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Benedict de Spinoza, THE ETHICS
(Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata)
Translated by R. H. M. Elwes
Part II: ON THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND
PREFACE I now pass on to explaining the results, which must
necessarily follow from the essence of God, or of the eternal
and infinite being; not, indeed, all of them (for we proved in
Part i., Prop. xvi., that an infinite number must follow in an
infinite number of ways), but only those which are able to lead
us, as it were by the hand, to the knowledge of the human mind
and its highest blessedness.
DEFINITIONS I. By 'body' I mean a mode which expresses in a
certain determinate manner the essence of God, in so far as he
is considered as an extended thing. (See Pt. i., Prop. xxv.
Cor.)
II. I consider as belonging to the essence of a thing that,
which being given, the thing is necessarily given also, and,
which being removed, the thing is necessarily removed also; in
other words, that without which the thing, and which itself
without the thing, can neither be nor be conceived.
III. By 'idea,' I mean the mental conception which is formed by
the mind as a thinking thing.
>>>>>Explanation--I say 'conception' rather than perception,
because the word perception seems to imply that the mind is
passive in respect to the object; whereas conception seems to
express an activity of the mind.
IV. By 'an adequate idea,' I mean an idea which, in so far as
it is considered in itself, without relation to the object, has
all the properties or intrinsic marks of a true idea.
>>>>>Explanation--I say 'intrinsic,' in order to exclude that
mark which is extrinsic, namely, the agreement between the idea
and its object (ideatum).
V. 'Duration' is the indefinite continuance of existing.
>>>>>Explanation--I say 'indefinite,' because it cannot be
determined through the existence itself of the existing thing,
or by its efficient cause, which necessarily gives the existence
of the thing, but does not take it away.
VI. 'Reality' and 'perfection' I use as synonymous terms.
VII. By 'particular things,' I mean things which are finite and
have a conditioned existence; but if several individual things
concur in one action, so as to be all simultaneously the effect
of one cause, I consider them all, so far, as one particular
thing.
AXIOMS I. The essence of man does not involve necessary
existence, that is, it may, in the order of nature, come to pass
that this or that man does or does not exist.
II. Man thinks.
III. Modes of thinking, such as love, desire, or any other of
the passions, do not take place, unless there be in the same
individual an idea of the thing loved, desired, &c. But the idea
can exist without the presence of any other mode of thinking.
IV. We perceive that a certain body is affected in many ways.
V. We feel and perceive no particular things, save bodies and
modes of thought.
N.B. The Postulates are given after the conclusion of Prop.
xiii.
PROPOSITIONS I. Thought is an attribute of God, or God is a
thinking thing.
>>>>>Proof--Particular thoughts, or this and that thought, are
modes which, in a certain conditioned manner, express the nature
of God (Pt. i., Prop. xxv., Cor.). God therefore possesses the
attribute (Pt. i., Def. v.) of which the concept is involved in
all particular thoughts, which latter are conceived thereby.
Thought, therefore, is one of the infinite attributes of God,
which express God's eternal and infinite essence (Pt. i., Def.
vi.). In other words, God is a thinking thing. Q.E.D.
*****Note--This proposition is also evident from the fact, that
we are able to conceive an infinite thinking being. For, in
proportion as a thinking being is conceived as thinking more
thoughts, so is it conceived as containing more reality or
perfection. Therefore a being, which can think an infinite
number of things in an infinite number of ways, is,
necessarily, in respect of thinking, infinite. As, therefore,
from the consideration of thought alone, we conceive an infinite
being, thought is necessarily (Pt. i., Deff. iv. and vi.) one of
the infinite attributes of God, as we were desirous of showing.
II. Extension is an attribute of God, or God is an extended
thing.
>>>>>Proof--The proof of this proposition is similar to that of
the last.
III. In God there is necessarily the idea not only of his
essence, but also of all things which necessarily follow from
his essence.
>>>>>Proof--God (by the first Prop. of this Part) can think an
infinite number of things in infinite ways, or (what is the same
thing, by Prop. xvi., Part i.) can form the idea of his essence,
and of all things which necessarily follow therefrom. Now all
that is in the power of God necessarily is (Pt. i., Prop.
xxxv.). Therefore, such an idea as we are considering
necessarily is, and in God alone. Q.E.D. (Part i., Prop. xv.)
*****Note--The multitude understand by the power of God the free
will of God, and the right over all things that exist, which
latter are accordingly generally considered as contingent. For
it is said that God has the power to destroy all things, and to
reduce them to nothing. Further, the power of God is very often
likened to the power of kings. But this doctrine we have
refuted (Pt. i., Prop. xxxii., Cors. i. and ii.), and we have
shown (Part i., Prop. xvi.) that God acts by the same necessity,
as that by which he understands himself; in other words, as it
follows from the necessity of the divine nature (as all admit),
that God understands himself, so also does it follow by the same
necessity, that God performs infinite acts in infinite ways. We
further showed (Part i., Prop. xxxiv.), that God's power is
identical with God's essence in action; therefore it is as
impossible for us to conceive God as not acting, as to conceive
him as non-existent. If we might pursue the subject further, I
could point out, that the power which is commonly attributed to
God is not only human (as showing that God is conceived by the
multitude as a man, or in the likeness of a man), but involves a
negation of power. However, I am unwilling to go over the same
ground so often. I would only beg the reader again and again, to
turn over frequently in his mind what I have said in Part i.
from Prop. xvi. to the end. No one will be able to follow my
meaning, unless he is scrupulously careful not to confound the
power of God with the human power and right of kings.
