THE CONFEDERACY ESTABLISHED AND IN OPERATION--CALMNESS AND MODERATION
OF THE SOUTH--THE MONTGOMERY CONSTITUTION--THE IMPROVEMENTS UPON THE
FEDERAL INSTRUMENT--POPULAR DELIGHT AT THE SELECTION OF MR. DAVIS AS
PRESIDENT--MOTIVES OF HIS ACCEPTANCE--HIS PREFERENCE FOR THE ARMY--
DAVIS THE SYMBOL OF SOUTHERN CHARACTER AND HOPES--ON HIS WAY TO
MONTGOMERY--A CONTRAST--INAUGURATION AND INAUGURAL ADDRESS--THE
CONFEDERATE CABINET--TOOMBS--WALKER--MEMMINGER--BENJAMIN--MALLORY--
REAGAN--HISTORICAL POSITION OF PRESIDENT DAVIS--THE TWO POWERS--
EXTREME DEMOCRACY OF THE NORTH--NOBLE IDEAL OF REPUBLICANISM CHERISHED
BY THE SOUTH--DAVIS' REPRESENTATIVE QUALITIES AND DISTINGUISHED
SERVICES--THE HISTORIC REPRESENTATIVE OF THE CONFEDERATE CAUSE--EARLY
HISTORY OF THE GOVERNMENT AT MONTGOMERY--CONFIDENCE IN PRESIDENT DAVIS
UNLIMITED--PRESIDENT DAVIS' ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITY--HIS MILITARY
ADMINISTRATION--THE CONFEDERATE ARMY--WEST POINT--NEGOTIATIONS FOR
SURRENDER OF FORTS SUMTER AND PICKENS--MR. BUCHANAN'S PITIABLE
POLICY--THE ISSUE OF PEACE OR WAR--PERFIDIOUS COURSE OF THE LINCOLN
ADMINISTRATION--MR. SEWARD'S DALLIANCE WITH THE CONFEDERATE
COMMISSIONERS--HIS DECEPTIONS--THE EXPEDITION TO PROVISION THE
GARRISON OF SUMTER--REDUCTION OF THE FORT--WAR--GUILT OF THE
NORTH--ITS RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAR.
Thus, without the disorder of anarchy, and without the violence of armed
conflict, a new and imposing structure of state was speedily erected from
the separated fragments. The event was indeed unparalleled, and, to the
mind of the world, unused to the novel spectacle of the dismemberment of
an empire, except as the consummation of years of bloodshed, its
philosophy was difficult of comprehension.
The sixth of November, 1860, was the ominous day upon which the
revolution, so long threatened, and so often deferred by Southern
concession and sacrifice, was inaugurated. Upon that day, with the
election of Abraham Lincoln, was opened a new volume in American history.
Upon that day, the American Union, "formed to establish justice," resting
upon the principle of equality as its foundation-stone, passed under the
control of an arrogant majority, pledged to its perversion, to the
oppression of nearly one-half its members. From the profession of
fraternity, and the outward pretense of comity, it passed under the
domination of principles whose origin was discord and whose logical result
was dissolution.
The answer of those who were threatened most seriously by this subversion
of the Government of their fathers, though well considered, neither
debated with passion, nor concluded with rashness, was worthy of men--the
descendants of the authors of American Independence, and educated in that
political school which teaches the assertion of the rights of the few
against the power of the many. A manly resistance, such as only threatened
degradation inspires in the bosoms of freemen, which the insolence of
faction had long defied and a conscious physical superiority had haughtily
derided, was, at length, thoroughly aroused. Within a few months, the
revolutionary movement, begun in November, and pressed, by its authors, to
its inevitable consequences, had reached the important result of a
withdrawal of nearly one-fourth of the States constituting the American
Union.
The new government, in the incidents attending its construction and
setting in operation, fully vindicated the earnest and conscientious
convictions of the people who had called it into existence. The absence of
tumult and of all passionate display, at Montgomery, was in marked
contrast with the indecent exultation witnessed at Washington from the
adherents of the incoming administration. The calmness, moderation, and
evident earnestness of purpose which prevailed at the South, and was thus
manifested by those who were intrusted with the framing of the new
government, impressed the world to an extent that prepared it to entertain
a sympathy for the Southern cause not to have been expected from the
prevalent, though erroneous, impressions of foreigners respecting the
merits of the sectional quarrel in America.
That secession was not a revolutionary movement, but merely the necessary
defense of a people threatened with material ruin and political
degradation, by a revolution which had already been consummated, was amply
demonstrated by its immediate consequences. The Confederate leaders, at
Montgomery, exhibited an almost religious veneration for the spirit,
forms, and associations of the government which they had abandoned. The
strict adherence of the Montgomery Constitution to the features of the
Federal instrument, indicates the absurdity of the impression that it was
a proclamation of revolution; and the circumstances of its adoption are
totally inconsistent with a correct conception of the conduct of an
insurgent body.
It was a signal improvement upon the original American Constitution, and
the few alterations made were commended by enlightened and conservative
intellects every-where, as necessary changes in the perfection of the
American polity. The object sought, and successfully consummated, was to
embody every valuable principle of the old Constitution with certain
remedial provisions for the correction of obvious evils, which experience
had fully indicated. Among these changes, which were universally
recognized as of the utmost value, were provisions making the Presidential
term six years, instead of four, as under the old system, and precluding
reëlection; permitting cabinet ministers to participate in the debates of
Congress, and the virtual abolition of the pernicious system of removing
all officials, of whatever degree, upon each advent of a new
administration. The Confederate Constitution positively prohibited the
African slave-trade, which the Federal Constitution had failed to do. A
striking provision, and one never before avowed in any similar instrument,
was the prohibition of duties for the purpose of protection. There was,
indeed, nothing whatever in the Montgomery instrument which a candid and
enlightened public sentiment, even at the North, might not have fully
approved, excepting the ample and avowed protection to property in slaves.
