present military resources and position of Russia in Central
Asia, and of the difficulties presented both geographically and
by the national characteristics of the races that she would have
to encounter in an advance south of the Oxus, a good deal has
been already learned from the Afghans themselves. Among the
turbulent tribes dwelling in and around Kabul, whose chief and
keenest interest always lies in that which bears, more or less
directly, on their chances of success in mere faction fights,
which they seem to regard as the highest occupation in life, the
Russian factor in the general game must be a matter of constant
discussion. Thus it may possibly arise from their individual
interest in their national position that there is no better
natural geographer in the world than the Afghan of the Kabul
district. There is often an exactness about his method of
imparting information (sometimes a careful little map drawn out
with a pointed stick on the ground) which would strike one as
altogether extraordinary, but for the reflection that this one
accomplishment is probably the practical outcome of the
education of half a lifetime.
Russia's bases of military operations towards India are two: one
on the Caspian Sea at Krasnovodsk, and Chikishliar, with
outposts at Chat and Kizil Arvat; and the other on the line of
Khiva, Bokhara, Samarcand, and Margillan, which may roughly be
said to represent the frontier held (together with a large
extent of boundary south of Kuldja) by the Army of Tashkend,
under General Kaufmann. But between this latter line and the
Oxus, Russia is undoubtedly already the dominant Power. The mere
fact of Russia having already thoroughly explored all these
regions, gives her the key to their future disposal. There is no
doubt that in all matters relating to the acquirement of
geographical knowledge, where it bears on possible military
operations, Russian perceptions are of the keenest. Her
surveying energies appear to be always concentrated on that
which yet lies beyond her reach, rather than in the completion
of good maps to aid in the right government of that which has
already been acquired.
With what lies north of the Oxus we can have very little to say
or to do; therefore it matters the less that in reality we know
very little about it. The Oxus is not a fordable river. At Khoja
Saleh, which is the furthest point supposed to have been reached
by the Aral flotilla, it is about half a mile wide, with a slow
current. At Charjui it is about the same width, only rapid and
deep. At Karki it is said to be one thousand yards wide, and at
Kilif perhaps a quarter of a mile. But at all these places there
are ferries, and there would be ample means of crossing an army
corps, if we take into account both the Aral flotilla and the
native material, in the shape of large flat-bottomed boats,
capable of containing one hundred men each, used for ferrying
purposes, of which there are said to be three hundred between
Kilif and Hazarasp. These boats are drawn across the river by
horses swimming with ropes attached to their manes. But under
any circumstances it seems about as unlikely that any British
force would oppose the passage of a Russian army across the Oxus
as that it would interfere with the Russian occupation of the
trans-Oxus districts; but once south of the Oxus, many new
conditions of opposition would come into play, arising
principally from the very different national characteristics of
the southern races to those farther north. It would no longer be
a matter of pushing an advance through sandy and waterless
deserts, or over wild and rugged mountains, difficulties which
in themselves have never yet retarded the advance of a
determined general, but there would be the reception that any
Christian foe would almost certainly meet at the hands of a
warlike and powerful people, who can unite with all the cohesion
of religious fanaticism, backed up by something like military
organization and a perfect acquaintance with the strategical
conditions of their country. Most probably there would be no
serious local opposition to the occupation by Russia of a line
extending from Balkh eastwards through Khulm and Kunduz to
Faizabad and Sarhadd, all of which places can be reached without
great difficulty from the Oxus, and are connected by excellent
lateral road communications. But the occupation of such a line
could have but one possible object, which would be to conceal
the actual line of further advance. Each of these places may be
said to dominate a pass to India over the Hindoo Kush. Opposite
Sarhadd is the Baroghil, leading either to Kashmir or to Mastuj
and the Kunar valley. Faizabad commands the Nuksa Pass. Khulm
looks southwards to Ghozi and the Parwan Pass into Kohistan,
while from Balkh two main routes diverge, one to Bamian and
Kabul, the other to Maimana and Herat.
