A VINDICATION OF ENGLAND'S POLICY WITH REGARD TO THE OPIUM TRADE.

Again there has been a debate in Parliament on the opium traffic:[1] again

has the same weary series of platitudes and misrepresentations been

repeated, and no one has taken the trouble to defend the policy of England

as it should and can be defended. But it is high time that the falsities

and the fallacies of the statements of the Anti-opium Society should be

exposed, and that everyone to the best of his ability should enlighten the

people of England on a subject which so nearly concerns the honour of our

country. Isolated voices have indeed been raised to protest against the

views disseminated by the Society for the Abolition of the Opium Trade;

but these efforts have been too few and far between to reach the mass of

the nation. At present the agitators have it all their own way. The

majority of people, having heard nothing but what the agitators have told

them, denounce the iniquitous traffic with a fervour that varies

proportionately with their ignorance. In contemplating the success of this

misdirected enthusiasm we are irresistibly reminded of a very "judicious"

remark of Hooker's, who says: "Because such as openly reprove supposed

disorders of State are taken for principal friends to the common benefit

of all, and for men that carry singular freedom of mind; under this fair

and plausible colour whatsoever they utter passeth for good and current."

For more than forty years the opium trade between India and China has been

a subject for keen discussion and hostile comment in England. Being as it

was the _immediate_ cause of our first war with China in 1840, the opium

traffic could not fail, in Parliament and elsewhere, to be brought

prominently before the notice of the people of England, and of course

there were not wanting public men to denounce the policy pursued by this

country towards China in that matter. This denunciation, at first of a

vague and desultory character, took a definite shape in the memorial

presented to Her Majesty's Government in the Earl of Shaftesbury's name,

and backed by all his great personal authority. The specific charges

contained in this document will be noticed hereafter, when we come to

sketch the present position of the "Society." Suffice it here to say that

it teemed with misstatements and exaggerations of the grossest and most

palpable kind, which, having been exposed and refuted again and again,

need not detain us now. But so far were those random statements from

furthering the cause which the memorialists had at heart, that they only

served to steel the minds of unprejudiced people against further

representations, however just, from the same quarter.

Since then, however, the agitation has taken a more organized form, and

there is now a society for the suppression of the trade, numbering its

hundreds of supporters, and linked with the names of such men as Lord

Shaftesbury, Cardinal Manning, Sir J. W. Pease, and Sir Wilfrid Lawson.

Nearly the whole of the clergy from the Archbishops downwards, and

ministers of every denomination, have declared for the same side. Add to

this that the Society has a large income, derived from voluntary

subscriptions, which is assiduously employed in the dissemination of its

peculiar doctrines. The country is flooded with tracts, pamphlets, reports

of addresses, speeches, and petitions, all inculcating the same extreme

opinions.

Under these conditions it is not surprising that the anti-opiumists have

succeeded in enlisting popular sympathy to a certain extent on their side.

But, with the single exception of missionaries, they have against them the

vast majority of those who, from personal knowledge and experience, are

competent to form an opinion on the subject. Sir Rutherford Alcock, for

twenty years Her Majesty's Minister in China, who has had opportunities

for forming a correct judgment on the subject such as have fallen to the

lot of few, and who can have no bias[2] or prejudice in the matter, has

recently before the Society of Arts, in a paper of singular ability and

fairness, vindicated the policy of the British Government. Mr. Brereton,

for fifteen years resident in Hongkong, has challenged and, on the

authority of his own experience, denied _every_ assertion of the

Anti-opiumists. As to the missionaries, from whom the majority of the

arguments against the trade are drawn, no one doubts their good faith, and

everyone gives them credit for the best of motives; but, for reasons to be

afterwards given, their evidence is likely to be biassed, and in any case

cannot be considered worthy to be set against that of all the other

residents in China.

But what are the enormities of which England has been guilty? Here is the

indictment, stated with all the energy of conviction: That England, and

England only, is responsible for the introduction into China of a highly

deleterious, if not wholly poisonous, drug, for which, till India took

upon herself to supply it, there was in China no demand whatever; that she

is responsible, further, for forcing this opium _vi et armis_ upon the

Chinese, contrary to all obligations of international morality, and in

the face of the sincere and determined opposition of the Chinese people;

that, in fine, Christian England, with a single eye to gain, is wilfully

and deliberately compassing the ruin of heathen China. Such is the

indictment brought against England by her own sons; and the tribunal which

they would arraign her before is the public opinion of their own

countrymen and of Europe.

The original habitat of the poppy plant, which is now extensively

cultivated in Asia Minor, Persia, Egypt, India, China, and even in Africa,

was probably Central Asia. It must have made its way very early into

India, as it is mentioned in the _Laws of Manu_. But it was not till the

tenth century that the Hindoos learnt from the Mohammedans the narcotic

qualities of the plant.

In China there can be no doubt that opium has been known from the

_earliest_[3] times; even if the poppy be not indigenous to that country,

as we might be led to suppose from its mention in a Chinese[4] herbal

compiled more than two centuries ago. In the _General History of South

Yuennan_, published in 1736, opium is noted as a common product of

Yung-chang-foo; and it is remarked by Mr. Hobson, Commissioner of Customs

at Hankow,[5] that, "if 134 years ago so much opium was produced as to

deserve notice in such a work, the production could have been no novelty

to the Chinese population at the beginning of the present century, when we

began to import it in small quantities." Moreover, it is well known that

the seeds of the poppy have been used from time immemorial in the

preparation of cakes and confections. Two Court officials were even

appointed specially to superintend the making of these for the Emperors'

use.[6] Dr. Edkins, in a recent pamphlet on the subject of opium-smoking

in China, quotes an edict against the habit published as early as A.D.

1728, and consequently some forty years before the British took any part

in the trade. Dr. Wells Williams is of opinion that opium may have been

introduced into China from Assam, where it has been used time out of mind.

However that may be, the Chinese may be credited with having improved upon

their use of it by smoking instead of swallowing it; though this, too, is

attributed to the Assamese by Don Sinibaldo de Mas, Spanish Consul in

China.[7]

It may, then, be taken for granted that opium-smoking was known to the

Chinese long before European nations took to importing opium into China.

But at the same time no one will deny that the habit has become enormously

more prevalent than it used to be.

The foreign trade in opium is of comparatively recent growth. The

Portuguese were the first European nation to import it into China. For

some years previous to 1767 they imported from Goa some 200 chests of

Turkey opium to Macao. This they would scarcely have done had there been

no demand for the drug. It was not till 1773 that the East India Company

appeared upon the scene as exporters of opium in very small quantities.