This, it was claimed, was not an alteration of the old Constitution, but
merely a formal interpretation of its obvious purpose.
In no respect was the action of the new Confederacy deemed more fortunate
than in the selection of its leader. That, in the choice of Mr. Davis as
President, the Congress only responded to the preconceived choice of the
Southern people, was attested by the spontaneous acclamation with which
the announcement was received. Even those who had been in doubt as to the
proper personage to endow with the powers and responsibilities of a
position, at once the most onerous, and, looking to the contingencies of
the early future, a long and sanguinary war, with the chances of a
disastrous termination, the most precarious of modern times, yielded
hearty recognition of the wise selection of the Congress.
The responsibilities and difficulties of the trust, did not suggest to Mr.
Davis hesitation as to its acceptance. If this, the highest distinction
which public appreciation had yet tendered him should prove a forlorn
hope, his sense of duty would no more permit hesitation than in the
assumption of more cheaply-earned honors. Entertaining no purpose of
inglorious ease, amid the trials and perils, which, with a prevision,
rare, indeed, at that period, he already anticipated, his own preference
was for a different station of public service. Months subsequently he
indicated the post of danger as the post of duty to which he had aspired
in that gigantic struggle through which his country must pass to the
assurance of independence. "I then imagined," said he, "that it might be
my fortune again to lead Mississippians in the field, and to be with them
where danger was to be braved and glory won. I thought to find that place
which I believed to be suited to my capacity--that of an officer in the
service of the State of Mississippi."[21]
Of the public conviction as to his preëminent fitness, there could not be
a question. His character, his abilities, his military education and
experience, had long been recognized throughout the Union, and his exalted
reputation was a source of just pride to the South. No Southern statesman
presented so admirable a combination of purity, dignity, firmness,
devotion, and skill--qualities for which there is an inexorable demand in
revolutionary periods. William Tell, with his cross-bow and apple, to the
rustic simplicity of the Swiss, was the very embodiment of the genius of
liberty. Far beyond any influence of fiction was the magic potency of the
red shirt and felt hat of Garibaldi to imaginative Italy; and Washington,
as Lamartine said, with his sword and the law, was the symbol standing
erect at the cradle of American liberty. Equally with the greatest of
these prototypes was Jefferson Davis, the symbol of the noble aspirations
of the proud, impulsive, chivalrous race which confided to him the conduct
of its destinies through the wilderness of revolution to the goal of
independence and nationality beyond. He did not seek the position; had not
been conspicuous in flaming exhortations to popular assemblies; had not
employed any of the arts of the demagogue--of flattery or cajolery of the
masses into a false and extravagant estimate of his qualities; but before
the world were his character, fame, and services, in unadorned simplicity,
painted only in the severe colors of truth. It was the tribute to virtue,
most to be valued when unsought; the award of honor, only appropriate when
merited and becomingly worn.
Mr. Davis' assumption of his trust was characterized by a dignity, absence
of ostentation, and profound appreciation of its delicate nature, in the
highest degree imposing. From it was augured such a worthy administration
of public affairs as would secure for the Confederacy, if permitted the
blessings of peace, an enviable position among the nations of the earth.
But his first announcement of its policy indicated his appreciation of the
danger of war, in which its utmost exertions would be required to
vindicate the independence which the States had declared. To the heroic
maintenance of that position he committed himself by the most emphatic
avowals; and in whatever contingency, whether of peace or war, his purpose
was one of deathless resistence to any denial of the right of
self-government, which his fellow-citizens had exercised.
Informed of his election, Mr. Davis immediately left his home for the seat
of government. Along the route to Montgomery he was greeted, by the
people, with every possible demonstration of patriotic enthusiasm and
personal regard. In response to these demonstrations, he at several
points addressed the people in terms of characteristic eloquence, dignity
and moderation.
Proud, indeed, must ever be, to the Southern people, the contrast of the
noble bearing of their chosen ruler with the display of vulgarity
attending the journey of Mr. Lincoln from Springfield to Washington. These
two men--the one with the calm dignity of the statesman and the polished
bearing of the gentleman; the other with coarse jests and buffoonery, upon
the eve of the most important event in their individual history, and
pregnant with significance to millions--were no bad indices of the
civilization of their respective sections.
Arriving in Montgomery, Mr. Davis was inaugurated on the 18th February,
with a simplicity of ceremony, an absence of personal inflation, and a
degree of popular enthusiasm, which well befitted the formal assertion of
true republican liberty, equally protected against the license of mobs and
the usurpations of tyrants. The ceremonies of inauguration were little
more than the taking of the oath of office and the delivery of the
inaugural address. The inaugural of President Davis is unquestionably of
the highest order of state papers. As a model of composition, it is rarely
equaled; and its statement of the position of the South, the grievances
which had led to the assumption of that position, her hopes, aspirations,
and purposes, has never been surpassed in power and perspicuity, by any
similar document.
INAUGURAL ADDRESS OF PRESIDENT DAVIS, DELIVERED AT THE CAPITOL,
MONDAY, FEB. 18, 1861.
_Gentlemen of the Congress of the Confederate States of America;
Friends and Fellow-Citizens_:
Called to the difficult and responsible station of Chief Executive of
the Provisional Government which you have instituted, I approach the
discharge of the duties assigned to me with an humble distrust of my
abilities, but with a sustaining confidence in the wisdom of those who
are to guide and aid me in the administration of public affairs, and
an abiding faith in the virtue and patriotism of the people.
Looking forward to the speedy establishment of a permanent government
to take the place of this, and which, by its greater moral and
physical power, will be better able to combat with the many
difficulties which arise from the conflicting interests of separate
nations, I enter upon the duties of the office, to which I have been
chosen, with the hope that the beginning of our career, as a
Confederacy, may not be obstructed by hostile opposition to our
enjoyment of the separate existence and independence which we have
asserted, and, with the blessing of Providence, intend to maintain.
