most of the time [one Party wife wrote]. There has never been
any question about carrying out the decisions made, even when
Hazel [small daughter] and I were set adrift by the Party with
no financial provision and I had to go to my family so that my
infant could have food and a place to live. When Hazel almost
died from third-degree burns, Hank didn’t even know about it
since we had no way to communicate. I have been cut off from
my family completely. The furniture, clothes and other things
that we accumulated during our marriage we’ll probably never
see again. We have moved, and moved, and moved yet again
... dragging Hazel around from place to place, carrying out
decisions made, guarding our security and that of others.
The total effect was demoralizing. The wife continues:
I can’t have an operation because it would mean six months in
a cast and on my stomach—and there is no one to take care of
Hazel .... I get overtired physically, and the past four years
of the kind of life we have led, with its many pressures of
loneliness, financial scrounging, security measures and the
sword of Damocles—that of being discovered—hanging over my
head, finally took its toll.
Despite this woman’s hardships the Party brought charges that her husband
had been seeing her without permission. The utter fanaticism of Party
discipline is shown by her reaction toward the charges: “If in spite of
all this the Board feels that there has been a breach of discipline, then
I am willing to abide by any decision made and accept whatever control is
agreed upon.”
The underground, perhaps more than any other phase of Party activity,
brings out the fanaticism of communist discipline. The member becomes so
entranced with his mission that his hardships, sufferings, and obstacles
become challenges to overcome, not reasons for discouragement. The very
thought of working on this assignment, as one Party leader stated, should
make him “ooh and ah.”
Some Party wives, however, did not always “ooh and ah,” but bitterly
resented their husbands’ long absences from home and the disruption of
family life. This presented the Party with a serious problem. These
wives were potential weak links in communist security; they might
jeopardize the husbands’ location by making unauthorized contacts, might
give information to the “enemy” or impair morale by their uncongenial
attitude. One Party instruction, for example, urged that wives should be
spoken to and the importance of the Party’s policies explained. They
must be indoctrinated more. For some Party wives it would certainly take
a lot of explaining.
Children have been born in the communist underground, children who were
not even given their true family names. In one instance a father and
mother living as an underground couple (_transformed couple_) entered
their child at a nearby school under the family alias. In another case a
baby born to underground parents was registered with county authorities
under the underground alias. Imagine the hypocrisy of such a family
situation. A whole world of falsehoods must be invented to satisfy
youthful curiosity. What about the parents’ childhoods? What about
grandparents? Every family matter discussed must be carefully weighed:
Will it give away any secrets?
The very character of the underground, with its emphasis on stealth and
deceit, degrades human values. While many comrades struggle in poverty,
living in squalid conditions at great personal sacrifice, a few enjoy the
very best—comfortable hide-outs equipped with all conveniences. For them
the underground is a “good life,” with others paying the bill. Moreover,
Party discipline often places great power into the hands of some who, as
petty dictators, do not hesitate to use it to inflict revenge and spite
on their personal enemies. Many times the underground becomes a catacomb
of back-stabbing and the settling of old scores.
Sexual immorality is also abetted. In one instance an organizer, leaving
his wife and children, lived in Chicago with another woman. In an Eastern
city, a woman whose husband was underground carried on an affair with
another man. In still another instance a wife kept company with a man
while her husband was forbidden by the Party’s underground leaders to see
her.
This is the communist underground. It may appear as a “beehive of crazy
confusion.” But it is not. All these shifts, midnight meetings, and
escape routes find meaning in only one thing: the strengthening of the
Party. The cardinal question always is, “What is best for the Party?”
As one Party leader stated, “Our best people are in this field.... They
are not in it for adventure, romance, thrills or pleasure....” They
“are in it because that is where the Party wants them for political
reasons....” “... it is ... probably one of the toughest and hardest
assignments for anyone.”