In that year the Company assumed the monopoly of the opium culture in

India, and, according to the existing Mongol practice, farmed it out for

an annual payment in advance. In 1781 a cargo of 1,600 chests was found

unsaleable, and re-exported. By 1790, however, the importation into China

amounted to 4,054 chests yearly, at which number it remained nearly

stationary for thirty years. It was in 1793 first that the ships engaged

in the traffic began to be molested, chiefly by pirates, but partly also

through the hostility of the Chinese officials. One ship was then sent to

Whampoa, an island twelve miles from Canton, where she lay for fifteen

months entirely unmolested.

In 1796, however, the first year of Keaking's reign, the importation of

opium was prohibited by the Government at Pekin, under heavy penalties,

for the alleged reason "that it wasted the time and property of the people

of the Inner Land, leading them to exchange their silver and commodities

for the vile dirt of the foreigner."

Up to this time, though opium was being imported for the space of more

than forty years, not a word had been said against it, and now, when

exception _was_ taken to it, it was on the ground of the worthless, not

the poisonous, nature of the drug, for which so much sycee silver was

bartered. This law, like sumptuary laws in general, proved wholly

inoperative as far as the Chinese were concerned. The East India Company,

however, did so far regard it as to forbid their own ships from engaging

in the trade, and their mandate was obeyed. Nevertheless, the trade went

on in private ships, and from Whampoa, the headquarters of the trade, the

smuggling (if what went on under the very eyes of the custom-house

officials can be called smuggling) continued uninterruptedly along the

coast, being carried on openly and in the light of day. For though the

Government might fulminate against it from Pekin, the officials on the

spot, by their undisguised connivance,[8] caused the trade to be

established on something like a regular footing. Under which conditions

the trade continued for the next twenty years or so with little

variation.

In 1816 the Bengal drug first began to suffer from competition with Malwa

and Turkey opium, the latter brought from Madeira in American as well as

British ships. In 1821 the exportation of Bengal opium had sunk to 2,320

chests, when the Chinese commenced vigorous proceedings against smugglers,

and drove the contraband trade to Lintin, an island forty miles from

Canton.[9] This seems to have given a fresh impetus to the trade, for the

export rose at once to 6,428 chests, and by 1831 to more than 20,000: at

which number it remained till Lin's raid in 1839, when 20,291 chests were

delivered up and destroyed in the Canton waters.

This violent action of Lin was the outcome of the ascendancy[10] of the

Protective party in China; for there can be no doubt that even in

Conservative China there was at this time a reform party, headed by the

young and accomplished Empress, who advocated enlarged intercourse with

foreign states, and, as a step towards this, a less protective policy in

trade, including a legalization of the importation of opium. A memorial

was even drawn up and presented to the Emperor by Heu Naetze,

Vice-President of the Sacrificial Board, in 1829, advocating the

legalization of opium. But even the influence of the Empress could not

prevail against the prejudices of the Court, and the memorials of Choo

Tsun[11] and Heu Kew, who, like Cleon of old, argued for the dignity of

the Empire and the danger of instability in maintaining the laws, carried

the day. It is not quite clear what grounds of objection to the traffic

were held by the Chinese Government, but the _moral_ ground, now made so

much of, was certainly not one. Between 1836 and 1839 several Imperial

edicts were published prohibiting the importation of opium, in which

"there is little if any reference to the evils of opium, but very clear

language as to the export of bullion."[12] This drain of silver was no

doubt the great reason for the Chinese hostility to the traffic. As late

as 1829 the balance of trade had been in favour of China, and silver had

accumulated; but this state of things had now been reversed, and the

increased export of silver--for opium was a very expensive article and had

to be paid for clandestinely in hard silver--had begun to cause a great

depreciation of cash,[13] the only copper coin of the realm, and to

occasion serious alarm at Pekin. Accordingly the Emperor, in pursuance of

several memorials on the subject, forbad the export of sycee, at the same

time that he took more energetic measures to put a stop to the traffic

which was chiefly responsible for this loss of bullion. In 1836 opium

ships were prohibited from entering the inner waters of Kunsing-moon,

while all foreign ships were detained at Lintin; and the local revenue

officers began to show more vigilance in putting down smuggling. In the

following year an edict was published prohibiting the continuance of

receiving ships in the outer waters, to which Captain Elliott, our

Superintendent of Trade, paid little attention, seeing that the Chinese

themselves openly disregarded it; and it is even stated that the trade was

carried on by four boats under the Viceroy's flag, which paid regular

fees to the custom-house and military stations.[14]

In 1834 the East India Company's monopoly of trade to China came to an

end, and the trade was taken up by Her Majesty's Government, who sent out

a commission with Lord Napier at its head to apprise the Chinese

Government of the change. It had been usual up to this period for all

communications to be addressed to the Viceroy of Canton through the

thirteen "Hong"[15] merchants, in the form of a humble petition. This Lord

Napier naturally refused to do, and the Chinese Viceroy resented what he

considered the insolent presumption of the "outside barbarians." He

declined to receive the Envoy, and ordered a blockade of all the

factories. Lord Napier was forced to surrender at discretion, and was

escorted back to Macao by an insulting guard of Chinese soldiers, where he

died soon after. After this, though the trade was graciously allowed to

proceed in its existing unsatisfactory condition, an open rupture between

the two Governments was clearly only a question of time. It was evident

that the claims of the Chinese to suzerainty over all outside barbarians

could not fail to cause one of two things: either a total cessation of

intercourse between them and other nations, or a war which should bring

them to their senses. Peaceable means to conciliate the Chinese had been

tried more than once and had failed. In 1796 Lord Macartney, and in 1816

Lord Amherst, had been sent on missions to effect a peaceable arrangement

with regard to trade. Both attempts failed in their object, but served to

show the overweening pretensions of the Chinese and their thorough

contempt for foreigners.[16] "In both cases," says Sir Rutherford Alcock,

"the British mission was paraded before the Chinese population, _en route_

from the coast, as tribute-bearers." Lord Amherst was even subjected to

personal indignity and insult for refusing to perform the kotow or

prostration before the Emperor. Meanwhile, as the power of the Empress and

the reform party declined, edicts against opium followed one another in

quick succession, but were completely ineffectual in checking the

corruption and connivance of the Canton officials, until Lin was appointed

Viceroy of Canton, for the avowed purpose of coercing his countrymen and

humiliating the foreigner. It was a congenial task, and accordingly we

find that immediately upon his arrival in February 1839 he executed a

native smuggler opposite the British factories as a menace to his own

people and an insult to the barbarians. Early in the following March he

issued an edict marked with the "vermilion pencil," forbidding, in the

most uncompromising terms, the long-established traffic. With this was

coupled a demand for all the opium in the Canton waters. Captain Elliott,

who had arrived from Macao in the midst of this crisis, at first refused

compliance with this demand, but was starved out, and, like Lord Napier,

compelled to surrender at discretion. Lin's victory was complete, and on

the whole he used it well. All the opium, to the amount of 20,290 chests

was, in the sight of all, sunk in the muddy waters of the estuary. All

foreigners were now graciously permitted to depart in peace. But it was

evident that the matter could not rest here; for Elliott had guaranteed

compensation from the State to those traders who had voluntarily

surrendered their opium (which was otherwise quite beyond Lin's reach) in

order to release from durance vile the European residents whom Lin had

unjustifiably seized. War was now inevitable; but its formal declaration

was preceded by one or two collisions between the Chinese and foreign

ships. One encounter in the Bay of Coalloon led to the total destruction

of a fleet of Chinese junks by the English frigates _Hyacinth_ and

_Volage_. This was the first experience the Chinese had of our shot and

shell, and it should have warned them of what they might have to expect.