It would be a great mistake to suppose that this short list
disposes of all the practicable passes over the Hindoo Kush. The
range is a singularly well-defined one throughout its vast
length; but it is not by any means a range of startling peaks
and magnificent altitudes. It is rather a chain of very elevated
flattish-topped hills, spreading down in long spurs to the north
and south, abounding in warm sheltered valleys and smiling
corners, affording more or less pasture even in its highest
parts, and traversed by countless paths. Many of these paths are
followed by Kuchis in their annual migrations southward, with
their families and household goods piled up in picturesque heaps
on their hardy camels, or with large herds of sheep and goats,
in search of fresh pasturage. South of the Hindoo Kush we find
most of the eastern routes to our northwest frontier to converge
in one point, very near to Jelalabad. There are certain routes
existing between the Russian frontier and India which pass
altogether east of this point. There is one which can be
followed from Tashkend to Kashgar, and over the Karakoram range,
and another which runs by the Terek Pass to Sarhadd, and thence
over the Baroghil into Kashmir; but these routes have justly,
and by almost universal consent, been set aside as involving
difficulties of such obvious magnitude that it would be
unreasonable to suppose that any army under competent leadership
could be committed to them. The same might surely be said of the
route by the Nuksan Pass into the valley of Chitral and the
Kunar, which joins the Khyber route not far from Jelalabad. Its
length and intricacy alone, independently of the intractable
nature of the tribes which border it on either side, and of the
fact that the Nuksan Pass is only open for half the year, would
surely place it beyond the consideration of any general who
aspired to invade India after accomplishing the feat of carrying
an army through it. West of Kafirstan across the Hindoo Kush
are, as we have said, passes innumerable, but only three which
need be regarded as practicable for an advancing force, all the
others more or less converging into these three. These are the
Khak, the Kaoshan (or Parwan, also called Sar Alang), and the
Irak. The Khak leads from Kunduz _via_ Ghori and the valley of
the Indarab to the head of the Panjshir valley. Its elevation is
about thirteen thousand feet. It is described as an easy pass,
probably practicable for wheeled artillery. The Panjshiris are
Tajaks, and, like the Kohistanis generally, are most bigoted
Suniu Mohammedans. The rich and highly cultivated valley which
they inhabit forms a grand highway into Kohistan and Koh Dahman;
but all this land of terraced vineyards and orchards, watered by
snow-cold streams from the picturesque gorges and mountain
passes of the Hindoo Kush and Paghman mountains,--this very
garden of Afghanistan, stretching away southwards to the gates
of Kabul, is peopled by the same fierce and turbulent race who
have ever given the best fighting men to the armies of the
Amirs, and who have rendered the position of Kabul as the ruling
capital of Afghanistan a matter of necessity; with their
instincts of religious hostility, it will probably be found that
the Kohistani, rather than the Hindoo Kush, is the real barrier
between the north and the south. The Sar Alang or Parwan Pass
leads directly from Kunduz and Ghori to Charikar and Kabul. It
is the direct military route between Afghan Turkestan and the
seat of the Afghan Government, but is not much used for trade.
It cannot be much over eleven thousand feet elevation, and it is
known to be an easy pass, though somewhat destitute of fuel and
forage. The next route of importance is that which leads from
Balkh, _via_ Bamian, to the Irak Pass on the Hindoo Kush, and
into the upper watercourse of the Helmund River, and thence by
the Unai over the Paghman range to Kabul. This is the great
trade route from the markets of Turkestan and Central Asia
generally to Kabul and India. The Irak, like the Parwan, is not
nearly so high as has been generally assumed, while the Unai is
a notoriously easy pass. This route is at present very much
better known to the Russians, who have lately frequently
traversed it, than to ourselves. Like the Parwan and the Khak,
it is liable to be closed for three or four months of the year
by snow. During the winter of 1879-80 they were open till late
in December, and appear to be again free from snow about the
middle of April. Between these main passes innumerable tracks
follow the "durras," or lines of watercourse, over the ridges of
the Hindoo Kush and Paghman, which afford easy passage to men on
foot and frequently also to "Kuchi" camels. These passes (so far
as we can learn) could, any of them, be readily made available
for mountain artillery with a very small expenditure of
constructive labor and engineering skill. In Koh Dahman nearly
every village of importance lying at the foot of the eastern
slopes of the Paghman (such as Beratse, Farza, Istalif, etc.)
covers a practicable pass over the Paghman, which has its
continuation across the Shoreband valley and over the ridge of
the Hindoo Kush beyond it. But between the Khak Pass and the
Irak, the various routes across the Hindoo Kush, whether
regarded as routes to India or to Kandahar, although they by no
means converge on Kabul City, must necessarily pass within
striking distance of an army occupying Kabul. Such a force would
have, first of all, thoroughly to secure its communication with
the Oxus, and a strong position at Kabul itself.