That is why the Party, as we have seen, tries desperately to create the
communist man, the individual obedient even when he is beyond the Party’s
immediate control. “It’s not me who speaks,” one leader said, “but the
Party.” Any allegiance outside the Party must be broken. The underground
worker is the member who, even if cut off from leadership, will know what
to do, will carry out the assignment, regardless of what it is. He is the
man on whom all revolutionary plans depend.
Here is an example of how this fanaticism works:
Shortly before noon one day a top Party official drove east out of town.
At the outskirts he doubled back, twice turning corners and coming to
abrupt stops. Then, at speeds varying from forty to eighty miles an hour,
he continued east for twenty-six miles. Turning around, he retraced his
route at eighty miles an hour.
He was “dry-cleaning” in a most dangerous and reckless fashion. Back in
town, for three hours he parked and reparked his car, darting up streets,
entering and immediately leaving hotels.
At roughly 4:00 P.M. he left town again, this time driving south, again
at various speeds. After five hours he cut east for fourteen miles, north
for two, doubled back for twelve, south-east for forty-two, sometimes
running without his lights; parking for a few minutes near buildings,
then darting out at savage speed.
Late that night, after roughly twelve hours of furtive, reckless driving,
often at highly dangerous speeds, he arrived at his destination and
checked into a hotel. He had covered some 360 miles; the normal driving
distance was 195.
This type of fanatical communist, if so instructed, would not hesitate to
lead a riot, steal vital military secrets, sabotage defense industries,
or perform illegal activities. Here is the true communist at work,
without concern for personal risk or safety.
21.
_Espionage and Sabotage_
The communist underground is designed to carry forward phases of
the Party’s program which cannot be conducted openly and lawfully.
In addition, it contains weapons of attack which must always remain
hidden (the permanent part of the underground), such as aid to Soviet
espionage, attempts to place members in strategic positions in industry
for potential sabotage, techniques to discredit law enforcement, and
endeavors to infiltrate the armed forces.
Lenin taught that the enemy must be weakened in advance. To wait for
something to happen is not the way to achieve revolution. The way must
be prepared. The enemy must be softened up: weaken his will to resist,
nullify his capacity for counteraction, impair his morale. Then, as in
November, 1917, in Russia, when the crisis comes, communists can march to
power through the ranks of a demoralized enemy.
The Party’s relation to Soviet espionage is one of the most potent
weapons in the communist underground arsenal. As past events have
proven—for instance the Harry Gold-Klaus Fuchs combination and the
case of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, executed in 1953 on espionage
charges—Moscow-directed spying represents a vital danger to the integrity
and safety of free government. Espionage is utilized not only to secure
information but also to weaken the “enemy” from within.
The Soviets very early instituted espionage operations against the
United States with the full cooperation of the Communist Party. In
1919 the Comintern was established and, as we have seen in Chapter 4,
Comintern “reps” became common figures in Party circles. In January,
1919, Ludwig C. A. K. Martens, a member of the Russian Communist Party,
was appointed as the first Soviet representative to the United States.
Although never recognized by the American government, he set up an office
in New York City. Arthur Adams, later identified as a Soviet atom spy,
was a member of Martens’ staff.
In the light of today’s well-organized, efficiently operated spy
apparatus, the Soviets in the early days were crude and clumsy. Many
of the Russians were not proficient in English. They lacked knowledge
of our customs and possessed no special espionage training. Many were
propaganda as well as espionage agents and could be identified by their
rabid preaching of communism. Often the security of their communications
was not of the best.
In late July, 1920, a seaman on the SS _Stockholm_ walked up Pier 95 in
New York City. Noticing customs officials searching two other seamen, he
turned and ran down the pier. Later, after the seaman’s apprehension,
a package was found concealed in his trousers. Inside was a series of
envelopes, one inside the other with the smallest containing over 200
uncut diamonds valued at 50,000 dollars. The smuggling of diamonds
was one of the early Bolshevik techniques of financing operations in
the United States. For whom was the package destined? Inside was a
typewritten letter starting, “Comrade Martens.”