But it did not. Lin retaliated by a proclamation, addressed to the Queen

of England, giving out that for the future "principals in the opium

business would be decapitated and accessaries strangled." War followed,

and the Chinese were soon brought to their knees. The terms of peace

signed at Nankin were the cession of Hongkong, the opening of the ports

Canton, Amoy, Foochowfoo, Ningpo, Shanghae, to trade, with consular

officers at each place, and an indemnity of six million dollars as the

value of opium seized in 1839. The old exclusive trading with "Hong"

merchants was abolished, and a fair and regular tariff of import and

export customs and other dues was established at the open ports. In this

tariff opium was not even mentioned.[17] The author of the _Opium Question

Solved_ says: "The negotiators dared not mention it; the Emperor would not

legalize the hated source of all his humiliations." So the same system of

organized smuggling, only carried on now even more openly than before,

went on. This smuggling of opium had been the _immediate_[18] cause of the

late war; and it was evident that a cordial understanding between the two

nations could not be established while this apple of discord remained in

their midst. Yet the English Government was very reluctant even to seem

to force opium upon the Chinese against their will. Lord Palmerston's

instructions to Admiral and Captain Elliott in 1841 on this matter are

very precise. This despatch, indicating as it does our policy in this

question both at that time and subsequently with unmistakable clearness,

may excusably be quoted here.

"In bringing this matter of the trade," he says, "before the Chinese

plenipotentiaries, you will state that the admission of opium is _not_ one

of _demands_ you have been instructed to make upon the Chinese Government,

and you will not enter upon it in such a way as to lead the Chinese

plenipotentiaries to think that it is the intention of Her Majesty's

Government to use any compulsion in regard to this matter. But you will

point out that it is scarcely possible that a permanent good understanding

can be maintained between the two Governments if the opium trade be

allowed to remain upon its present footing. It is evident that no

exertions of the Chinese authorities can put down the trade on the Chinese

coast. It is equally clear that it is wholly out of the power of the

British Government to prevent opium from being carried to China. It would

seem, therefore, that much additional stability would be given to the

friendly relations between the two countries if the Government of China

would make up its mind to legalize the importation of opium upon payment

of a duty sufficiently moderate to take away from the smuggler the

temptation to introduce the commodity without payment of duty. By this

means also it is evident that a considerable increase of revenue might be

obtained by the Chinese Government, because the sums which are now paid as

bribes to the Custom-house officers, would enter the public coffers in the

shape of duty."

In accordance with these instructions, Sir H. Pottinger used every

argument to persuade the Chinese Commissioners to have the trade

legalized. They, while admitting that the suppression of the trade

depended upon the Government of China being able to stop the use of the

drug, said that they could not yet approach the throne on the subject; but

that the Custom-house officers "would not trouble to inquire whether our

ships brought opium or not." They even went so far as to say[19] that "on

the subject of opium the British and Chinese Governments should adopt

their own rules with reference to their own subjects." Sir H. Pottinger

intimated his readiness to prohibit our ships from carrying opium into the

inner waters of the empire, but the Chinese, he added, must enforce the

prohibition. But this was the difficulty; for what could be expected from

our measures while the imperial servants winked at the breach of the

imperial edicts. The Commissioner, Keying, then suggested that the Emperor

might consent to the legalization of the traffic if a large revenue[20]

were _guaranteed_ to him. The answer of the British Commissioner was that

the British Government did not wish to foster or encourage the trade, but

to place it on a less objectionable footing; and, therefore, that Keying's

proposal could not be considered. In commenting on these negotiations, Sir

H. Pottinger said that the principal _public_ reason (bribery and

corruption being the private ones) why the truth was disguised, or said to

be disguised, from the Emperor, was the inability of the Chinese to

prevent opium from entering the rivers and harbours of the empire, or from

being consumed by their subjects. The Chinese Commissioner tried to throw

the blame on the British Government, asserting that _they_ should enforce

the prohibition and prevent their subjects from engaging in the trade, a

position tenable on no principle of international obligations.[21] The

Chinese, then, were unable to stop the traffic and unwilling to legalize

it. The mandarins were driven to all kinds of desperate shifts to cloak

their imbecility; and Sir H. Pottinger, in one of his last despatches,

says: "The mandarins openly give out that they dare not stop the traffic,

else it would lead to the cultivation of the poppy in China to so great an

extent as to cause a scarcity of food, if not a famine." A truly

surprising reason!

However, the arguments of successive British Commissioners seem to have

gradually had their effect, and there were not wanting signs that the

Chinese authorities were coming round. They were beginning to see that the

only way to arrest the haemorrhage of silver, so alarming to them, which in

fifty-four years had amounted to 12,000 tons, was to legalize the traffic

in opium, so that the drug might be exchanged for other commodities,

instead of, as now, being paid for clandestinely in sterling silver. As a

proof that the Chinese were not now in earnest against the traffic, it may

be mentioned that not a single proclamation was issued against it since

the negotiations between Keying and the English Envoy began. Moreover, as

Sir J. Davis wrote to the Earl of Aberdeen, the Chinese did not wish to

abolish the traffic, as the impoverished state of the finances of the

country did not admit of the servants of the Government being adequately

paid in a legitimate manner. So recognized, indeed, had the traffic

become, that legal duties even were often paid in opium.[22] But that the

smuggling and piracy caused by opium being technically a contraband

article were a "womb of evil," was evident to the Chinese themselves, and

also that they might any moment be made the excuse for a raid against the

foreign community (and there was even a report that Seu, the Imperial

Commissioner, was contemplating this), which could only result in a fresh

war. So we find that, in spite of their protestations to the contrary, the

Chinese Commissioners did refer the matter to the Emperor several times,

and on one occasion a decree legalizing the importation was drawn up by

his ministers for the Emperor's approval. When, however, the imperial

pleasure was finally taken, Taou Kwang forbad any further reference to the

proposal, saying that he could not "change face." So the matter rested for

the present. But the advice pressed upon the Emperor that he should

legalize the trade did not come from the British Envoys only; for in the

_Pekin Gazette_ for January 4th, 1853, there appeared a memorial from a

Censor, Wootingpoo, who, while admitting that the complete abolition of

opium, if that were only possible, would be far the best, points out in

forcible terms that as a help to rendering the national advantages fairly

and openly available for all, and to removing differences with the

barbarians, no measure can compare with that of levying a duty on opium.