IV. The idea of God, from which an infinite number of things
follow in infinite ways, can only be one.
>>>>>Proof--Infinite intellect comprehends nothing save the
attributes of God and his modifications (Part i., Prop. xxx.).
Now God is one (Part i., Prop. xiv., Cor.). Therefore the idea
of God, wherefrom an infinite number of things follow in infinite
ways, can only be one. Q.E.D.
V. The actual being of ideas owns God as its cause, only in so
far as he is considered as a thinking thing, not in so far as he
is unfolded in any other attribute; that is, the ideas both of
the attributes of God and of particular things do not own as
their efficient cause their objects (ideata) or the things
perceived, but God himself in so far as he is a thinking thing.
>>>>>Proof--This proposition is evident from Prop. iii. of this
Part. We there drew the conclusion, that God can form the idea
of his essence, and of all things which follow necessarily
therefrom, solely because he is a thinking thing, and not because
he is the object of his own idea. Wherefore the actual being of
ideas owns for cause God, in so far as he is a thinking thing.
It may be differently proved as follows: the actual being of
ideas is (obviously) a mode of thought, that is (Part i., Prop.
xxv., Cor.) a mode which expresses in a certain manner the
nature of God, in so far as he is a thinking thing, and therefore
(Part i., Prop. x.) involves the conception of no other attribute
of God, and consequently (by Part i., Ax. iv.) is not the effect
of any attribute save thought. Therefore the actual being of
ideas owns God as its cause, in so far as he is considered as a
thinking thing, &c. Q.E.D.
VI. The modes of any given attribute are caused by God, in so
far as he is considered through the attribute of which they are
modes, and not in so far as he is considered through any other
attribute.
>>>>>Proof--Each attribute is conceived through itself, without
any other part (Part i., Prop. x.); wherefore the modes of each
attribute involve the conception of that attribute, but not of
any other. Thus (Part i., Ax. iv.) they are caused by God, only
in so far as he is considered through the attribute whose modes
they are, and not in so far as he is considered through any
other. Q.E.D.
<<<<<Corollary--Hence the actual being of things, which are not
modes of thought, does not follow from the divine nature,
because that nature has prior knowledge of the things. Things
represented in ideas follow, and are derived from their
particular attribute, in the same manner, and with the same
necessity as ideas follow (according to what we have shown) from
the attribute of thought.
VII. The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order
and connection of things.
>>>>>Proof--This proposition is evident from Part i., Ax. iv.
For the idea of everything that is caused depends on a
knowledge of the cause, whereof it is an effect.
<<<<<Corollary--Hence God's power of thinking is equal to his
realized power of action-- that is, whatsoever follows from the
infinite nature of God in the world of extension (formaliter),
follows without exception in the same order and connection from
the idea of God in the world of thought (objective).
*****Note--Before going any further, I wish to recall to mind
what has been pointed out above--namely, that whatsoever can be
perceived by the infinite intellect as constituting the essence
of substance, belongs altogether only to one substance:
consequently, substance thinking and substance extended are one
and the same substance, comprehended now through one attribute,
now through the other. So, also, a mode of extension and the
idea of that mode are one and the same thing, though expressed
in two ways. This truth seems to have been dimly recognized by
those Jews who maintained that God, God's intellect, and the
things understood by God are identical. For instance, a circle
existing in nature, and the idea of a circle existing, which is
also in God, are one and the same thing displayed through
different attributes. Thus, whether we conceive nature under the
attribute of extension, or under the attribute of thought, or
under any other attribute, we shall find the same order, or one
and the same chain of causes--that is, the same things following
in either case.
I said that God is the cause of an idea--for instance, of the
idea of a circle,--in so far as he is a thinking thing; and of a
circle, in so far as he is an extended thing, simply because the
actual being of the idea of a circle can only be perceived as a
proximate cause through another mode of thinking, and that again
through another, and so on to infinity; so that, so long as we
consider things as modes of thinking, we must explain the order
of the whole of nature, or the whole chain of causes, through
the attribute of thought only. And, in so far as we consider
things as modes of extension, we must explain the order of the
whole of nature through the attributes of extension only; and so
on, in the case of the other attributes. Wherefore of things as
they are in themselves God is really the cause, inasmuch as he
consists of infinite attributes. I cannot for the present
explain my meaning more clearly.
VIII. The ideas of particular things, or of modes, that do not
exist, must be comprehended in the infinite idea of God, in the
same way as the formal essences of particular things or modes
are contained in the attributes of God.