Our present condition, achieved in a manner unprecedented in the
history of nations, illustrates the American idea that governments
rest upon the consent of the governed, and that it is the right of the
people to alter or abolish governments whenever they become
destructive of the ends for which they were established.
The declared purpose of the compact of union from which we have
withdrawn, was "to establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity,
provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and
secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and posterity;" and when,
in the judgment of the sovereign States now composing this
Confederacy, it had been perverted from the purposes for which it was
ordained, and had ceased to answer the ends for which it was
established, a peaceful appeal to the ballot-box, declared, that so
far as they were concerned, the government created by that compact
should cease to exist. In this they merely asserted a right which the
Declaration of Independence of 1776 had defined to be inalienable. Of
the time and occasion for its exercise, they, as sovereigns, were the
final judges, each for itself. The impartial and enlightened verdict
of mankind will vindicate the rectitude of our conduct, and He, who
knows the hearts of men, will judge of the sincerity with which we
labored to preserve the government of our fathers in its spirit. The
right solemnly proclaimed at the birth of the States, and which has
been affirmed and re-affirmed in the bills of rights of States
subsequently admitted into the Union of 1789, undeniably recognizes in
the people the power to resume the authority delegated for the
purposes of government. Thus the sovereign States, here represented,
proceeded to form this Confederacy, and it is by abuse of language
that their act has been denominated a revolution. They formed a new
alliance, but within each State its government has remained, and the
rights of person and property have not been disturbed. The agent,
through whom they communicated with foreign nations, is changed; but
this does not necessarily interrupt their international relations.
Sustained by the consciousness that the transition from the former
Union to the present Confederacy, has not proceeded from a disregard
on our part of just obligations, or any failure to perform any
constitutional duty; moved by no interest or passion to invade the
rights of others; anxious to cultivate peace and commerce with all
nations, if we may not hope to avoid war, we may at least expect that
posterity will acquit us of having needlessly engaged in it. Doubly
justified by the absence of wrong on our part, and by wanton
aggression on the part of others, there can be no cause to doubt that
the courage and patriotism of the people of the Confederate States
will be found equal to any measures of defense which honor and
security may require.
An agricultural people, whose chief interest is the export of a
commodity required in every manufacturing country, our true policy is
peace and the freest trade which our necessities will permit. It is
alike our interest, and that of all those to whom we would sell and
from whom we would buy, that there should be the fewest practicable
restrictions upon the interchange of commodities. There can be but
little rivalry between ours and any manufacturing or navigating
community, such as the North-eastern States of the American Union. It
must follow, therefore, that a mutual interest would invite good will
and kind offices. If, however, passion or the lust of dominion should
cloud the judgment or inflame the ambition of those States, we must
prepare to meet the emergency, and to maintain, by the final
arbitrament of the sword, the position which we have assumed among the
nations of the earth. We have entered upon the career of independence,
and it must be inflexibly pursued. Through many years of controversy
with our late associates, the Northern States, we have vainly
endeavored to secure tranquillity, and to obtain respect for the
rights to which we were entitled. As a necessity, not a choice, we
have resorted to the remedy of separation; and henceforth our energies
must be directed to the conduct of our own affairs, and the perpetuity
of the Confederacy which we have formed. If a just perception of
mutual interest shall permit us peaceably to pursue our separate
political career, my most earnest desire will have been fulfilled; but
if this be denied to us, and the integrity of our territory and
jurisdiction be assailed, it will but remain for us, with firm
resolve, to appeal to arms and invoke the blessings of Providence on a
just cause.
As a consequence of our new condition, and with a view to meet
anticipated wants, it will be necessary to provide for the speedy and
efficient organization of branches of the Executive Department,
having special charge of foreign intercourse, finance, military
affairs, and the postal service.
For purposes of defense, the Confederate States may, under ordinary
circumstances, rely mainly upon the militia; but it is deemed
advisable, in the present condition of affairs, that there should be a
well-instructed and disciplined army, more numerous than would usually
be required on a peace establishment. I also suggest that, for the
protection of our harbors and commerce on the high seas, a navy
adapted to those objects will be required. These necessities have
doubtless engaged the attention of Congress.
With a Constitution differing only from that of our fathers, in so far
as it is explanatory of their well-known intent, freed from the
sectional conflicts which have interfered with the pursuit of the
general welfare, it is not unreasonable to expect that States, from
which we have recently parted, may seek to unite their fortunes with
ours under the government which we have instituted. For this your
Constitution makes adequate provision; but beyond this, if I mistake
not the judgment and will of the people, a reunion with the States
from which we have separated is neither practicable nor desirable. To
increase the power, develop the resources, and promote the happiness
of the Confederacy, it is requisite that there should be so much of
homogeneity that the welfare of every portion shall be the aim of the
whole. Where this does not exist, antagonisms are engendered which
must and should result in separation.
Actuated solely by the desire to preserve our own rights and promote
our own welfare, the separation of the Confederate States has been
marked by no aggression upon others, and followed by no domestic
convulsion. Our industrial pursuits have received no check; the
cultivation of our fields has progressed as heretofore; and even
should we be involved in war, there would be no considerable
diminution in the production of the staples which have constituted our
exports, and in which the commercial world has an interest scarcely
less than our own. This common interest of the producer and consumer
can only be interrupted by an exterior force, which should obstruct
its transmission to foreign markets--a course of conduct which would
be as unjust toward us as it would be detrimental to manufacturing and
commercial interests abroad. Should reason guide the action of the
Government from which we have separated, a policy so detrimental to
the civilized world, the Northern States included, could not be
dictated by even the strongest desire to inflict injury upon us; but
if otherwise, a terrible responsibility will rest upon it, and the
suffering of millions will bear testimony to the folly and wickedness
of our aggressors. In the meantime, there will remain to us, besides
the ordinary means before suggested, the well-known resources for
retaliation upon the commerce of an enemy.