Alluding to the mine of wealth which lies unworked by China in the opium

trade, he defends the policy of making it contribute to pay the expenses

of the State, on the principle that of two evils it is always well to

choose the least; and he proceeds to enforce his views by showing the

impossibility of preventing indulgence in such tastes, which no doubt,

when excessive, is pernicious. His estimate of the consumption was L66,666

daily; and he suggested a duty of 11 per cent., which should bring in a

revenue of seven million taels[23] a year, whereby the foundations of

England's greatness would be sapped. Further, he adds, the increase of

native growth will eventually drive out the foreign drug. But this

expression of native opinion was disregarded no less than the friendly

counsels of our Envoys, and matters went on in the old underhand way till

the outbreak of the second war.

On October 8th, 1856, the Chinese officials, in a war-boat, boarded the

lorcha _Arrow_ as it lay, flying the English flag, in the Canton river,

for the alleged reason that it had on board a pirate who was "wanted" by

the Chinese authorities. Of the merits of this question it will not be

necessary to speak here. It is enough to say that, in all probability, the

Chinese were strictly within their right; but, however that may be, it is

quite clear that the dispute had nothing whatever to do with opium. Yeh, a

man of similar character with Lin and Seu, was Viceroy of Canton, and he

promised satisfaction, but withheld it. Admiral Seymour accordingly

proceeded to enforce the British claims, and the second war broke out.

Owing to the Indian Mutiny, vigorous proceedings against China were

deferred till 1858; but when hostilities were resumed Canton was soon

captured, and Yeh made prisoner and banished to India, where he shortly

died.

But the trouble was not at an end yet; for as the English and French

ambassadors,[24] with an escorting squadron, were on their way to Pekin to

ratify the treaty which had been drawn up, they were attacked and

repulsed before the Taku forts. This brought about a renewal of the war,

and Pekin was taken October 1860, and the Treaty of Tientsin was ratified.

Five new ports[25] were opened. A British ambassador was to be established

at Pekin and a Chinese ambassador in London. Consuls were to be stationed

at all the open ports. Not a word was mentioned about opium in the treaty

itself, but, in pursuance of Article 26, an agreement was entered into

five months later concerning the tariff regulations, wherein "the Chinese

Government admitted opium as a legal article of import, not under

constraint, but _of their own free will deliberately_."[26] To a similar

effect is the testimony of Mr. Oliphant, another secretary to the mission,

whose evidence on this point will readily be considered conclusive. He

affirms that he informed the Chinese Commissioner "that he had received

instructions from Lord Elgin[27] not to insist on the insertion of the

drug in the tariff, should the Chinese Government wish to omit it." But

the Commissioner _declined to omit it_. An increase of duty was then

proposed, but this was objected to by the Chinese themselves as affording

a temptation to smugglers.

It is clear, then, that no force came into play at all, except it were the

force of circumstances, and opium--like all other articles except

munitions of war and salt, which remained contraband--was admitted under a

fixed tariff. This in the case of opium was fixed at thirty taels per

picul (133-1/3 lbs.), and it was further agreed that opium should only be

sold at the port; that the likin or transit dues should be regulated as

the Chinese Government thought fit. The terms of this tariff were to be

revisable after the lapse of ten years.

Leaving for a moment the question of the foreign import as thus settled,

let us turn to the Chinese policy towards their own native growth. The

exact date of the introduction of the culture of the poppy into China is

unknown; but there can be little doubt that the cultivation has existed

for a considerable period. Edicts and proclamations against the

cultivation, some of them published last century, are sufficient evidence

of this. Mr. Watters, Consul at Ichang on the upper Yangtze, speaks of

opium-smoking as having existed _for centuries_ in Western China, where,

as we know, Indian opium never finds its way. The policy of the Government

with regard to this native growth has all along been of a piece with that

pursued towards the foreign import. While prohibited by the Government it

has been connived at and sanctioned by the local authorities. The reason

of this conflict between the local and imperial authorities is clearly

pointed out in the recent Parliamentary paper on opium, where a statement

of the Consul at Chefoo is quoted to the effect that "the authorities at

Pekin have always been hostile to the cultivation of native opium, on the

ground of its interfering with the revenue derived from the import of the

foreign drug. On the other hand, the local authorities steadily connive at

the growth, both from indolence and from the fact that they find it very

lucrative themselves, the growers being able and willing to pay largely

for the privilege of evading the prohibitions." Under these circumstances

it is not surprising that the sanction of the local officials has in most

cases prevailed over the prohibition of the Imperial Court; and it is

certain that the cultivation had attained considerable proportions by the

middle of the present century, for Wootingpoo, in the memorial quoted

above, speaks of "gangs of smugglers of _native_ opium, numbering hundreds

and even thousands, entering walled cities in the west and setting the

local governments at defiance." He would have had the prohibition against

the native growth withdrawn, as well as that against the foreign import.

He answered the chief objection to the native culture, that it took the

place of food crops, by pointing out that the poppy was grown in the

winter months, and rice in the summer on the same ground. But his

representations were of no effect, and the prohibition continued, and was

even enforced by a fresh edict, at the instigation of Sheu-kueo-feu,[28]

in 1865. How far this edict was effectual it is impossible to say;

certain it is that it was flagrantly set at nought by the highest

officials. Li Hung Chang, who has lately taken a high moral tone in his

correspondence with the Anti-Opium League, actively busied himself in

promoting the cultivation of the poppy in the provinces over which he was

appointed, alleging, in a memorial to the throne, the importance of the

native growth as a source of revenue and as a check on the importation of

foreign opium.[29] A fresh edict prohibiting the cultivation was, however,

published in the _Pekin Gazette_, January 29, 1869, in answer to a fresh

memorial by the Censor Yu Po Chuan; and to this day this prohibition

remains unrepealed but obsolete, like the law against infanticide. The

poppy is now grown in every province of the Chinese Empire, but the

cultivation is far more extensive in the western than the eastern

provinces. The two provinces of Yuennan and Szechuen produce by far the

largest portion of the drug. Two-thirds of the available land of those two

provinces may be said to be under poppy cultivation. The amount of native

opium thus produced may be taken to be at least four times as much as the

whole amount imported, and the native growth is even encouraged by the

duty levied upon it being 50 per cent. less than that levied upon the

foreign drug. Such being the case, it is quite impossible to believe that

the authorities were ever unanimous or really earnest in their wish to

prohibit either the foreign import or the native growth. While the Emperor

denounced the foreign traffic from Pekin, and sent Lin to make an example

of offenders, the Governor of Canton dealt in opium, and the Emperor's own

son was an opium-smoker. Whilst edict followed edict forbidding the growth

of the poppy, the Governor-General of a large province openly fostered the

cultivation, and the poppy plant flaunted itself in red and white over the

half of China. It is useless to assert, as is so often asserted, that the

legalization of the foreign trade tied the hands of the Government with

regard to the home production. The native growth was well established

long before the legalization was effected, and the admission of Indian

opium never affected the western provinces of the Empire. Had the

Government been in earnest they could have suppressed the cultivation,

just as the Taeping rebels did in 1860 in Yuennan.