>>>>>Proof--This proposition is evident from the last; it is
understood more clearly from the preceding note.
<<<<<Corollary--Hence, so long as particular things do not
exist, except in so far as they are comprehended in the
attributes of God, their representations in thought or ideas do
not exist, except in so far as the infinite idea of God exists;
and when the particular things are said to exist, not only in so
far as they are involved in the attributes of God, but also in so
far as they are said to continue, their ideas will also involve
existence, through which they are said to continue.
*****Note--If anyone desires an example to throw more light on
this question, I shall, I fear, not be able to give him any,
which adequately explains the thing of which I here speak,
inasmuch as it is unique; however, I will endeavour to
illustrate it as far as possible. The nature of a circle is
such that if any number of straight lines intersect within it,
the rectangles formed by their segments will be equal to one
another; thus, infinite equal rectangles are contained in a
circle. Yet none of these rectangles can be said to exist,
except in so far as the circle exists; nor can the idea of any of
these rectangles be said to exist, except in so far as they are
comprehended in the idea of the circle. Let us grant that,
from this infinite number of rectangles, two only exist. The
ideas of these two not only exist, in so far as they are
contained in the idea of the circle, but also as they involve the
existence of those rectangles; wherefore they are distinguished
from the remaining ideas of the remaining rectangles.
IX. The idea of an individual thing actually existing is caused
by God, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he is
considered as affected by another idea of a thing actually
existing, of which he is the cause, in so far as he is affected
by a third idea, and so on to infinity.
>>>>>Proof--The idea of an individual thing actually existing is
an individual mode of thinking, and is distinct from other modes
(by the Cor. and Note to Prop. viii. of this part); thus (by
Prop. vi. of this part) it is caused by God, in so far only as he
is a thinking thing. But not (by Prop. xxviii. of Part i.) in
so far as he is a thing thinking absolutely, only in so far as
he is considered as affected by another mode of thinking; and he
is the cause of this latter, as being affected by a third, and
so on to infinity. Now, the order and connection of ideas is
(by Prop. vii. of this book) the same as the order and connection
of causes. Therefore of a given individual idea another
individual idea, or God, in so far as he is considered as
modified by that idea, is the cause; and of this second idea God
is the cause, in so far as he is affected by another idea, and
so on to infinity. Q.E.D.
<<<<<Corollary--Whatsoever takes place in the individual object
of any idea, the knowledge thereof is in God, in so far only as
he has the idea of the object.
>>>>>Proof--Whatsoever takes place in the object of any idea, its
idea is in God (by Prop. iii. of this part), not in so far as he
is infinite, but in so far as he is considered as affected by
another idea of an individual thing (by the last Prop.); but (by
Prop. vii. of this part) the order and connection of ideas is
the same as the order and connection of things. The knowledge,
therefore, of that which takes place in any individual object
will be in God, in so far only as he has the idea of that
object. Q.E.D.
X. The being of substance does not appertain to the essence of
man--in other words, substance does not constitute the actual
being (forma) of man.
>>>>>Proof--The being of substance involves necessary existence
(Part i., Prop. vii.). If, therefore, the being of substance
appertains to the essence of man, substance being granted, man
would necessarily be granted also (II. Def. ii.), and,
consequently, man would necessarily exist, which is absurd (II.
Ax. i.). Therefore &c. Q.E.D.
*****Note--This proposition may also be proved from I.v., in
which it is shown that there cannot be two substances of the
same nature; for as there may be many men, the being of
substance is not that which constitutes the actual being of man.
Again, the proposition is evident from the other properties of
substance--namely, that substance is in its nature infinite,
immutable, indivisible, &c., as anyone may see for himself.
<<<<<Corollary--Hence it follows, that the essence of man is
constituted by certain modifications of the attributes of God.
For (by the last Prop.) the being of substance does not belong
to the essence of man. That essence therefore (by I. xv.) is
something which is in God, and which without God can neither be
nor be conceived, whether it be a modification (I. xxv. Cor.),
or a mode which expresses God's nature in a certain conditioned
manner.
*****Note--Everyone must surely admit, that nothing can be or be
conceived without God. All men agree that God is the one and
only cause of all things, both of their essence and of their
existence; that is, God is not only the cause of things in
respect to their being made (secundum fieri), but also in
respect to their being (secundum esse).
At the same time many assert, that that, without which a thing
cannot be nor be conceived, belongs to the essence of that
thing; wherefore they believe that either the nature of God
appertains to the essence of created things, or else that created
things can be or be conceived without God; or else, as is more
probably the case, they hold inconsistent doctrines. I think
the cause for such confusion is mainly, that they do not keep to
the proper order of philosophic thinking. The nature of God,
which should be reflected on first, inasmuch as it is prior both
in the order of knowledge and the order of nature, they have
taken to be last in the order of knowledge, and have put into the
first place what they call the objects of sensation; hence,
while they are considering natural phenomena, they give no
attention at all to the divine nature, and, when afterwards they
apply their mind to the study of the divine nature, they are
quite unable to bear in mind the first hypotheses, with which
they have overlaid the knowledge of natural phenomena, inasmuch
as such hypotheses are no help towards understanding the divine
nature. So that it is hardly to be wondered at, that these
persons contradict themselves freely.