Experience in public stations, of subordinate grade to this which your
kindness has conferred, has taught me that care, and toil, and
disappointment, are the price of official elevation. You will see many
errors to forgive, many deficiencies to tolerate, but you shall not
find in me either a want of zeal or fidelity to the cause that is to
me highest in hope and of most enduring affection. Your generosity has
bestowed upon me an undeserved distinction--one which I neither sought
nor desired. Upon the continuance of that sentiment, and upon your
wisdom and patriotism, I rely to direct and support me in the
performance of the duty required at my hands.
We have changed the constituent parts but not the system of our
Government. The Constitution formed by our fathers is that of these
Confederate States, in their exposition of it; and, in the judicial
construction it has received, we have a light which reveals its true
meaning.
Thus instructed as to the just interpretation of the instrument, and
ever remembering that all offices are but trusts held for the people,
and that delegated powers are to be strictly construed, I will hope,
by due diligence in the performance of my duties, though I may
disappoint your expectations, yet to retain, when retiring, something
of the good-will and confidence which welcomed my entrance into
office.
It is joyous, in the midst of perilous times, to look around upon a
people united in heart, where one purpose of high resolve animates and
actuates the whole--where the sacrifices to be made are not weighed in
the balance against honor, and right, and liberty, and equality.
Obstacles may retard--they can not long prevent--the progress of a
movement sanctified by its justice, and sustained by a virtuous
people. Reverently let us invoke the God of our fathers to guide and
protect us in our efforts to perpetuate the principles which, by his
blessing, they were able to vindicate, establish, and transmit to
their posterity, and with a continuance of His favor, ever gratefully
acknowledged, we may hopefully look forward to success, to peace, and
to prosperity.
Working in great harmony between its executive and legislative
departments, the new government, within a very few weeks, presented an
extraordinary spectacle of compact organization, though in all its parts
it was yet purely provisional. The Cabinet announced by the President,
embraced, for the most part, names well known to the country in connection
with important public trusts. It may not be inappropriate to speak briefly
here of those who sustained to President Davis the close relations of
constitutional advisers.
Mr. Robert Toombs, the Secretary of State, was indebted for his
appointment not less to the position of his State, the first in rank in
the Confederacy, than to the public appreciation of his abilities. For
several years he had represented Georgia in the United States Senate, and
in that body his reputation was very high as a debater and orator. His
oratory, however, was a good index of his mind and disposition, strong and
impassioned, but desultory, vehement and blustering. Mr. Toombs had
contributed largely to prepare the people of Georgia for secession, and
his fierce and persistent eloquence had greatly accelerated the movement.
His capacity for agitation and destruction was indeed immeasurably
superior to any qualification that he may have had for reconstructing the
broken and scattered fragments of the governmental column. Restless,
arrogant, and intolerant--a born destructive and inveterate agitator--Mr.
Toombs speedily demonstrated his deficiency in statesmanship. His
connection with the Confederate Cabinet was of brief duration, and his
subsequent military service undistinguished. The War Department--the
second post of distinction in the Cabinet--was given to Alabama, the
second State of the Confederacy, in the person of Mr. Leroy P. Walker. His
connection with the Government, like that of Mr. Toombs, was brief, and
wholly unmarked by evidence of fitness. Mr. Memminger, of South Carolina,
the Secretary of the Treasury, made an exceedingly unpopular officer, and,
as the sequel demonstrated, was incompetent to the delicate task of
financial management. The Attorney-General, Mr. Benjamin, of Louisiana, an
eminent lawyer and a prominent Senator, was, beyond all question, the
ablest of Mr. Davis' Cabinet. He was a man of marvelous intellectual
resources, an orator, a lawyer, and gifted, to an unexampled degree, in
the varied attributes, entering into the _savior faire_ of politics and
diplomacy. Mr. Benjamin continued the trusted counselor of President Davis
during the whole period of his authority. Mr. Mallory, of Florida, was the
Secretary of the Navy--a gentleman of excellent sense, unpretending
manners, who probably conducted his department as successfully as was
possible, with the limited naval resources of the South. The Post-office
Department was given to Mr. Reagan, of Texas, noted for his fidelity,
industry, and good sense.
The Cabinet of President Davis was destined to many changes in the
progress of subsequent events. Of those originally appointed, Messrs.
Benjamin, Mallory, and Reagan continued their connection with the
Confederate Government during the entire period of its existence. The
brief experiment of Confederate independence was fruitful in illustrations
of the important truth that political distinction achieved in the ordinary
struggles of parties, in times of profound peace, is not the sure
guarantee of the possession of those especial and peculiar qualifications
which befit the circumstances of revolution. That President Davis, in the
selection of some of his advisers, was at fault, is to be ascribed rather
to the novelty and necessities of the public situation than to errors of
his judgment. Not only must public sentiment respecting men be to some
extent consulted, but the test of experience must, necessarily, after all,
determine the question of fitness, where all were untried.
Jefferson Davis now occupied a position in the highest sense historical.
It was plain that his name was destined to be indelibly associated with a
series of incidents forming a most thrilling and instructive episode in
political history. As the exponent of a theory of constitutional
principles never asserted, and unknown save through the inspiration of the
genius of American Liberty, and as the head of a Government whose birth
and destiny must enter conspicuously into all future questions of popular
government, he stood, in a double sense, the central figure in a most
striking phase of the drama of human progress. Splendid as had been
American history until that day, it was now to contribute, still more
generously, to the illumination of the great truths of political science.