But to return to the history of the foreign trade. As was mentioned above,

the Chinese Commissioners of their own accord fixed the tariff duty upon

opium at thirty taels. But, though bound, as they were by their own act,

to admit opium at this rate, as soon as it passed into native hands they

had power to tax it as they pleased, and they did not fail to profit by

their power, though this likin tax varied considerably at the different

ports[30] in accordance with the necessities of the provincial

governments. It is difficult to estimate the revenue obtained by China

from the foreign opium trade, but it is probably close upon two millions

sterling. That the Chinese Government were not satisfied with this amount,

compared with the profits gained by India, is quite clear; and we find

accordingly that various efforts were made by them, subsequent to 1869,

to have the tariff agreed upon in the Treaty of Tientsin revised. But it

was not till 1876 that any definite agreement was come to between the two

Governments. In September of that year Sir Thomas Wade, Secretary Li, and

Prince Kung concluded a convention, by which China opened four new

ports[31] and six places of call on the great river, while Sir Thomas Wade

agreed to recommend to his own Government, and through it to all the

Treaty Powers, the limitation of the area, within which imports should be

exempt from likin, to the actual space occupied by the foreign

settlements. As the treaty regulations then stood, imports, except opium,

after paying their regular import duty, were not liable to likin or

transit dues till they reached a certain barrier at some distance inland.

Opium could be taxed as soon as it left the importer's hands. But this

right, which applied to opium only, had been used by the Chinese against

all imports, a clear infraction of treaty which the German Consul, among

others, had protested against. But as some doubt existed as to where the

first inland barrier really stood, Sir Thomas Wade proposed to make the

circuit of the foreign settlement the limit of exemption from duty. But

foreseeing that, if the likin Collectorate were banished from the

port-areas, opium would evade paying the likin tax, he proposed also to

recommend that the likin, as well as the import duty, on opium should be

collected by the foreign Inspectorate, and that for this purpose the opium

should be bonded in a warehouse or receiving hulk till such time as the

importer had paid the import due and the purchaser had paid the likin. He

further proposed as a fair likin tax forty taels per picul (though certain

that the Chinese did not get more than 30) on all Indian opium, that

brought to Hongkong included. Thus the whole duty (import and likin) on

opium would be seventy taels a picul, which would yield 6,117,930 taels,

or a million more than under the old system. But the Chinese Commissioner,

Prince Kung, objected to a uniform duty of forty taels, as too low, and

suggested sixty taels a picul, or an adherence to the different rates

prevailing in different ports. Sir Thomas Wade, though averse to the

higher uniform rate, was willing to consider the other alternative,

provided that he were informed of the exact position of the next inland

Collectorate, and the amount of rates levied. Further, the Chinese

Government must guarantee that no second Collectorate should be

established between the port Collectorate and the first of the present

inland Collectorates. It was agreed by the Chefoo Convention[32] that this

collection of the dues on opium by the foreign customs under these

conditions should be tried for five years at Shanghae.

Neither the Indian nor the English Government have raised any serious

objection to this convention, and the only reason why it is not ratified

yet is that the other Treaty Powers will not join in the Shanghae

agreement, unless China consents to abolish likin on goods other than

opium. Until these other Powers do give in their adhesion, our

arrangements must necessarily be inoperative, as opium will be imported

under the flag of Powers not parties to it. Pending the ratification of

this convention, Sir Thomas Wade offered to give up the concessions

granted by the Chinese, and have the ports recently opened closed again;

but this the Chinese would not agree to. There now seems every reason to

suppose that the difficulties with the other Powers will be got over, and

the Chefoo Convention finally ratified.

Before closing this historical survey, we may record the words of the

Chinese Commissioner in 1881 to Sir Thomas Wade, when the latter suggested

a yearly diminution of the opium sale, that the Chinese _would_ have the

drug, and that any serious attempt to check the trade must originate with

the people themselves. With this sentiment we shall all agree.

It will be necessary now briefly to describe the nature of opium, and its

use among, and effect upon, different races.

As a powerful medicine, then, opium, or its principal ingredient morphia,

has been known in all ages of the world to all civilized nations, and it

may confidently be stated that in the whole range of the Pharmacopoeia

there is no remedy so unique in its effects, and so indispensable to the

efficiency of the healing art as this "much abused drug." As a

febrifuge[33] it is invaluable; and, indeed, till the discovery of

quinine, stood alone in that respect; while it is of incalculable service

in relieving cholera and dysentery[34], and other diseases incidental to a

hot climate. It has also a wonderful power of checking consumption, and

mitigating its more distressing symptoms.[35] Its efficacy in this

respect, though recently denied by Dr. Shearer, is surely beyond all

reasonable doubt.

The three chief alkaloid constituents of opium are morphine, narcotine,

thebaine, of which the first is the principle peculiar to the poppy, and

gives it its stupefying power. The second, narcotine, which in spite of

its name has nothing narcotic in it, is a febrifuge and stimulant like

quinine; the third, thebaine, affects the nervous system, and is credited

by the Chinese with having certain aphrodisiac qualities. Needless to say,

however, it is not as a medicine that the opponents of opium find fault

with its use, but as a luxury that ensnares the appetite, and enfeebles

the mind and body of its hapless votaries. We shall have occasion to show

that in the case of the Chinese at least there is an intimate relation

between its use as a luxury and as a medicine.

