by the
infant power, at the very outset of hostilities, was the foundation of
that brilliant _prestige_ which marked its earlier history. To an
adversary intoxicated with an overweening sense of numerical superiority,
and a brutal reliance upon his superior strength, this defiant planting of
the standard in front of his first line was a significant warning of the
difficulties of the task which he had undertaken.
President Davis has never seen reason to regret the transfer of the
Government to Richmond. It bound Virginia, by indissoluble ties to the
fortunes of the Confederacy, and was the beginning of an affection for
himself, among her citizens, which it was their pride to exhibit in the
face of calamities common to him and to themselves. Not even in his own
gallant State of Mississippi are the genius, virtues, and fame of
Jefferson Davis cherished with a more tender association than in Virginia.
A brief résumé of events will now assist to a clear understanding of the
situation of affairs when President Davis reached Richmond in the latter
part of May. Virginia, a week previously, had, by formal vote of her
people, ratified the ordinance of secession adopted by her convention.
When the convention passed the ordinance of secession on the 17th of
April, the State authorities, with commendable discretion, prepared to
make important seizures of arms, stores, etc., the property of the Federal
Government within the limits of the State. Governor Letcher--well known
for his steadfast devotion to the Union, and for his honorable zeal to
preserve it--in this trying crisis of the State, was nobly faithful to his
Virginian instincts, and mindful of the honorable part which devolved upon
Virginia's Governor.
The capture of two places of special importance was sought by expeditions
arranged with secrecy and ingenuity, but resulting, in both instances, in
only partial success. These places were Gosport Navy-yard--famous for its
dry-dock, shops, ammunition, arms, timber, rope-walks, and other
appurtenances of an extensive naval establishment--and Harper's Ferry, on
the Potomac, with its extensive armory and arsenal, large collection of
arms, and valuable machinery. At the latter place, the Federal commander,
by an unworthy subterfuge, obtained a delay in the attack which the
Virginians were about to make, and took advantage of a parley, to attempt
the destruction, by fire, of the buildings and machinery. Much valuable
property was destroyed, but the State secured machinery, which was
afterward turned to most important account, and many excellent arms for
her rapidly gathering volunteers. The attempted destruction, by the
Federals, at Gosport, was imperfectly executed. Among the prizes captured
here was the steam frigate Merrimac, nearly finished, but greatly damaged
by fire. Within a very few months this vessel was destined to a
performance, conspicuous for all time in the annals of naval warfare.
The authorities of North Carolina--a State which had clung with
unsurpassed fidelity to the Federal Union--acted with a vigor which well
befitted a community conspicuous, in the first American revolution, for
the fidelity of its patriotism. Slow to reach her conclusions, North
Carolina was fully up to the demands of the occasion, in her preparation
for a struggle, during which her revolutionary fame was to be excelled by
a second dedication of her blood and energies to the cause of liberty. On
the 21st of May, North Carolina, by unanimous vote of her convention,
adopted an ordinance of secession. Her brave Governor (Ellis) whose
services were too soon lost to his State and country, had previously
caused the seizure of Forts Macon and Caswell, and the arsenal at
Fayetteville, with nearly sixty thousand arms, of which half were of the
most approved construction.
On the 19th of April occurred a collision between citizens of Baltimore
and Massachusetts soldiers, _en route_ to the Federal capital, followed by
such a stringent policy as made clearly hopeless the open coöperation of
Maryland, unless by successful invasion of the Confederate forces.
Missouri, under the guidance of Jackson, Price, and other able and
resolute leaders, was preparing a heroic resistance, but under
difficulties greater than were experienced in any other Southern State,
against the domination established upon her soil.
When President Davis reached Richmond he found Virginia in an advanced
state of preparation. Thirty thousand troops were in camps of instruction,
or upon duty at Norfolk, upon the peninsula of James and York Rivers, and
at different points upon the northern boundary of the State. In supreme
command was General Robert E. Lee, the friend and former classmate of the
President at West Point; and, under him, Colonel John B. Magruder, also
his associate at West Point, and other officers of promise and ability,
seeking service in defense of their native State and the South. As the
several States acceded to the Confederacy, their troops, arms, stores,
etc., were turned over to the Confederate authorities, and officers were
assigned rank in the Confederate service by a rule, regulated by the rank
which they had held in the Federal army.