Having the official statement of a military engineer with reference
to the Oxus-Hindu-Kush line, as a barrier or base or curtain, we may
pass to the principal approach to Herat from the northwest.
There are four distinct lines by which Russia could move on Herat:
I. From the _Caspian_ base a trans-Caucasian army corps could move
(only with the concurrence and alliance of Persia) by the Mashed
route direct;
II. Or it could move outside Persian territory, from _Chikishliar_
by the Bendessen Pass to Asterabad, and would then have to pass
through Persian territory to Sarakhs, or across the desert to Merv;
III. From the _Tashkend-Bokhara_ base a route exists _via_ Charjui,
the Oxus, direct to Merv; and there is
IV. Also the well-known road by _Balkh_ and Mamiana, direct to
Herat.
Routes III. and IV. having just been discussed, let us look at
Routes I. and II.
Referring to the small outline map of the trans-Caspian region,
herewith, it will be seen that troops could embark from Odessa in
the fleet of merchant steamers available, and, if not molested _en
route_ by hostile cruisers, would reach Batum in from 2 to 3 days,
thence by rail to Baku in 24 hours, another 24 hours through the
Caspian Sea to Krasnovodsk, a transfer in lighters to the landing at
Michaelovsk, and the final rail transportation to the present
terminus of the track beyond Kizil Arvat; this, it is said, will
soon reach Askabad, 310 miles from Herat. The Secretary of the Royal
Asiatic Society, Mr. Cust, with his wife, passed over this route in
1883, and testifies to the ease and comfort of the transit and to
the great number of vessels engaged in the oil trade, which are
available for military purposes, both on the Black and Caspian seas.
He estimates that they could easily carry 8,000 men at a trip.
[Footnote: Mr. Cust says: "There are three classes of steamers on
the Caspian. 1, the Imperial war steamers with which Russia keeps
down piracy; 2, the steamers of the Caucasus and Mercury Company,
very numerous and large vessels; 3, petroleum vessels--each steamer
with a capacity of 500 men."]
General Hamley [Footnote: Lecture before R. U. S. Institution
(London), 1884.] says: "We may assume that if on the railway (single
track) the very moderate number of 12 trains a day can run at the
rate of 12 miles an hour, the journey would occupy 40 hours. The
successive detachments would arrive, then, easily in two days at
Sarakhs. A division may be conveyed, complete, in 36 trains. Thus,
in six days a division would be assembled at Sarakhs ready to move
on the advanced guard. An army corps, with all its equipments and
departments, would be conveyed in 165 trains in 17 days. It would
then be 200 miles--another 17 days' march--from Herat. Thus, adding
a day for the crossing of the Caspian, the army corps from Baku
would reach Herat in 35 days. Also the advance of a corps from
Turkestan upon Kabul is even more practicable than before."
[Footnote: In his plan of invasion, Skobeleff thought 50,000 men
might undertake the enterprise without fear of disaster. This force
could be doubled from the Caucasus alone.]
The route from Tchikishliar _via_ Asterabad (where it strikes the
main Teheran-Mashed-Herat road) would be an important auxiliary to
the railway line, _via_ Asterabad. There is also a more direct
caravan track running south of this across the Khorassan, from
Asterabad (through Shahrud, Aliabad, Khaf, Gurian) to Herat; or, at
Shahrud, an excellent road running between the two already described
straight (_via_ Sabzawar and Nishapar) to Mashed.
From Sarakhs to Merv the road is said to be good and fairly supplied
with water. From Merv to Herat the well-worn expression "coach and
four" has been used to denote the excellent condition of the road.