There are three ways in which opium may be consumed: it may be eaten in

the shape of pills, drunk as a solution, or smoked as a

highly-concentrated extract. And it may here be remarked at once that

opium smoked is a quite different thing from opium swallowed, so that

arguments proving the pernicious effects of the latter will not of

necessity apply to the former at all; while, on the other hand, arguments

tending to show the harmlessness of opium eaten or drunk will _a fortiori_

prove the innocuousness of opium smoked. The opponents of opium have

disregarded this important distinction. Hence much of their evidence

against opium-smoking is wholly irrelevant. Sir George Birdwood,[36]

relying on the authority of Sir Robert Christison, and on the knowledge

derived from personal experience, asserts that opium-smoking _must_ be

absolutely harmless, as the active principles contained in opium are not

volatizable. Theoretically this may be sound enough, but its practical

effect upon Asiatics at least can scarcely be reconciled with this

supposition. However this may be, opium-smoking is probably not much worse

than tobacco-smoking, and far less injurious than dram-drinking; while

opium smoked, whatever be its effect upon the system, certainly has not

one-tenth part the potency of opium swallowed. And it is obvious that this

must be so, for, when swallowed, all the various constituents of opium

are admitted into, and retained by, the stomach; whereas, when smoked,

only the narcotizing agent, which is volatizable, finds its way into the

system, and that merely momentarily. No doubt opium smoked produces its

effect _sooner_ than opium swallowed, for it is brought at once into

contact with the blood in the lungs, and thus quickly permeates the whole

system. The Chinese are generally credited with being the first people to

smoke the drug, and the practice is almost confined to them now.

Before, however, speaking of the introduction and spread of the habit in

China, we will briefly notice those countries where some form of

opium-consumption is prevalent, and endeavour to point out the general

effects observable therefrom. And we are in a position to form a correct

judgment in this matter, for there is a considerable consumption of opium

in British India, so to speak, under our own eyes. The districts in which

this consumption is most prevalent are Rajpootana, parts of the Punjaub,

Orissa, Assam, and Burmah. In Rajpootana, among the Sikhs, the drinking of

"umal pawnee," a solution of opium, is a common custom extending to women

and even children as well as men. They take their glass of laudanum as we

take our glass of wine. And though this habit is of long standing, and

indulged in by at least 12 per cent. of the inhabitants of the country, no

such wholesale ruin and demoralization has been caused as the declamations

of the anti-opiumists would lead us to expect.[37] Indeed, the Sikhs are

physically the finest race in India,[38] and show as yet no signs of

degeneration. Dr. Moore, for some time Superintendent-General of

Dispensaries in Rajpootana, assures us that he has known individuals who

had consumed opium all their lives, and at forty, fifty, sixty, and even

older, were as hale and hearty as any of their fellows. Opium, then, even

when swallowed, cannot, as it appears, do the Rajpoots much harm. In some

cases it is undoubtedly highly beneficial. "When taken," says Dr.

Moore,[39] "by the camel-feeders in the sandy deserts of Western

Rajpootana, it is used to enable the men, far away from towns or even from

desert villages, to subsist on scanty food, and to bear without injury the

excessive cold of the desert winter night, and the scorching rays of the

desert sun. When used by the impoverished ryot, it occupies the void

resulting from insufficient food or from food deficient in nourishment;

and it not only affords the ill-nourished cultivator, unable to procure or

store liquor, a taste of that exhilaration of spirits which arises from

good wine, but also enables him to undergo his daily fatigue with far less

waste of tissue than would otherwise occur. To the 'kossid,' or

runner,[40] obliged to travel a long distance, it is invaluable." It may

be added that opium _smoking_ is almost entirely unknown in Rajpootana.

Passing on to the Punjaub, it appears from the recent report on the Excise

in that province, that, though a large part of the rural population have a

preference for opium above spirits, a preference derived from custom and

religious prejudice; yet they are compelled to take to the latter, and the

yet more deleterious "bhang,"[41] owing to a growing disinclination among

the cultivators to cultivate opium under such strict Government

supervision as is enforced, combined with a diminution in the amount

imported. This state of things is deplored by the Excise officers, who

recommend an increased importation to meet the demand which undoubtedly

exists. In this province opium is smoked to a considerable extent under

the name of kossumba.

In Orissa the consumption of the drug is very general, and has much

increased since the famine of 1866. According to Dr. Vincent Richards,[42]

who instituted a statistical inquiry for the purpose of eliciting

trustworthy information, from 8 to 10 per cent. of the adult population

of Balasore take opium, those living in unhealthy localities being much

more addicted to it than others. Moderation is the rule, but even

excessive doses of the drug are taken without any very serious

ill-effects, while its efficacy in cases of fever, elephantiasis, and

rheumatism, is undoubted.

In Assam, as might be expected from the unhealthy and malarious character

of its soil, opium is freely resorted to, and Assam has been singled out

by Dr. Christlieb--one of the most strenuous, and we may add misinformed,

supporters of the anti-opium league--as affording the most striking

evidence of the disastrous use of opium in India. Among other things that

pernicious drug is credited with producing barrenness; a result which, as

Dr. Moore has conclusively shown, is due entirely to the unhealthy nature

of the soil, and may even be counteracted by a moderate use of opium.

Residence in low, swampy districts creates a natural craving for opium, as

the statistics of our own islands will abundantly testify. Throughout the

British islands, the only districts where the consumption of opium can be

said to be at all common are in the fen country of Cambridgeshire,

Lincolnshire, and Norfolk.

Lastly, we come to British Burmah; and here undoubtedly the case against

opium _seems_, at first sight, overwhelming. But those who have only read

what the anti-opiumists have said about it, will have formed a very

one-sided notion of the facts of the case. Till 1870 a comparatively small

quantity of opium was imported into that country, but in the succeeding

decade the amount rose from 15,000 to 46,000 sears.[43] This was

apparently owing to the direct encouragement of the Government. The habit

of _eating_[44] or smoking opium (for--and this is an important

point--both are practised) spread with fearful rapidity even among the

population of the villages, especially among the rising generation. The

physical and mental deterioration in those who contracted the evil habit,

and the consequent increase of misery and crime brought about a strong

expression of native feeling against the practice. "To put away the

accursed thing entirely was the only advice that appeared to the native

elders of any value at all."[45] The Government, as a recent writer in the

_Times_[46] says, promptly took advantage of this feeling to close forty

out of the sixty-eight opium shops, and raise the price of opium 30 per

cent., at a loss to the provincial revenues of from. L50,000 to L70,000.

No one will question the wisdom of these measures; but there can be little

doubt that on the one hand the demoralization caused by the spread of the

vice was exaggerated,[47] while on the other the guilt of the Government

is not so flagrantly evident, for there never were more than sixty-eight

shops in 87,000 square miles of country. No one could lawfully possess

more than one ounce of opium outside a licensed shop, and the law, if

broken, was promptly vindicated. "The Government sales, when highest,

were only enough to satisfy 3 per cent. of the adult male population."[48]

We are tempted to ask what was the cause of this sudden increase in the

consumption of opium. Increased facilities for its purchase was

undoubtedly one cause, but Sir Charles Aitchison supplies us with another

important one. "The people,"[49] he says, "are becoming emancipated from

many restrictions of their old creed. The inevitable tendency of the

education we give, and of the new sense of personal liberty which our

Government creates among an Oriental people, is to weaken the sanctions of

religious belief, and break down the restraints of social customs."[50] So

far, and this is all that a perusal of anti-opium publications will tell

us, the contention that opium is wholly pernicious seems fully borne out.