However, I pass over this point. My intention her was only to
give a reason for not saying, that that, without which a thing
cannot be or be conceived, belongs to the essence of that thing:
individual things cannot be or be conceived without God, yet God
does not appertain to their essence. I said that "I considered
as belonging to the essence of a thing that, which being given,
the thing is necessarily given also, and which being removed, the
thing is necessarily removed also; or that without which the
thing, and which itself without the thing can neither be nor be
conceived." (II. Def. ii.)
XI. The first element, which constitutes the actual being of the
human mind, is the idea of some particular thing actually
existing.
>>>>>Proof--The essence of man (by the Cor. of the last Prop.) is
constituted by certain modes of the attributes of God, namely
(by II. Ax. ii.), by the modes of thinking, of all which (by II.
Ax. iii.) the idea is prior in nature, and, when the idea is
given, the other modes (namely, those of which the idea is prior
in nature) must be in the same individual (by the same Axiom).
Therefore an idea is the first element constituting the human
mind. But not the idea of a non-existent thing, for then (II.
viii. Cor.) the idea itself cannot be said to exist; it must
therefore be the idea of something actually existing. But not of
an infinite thing. For an infinite thing (I. xxi., xxii.), must
always necessarily exist; this would (by II. Ax. i.) involve an
absurdity. Therefore the first element, which constitutes the
actual being of the human mind, is the idea of something actually
existing. Q.E.D.
<<<<<Corollary--Hence it follows, that the human mind is part of
the infinite intellect of God; thus when we say, that the human
mind perceives this or that, we make the assertion, that God has
this or that idea, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far
as he is displayed through the nature of the human mind, or in
so far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind; and when
we say that God has this or that idea, not only in so far as he
constitutes the essence of the human mind, but also in so far as
he, simultaneously with the human mind, has the further idea of
another thing, we assert that the human mind perceives a thing
in part or inadequately.
*****Note--Here, I doubt not, readers will come to a stand, and
will call to mind many things which will cause them to hesitate;
I therefore beg them to accompany me slowly, step by step, and
not to pronounce on my statements, till they have read to the
end.
XII. Whatsoever comes to pass in the object of the idea, which
constitutes the human mind, must be perceived by the human mind,
or there will necessarily be an idea in the human mind of the
said occurrence. That is, if the object of the idea constituting
the human mind be a body, nothing can take place in that body
without being perceived by the mind.
>>>>>Proof--Whatsoever comes to pass in the object of any idea,
the knowledge thereof is necessarily in God (II. ix. Cor.), in
so far as he is considered as affected by the idea of the said
object, that is (II. xi.), in so far as he constitutes the mind
of anything. Therefore, whatsoever takes place in the object
constituting the idea of the human mind, the knowledge thereof
is necessarily in God, in so far as he constitutes the essence of
the human mind; that is (by II. xi. Cor.) the knowledge of the
said thing will necessarily be in the mind, in other words the
mind perceives it.
*****Note--This proposition is also evident, and is more clearly
to be understood from II. vii., which see.
XIII. The object of the idea constituting the human mind is the
body, in other words a certain mode of extension which actually
exists, and nothing else.
>>>>>Proof--If indeed the body were not the object of the human
mind, the ideas of the modifications of the body would not be in
God (II. ix. Cor.) in virtue of his constituting our mind, but
in virtue of his constituting the mind of something else; that is
(II. xi. Cor.) the ideas of the modifications of the body would
not be in our mind: now (by II. Ax. iv.) we do possess the idea
of the modifications of the body. Therefore the object of the
idea constituting the human mind is the body, and the body as it
actually exists (II. xi.). Further, if there were any other
object of the idea constituting the mind besides body, then, as
nothing can exist from which some effect does not follow (I.
xxxvi.) there would necessarily have to be in our mind an idea,
which would be the effect of that other object (II. xi.); but
(I. Ax. v.) there is no such idea. Wherefore the object of our
mind is the body as it exists, and nothing else. Q.E.D.
*****Note--We thus comprehend, not only that the human mind is
united to the body, but also the nature of the union between
mind and body. However, no one will be able to grasp this
adequately or distinctly, unless he first has adequate knowledge
of the nature of our body. The propositions we have advanced
hitherto have been entirely general, applying not more to men
than to other individual things, all of which, though in
different degrees, are animated (animata). For of everything
there is necessarily an idea in God, of which God is the cause,
in the same way as there is an idea of the human body; thus
whatever we have asserted of the idea of the human body must
necessarily also be asserted of the idea of everything else.
Still, on the other hand, we cannot deny that ideas, like
objects, differ one from the other, one being more excellent than
another and containing more reality, just as the object of one
idea is more excellent than the object of another idea, and
contains more reality.