[Footnote: For the first 100 miles the road follows the Murghab,
which Abbott describes as "a deep stream of very pure water, about
60 feet in breadth, and flowing in a channel mired to the depth of
30 feet in the clay soil of the valley; banks precipitous and
fringed with lamarisk and a few reeds."] Yalatun is described as
fertile, well populated, and unhealthy. [Footnote: Band-i-Yalatun,
or "bank which throws the waters of the Murghab into the canal of
Yalatun."] From Penjdeh, where the river is sometimes fordable, the
road follows the Khusk River, and, ascending the Koh-i-Baber Pass,
descends into the Herat valley, immediately beneath it. [Footnote:
Before closing the chapter on the "Russian Forces," a brief
description of the order of march customary in Central Asia may be
proper. From a translation by Major Clarke, R.A., from Kotensko's
"Turkestan," it appears that the horses accompanying Central Asian
detachments are so considerable that the latter form, as it were,
the escort of the former. As an Asiatic enemy nearly always attacks
from every side, the distribution of the troops, during the march,
must be such that they may be able to repulse the enemy no matter
where he may appear. Usually, a half sotnia (70 men) of cavalry
marches in advance at a distance from 3/4 to 1-1/3 miles, so as to
be in view of main body. Immediately in front of main body marches a
detachment of sappers and a company or two of infantry; then part of
the artillery; then more infantry; the train; behind the train,
remainder of artillery and infantry; as a rear guard, a sotnia of
cavalry. Bivouacs in the Steppe are usually chosen at wells, and
are, in many respects, similar to those customary in the Indian
country in America. First, an outer line of carts or wagons; then
the troops; and inside, all the animals. The accompanying diagram is
from _The Journal Royal United Service Institution_ (London).]
[Illustration: NORMAL ORDER OF MARCH IN CENTRAL ASIA.
NORMAL BIVOUAC IN CENTRAL ASIA.]
V.
REVIEW OF THE MILITARY SITUATION.
The purpose of this volume has been to give as much reliable
information upon the cause of the Anglo-Russian dispute, the nature
of the probable theatre of operations in case of war, and of the
armies of the Powers concerned, as could be obtained and printed
within a single fortnight. The richness of the available material
made this especially difficult, comprising as it did the record of
recent campaigns in Afghanistan, as well as the opinions of those
who, like Vambery, Veniukoff, Rawlinson, Napier, and Cust, are
authorities upon Asiatic topics.
As these lines are written [Footnore: April 18, 1885.] the civilized
nations of the world await with bated breath the next scene upon the
Afghan stage.
Seldom when two gladiators, armed and stripped, enter the arena does
a doubt exist as to their purpose. Yet such an exceptional
uncertainty attends the presence of England and Russia on the border
of Afghanistan.
[Illustration: Gorge in the Tirband-i-Turkestan through which the
Murghab Flows.]
At least 50,000 British soldiers are drawn up in front of the Indus
awaiting a signal from their Queen. Nearly twice that number of
Russian troops are massed on or near the northwestern angle of the
Ameer's country. [Footnote: Since the events noted in our first
chapter (page 12) transpired, another page has been added to
Afghanistan's blood-stained record. After confronting each other on
the Khusk River for some weeks a large Russian force under General
Komaross attacked (March 30, 1885) the Afghan troops at Penjdeh, and
after a gallant resistance on the part of the native garrison it was
utterly routed and the town occupied by the victors. The Russian
casualties were inconsiderable, but the Afghans lost nearly 1,000
men.]
It is impossible to eliminate, altogether, from a study of the
present military situation, certain political elements.
It is apparent that the Russians near Herat stand practically at
"the forks of the road"; it is a three-pronged fork--one branch
running due south to the sea and two branches due east to India. The
first-named requires but passing comment and only as it relates to
Herat, planted on a route which cannot be controlled without its
possession, for military and commercial reasons well understood.
As already explained, the routes to India, available to Russia,
enable her to move from her base on the Merv-Herat line, both _via_
Balkh and Kabul, for the purpose of flanking a British column moving
from Quetta westward, or of raiding the rich valley of the Helmund;
from Turkestan above this route, a British force moving from Kabul
to Balkh could also be threatened. By the main Herat-Kandahar route
an advance from the east could also be directly opposed; the
crossing of the Helmund by either army would probably be contested.
In case of war, whether Anglo-Russian or Russo-Afghan, the first
great battle would doubtless be fought on the Kandahar-Ghazni-Kabul
line.
[Illustration: Jelalabad from Piper's Hill.]