But, as before pointed out, a proof of the injuriousness of opium-_eating_

is no proof that opium-smoking is injurious; and the zealous denouncers of

the drug have omitted to mention all in the Report which tells strongly

against their own case. At the very beginning of the memorandum the

Commissioner says: "The Chinese population in British Burmah, and to some

extent also the immigrants from India, especially Chittagonians and

Bengalese, habitually consume opium without any apparent ill-effects;

those of them who have acquired the habit do not regularly indulge to

excess. With the Burmese and other indigenous races the case is different.

The Burmese seem quite incapable of using the drug in moderation."[51] So

that if there were no other difference between the Chinese and Burmans in

their appetite for opium, there would be this, that the one habitually

smokes in moderation, the other habitually indulges to excess. Further,

one of the arguments brought forward by the Commissioner against the total

closing of all shops, a step clamoured for by the anti-opiumists, not to

mention the obvious difficulty of preventing smuggling, is that "the

_legitimate requirements_ of the 200,000 Chinese and natives of Bengal,

resident in British Burmah, must be considered and provided for. These,

to whom the drug is a _necessary of life_, constitute perhaps the most

thriving and industrious section of the population."[52] It will be seen,

then, that we cannot argue from the effect of opium on the Burmese to its

effect upon the Chinese.

The greater part of the opium consumed in India is supplied from the

Government stores under the name of "abkari," or excise opium.[53] Four

thousand chests are issued yearly for this purpose from the reserve stock

of Bengal opium; but this year it has been decided to allow Malwa opium,

for which the market is at present very slack, to supply this. Besides

this excise opium, which is never sold at a rate low enough to encourage

export, some little opium is imported from the Hill states, and a small

quantity is grown in Rajpootana, the Punjaub, and the Central Provinces,

under strict Government supervision and for local consumption only.

Besides in India opium is eaten in Turkey, where its virtues are so much

appreciated that the legend stamped on the opium lozenges is

"Mash-Allah," the "Gift of God"; and the habit is prevalent in Persia

also. Among the Malays and Siamese, and in Java and Sumatra and the

neighbouring islands, it is mostly smoked; and, of course, the Chinese

carry the habit with them wherever they go. Even America has caught the

infection, and the rapid progress of the habit, especially among the lower

orders, called forth vigorous coercive measures. It may be that these will

have the desired effect; but that will only be because the Americans have

no natural craving for the drug, and prefer their national taste for gin

and whiskey and rum. Some of the more violent opio-phobists, pointing to

the spread of this "horrid and infectious vice" among the Americans, hint

in almost triumphant tones that the secret use of opium in England is

already considerable, and still increasing, as though it were a Nemesis,

too long delayed, for her crimes.[54] If we may believe De Quincey,[55]

opium-eating was by no means an uncommon thing among the upper classes,

even in his day; and Dickens, in his description of an opium-den in

_Edwin Drood_, draws no doubt upon his stores of personal knowledge

acquired in his youthful rambles among the streets of London. However, we

cannot think there is any real danger of the English people deliberately

taking to opium. Tobacco answers every purpose. But it is an undoubted

fact that the mortality among children in large towns like Bradford and

Manchester is due, in a great measure, to their being unwittingly dosed

with opium, which enters largely into the composition of soothing syrups,

cordials, and elixirs of all kinds.[56] It has been estimated that 300,000

lbs. of opium are imported annually into the United Kingdom, only a part

of which can be used medicinally.[57]

Before speaking more particularly of the political agitation against our

policy with regard to opium, it will be necessary to state shortly what

that policy has been in the case of India. The opium from which India

derives her revenue is of two kinds, called respectively Bengal and Malwa

opium. The former is that grown by the Government agencies at Patna and

Benares; the latter, that grown by the native states of Scindia and

Holkar, which has to pay a heavy duty in passing through our territory.

With regard to the Government monopoly of Bengal opium, our policy has

been very vacillating in past time; and mainly to this cause may be

ascribed the fluctuations in the revenue derived from this source. The

opium revenue amounted in 1838 to L1,586,445 net, which by 1857 had risen

to L5,918,375. In 1871 the large total of L7,657,213 was reached, and this

has been still further increased in the last decade to eight and a half

millions. The constancy of increase noticeable in the revenue for the last

few years has been due in great measure to the adoption of a plan proposed

by Sir Cecil Beadon in 1867 that a reserve stock of opium should be formed

from the abundance of fruitful years to supply the deficiencies of lean

ones; so that a certain fixed amount of the drug might be brought into the

market every year. This reserve stock, which amounted in 1878 to 48,500

chests, by constant demands upon it has diminished to 12,000 chests. The

amount sold yearly has, in consequence, been lowered from 56,400 to

53,700 chests, and a further reduction to 50,000 chests is

contemplated.[58] The revenue, therefore, is not likely to be in excess of

the amount received 1881-2, which was eight and a half millions (net), of

which three and a half millions are due to the export duty on Malwa, the

other five millions to the direct profit on the Bengal drug.

The amount of land at present under opium cultivation in British India is

about 500,000 acres,[59] and this amount does not admit of any

considerable extension.

It was in 1826 first that the East India Company made an agreement with

Holkar and other native chiefs that the former should have the exclusive

right to purchase all opium grown in the table-land of Malwa.[60] But, in

spite of this agreement, opium grown in these estates found its way to the

Portuguese ports of Damaum and Diu on the Persian Gulf, for export to

China. Consequently, after an unsuccessful attempt to limit the

production in the native states, which almost occasioned a civil war, the

existing system was abandoned, and a tax upon opium exported through

Bombay substituted.

The number of chests annually exported out of India is about 45,000, which

gives the Indian Government a revenue of L3,150,000; whereas a similar

amount of Bengal would bring in five and a half millions sterling. It is

difficult to estimate the exact revenue that accrues to the native princes

from the culture of the poppy, but in any case it must form a main portion

of their whole income, amounting in some cases to as much as half, in

spite of the enormous duty we can lay upon its export. The cultivation is

very popular in the native states, and the people, we may be sure, have no

scruple in supplying China or any other nation that will buy their

produce. "No rajah," says Dr. Christlieb, "under a purely native system,

would administer the opium revenue as we do; the Brahmins would soon

starve him out." What this remark precisely means, it is difficult,

perhaps impossible, to discover; but the general meaning desired to be

conveyed, no doubt, is that a native ruler would not be allowed to engage

in so iniquitous a traffic by the superior sense of justice and morality

inherent in his Brahmin councillors. Credat Judaeus! Whether it would be

possible[61] or in accordance with justice, or consistent with the policy

hitherto pursued towards the native states, to prevent opium from being

grown by the native princes (if so be that the doctrines of the anti-opium

league find favour in the sight of Englishmen), is a question which will

be more fully dealt with when we come to discuss the remedial measures

proposed by the denouncers of our opium policy. We only know that our last

attempt at interference in this matter well-nigh caused a civil war.