Wherefore, in order to determine, wherein the human mind differs
from other things, and wherein it surpasses them, it is
necessary for us to know the nature of its object, that is, of
the human body. What this nature is, I am not able here to
explain, nor is it necessary for the proof of what I advance,
that I should do so. I will only say generally, that in
proportion as any given body is more fitted than others for doing
many actions or receiving many impressions at once, so also is
the mind, of which it is the object, more fitted than others for
forming many simultaneous perceptions; and the more the actions
of the body depend on itself alone, and the fewer other bodies
concur with it in action, the more fitted is the mind of which
it is the object for distinct comprehension. We may thus
recognize the superiority of one mind over others, and may
further see the cause, why we have only a very confused
knowledge of our body, and also many kindred questions, which I
will, in the following propositions, deduce from what has been
advanced. Wherefore I have thought it worth while to explain
and prove more strictly my present statements. In order to do
so, I must premise a few propositions concerning the nature of
bodies.
---Axiom I. All bodies are either in motion or at rest.
---Axiom II. Every body is moved sometimes more slowly,
sometimes more quickly.
Lemma I. Bodies are distinguished from one another in respect of
motion and rest, quickness and slowness, and not in respect of
substance.
>>>>>Proof--The first part of this proposition is, I take it,
self-evident. That bodies are not distinguished in respect of
substance, is plain both from I. v. and I. viii. It is brought
out still more clearly from I. xv., Note.
Lemma II. All bodies agree in certain respects.
>>>>>Proof--All bodies agree in the fact, that they involve the
conception of one and the same attribute (II., Def. i.).
Further, in the fact that they may be moved less or more
quickly, and may be absolutely in motion or at rest.
Lemma III. A body in motion or at rest must be determined to
motion or rest by another body, which other body has been
determined to motion or rest by a third body, and that third
again by a fourth, and so on to infinity.
>>>>>Proof--Bodies are individual things (II., Def. i.), which
(Lemma i.) are distinguished one from the other in respect to
motion and rest; thus (I. xxviii.) each must necessarily be
determined to motion or rest by another individual thing, namely
(II. vi.) by another body, which other body is also (Ax. i.) in
motion or at rest. And this body again can only have been set
in motion or caused to rest by being determined by a third body
to motion or rest. This third body again by a fourth, and so on
to infinity. Q.E.D.
<<<<<Corollary--Hence it follows, that a body in motion keeps in
motion, until it is determined to a state of rest by some other
body; and a body at rest remains so, until it is determined to a
state of motion by some other body. This is indeed self-evident.
For when I suppose, for instance, that a given body, A, is at
rest, and do not take into consideration other bodies in motion,
I cannot affirm anything concerning the body A, except that it
is at rest. If it afterwards comes to pass that A is in motion,
this cannot have resulted from its having been at rest, for no
other consequence could have been involved than its remaining at
rest. If, on the other hand, A be given in motion, we shall, so
long as we only consider A, be unable to affirm anything
concerning it, except that it is in motion. If A is
subsequently found to be at rest, this rest cannot be the result
of A's previous motion, for such motion can only have led to
continued motion; the state of rest therefore must have resulted
from something, which was not in A, namely, from an external
cause determining A to a state of rest.
-----Axiom I--All modes, wherein one body is affected by another
body, follow simultaneously from the nature of the body
affected and the body affecting; so that one and the same body
may be moved in different modes, according to the difference in
the nature of the bodies moving it; on the other hand, different
bodies may be moved in different modes by one and the same body.
-----Axiom II--When a body in motion impinges on another body at
rest, which it is unable to move, it recoils, in order to
continue its motion, and the angle made by the line of motion in
the recoil and the plane of the body at rest, whereon the moving
body has impinged, will be equal to the angle formed by the line
of motion of incidence and the same plane.
So far we have been speaking only of the most simple bodies,
which are only distinguished one from the other by motion and
rest, quickness and slowness. We now pass on to compound
bodies.
Definition--When any given bodies of the same or different
magnitude are compelled by other bodies to remain in contact, or
if they be moved at the same or different rates of speed, so
that their mutual movements should preserve among themselves a
certain fixed relation, we say that such bodies are 'in union,'
and that together they compose one body or individual, which is
distinguished from other bodies by the fact of this union.
-----Axiom III--In proportion as the parts of an individual, or
a compound body, are in contact over a greater or less
superficies, they will with greater or less difficulty admit of
being moved from their position; consequently the individual
will, with greater or less difficulty, be brought to assume
another form. Those bodies, whose parts are in contact over
large superficies, are called 'hard;' those, whose parts are in
contact over small superficies, are called 'soft;' those, whose
parts are in motion among one another, are called 'fluid.'
Lemma IV. If from a body or individual, compounded of several
bodies, certain bodies be separated, and if, at the same time,
an equal number of other bodies of the same nature take their
place, the individual will preserve its nature as before, without
any change in its actuality (forma).