The issue was again to be joined between constitutional freedom and the
odious despotism of an enthroned mob. On the one side were asserted the
principles of regulated liberty, without which free government can never
be stable--order, allegiance, and reverence for law and authority. On the
other, the wild passions of an infuriated populace, hurling down the
restraints of law, shattering constitutions; and when its frenzied lust
had been satiated by the destruction of every accessible image of virtue
and order, transferring supreme power from its polluted grasp to the hands
of demagogues--capable agents of the depraved will which invests them with
authority.
Such was really a faithful contrast of the two powers which were now
inaugurated in what had been the United States. It was still the old Greek
question of the "few or the many," the "King Numbers" of the North against
the conservatism of the South. The old contest was to be revived, of Cleon
and Nicias, in the Athenian Agora, and struggling on through the political
battle-fields of free governments in all ages.
It is not an abuse of language to characterize the North as realizing the
_ultra_ theory of popular government. Its political fabric rests
exclusively upon the Utopian conception of an intelligence and integrity
in the masses which they have never been known to possess. Carrying out
its pernicious construction of the doctrine of the Declaration of
Independence, that "all men are born free and equal," it professes to hold
in light esteem the obvious distinctions of race, property, and color.
Earnestly devoted to the successful illustration of the experiment of
Democracy, it has sedulously directed its social and political development
to the overthrow of caste, the obliteration of necessary social
distinctions, and the practical assertion of the principle of absolute
social, political, and personal equality among all men. The election of
Lincoln was the grand, decisive triumph of these tendencies. He went into
power as the avowed champion of the interests of the poor and laboring
classes, which he declared to be in conflict with those of the
slave-holding aristocrats of the South. Entirely undistinguished, with no
political record, his popularity was based upon his vulgar antecedents--no
slight recommendation to the populace, gratified at the prospective
promotion of one of its own class.
A free society, politically, in which wealth and distinction were debarred
to none, the aristocratic influences of slavery were the propitious
inducements in the South, to the cultivation of that personal dignity
which marks the refinement of rank, in contradistinction to the vulgar
pretensions and affectation of a mere aristocracy of money. The patrician
society of the South sought the noblest type of republicanism--regulated
liberty--beyond the influence of ignorant and fanatical mobs, that perfect
order which reposes securely upon virtue, intelligence, and interested
attachment, which all human experience teaches are the only reliable
safeguards of freedom.
The noblest achievement of constitutional liberty would have been the
realization of the Southern ideal of republicanism. The success and
beneficence of such a government would have been in perfect accord with
the philosophy of history. Every nation to which has been guaranteed a
free constitution is indebted for its liberal features to its educated,
patrician classes, while all the decayed republics of history owed their
downfall to the corruption and excesses of an "unbridled Democracy."
Of such a government, Jefferson Davis was the appropriately chosen head.
An ardent republican, in the truest and noblest sense of that abused term,
a foe to absolutism and radicalism in every shape, he was the noblest
product of a conservatism in which the elements of distinction were
ability, intelligence, refinement, and social position. When, added to
this representative quality, are considered his splendid career of public
service, and his varied talents, exemplified on almost every field of
exertion, it must be conceded that no ruler was ever more worthily invited
to the head of a nation, and assuredly none ever was invited with such
unanimity of popular acclaim.
We have said that Jefferson Davis must ever appear to the eye of mankind
the historic representative of the Confederate cause. The North can not,
assuredly, reject this decision, since it made him the vicarious sufferer
for what it affected to consider the sins of a nation. Through him, it
actually accomplished that from which the great abilities of Edmund Burke
recoiled in confession of impotent endeavor, the indictment of an entire
people. Those Southern men who have rashly and ungenerously assailed him
as responsible for the failure of the South to win its independence, can
not complain if the verdict of history shall be that the genius of its
leader was worthy of a noble cause, whose fate the laws of nature, not the
resources or the impotence of one man, determined. The star of Napoleon
went down upon the disastrous field of Waterloo, and the millions that he
had liberated passed again under the domination of tyrants whom they
despised. But would the most stupid Bourbon partisan, therefore, call in
question the mighty genius of Napoleon? It is a glorious memory to
France, that her illustrious sovereign, aided by the valor of her
children, defied for twenty years, the arms of combined Europe, but she
has no blush that those energies were not equal to an indefinite
resistance. That the South, struggling against mortal odds, with her
comparatively feeble resources constantly diminishing with each prodigious
effort, finally succumbed to an enemy inexhaustible in strength and
reinforced by the world, is no testimony against either the valor or the
skill with which her struggle was directed. Like Washington, Davis was
embarrassed, in a hazardous cause, with defection, distrust, and
discontent. But, unlike Washington, Davis did not receive the assistance
of a powerful ally at the moment when aid could be most serviceably
employed.
Recurring to the early history of the Confederacy, during the brief season
when Montgomery was its seat of government, and especially to its
unwritten details, there seems wanting no auspicious omen to presage for
it future security and renown. The cause and its leader equally challenged
the enthused sympathies of a patriotic people, and all that patriotism was
ready to sacrifice for the one was cheerfully confided to the other.
Hopefully, almost joyously, the young Confederacy began its short-lived
career. Those were the halcyon days of that cheap patriotism and ferocious
valor which delights to vaunt itself beyond the sound of "war's rude
alarms." Every aspect of the situation appears tinged with the _couleur de
rose_. In fancied security of certain independence, achieved without the
harsh resort of arms, demagogues boasted that they courted a trial of
strength with the North, as an opportunity for the display of Southern
prowess. Men who subsequently were noted for unscrupulous assaults upon
the Confederate administration, and, since the war, for their ready
prostration before the Northern juggernaut, were then loud in "never
surrender" proclamations of eternal separation from the North.