Unfamiliarity with America made dependence on the Communist Party, USA,
more important than ever. Without the ready base of the Communist Party,
USA, with its fanatical allegiance to Moscow, Soviet espionage would have
had tremendous problems in getting started. As it was, there were Party
members available, able and willing to carry out Soviet instructions.
Often it was difficult to distinguish between a member’s work for the
Party and for Moscow. Comrades traveled back and forth to Russia, were
given assignments by the Kremlin, and felt it their highest duty to
gather information for the Bolsheviks.
Party officials made assistance to Moscow priority Number One. We have
seen in Chapter 4 how the communist leadership, for example, promised to
help Comrade Loaf (a Comintern agent) collect information on the American
labor movement. In another instance the Party Secretariat actually
approved the release of a Party member for Soviet intelligence duties.
What were some of the ways through which the Communist Party, USA,
rendered aid to Soviet espionage?
Most important, of course, was recruitment. The Party was able, time
after time, to supply recruits, both members and sympathizers, for
espionage use. Suppose the Soviets needed a photographer? a source of
information in a Pennsylvania steel plant? a trusted short-wave radio
expert? The Party would be expected to, and did, “fill the bill.”
This funneling of talent to the Soviets was often accomplished through
a special Party contact who was called a “steerer.” A trusted old-time
member, he was able to spot recruits for espionage among the Party’s
ranks and to fulfill requests made by the Soviets. As espionage
operations became more complex, the “steerer’s” role became ever more
vital. The Party was a vast recruiting ground for spy talent.
The Party provided many essential “services” to Soviet espionage. Suppose
a Russian espionage agent secretly entered the United States, to operate
here or while en route to another country. Most likely, as so often
happened, he would need a “new identity,” or, in espionage language, a
“change of feathers.” This probably meant a faked birth certificate, a
false passport, and other identification papers. Maybe he would be placed
in “deep freeze” for several months. If so, he had to be “serviced”—that
is, fed and clothed. After being “re-feathered,” he would be on his way.
Then there were “business covers.” A Party member, perhaps with Soviet
funds, would set up a business, allegedly for legitimate purposes but
actually for espionage. In 1927, World Tourists was incorporated in New
York, ostensibly for tourist business. Actually, this “business,” under
the operation of Jacob Golos, a communist “steerer,” became an active
espionage “cover.”
The Party, in addition, helped arrange the transfer of funds, established
mail drops (where espionage communications come to a third person, later
to be given to the espionage network), and operated couriers. In one
instance a Party member even served as an interpreter for a Soviet agent.
Even from these early days, however, evidence existed that the Soviets
were aware of the dangers of too close an affiliation with the United
States Party. An espionage operation might be jeopardized by a known
Party member’s participation. Similarly, in the event of a “blow-up,”
the Party, in the public’s eyes, would be linked directly with a
foreign power, Soviet Russia. This was one thing both the Soviets and
Party officials wanted to avoid. Hence, by the early 1940’s there was
a definite lessening of direct Soviet dependence on the U.S. Party for
espionage assistance.
The Soviet spy system, moreover, was now better able to stand on its own
feet. In 1924, Amtorg Trading Corporation (a Soviet government commercial
agency) was established. This gave the Soviets their first “legal” base
for espionage operations. In this way persons or institutions in a
country openly as representatives or agents of a foreign power have an
ideal cover to fulfill their assignments of clandestine espionage. In
1933 diplomatic recognition was afforded the Soviet Union. Now trained
espionage agents, operating under diplomatic immunity, could direct
operations. After World War II Russians assigned to the United Nations
in this country gave additional striking power to Soviet espionage.
Moreover, assistance was possible through the espionage networks of
Soviet satellite countries operating in the United States.
This lessening of direct Soviet dependence on the Party was a gradual
development. Whereas in the early 1920’s Party and espionage work were
often indistinguishable, the Soviets now instructed members tapped for
service to drop all connections with the Party. One old-time Party
member, turned spy, told the FBI that the Soviets had instructed agents
to conceal their Party affiliations. This soon became a standard
technique. If engaged in espionage, cut off all connections with the
Party, even contacts with former Party friends. Ethel Rosenberg, for
example, indicated that she no longer bought the _Daily Worker_ at
her usual newsstand. Another agent, while in the company of a Soviet
superior, stopped to purchase a communist publication. He was severely
reprimanded. The communist label might betray the espionage ring.