>>>>>Proof--Bodies (Lemma i.) are not distinguished in respect of
substance: that which constitutes the actuality (formam) of an
individual consists (by the last Def.) in a union of bodies; but
this union, although there is a continual change of bodies, will
(by our hypothesis) be maintained; the individual, therefore,
will retain its nature as before, both in respect of substance
and in respect of mode. Q.E.D.
Lemma V. If the parts composing an individual become greater or
less, but in such proportion, that they all preserve the same
mutual relations of motion and rest, the individual will still
preserve its original nature, and its actuality will not be
changed.
>>>>>Proof--The same as for the last Lemma.
Lemma VI. If certain bodies composing an individual be compelled
to change the motion, which they have in one direction, for
motion in another direction, but in such a manner, that they be
able to continue their motions and their mutual communication in
the same relations as before, the individual will retain its own
nature without any change of its actuality.
>>>>>Proof--This proposition is self-evident, for the individual
is supposed to retain all that, which, in its definition, we
spoke of as its actual being.
Lemma VII. Furthermore, the individual thus composed preserves
its nature, whether it be, as a whole, in motion or at rest,
whether it be moved in this or that direction; so long as each
part retains its motion, and preserves its communication with
other parts as before.
>>>>>Proof--This proposition is evident from the definition of an
individual prefixed to Lemma iv.
*****Note--We thus see, how a composite individual may be
affected in many different ways, and preserve its nature
notwithstanding. Thus far we have conceived an individual as
composed of bodies only distinguished one from the other in
respect of motion and rest, speed and slowness; that is, of
bodies of the most simple character. If, however, we now
conceive another individual composed of several individuals of
diverse natures, we shall find that the number of ways in which
it can be affected, without losing its nature, will be greatly
multiplied. Each of its parts would consist of several bodies,
and therefore (by Lemma vi.) each part would admit, without
change to its nature, of quicker or slower motion, and would
consequently be able to transmit its motions more quickly or more
slowly to the remaining parts. If we further conceive a third
kind of individuals composed of individuals of this second kind,
we shall find that they may be affected in a still greater
number of ways without changing their actuality. We may easily
proceed thus to infinity, and conceive the whole of nature as
one individual, whose parts, that is, all bodies, vary in
infinite ways, without any change in the individual as a whole.
I should feel bound to explain and demonstrate this point at
more length, if I were writing a special treatise on body. But
I have already said that such is not my object; I have only
touched on the question, because it enables me to prove easily
that which I have in view.
POSTULATES I. The human body is composed of a number of
individual parts, of diverse nature, each one of which is in
itself extremely complex.
II. Of the individual parts composing the human body some are
fluid, some soft, some hard.
III. The individual parts composing the human body, and
consequently the human body itself, are affected in a variety of
ways by external bodies.
IV. The human body stands in need for its preservation of a
number of other bodies, by which it is continually, so to speak,
regenerated.
V. When the fluid part of the human body is determined by an
external body to impinge often on another soft part, it changes
the surface of the latter, and, as it were, leaves the
impression thereupon of the external body which impels it.
VI. The human body can move external bodies, and arrange them in
a variety of ways.
PROPOSITIONS XIV. The human mind is capable of perceiving a
great number of things, and is so in proportion as its body is
capable of receiving a great number of impressions.
>>>>>Proof--The human body (by Post. iii. and vi.) is affected in
very many ways by external bodies, and is capable in very many
ways of affecting external bodies. But (II.xii.) the human mind
must perceive all that takes place in the human body; the human
mind is, therefore, capable of perceiving a great number of
things, and is so in proportion, &c. Q.E.D.
XV. The idea, which constitutes the actual being of the human
mind, is not simple, but compounded of a great number of ideas.
>>>>>Proof--The idea constituting the actual being of the human
mind is the idea of the body (II. xiii.), which (Post. i.) is
composed of a great number of complex individual parts. But
there is necessarily in God the idea of each individual part
whereof the body is composed (II. viii. Cor.); therefore (II.
vii.), the idea of the human body is composed of each of these
numerous ideas of its component parts. Q.E.D.
XVI. The idea of every mode, in which the human body is
affected by external bodies, must involve the nature of the
human body, and also the nature of the external body.
>>>>>Proof--All the modes, in which any given body is affected,
follow from the nature of the body affected, and also from the
nature of the affecting body (by Ax. i., after the Cor. of Lemma
iii.), wherefore their idea is also necessarily (by I, Ax. iv.)
involves the nature of both bodies; therefore, the idea of every
mode, in which the human body is affected by external bodies,
involves the nature of the human body and of the external body.
Q.E.D.
<<<<<Corollary I.--Hence it follows, first, that the human mind
perceives the nature of a variety of bodies, together with the
nature of its own.
<<<<<Corollary II.--It follows, secondly, that the ideas, which
we have of external bodies, indicate rather the constitution of
our own body than the nature of external bodies. I have amply
illustrated this in the Appendix to Part I.
XVII. If the human body is affected in a manner which involves
the nature of any external body, the human mind will regard the
said external body as actually existing, or as present to
itself, until the human body be affected in such a way, as to
exclude the existence or the presence of the said external body.