General Hamley, the leading British military authority, [Footnote:
Lieut.-General Sir. E. Hamley, K.C.B.] shows that this line is, of
all proposed, at once the most practicable and desirable line for
the defence of India. [Footnote: Three lines had been considered:
first, the line of the Eastern Sulimani, but this would leave the
seaport of Kurrachee unprotected; second, from Pishin northeast to
Kabul.] He says: "We should have a strong British governor in
Kandahar, and a strong British force on the Helmund and on the road
to Kabul; the railway completed to Kandahar, and, in case of a
movement from Turkestan against Kabul, a force on our side on its
way to occupy that city, and new recruiting grounds open to us amid
warlike populations. Surely there can be no question as to which of
these two sets of circumstances would give us most influence in
Afghanistan, most power to oppose Russia and to maintain confidence
in India." [Footnote: Gen. Hamley's remarks were made before the
Royal United Service Institution (May 18, 1884), and, in the
discussion which followed, Colonel Malleson said: "Recently in India
some influential natives said to me: 'Russia will continue her
advance; she will not stop until she has gained the fertile country
of Herat, and then she will intrigue with the native princes behind
the Indus, and when you send an army to meet her, you will find
those native princes rising in your rear.' I may fortify my own
experience by what was told me by an Austrian gentleman who visited
India about seven years ago. He paid a visit to the Maharaja, of
Cashmere, who said to him: 'From you I hope to get the truth; you
are not an Englishman nor a Russian. Tell me which is the stronger--the
English power or the Russian; because it will be necessarily my
duty, if Russia should advance, and if I should find Russia stronger
than England, to go for the defence of my throne on the side of
Russia.'"]
The same authority approves Sir Michael Biddulph's recommendation to
utilize the strong natural positions near Girishk on the Helmund. As
to Afghanistan he testifies: "With a power like Russia closing on
it, holding Persia and Persian resources subject to its will, it is
in vain to think that Afghanistan will be long independent even in
name. It is between hammer and anvil, or, to use a still more
expressive metaphor, between the devil and the deep sea. Bound to us
by no traditions, by no strong political influences such as might
have been used to constrain them, the Afghan tribes, mercenary and
perfidious to a proverb, an aggregate of tribes--not a nation,--will
lose no time, when the moment occurs, in siding with the great power
which promises most lavishly, or which can lay strongest hold on
them."
The burning words with which General Hamley closed his lecture one
year ago are singularly true to-day, and form a fitting termination
to this sketch:
"I do not undervalue the many influences which will always oppose
any policy entailing expense. But if the present question is found
to be--How shall we guard against a terrible menace to our Indian
Empire? any cost to be incurred can hardly be admitted as a reason
which ought to influence our course. Magnanimous trustfulness in the
virtue and guilelessness of rival states; distrust and denunciation
of all who would chill this inverted patriotism by words of warning;
refusal of all measures demanding expense which do not promise a
pecuniary return:--such is the kind of liberality of sentiment which
may ruin great nations. The qualities of the lamb may be very
excellent qualities, but they are specially inapplicable to dealings
with the wolf. Do those who shrink from expense think that the
presence of Russia in Afghanistan will be inexpensive to us? Will
the weakness which will be the temptation and the opportunity of
Russia be less costly than effectual defence? When we enter the
councils of Europe to assert our most vital interests, shall we
speak as we have been accustomed to speak, when our free action is
fettered by the imminent perpetual menace to India? These are
questions which, now put forth to this limited audience, will,
perhaps, within the experience of most of us, be thundered in the
ears of the nation. England is just now not without serious
perplexities, but none are so fraught with possibilities of mischief
as the storm which is now gathering on the Afghan frontier."
LIST OF AUTHORITIES.
[Footnote: Unless otherwise designated, the authors named are
officers of the British Army, and nearly all the works are in the
Library of the Military Service Institution of the United States,
(Governor's Island, N. Y. H.).]
[Source 1: Journal Royal United Service Institution (London).]
[Source 2: Journal of the United Service Institution of India
(Simla).]
ANDERSON, Capt. "A Scheme for Increasing the Strength of the Native
Armies," etc. [2]
ARMY LIST, British Official, 1885.
BIDDULPH, Gen. "The March from the Indus to the Helmund." [2]