The Soviets, however, still depended on communists or sympathizers for
assistance. In one major apparatus detected by the FBI, for example,
twelve of seventeen participants had been Party members. Both Ethel and
Julius Rosenberg, executed as Soviet spies, had communist backgrounds.
Elizabeth Bentley, moreover, has given testimony as to how she collected
dues from secret members of the Party when she came to Washington as a
courier of the Soviet espionage system. Among those from whom she has
stated she collected dues were officials of the Office of Strategic
Services (OSS), Department of Commerce, the Air Corps, the Office of
the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, the Treasury Department, and
others. In some instances one person would collect dues for a group
and hand them over to Miss Bentley. One such individual was Nathan
Gregory Silvermaster, who, according to Miss Bentley, headed a group.
(Silvermaster denied the disclosures initially and later invoked the
Fifth Amendment.) On occasions a member of a group when coming to New
York would deliver the Party dues collected to Miss Bentley there. The
Party also benefited, as disclosed by testimony, because, as in some
instances, information collected for the Soviets was made available to
the leadership of the Party for review.
In 1945 the defection of Igor Gouzenko, cipher clerk assigned to the
Soviet Embassy in Canada, revealed close tie-ups between Soviet espionage
and Canadian communists. Then the appearance of FBI informants at Smith
Act trials shocked the Soviet Union as to the amazing extent to which
the FBI had penetrated the Communist Party, USA. These, among other
revelations, encouraged even more the Soviet tendency to lessen its
direct dependence on the Party. Today, with some exceptions, the Soviets
are attempting to operate their espionage networks independent of the
Party, staying away, as much as possible, from Party assistance. This
does not mean, however, that the Party is today not playing an important
role in Soviet espionage. As we shall see, the Party is doing much to
prepare the way for Soviet espionage and, when the need arises, will
unhesitatingly supply vital assistance. The present “drawing away” from
direct Party assistance is strictly a Soviet tactical maneuver, subject
to instant change.
Soviet espionage is no longer a clumsy, crude affair, as it was in
the days of the rollicking “reps,” but a deadly efficient profession,
skillfully directed from Moscow, with well-trained agents supplied with
money, modern technical equipment, and experience. To the Soviets,
espionage is a part of over-all state policy.
On an April night in 1951, just two minutes before seven o’clock, a tall
man wearing a tweed sport coat walked through the darkness toward the
Washington Monument in our nation’s capital. Brilliant lights played on
the famous shrine. The usually bustling place was deserted. Everything
was quiet.
Suddenly the tall man stepped from the circle of darkness into the light.
He stopped a moment, peered up at the 555-foot top, looked at his watch,
then started to walk around the base. On his left hand he wore a glove. A
band of adhesive tape circled the middle finger of his right hand, and he
carried a red-covered book under his left arm. This man was an employee
of our Defense Department. As part of his work he had access to highly
confidential information, just what the Russians wanted.
Exactly at seven o’clock, another man clad in a dark business suit
stepped from the shadows. An espionage contact set up months previously
in Austria was being consummated to the minute. The second man was
Yuri V. Novikov, Second Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Washington.
(Novikov was well known to the FBI, since his activities in the United
States had gone far beyond those of a diplomatic official. He was
audacious almost beyond description. His brazenness reached a climax
when he sat with defense counsel during the espionage trial of the
onetime Justice Department employee, Judith Coplon. During this trial he
would write out questions and hand them to defense counsel to direct to
FBI agents on the witness stand. He was particularly interested in having
questions asked pertaining to our internal administration and procedures.)