In accordance with this rule, General Lee was third on the list of full
generals appointed by President Davis--General Cooper being first, and
General Albert Sydney Johnston being second. General Lee had been first
commissioned, after the tender of his resignation in the Federal service,
a Major-General of Virginia forces. Until he was commissioned full
general, by President Davis, in June, 1861, he continued to act as the
general commanding the Virginia forces, and was invested also with the
direction of the Confederate troops which were arriving daily from the
States south. His authority was as follows:
"MONTGOMERY, May 10, 1861.
"_To Major-General R. E. Lee_: To prevent confusion, you will assume
control of the forces of the Confederate States in Virginia, and
assign them to such duties as you may indicate, until further orders;
for which this will be your authority.
"L. P. WALKER, _Secretary of War_."
It would be impossible to overestimate the services of General Lee in the
preparation of the Virginia troops for the field, and in preparing the
general defense of the State by the location and disposition of the
Confederate forces as they arrived in Virginia. His distinguished services
afterwards are hardly better evidence of his genius as a soldier, than the
results of his arduous labor at this trying period, and in a position of
comparative obscurity. President Davis fully indicated his confidence in
the counsels of Lee by his constant retention of him at his side. The
South has probably not yet appreciated the extent to which the genius of
Lee, in coöperation with that of Davis, aided in those earlier
achievements of the war, which secured the immediate preservation of the
Confederacy, and earned so flattering a reputation for others.
With the establishment of the Confederate authority in Virginia,
reinforcements from other States were constantly added to her own levies,
and by the middle of June, more than fifty thousand men were in arms for
her defense. As yet, collisions between the opposing forces had been rare,
and totally indecisive. A force of raw volunteers, unorganized and
imperfectly armed, was surprised in Western Virginia, by a movement of
considerable vigor on the part of the Federal commander, and the patriots,
under Colonel Porterfield, compelled to retreat. At Great Bethel, near
Fortress Monroe, a few hundred Virginians and North Carolinians, under
Colonel Magruder, handsomely repulsed a large column of Federal troops,
attempting to advance up the peninsula. In the then uneducated popular
idea of military operations, the fight at Bethel was magnified to an
extent greatly beyond its real importance. It had, nevertheless, a timely
significance, in its evidence of the spirit of the Confederate soldiery.
President Davis was pleased to recognize this fact in a congratulatory
letter to Governor Ellis, commending the conduct of the North Carolinians
who were engaged in the fight.
These minor affairs were preliminary incidents to the thrilling events,
upon a more extended scale of operations, and upon a more important
theatre, which were to make memorable the approaching midsummer. Pending
the preparations, active and extensive on both sides, for the coming grand
encounter, there was a marked pause in military operations, attended by an
agreeable subsidence of the feverish excitement of which war is so
productive. The struggle for the mastery in Virginia, which it was plain
would decide the present fate of the Southern movement, was destined also
to decide, in a large measure, the extent and duration of the war. Viewed
in its historical significance, it becomes chiefly important as a stage of
the revolution indicating a new departure, and an altered direction of
events. Preparation was now to be displaced by action. Skirmishes were to
be followed by heavy engagements, and the high prestige of the South was
now to be subjected to its first test, in that long series of cruel
encounters, between valor and endurance on one side, and mere weight of
numbers on the other.
Preliminary to the narrative of these important events, appropriately
arises one phase of that historical question which involves the
statesmanship, the forecast, and the general fitness of Jefferson Davis
in the position which he now occupied, and under the circumstances by
which he was surrounded.