Such was not an appropriate season for expressing grave and painful doubts
of the President's fitness for his high trust. No whisper was then heard
of his want of appreciation of his situation. There was no intimation then
that he failed to discern the future, or refused to provide against the
perils that menaced the Confederacy, and were so obvious to more sagacious
minds. Sensational newspaper correspondents, professing to base their
accounts upon reliable hints from the executive quarter, were profuse in
their panegyrics upon his indefatigable industry, his vigilance,
penetration, and marvelous intuition of Yankee designs. They vied with
each other in telling the world, especially the North, of the stupendous
preparations which the Government was making in anticipation of a possible
attempt at coercion by the Lincoln government. It was evident, from the
outgivings of every source of opinion, that the Confederates trusting much
to the merits of their cause and their own valor, yet largely depended for
the successful issue of their assertion of independence upon the
soldier-statesman, who, charged with many public duties, had never proven
either unwilling or incapable in any trust. The time for censure was not
yet at hand. Incompetent generals and recreant politicians were not yet in
want of a scape-goat upon which to throw their own delinquencies. Harsh
and censorious criticism was reserved for a more opportune period, when
the Confederacy, like a wearied gladiator, whose spirit was invincible,
reeled under the exhaustion of a dozen successive combats, with as many
fresh adversaries.
The high administrative capacity of Mr. Davis had received a most
fortunate discipline in his brilliant conduct of the Federal War
Department. That service was a valuable auxiliary to his efficiency as the
executive head of a new government, whose safety was, from its incipiency,
to depend upon the resources of that rarest phase of genius, the combined
capacity for civil and military administration. The complex machinery of
government, even when moving smoothly in the accustomed grooves, imposes
not only severe labor, but is frequently a painful tax upon the faculties
of those most familiar with its workings. When to the labor of
comprehension is added the task of construction and organization from
comparative chaos, such as prevailed at Montgomery, and as prevails
every-where, as the result of political change, the difficulties are
increased tenfold. Creation must then precede order. Organization is to be
perfected before administration can be successfully attempted. It is this
task of organization which has invoked some of the most splendid displays
of genius, and interposed the obstacles which have occasioned its severest
disappointments. Universal testimony awards to Napoleon, for his wonderful
ingenuity in penetrating social necessities and meeting civil emergencies,
a merit not inferior to his unrivaled genius for war. Frederick the Great,
in times of peace, exhibited a vicious pragmatism which rendered his civil
rule contemptible when contrasted with his military success.
The underlying secret of all successful administration is the union of the
advantages flowing from unity of purpose, and those resulting from
division of labor--so necessary to exact and intelligent execution.
President Davis, throughout his administration, sought the attainment of
this aim. Confiding the various departments to men of at least reputed
talents and integrity, he yet exercised that constant supervision which
was inseparable from his responsibilities, and exacted by public
expectation, and this without arrogance or dictation. Disingenuous
criticism has alleged that, by an assumption of autocracy, he united in
himself all the powers and prerogatives of government, and thus professes
to hold him alone responsible for the loss of his country's liberties. A
score of years, or even a decade hence, and he will be exalted as the
all-informing mind which directed, vitalized, and inspired the noblest
struggle of republicanism known to ancient or modern story.
At the organization of the Confederate Government, his individual taste,
capacity and experience, were fortunately coincident with the necessities
of the situation in urging upon President Davis a thorough and efficient
military establishment upon a war footing. The necessity of thorough
preparation for war with the United States was never lost sight of by him.
Whatever his efforts to avert that calamity, its probabilities were too
menacing not to challenge unremitting precautions. In the War Department
and military legislation of the Confederacy was felt the infusion of his
energy and system, and were realized the fruits of his labors. There can
be no more splendid monument of his genius than that superb specimen of
scientific mechanism, the army of the Confederate States. Its nucleus was
prepared in those few weeks' respite from actual war, passed by the
Confederate Government, at Montgomery; and the framework then established
was subsequently enlarged upon, until it was developed into a model of
military anatomy--of complex, yet harmonious organism--seldom rivaled and
never surpassed in the history of war. Whatever may be said of defective
features exhibited in the Confederate military organization, in the
numerous and varied campaigns of the war, those defects are not to be
attributed to the original system. Whatever may be alleged against its
lax discipline--that morbid influence which so fearfully enervated its
efficiency, neutralized valor and strategy, and made the war a series of
magnificent but valueless successes, the shadow without the substance of
victory--the fault was in the execution, not in the original conception.
However admirably tempered the blade, that must be a skillful hand which
would efficiently wield it.
A graduate of West Point and a practical as well as theoretical soldier,
President Davis naturally and, as the war demonstrated, wisely inclined in
his military administration to those theories which regard war as a
science difficult and laborious of mastery. His marked and judicious
partiality for _educated soldiers_ was often the ground of censorious
comment during the war, but this will hardly be adjudged a fault now.
"West Point" was amply vindicated by the experience of both armies,
against the sneers of those who affected such extreme admiration for the
"native genius" of citizen-soldiers. With a few notable exceptions in the
Confederate army (and here is to be considered the peculiar genius for war
of the South), and scarcely one worth mention in the armies of the North,
the achievements of educated officers, and those of officers from civil
life, are so utterly disproportionate as to forbid comparison.
The paramount object of all Confederate diplomacy was to secure a
recognition of the new Government by the Government of the United States.
If war with the United States could be averted, the Confederacy was, for
all time, a fixed fact. At an early period President Davis instituted
efforts to secure by negotiation possession of certain fortifications and
other property of the Federal Government located within the limits of the
seceded States. Arsenals, located in the interior, had, in many instances,
been seized by the State troops previous to the formation of the
Confederate Government. Happily, those in authority at these places,
appreciating the folly of resistance in a situation utterly helpless, had
avoided a needless shedding of blood, by a prompt compliance with the
demands of the State authorities.