When Novikov met the government employee he said, “I’m Mr. Williams,” the
code words of recognition, along with the glove, tape, and red book. The
two shook hands, then Novikov took the military specialist by the elbow,
directing him from the light. A few words, arranging another meeting, and
they parted.
From that night, for an entire year, the Soviets made secretive contacts
with the government employee, never realizing that he was a “double
agent” of the FBI. Seldom were meetings held in the same place. Some were
on lonely lanes or in dead-end streets; one on a narrow rock bridge on
a deserted Maryland road after dark. One time Novikov stood in a movie
line; the double agent was to pass by and, seeing him there, would know
that a meeting was scheduled one hour later at a nearby school. Then
there were chalk marks on trash cans and a pencil mark on page 100 of the
Manhattan (New York) telephone directory in Washington’s Union Station,
elaborate code signals between Novikov and the man from the defense
establishment.
I hasten to add that the government employee was a loyal American, and
in meeting Novikov he was merely carrying out a duty imposed upon him
when he was assigned in Austria with the air force. His services were
solicited by Otto Verber, who came to the United States as a refugee,
as did Kurt L. Ponger, who had married Verber’s sister. Both Verber
and Ponger were in the armed services, both had acquired American
citizenship, and, after the war, both had served in Europe. Upon
returning to private life, both settled in Vienna, where they took
advantage of the GI bill and benefits and enrolled in the University of
Vienna. In 1949 Ponger was recruited by the Soviet intelligence service,
and he in turn recruited Verber. It was later learned that Ponger had
been a member of a Communist Party cell in England before he came to the
United States as a refugee. He also had indoctrinated Verber.
The air force representative promptly reported Verber’s approach to his
superiors and from that time on acted under instructions. Prior to his
return to the United States, Verber and Ponger arranged for the meeting
at the Washington Monument. The Treasury of the United States, of course,
received the thousands of dollars of Soviet funds paid to the loyal
American.
In June, 1953, after pleading guilty to an espionage indictment, Ponger
was sentenced to a prison term of from five to fifteen years, while
Verber received a sentence of from three years, four months, to ten
years. Novikov, who was named in the indictment as a co-conspirator, was
declared _persona non grata_ and returned to the Soviet Union.
The Soviet spy system is a disciplined structure, composed of many
networks. There are the “legal” networks; that is, espionage controlled
by legal representatives of the Russian government, such as diplomats.
This was the case of Novikov. Then there are illegal networks, meaning
spy rings operated by Moscow independent of the legal establishments.
More and more the Soviets are concentrating on building illegal
networks and planting “sleeper” agents. Such was the case of Colonel
Rudolf Ivanovich Abel, of Soviet intelligence, who was arrested by the
Immigration and Naturalization Service in June, 1957, at the request of
the FBI, after we had identified him as a concealed agent. After his
indictment in August, 1957, on espionage charges, information was made
public concerning him which the FBI could not previously disclose. In
November, 1957, after being convicted in Federal Court, Eastern District
of New York, he was sentenced to thirty years in prison and fined 3000
dollars. Subsequently, a notice of appeal was filed.
Ordinarily a network includes a principal (the boss), always a Russian
national in a “legal” network. Then there are, depending on the size
of the network, group leaders, couriers, sources of information.
Non-Russians, such as Harry Gold, may reach as high as a group leader or
may be even a principal, but at all times they are under the firm control
of Soviet superiors. In espionage, as in all features of communism,
native comrades exist only to serve the Russian master.
Strange as it may sound, it is difficult to become a Russian espionage
agent. The Soviets are highly selective. They will not accept just
anybody. Does the prospect have access to confidential data? Will he
accept discipline? What is his background? The Russians want to know
everything about him. Sometimes elaborate verification checks, from
Soviet contacts around the world, are run. Moreover, the breaking-in
period of a prospect may be very slow. At first he may be given minor
assignments to test his flair for intelligence work and discernment of
details, all without risk to any established espionage operation. If he
“comes through,” he’ll be given more responsible work.
Why does an individual engage in espionage? Why do native Americans
betray their country for a foreign tyranny?