It would be a superfluous and unprofitable task to consider in detail the
numerous allegations, trivial and serious, made against President Davis by
his assailants, in support of their professed belief in his responsibility
for the failure of the Confederate cause. When facts are perverted,
history distorted, and prejudice, rather than truth, is the governing
influence, such allegations will be sufficiently numerous, even though
they be not well sustained. Nor yet is it maintained that President Davis
committed no errors in the long and trying term of his administration. It
is very certain that no such defense, asserting his infallibility, would
be approved by him. But the real historical significance of the question
of Mr. Davis' capacity for his office may be reduced to very simple
dimensions. Conceding him to be mortal, we concede that he is fallible.
Then the question arises, Were his errors sufficiently numerous and
serious, unaided by other and greater causes, to have occasioned the
failure of the South in the late war? Again, conceding still more
liberally to his assailants, were those errors the chief causes of a
failure, which might have been avoided, despite all other adverse
influences, disadvantages, and obstacles, if a different administrative
policy had prevailed?
The subject now has no value, save in its historical sense, and in that
sense its value must be determined from the stand-point just indicated. At
least it is in that aspect that we propose to consider it, whenever its
discussion shall be appropriate in these pages. The consideration will be
modified by many collateral questions which must incidentally arise. It
may be necessary to ask if no other Southern leader, entrusted with great
responsibilities, and enjoying uninterrupted popular favor, during and
since the war, committed mistakes quite as serious and frequent as did the
President, in proportion to the multiplicity of his cares? It may be
appropriate, too, to consider the influence that these mistakes of others
exerted upon those final disasters for which he alone is held responsible.
These questions we propose to consider, each in its appropriate place, and
with becoming candor. If we shall not meet the arguments and allegations
employed against Mr. Davis with a spirit more ingenuous than has seemed to
actuate his assailants, our success must be poor, indeed.
Those who profess to consider President Davis wanting in the necessary
qualifications for his position, dwell with especial emphasis upon what
they are pleased to characterize his failure in the early months of the
war, to foresee its character, duration and magnitude, and the consequent
imperfect preparation of the Confederate Government. It is asserted that
he was utterly blind to all the indications of a long and obstinate
struggle, urged upon his attention by a more sagacious statesmanship than
his own; that he was persistent and arrogant in his prophecies of a
struggle, short, brilliant, and overwhelming in favor of the South, even
after the war had commenced; and that before the bombardment of Sumter he
was no less positive in his convictions that there would be no war; that
he was, in short, stupidly unreasoning and inactive, deaf alike to
entreaties, arguments, and facts.
If, indeed, it could be established that during the era of secession (the
interval between November, 1860, and April, 1861), Mr. Davis had cherished
expectations of peaceable separation, and that during that portion of his
presidential term embraced before the assault upon Sumter, relying upon
this prospect of peace, he had failed to prepare for war, then, indeed,
would his responsibility be great; but it would be shared by every
contemporary statesman of the South, almost, if not quite, without an
exception. History may palliate the amazing infatuation of the Southern
masses at this period, but surely its verdict must be a contemptuous
condemnation of that vaunted statesmanship which scouted war as the result
of secession, as an impossibility, and its anticipation as the product of
timidity. But President Davis is not driven to the extremity of seeking so
poor a refuge as the common and universal blindness and weakness of that
critical period. Recognizing the justice of that test which demands of the
true statesman a prescience beyond the average vision, it is believed that
his defense may be made easy and triumphant.
Candid investigation will demonstrate the fact that Davis, among Southern
statesmen, was an almost solitary exception in his rejection of the
dominant sentiment of the times. The remarkable consistency of his public
life is in no respect better sustained than in his oft-repeated
apprehensions of eventual war between the sections. His dread of disunion
arose from his dread of civil war, and the latter he always urged to be
the necessary consequence of the former. Striving to save the Union upon a
just and constitutional basis, he yet habitually admonished the South of
the inevitable result of disunion, and coupled his admonitions with
earnest exhortations of thorough preparation for the most serious
emergency in its history. His speeches, addresses, and letters, furnish
irrefutable testimony of his apprehension of civil war as an inevitable
concomitant of disunion. _Not one line, or one sentence, written or
uttered by him in the entire period of his public career, can be so
construed as to indicate a different conviction._ Believing that he
foresaw the impending conflict, he strove with indefatigable energy and
incomparable ability, in company with Calhoun, in 1850, to place the South
in a position which would then have rescued her liberties. If the warning
voice of the South, proclaiming the inexorable decree of disunion, unless
her constitutional rights were fully and forever secured, had then been
disregarded, at least her _resistance_ must have been more effectual than
it could become by postponement. In innumerable passages of rare
eloquence, he has left an imperishable record of patriotic devotion to a
constitutional union, and touching proofs of the emotion with which he
contemplated the evils which were to follow its destruction. The words of
his farewell address to the Senate, ("putting our trust in God, and in our
firm hearts and strong arms, we will vindicate the right as best we may")
do not more clearly indicate the calm determination with which he would
meet the peril, than his appreciation of its serious nature.