When the Confederate Government went into operation, there were but two
fortifications within the limits of its jurisdiction in the possession of
Federal garrisons: Fort Sumter, in Charleston Harbor, and Fort Pickens,
off Pensacola, Florida. These two positions were of the utmost value to
the Confederacy, viewed as to location, and their peaceable acquisition
was of increased importance in consideration of the obstinate defense of
which they were capable. The continued occupation of these positions by
Federal forces was, in the highest degree, inconsistent with the dignity
of the Confederacy after it had proclaimed a distinct and independent
nationality. Moreover, in the present temper of the dominant party in the
United States, a large majority of which favored coercion of the South
back into the Union, Federal occupancy of these forts was a menace to the
safety of the Confederacy.
It is easy to appreciate the delicate character of the diplomacy now
required by the situation of the Confederacy. Without at all acquiescing
in the Federal possession of Sumter and Pickens--on the contrary,
asserting the right of the Confederacy to those places, and avowing its
willingness to give adequate compensation whenever they should be
surrendered--it was yet necessary to avoid affront to a respectable
minority at the North, influenced, apparently, by pacific intentions. In
short, it became the settled policy of the Confederate Government to
postpone collision with the Federal Government until the latest possible
moment--until obvious considerations of public safety should impel a
resort to hostile measures.
President Buchanan, whose term of office expired March 4, 1861, after
numerous badly disguised attempts at duplicity with the Confederate
authorities, or more properly, with the authorities of some of the States
constituting the Confederacy, and after a contemptibly weak and driveling
policy of evasion, had left the negotiations between the two Governments
in a most unsatisfactory and confused condition. A brief summary of Mr.
Buchanan's conduct affords a most singular exhibition of mingled
imbecility, timidity, and disingenuousness. His course, until the meeting
of Congress, in December, 1860, was understood to be in thorough accord
with that of the States' Rights party of the South. In that party were his
most trusted advisers, both in and out of the Cabinet, and it had given to
his administration a consistent and cordial support. Like them, he was
pledged to the preservation of a _constitutional Union_, and also to a
full recognition of the perils which menaced the South, resulting from the
late sectional triumph. In his opening message he condemned the exercise
of secession as unauthorized and illegal, but denied emphatically the
right of coercion. Yet, in the sequel, he proved, equally with the
Republican party, an enemy to peaceable secession.
When South Carolina was preparing for secession, Mr. Buchanan entered into
a solemn understanding with a delegation of several of her most prominent
citizens, that, upon condition that the people and authorities of that
State should refrain from hostile demonstrations, no reinforcements
should be sent to the forts in Charleston harbor, and that "_their
relative military status should remain as at present_." Yet, when Major
Anderson, in positive violation of this agreement, removed his forces from
the weaker forts to Fort Sumter, Mr. Buchanan refused to order him back.
Having broken one stipulation, he now determined to disregard the other,
and, under the pretense of "provisioning a starving garrison," Mr.
Buchanan attempted to send troops to Sumter.[22]
But the conduct of Mr. Buchanan, weak, offensive, and disgusting, as it
was to both North and South, becomes simply pitiable, when contrasted with
the greater magnitude of the perfidy of the Lincoln government.
The two Presidents, Davis and Lincoln, were inaugurated within a fortnight
of each other--the first on the 18th of February, the latter on the 4th of
March. Between them the question of peace or war must, after all,
depend--for, however pacific might have been Mr. Buchanan's policy, it
would fail, should Lincoln adopt a belligerent course. Considerable hope
was, at times, indulged, that the negotiations with Mr. Lincoln and his
Cabinet would at least be marked with a better display of candor than had
commemorated the policy of his predecessor. These negotiations, as
fruitless as those attempted in Congress during the preceding winter, for
the prevention of secession, were to involve a question of even more
moment. The direct issue of peace or war was now pending. It is
confidently and successfully maintained by the South, that in the grave
question of responsibility for actual bloodshed, her vindication is as
clear and incontestable as must ever be her acquittal of the
responsibility of disunion. War with the United States was deprecated by
official declaration of the Confederate States as "a policy detrimental to
the civilized world." Most impressive is the declaration of President
Davis' inaugural: "Sustained by the consciousness that the transition from
the former Union to the present Confederacy has not proceeded from a
disregard, on our part, of just obligations, or any failure to perform any
constitutional duty--moved by no interest or passion to invade the rights
of others--anxious to cultivate peace and commerce with all nations, _if
we may not hope to avoid war, we may at least expect that posterity will
acquit us of having needlessly engaged in it_."
President Davis was at all times most solicitous for peace, and adopted
every expedient of negotiation that could promote that end. Heartily
responding to the wishes of the Congress and people of the Confederacy, he
appointed, in February, an embassy to the Government at Washington. The
resolution of Congress, asking that the embassy should be sent, explains
its object to be the "negotiating friendly relations between that
Government and the Confederate States of America, and for the settlement
of all questions of disagreement between the two governments upon
principles of right, justice, equity, and good faith."
Two of these commissioners, Messrs. Crawford and Forsyth, arrived in
Washington on the 5th of March, the day succeeding Mr. Lincoln's
inauguration. Wishing to allow the President abundant opportunity for the
discharge of the urgent official duties necessarily crowding upon him at
such a season, the Confederate commissioners did not immediately press
their mission upon his attention. At first giving merely an informal
announcement of their arrival, they waited until the 12th of March before
making an official presentation of their mission. On that day they
addressed a formal communication to the Secretary of State, Mr. Seward,
announcing their authority to settle with the Federal Government all
claims of public property arising from the separation of the States from
the Union, and to negotiate for the withdrawal of the Federal forces from
Forts Sumter and Pickens.
Here begins a record of perfidy, the parallel of which is not to be found
in the history of the world. Mr. Seward, while declining to recognize the
Confederate commissioners officially, yet frequently held confidential
communication with them, by which the faith of the two Governments was
fully pledged to a line of policy, by what should certainly be the
strongest form of assurance--the personal honor of their representatives.
In verbal interviews, the commissioners were frequently assured of a
pacific policy by the Federal Government, that Fort Sumter would be
evacuated, that the _status_ at Fort Pickens should not be changed, and
that no departure from these pacific intentions would be made without due
notice to the Confederate Government.