>>>>>Proof--This proposition is self-evident, for so long as the
human body continues to be thus affected, so long will the human
mind (II. xii.) regard this modification of the body --that is
(by the last Prop.), it will have the idea of the mode as
actually existing, and this idea involves the nature of the
external body; therefore the mind (by II. xvi., Cor. i.) will
regard the external body as actually existing, until it is
affected, &c. Q.E.D.
<<<<<Corollary--The mind is able to regard as present external
bodies, by which the human body has once been affected, even
though they be no longer in existence or present.
>>>>>Proof--When external bodies determine the fluid parts of the
human body, so that they often impinge on the softer parts, they
change the surface of the last named (Post. v); hence (Ax. ii.,
after the Cor. of Lemma iii.) they are refracted therefrom in a
different manner from that which they followed before such
change; and, further, when afterwards they impinge on the new
surfaces by their own spontaneous movement, they will be
refracted in the same manner, as though they had been impelled
towards those surfaces by external bodies; consequently, they
will, while they continue to be thus refracted, affect the human
body in the same manner, whereof the mind (II. xii.) will again
take cognizance --that is (II. xvii.), the mind will again
regard the external body as present, and will do so, as often as
the fluid parts of the human body impinge on the aforesaid
surfaces by their own spontaneous motion. Wherefore, although
the external bodies, by which the human body has once been
affected, be no longer in existence, the mind will nevertheless
regard them as present, as often as this action of the body is
repeated. Q.E.D.
*****Note--We thus see how it comes about, as is often the case,
that we regard as present many things which are not. It is
possible that the same result may be brought about by other
causes; but I think it suffices for me here to have indicated one
possible explanation, just as well as if I had pointed out the
true cause. Indeed, I do not think I am very far from the
truth, for all my assumptions are based on postulates, which
rest, almost without exception, on experience, that cannot be
controverted by those who have shown, as we have, that the human
body, as we feel it, exists (Cor. after II. xiii.). Furthermore
(II. vii. Cor., II. xvi. Cor. ii.), we clearly understand what is
the difference between the idea, say, of Peter, which
constitutes the essence of Peter's mind, and the idea of the
said Peter, which is in another man, say, Paul. The former
directly answers to the essence of Peter's own body, and only
implies existence so long as Peter exists; the latter indicates
rather the disposition of Paul's body than the nature of Peter,
and, therefore, while this disposition of Paul's body lasts,
Paul's mind will regard Peter as present to itself, even though
he no longer exists. Further, to retain the usual phraseology,
the modifications of the human body, of which the ideas represent
external bodies as present to us, we will call the images of
things, though they do not recall the figure of things. When
the mind regards bodies in this fashion, we say that it imagines.
I will here draw attention to the fact, in order to indicate
where error lies, that the imaginations of the mind, looked at
in themselves, do not contain error. The mind does not err in
the mere act of imagining, but only in so far as it is regarded
as being without the idea, which excludes the existence of such
things as it imagines to be present to it. If the mind, while
imagining non-existent things as present to it, is at the same
time conscious that they do not really exist, this power of
imagination must be set down to the efficacy of its nature, and
not to a fault, especially if this faculty of imagination depend
solely on its own nature--that is (I. Def. vii.), if this
faculty of imagination be free.
XVIII. If the human body has once been affected by two or more
bodies at the same time, when the mind afterwards imagines any
of them, it will straightway remember the others also.
>>>>>Proof--The mind (II. xvii. Cor.) imagines any given body,
because the human body is affected and disposed by the
impressions from an external body, in the same manner as it is
affected when certain of its parts are acted on by the said
external body; but (by our hypothesis) the body was then so
disposed, that the mind imagined two bodies at once; therefore,
it will also in the second case imagine two bodies at once, and
the mind, when it imagines one, will straightway remember the
other. Q.E.D.
*****Note--We now clearly see what 'Memory' is. It is simply a
certain association of ideas involving the nature of things
outside the human body, which association arises in the mind
according to the order and association of the modifications
(affectiones) of the human body. I say, first, it is an
association of those ideas only, which involve the nature of
things outside the human body: not of ideas which answer to the
nature of the said things: ideas of the modifications of the
human body are, strictly speaking (II. xvi.), those which
involve the nature both of the human body and of external bodies.
I say, secondly, that this association arises according to the
order and association of the modifications of the human body, in
order to distinguish it from that association of ideas, which
arises from the order of the intellect, whereby the mind
perceives things through their primary causes, and which is in
all men the same. And hence we can further clearly understand,
why the mind from the thought of one thing, should straightway
arrive at the thought of another thing, which has no similarity
with the first; for instance, from the thought of the word
'pomum' (an apple), a Roman would straightway arrive at the
thought of the fruit apple, which has no similitude with the
articulate sound in question, nor anything in common with it,
except that the body of the man has often been affected by these
two things; that is, that the man has often heard the word
'pomum,' while he was looking at the fruit; similarly every man
will go on from one thought to another, according as his habit
has ordered the images of things in his body. For a soldier,
for instance, when he sees the tracks of a horse in sand, will
at once pass from the thought of a horse to the thought of a
horseman, and thence to the thought of war, &c.; while a
countryman will proceed from the thought of a horse to the
thought of a plough, a field, &c. Thus every man will follow
this or that train of thought, according as he has been in the
habit of conjoining and associating the mental images of things
in this or that manner.