When it is alleged that the inadequate preparation of the South, during
the period which we have characterized as the era of secession, enters as
a most important feature in the explanation of her failure, a proposition
is boldly asserted, which is, at least, debatable; but its discussion does
not devolve upon us.[33] Mr. Davis is assuredly not to be held justly
accountable for what the various States failed to do while he was at his
post of duty in the Senate, and in no manner controlling their action. No
responsibility can attach to him beyond the action of the Confederate
Government, save in the case of his own State, and whatever preparation
Mississippi made was at his instance. By what law of justice or logic can
Mr. Davis be made accountable for the inadequate preparation of Georgia,
(assuming that Georgia _was_ unprepared, or had omitted any preparation
that was possible under the circumstances), which then had the full
benefit of the counsels of reputed statesmen like Messrs. Toombs,
Stephens, and Brown? or of South Carolina, under the counsels of Messrs.
Rhett and Orr, and the _Charleston Mercury_? Of Alabama, led by the
brilliant genius of Mr. Yancey? Yet, upon the aggregate resources and
means of defense of these and the other States must depend the safety of
the Confederacy. While Mr. Davis was yet in Washington, striving against
hope to avert the dreaded issue, many of the States, under the guidance of
their leading men, were passing ordinances of secession. Assuredly, then,
he is not to be censured for any lack of preparation at this period. Yet
no very close examination of the record is necessary to establish the
fact, that those who have since been most forward in denying the prevision
of statesmanship to Davis, were then, by their own showing, precipitating
their several States into secession, totally unprepared for a war, the
very possibility of which they derided.
The responsibility of Mr. Davis can date only from his inauguration as
President of the Confederate States, on February 18, 1861. Between that
date and the actual breaking out of war was an interval of _less than two
months_. Within this period the results accomplished were certainly all
that could have been anticipated, and all that ever were accomplished by
any government yet in its infancy, within the same space of time. The
organization of the Government had been perfected, efforts made to secure
intercourse with foreign nations, and the civil administration completed
in all important features. With the aid of that master genius for
organization, General Samuel Cooper, Adjutant and Inspector-General of the
Confederate army, the basis of a military organization, upon which the
most splendid armies of modern history were speedily created, was
prepared; troops were called into the field; and the Confederacy, in
proportion to its means, was actually placed, _in two months_, upon a war
footing, not inferior to that of the enemy at the outbreak of hostilities.
The unprejudiced Northern or European reader, whose admiration has been
freely expressed for the valor and endurance of the South, and for the
skillful use of its comparatively limited resources, may well be amazed at
the censures of Mr. Davis, from Southern sources.