The commissioners, conformably to the spirit of their Government, to
avoid, if possible, collision with the United States, made an important
concession in these interviews in consenting to waive all questions of
form. It was alleged that formal negotiations with them, in an official
capacity, would seriously jeopardize the success of Mr. Lincoln's
manipulation of public sentiment at the North, which, it was further
confidentially alleged, he was sedulously educating to concurrence with
his own friendly purposes toward the Confederates. By this cunning device
and the unscrupulous employment of deception and falsehood in his
interviews with the commissioners, Mr. Seward accomplished the double
purpose of successful imposition upon the credulity of the commissioners
and evasion of official recognition of the Confederate embassy.
In the meantime, while these negotiations were pending, and in the midst
of these friendly assurances, the Lincoln administration was secretly
preparing hostile measures, and, as was clearly demonstrated by subsequent
revelations, had never seriously entertained any of the propositions
submitted by the Confederate Government. Resolved not to evacuate Fort
Sumter, the Federal Government, while amusing the Confederate
commissioners with cunning dalliance, had for weeks been meditating the
feasibility of reënforcing it. To pass the numerous batteries erected by
the Confederates in Charleston harbor was clearly a task of the utmost
difficulty, if, indeed, possible. So complete was the cordon of
Confederate batteries which had been in course of preparation for many
weeks, that the beleaguered fortress was evidently doomed whenever the
Confederates were provoked to fire upon it. The evacuation of Fort Sumter
was clearly a military necessity, so pronounced by the highest military
authority in the United States, and so regarded by the intelligent public
of the North. Never had a Government so auspicious an opportunity to save
the needless effusion of blood, and to avert indefinitely, if not finally,
the calamity of war.
Such a result was, however, farthest from the wishes of Mr. Lincoln and
the majority of his Cabinet. Reinforcement of Fort Sumter being out of the
question, it became the study of the Federal authorities to devise a
convenient and effective pretext by which the North could be united in a
war of subjugation against the South, and for the extermination of
slavery. To this end an expedition was ordered to Charleston, for the
purpose of supplying the garrison of Sumter with provisions, _peaceably or
forcibly_, as events might decide. As it was well known that the
Confederate authorities would not permit the execution of the object of
this expedition, it was clearly a measure of hostility, prepared and
conducted, too, under the most dishonorable circumstances of secrecy and
falsehood as to its destination.
In the meantime the Federal authorities continued to practice the base
policy of deception with the Confederate commissioners. Upon one occasion
Mr. Seward declared that Fort Sumter would be evacuated before a letter,
then ready to be mailed, could reach President Davis at Montgomery. Five
days afterward, General Beauregard, commanding the Confederate forces in
Charleston harbor, telegraphed the commissioners at Washington the ominous
intelligence that the Federal commandant was actively strengthening Fort
Sumter. The commissioners were again soothed with Mr. Seward's renewed
assurances of the positive intention of his government to evacuate the
fort. As late as the 7th of April Mr. Seward gave the emphatic assurance:
"Faith as to Sumter fully kept: wait and see." _This was the date of the
sailing of the Federal fleet with a strong military force on board._[23]
The just characterization, by President Davis, of these deceptions, was,
that "the crooked paths of diplomacy can scarcely furnish an example so
wanting in courtesy, in candor, and directness, as was the course of the
United States Government toward our commissioners in Washington."[24]
The expedition was some hours on its way,[25] when its purpose to
provision the fort was announced to the Governor of South Carolina by an
agent of the United States. This announcement was telegraphed to
Montgomery by General Beauregard, who also asked for instructions. His
government replied, that if the message was authentic, a demand should be
made for the surrender of the fort to the Confederate forces; and in the
event of refusal, its reduction should be undertaken. On the 11th of April
the demand was made and refused.[26] In obedience to the orders of his
government General Beauregard opened fire upon Fort Sumter early on the
morning of the 12th April. On the 13th the fort surrendered.
The calculations of Mr. Lincoln and his cabinet, as to the result to be
produced by the attack on Fort Sumter, provoked by their deliberate and
dishonest design, were not disappointed. A furious and instantaneous rush
to arms by the North followed the intelligence of the surrender of the
fort, and revealed the ferocious lust with which it had awaited the signal
to begin the crusade against the liberties and property of the South. As
no possible trait of guilt had been wanting in the means employed to
precipitate hostilities, so no conceivable feature of atrocity was to be
wanting in the conduct of a war by the North, produced by its own avarice,
perfidy, and lust of dominion.
The brief recapitulation which we have given sufficiently exposes the
pretexts upon which the North began the war of coercion. Assuming that the
national dignity had been insulted, and the national honor violated, by an
attack upon the flag of the Union, under the impious profession of
vindicating the law, the North drew its sword against the sovereignty of
the States. It had procured the assault upon Sumter--that essential step
to the desired frenzy of the masses. By a shallow device, the South had
been provoked to initiate resistance--that long-sought pretext which
should justify the most barbaric invasion of modern times. Yet, under this
flimsy imposition, the North cloaks its crime, and exults in its
anticipated immunity from those execrations which have been the reward of
similar examples of turpitude. The spirit of inquiry is not to be thus
deftly eluded, nor the avenging sentence of history so easily perverted.
The question shall not be, who fired the first shot? but, _who offered the
first aggression? who first indicated the purpose of hostility?_ We are
not required to await the bursting forth of the flames over our heads,
when the fell intent of the incendiary is revealed to our sight. The
menace of the murderer justifies his intended victim in eluding the blow
while the steel is uplifted.
Jefferson Davis signed the order for the reduction of Fort Sumter, but he
did not thereby invoke the calamities of war. That act was simply the
patriot's defiance to the menace of tyranny. It was the choice of the
freeman between resistance and shame.