XIX. The human mind has no knowledge of the body, and does not
know it to exist, save through the ideas of the modifications
whereby the body is affected.
>>>>>Proof--The human mind is the very idea or knowledge of the
human body (II. xiii.), which (II. ix.) is in God, in so far as
he is regarded as affected by another idea of a particular thing
actually existing: or, inasmuch as (Post. iv.) the human body
stands in need of very many bodies whereby it is, as it were,
continually regenerated; and the order and connection of ideas
is the same as the order and connection of causes (II. vii.);
this idea will therefore be in God, in so far as he is regarded
as affected by the ideas of very many particular things. Thus
God has the idea of the human body, or knows the human body, in
so far as he is affected by very many other ideas, and not in so
far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind; that is (by
II. xi. Cor.), the human mind does not know the human body. But
the ideas of the modifications of body are in God, in so far as
he constitutes the nature of the human mind, or the human mind
perceives those modifications (II. xii.), and consequently (II.
xvi.) the human body itself, and as actually existing; therefore
the mind perceives thus far only the human body. Q.E.D.
XX. The idea or knowledge of the human mind is also in God,
following in God in the same manner, and being referred to God
in the same manner, as the idea or knowledge of the human body.
>>>>>Proof--Thought is an attribute of God (II. i.); therefore
(II. iii.) there must necessarily be in God the idea both of
thought itself and of all its modifications, consequently also
of the human mind (II. xi.). Further, this idea or knowledge of
the mind does not follow from God, in so far as he is infinite,
but in so far as he is affected by another idea of an individual
thing (II. ix.). But (II. vii.) the order and connection of
ideas is the same as the order and connection of causes;
therefore this idea or knowledge of the mind is in God and is
referred to God, in the same manner as the idea or knowledge of
the body. Q.E.D.
XXI. This idea of the mind is united to the mind in the same way
as the mind is united to the body.
>>>>>Proof--That the mind is united to the body we have shown
from the fact, that the body is the object of the mind (II. xii.
and xiii.); and so for the same reason the idea of the mind must
be united with its object, that is, with the mind in the same
manner as the mind is united to the body. Q.E.D.
*****Note--This proposition is comprehended much more clearly
from what we have said in the note to II. vii. We there showed
that the idea of body and body, that is, mind and body (II.
xiii.), are one and the same individual conceived now under the
attribute of thought, now under the attribute of extension;
wherefore the idea of the mind and the mind itself are one and
the same thing, which is conceived under one and the same
attribute, namely, thought. The idea of the mind, I repeat, and
the mind itself are in God by the same necessity and follow from
him from the same power of thinking. Strictly speaking, the
idea of the mind, that is, the idea of an idea, is nothing but
the distinctive quality (forma) of the idea in so far as it is
conceived as a mode of thought without reference to the object;
if a man knows anything, he, by that very fact, knows that he
knows it, and at the same time knows that he knows that he knows
it, and so on to infinity. But I will treat of this hereafter.
XXII. The human mind perceives not only the modifications of the
body, but also the ideas of such modifications.
>>>>>Proof--The ideas of the ideas of modifications follow in God
in the same manner, and are referred to God in the same manner,
as the ideas of the said modifications. This is proved in the
same way as II. xx. But the ideas of the modifications of the
body are in the human mind (II. xii.), that is, in God, in so
far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind; therefore
the ideas of these ideas will be in God, in so far as he has the
knowledge or idea of the human mind, that is (II. xxi.), they
will be in the human mind itself, which therefore perceives not
only the modifications of the body, but also the ideas of such
modifications. Q.E.D.
XXIII. The mind does not know itself, except in so far as it
perceives the ideas of the modifications of the body.
>>>>>Proof--The idea or knowledge of the mind (II. xx.) follows
in God in the same manner, and is referred to God in the same
manner, as the idea or knowledge of the body. But since (II.
xix.) the human mind does not know the human body itself, that is
(II. xi. Cor.), since the knowledge of the human body is not
referred to God, in so far as he constitutes the nature of the
human mind; therefore, neither is the knowledge of the mind
referred to God, in so far as he constitutes the essence of the
human mind; therefore (by the same Cor. II. xi.), the human mind
thus far has no knowledge of itself. Further the ideas of the
modifications, whereby the body is affected, involve the nature
of the human body itself (II. xvi.), that is (II. xiii.), they
agree with the nature of the mind; wherefore the knowledge of
these ideas necessarily involves knowledge of the mind; but (by
the last Prop.) the knowledge of these ideas is in the human
mind itself; wherefore the human mind thus far only has
knowledge of itself. Q.E.D.
XXIV. The human mind does not involve an adequate knowledge of
the parts composing the human body.