But what was his error after assumption of the Presidency? More important
still, what is the evidence? So far as we have been able to gather the
evidence, it consists in the fact that President Davis did not urge the
indiscriminate purchase of arms in Europe, or wherever else they might
have been obtained. The intelligent foreign reader can only be amazed
that, upon this single fact--for it is the only _fact_ alleged--rests the
charge that President Davis did not make adequate preparation for war. The
answer is very simple, and indisputable. First, the Confederate
Government, from the date of its organization, endeavored constantly to
purchase _serviceable_ arms wherever they could be obtained. Second, the
Confederate Government had given extensive orders to Northern
manufactories (because they were nearest) at Chickopee and elsewhere, some
of which were filled and the arms received, while, in other cases, they
were seized by the Federal authorities after the commencement of
hostilities while _en route_ South. Third, there were very few serviceable
arms to be purchased in Europe; and in support of this assertion we have
only to recall the enormous swindles practised on the Federal Government
in its purchase of arms in Europe at this period. Arms were offered, in
some instances, to the Government, and rejected, because President Davis,
while Secretary of War, had become acquainted with their worthlessness;
and thus, while certain speculations were disappointed, the means of the
Government were not squandered. An examination of the records will
demonstrate the fact that the Confederate Ordnance Bureau, under Colonel
Gorgas, was conducted with signal judgment and ability. From the beginning
to the end, it was managed with a success which entitles it to be
considered probably the most ably conducted bureau of the Government.
But not only do the recorded events of the period vindicate Mr. Davis from
the accusations of a tardy and delinquent policy in providing for the
threatened emergency of war; they are fully conclusive as to the energetic
provision made when hostilities were opened. Nothing can be more emphatic
in its enunciation of a bold, vigorous policy than President Davis'
message to the Confederate Congress, assembled by special convocation, on
the 29th of April:[34] "There are now in the field at Charleston,
Pensacola, Forts Morgan, Jackson, St. Philip, and Pulaski, nineteen
thousand men, and sixteen thousand are now _en route_ for Virginia. _It is
proposed to organize and hold in readiness for instant action, in view of
the present exigencies of the country, an army of one hundred thousand
men._" Surely we must look elsewhere than to such an announcement as this,
for evidence in support of this pretended absence of foresight, and
inappreciation of the extent and character of the approaching struggle.
This, be it remembered, was in Davis' first response to the Federal
declaration of war, only two weeks after the fall of Sumter, and when
President Lincoln had, as yet, called for but seventy-five thousand men.
This was the spirit in which President Davis began the contest, and the
results which immediately followed, in months of brilliant and consecutive
triumphs, demonstrated the ample provision made for the emergency.[35]
In marked contrast with this vigorous policy were the silly vaporings of
demagogues, prating of Southern invincibility against a world in arms,
protesting that the North, under no circumstances, could be induced to
fight, and scouting a longer duration of a war with "Yankees," than six
months at the farthest. That such was the dominant conviction at
Montgomery, no contemporary authority will deny. An eminent Virginian, a
commissioner from his own State to the Confederate Congress, was amazed to
hear laughed at as an excellent joke, his congratulations to that body,
upon the wise determination to locate the seat of government at Richmond,
in close proximity to the seat of war. The grave legislators at
Montgomery, at least, had not yet comprehended that there was to be war.
But perhaps we are in fault, in thus offering the evidence of
uncontradicted facts and obvious conclusions, where only vague inferences
and unsupported allegations are urged to the contrary. There are graver
questions yet to be encountered, far better justifying difference of
opinion, and affording better ground for discussion of the philosophy of
the Southern failure. Censure of those who have had the conduct of a
ruined cause is as inevitable as the criticism which ever waits upon
history; but it is not, therefore, always just. A great soldier,[36] who
has but recently contributed a chapter to history, thrilling in interest
and inestimable in importance, when congratulated since upon his brilliant
triumphs, touchingly replied: "How would it have been if success--this
unexampled success--had not crowned our undertaking? Would not this
undeserved exaltation have been so much unreasonable criticism and
undeserved blame?"
To a certain class of Southern critics, we commend the magnanimous
sentiment of an illustrious fellow-countryman,[37] now mourning, in
exile, the afflictions of his country: "As for myself, I have not
undertaken to speculate as to the causes of our failure, as I have seen
abundant reason for it in the tremendous odds brought against us. Having
had some means of judging, I will, however, say that, in my opinion, both
President Davis and General Lee, in their respective spheres, did all for
the success of our cause which it was possible for mortal men to do; and
it is a great privilege and comfort for me so to believe, and to have been
able to bring with me, into exile, a profound love and veneration for
those great men."