Allowing, then, for all deductions on the score of "abkari" opium, and for

a certain amount which the French colony of Chandernagore have a right to

purchase at existing rates, we may say that about 95,000 chests of

provision opium are exported from India every year: 45,000 chests of Malwa

from Bombay, and 50,000 of Bengal opium from Calcutta. But it is a

mistake to suppose that all this goes directly to China proper. About

1,000 chests a month, or more than one-fifth part of the whole annual

amount sold at Calcutta, goes to supply the needs of the Chinese in the

Straits Settlements and thereabouts, in Cochin China and Cambogia, and of

the Siamese and Malays. Moreover, a considerable quantity is deflected at

Hongkong for the use of the Chinese in California[62] and in the

Philippine, Fiji, and other islands. The exact amount so deflected it is

impossible to estimate;[63] but we may feel pretty sure that not much more

than 80,000 chests of Indian opium are sold in China itself. The Bengal

opium finds a better sale than the Malwa, partly from its inherent

superiority and partly from the Government guarantee being affixed. Its

price is very high, being 460 taels per picul or chest,[64] while native

opium is only 350 taels, including transit dues.

The use of Indian opium is consequently restricted to the richer classes,

and the poorer classes have to put up with the native drug. At present

there is little fear that the native drug will drive out Indian opium, as

there seems to be some peculiarity of soil or preparation which makes

Bengal opium superior to all other kinds.

The present import tariff paid by Indian opium varies at the different

ports, but is about thirty taels in most; and this brings in to the

Chinese Government (including likin or transit dues),[65] about L2,000,000

a year. This they seek to increase by being allowed to levy a higher duty

on the imported article than they themselves suggested after the Treaty of

Tientsin. The negotiations on this subject have been already described, so

we need not dwell upon them here. The English Government are naturally

unwilling to agree to any large increase of duty, such as would afford a

temptation to smugglers and restore the former unsatisfactory condition of

things, while in all probability just as much Indian opium would find its

way into China, the duty being at the same time evaded. But it is a

mistake to say that the Chinese are powerless to tax opium, for they can

place any transit duty they please upon it as soon as it has left the

importer's hands, and they have not failed to avail themselves of this

privilege, thereby causing in their own borders much successful smuggling.

If the Chinese were allowed to double the import duty on Indian opium as

they proposed to Sir Thomas Wade, and if they were able, as they formerly

were distinctly unable, to prevent smuggling, our profits on the drug

would no doubt be diminished in proportion to the increase of duty, and

this rivalry would presumably lead to a compromise. But apart from this

contingency there are two ways in which the opium revenue might be lost

to India. On the one hand, by natural competition with other kinds of

opium the Indian drug might be driven from the field. This, for many

reasons, is unlikely. On the other hand, the political agitation against

the trade, if successful, would have the effect of putting a sudden and

complete stop to the traffic; and it behoves us to consider, in a calm and

dispassionate manner, how far such a consummation is desirable, and, if

desirable, how far it is practicable.

First, how far is it desirable? And here let us premise, with Major (now

Sir Evelyn) Baring,[66] "that facts cannot be altered or their

significance attenuated by any enunciation of abstract principles."

Violent denunciations from platform and pulpit, combined with a persistent

ignoring of the exigencies of the case, as though they were irrelevant

matters, are not likely to commend themselves to those responsible

ministers, either in England or India, who have to face the financial and

political problems connected inseparably with any attempt to abolish the

opium trade. It is really no answer to the financial difficulty to say, as

the Lord Mayor[67] said at a meeting held at the Mansion House, "that the

financial difficulty would be got over if the Government would only deal

with the question and do what is right." Nor is it easy to believe that

the English taxpayers will come forward with five millions a year as

compensation to India. Those who seem to advocate this step do not fail

to remind us of the L20,000,000 spent for the emancipation of slaves as a

"glorious precedent." But the difference between the two cases need not be

pointed out: they must be obvious to all. What the exact remedies proposed

by the opponents of the traffic are, it is difficult to define; for,

united as is their condemnation of the present policy with regard to the

trade, they are by no means as unanimous in suggesting a policy of their

own.

The various objections to the trade were first formulated in Lord

Shaftesbury's memorial to Lord Clarendon in 1855. The challenge thus

thrown down was at once taken up by Sir John Bowring, our Superintendent

of Trade in China, who, as might be expected, knew somewhat more about the

matter than the enthusiastic memorialists at home. He may be taken to have

disproved all the most important allegations contained in that document,

namely, that the trade was exclusively British; that the annual death-rate

from opium rose to the "appalling" figure of more than a million; that the

Chinese were really in earnest about prohibiting the traffic. Some of

these points have been abandoned; others are considered irrelevant to the

question really at issue, which is held to be whether any interference

with the fiscal policy of a foreign state be in itself justifiable--

whether, that is, we are warranted in keeping China to her

treaty-obligations to admit opium at a certain rate. It is quite natural

that they should wish to confine the discussion to this their strongest

point, but we are not disposed to allow that this is the real or only

point at issue; and we will therefore take the main charges levelled

against the opium trade separately, and endeavour to do them full justice.

These are: 1st. Opium is a poison, and _therefore_ opium-smoking as

practised by the Chinese is poisoning the people. 2nd. We are responsible

for the introduction of this habit into China. "We have held the poisoned

chalice," an eloquent Bishop has said, "to the lips of the Chinese and

forced them to drink it." 3rd. We have even forced it upon them, and are

still forcing it. 4th. We hold a monopoly in the manufacture of opium, but

a monopoly is always economically wrong, and the monopoly of a poison is

morally indefensible. 5. This traffic is an insurmountable barrier to the

labours of our missionaries. Let us take them in this order.

1. It is stated that opium in any form is a poison pure and simple, and

has been declared to be so by Act of Parliament: that, moreover, its

pleasures are so seductive that the habit of taking it, once established,

can never be forgone, so that the moderate smoker glides almost

imperceptibly, but no less certainly, into the excessive smoker: that this

immoderate indulgence impoverishes the fortunes, mars the morality, and

ruins the health of the victim himself, and plants the seeds of disease

and vice in his children. This count in the indictment will not be quite

complete unless we add, on the authority of the missionaries, that

opium-smoking is all but universal, and the annual mortality due to it one

million at least. As to the latter estimate, we may say with the late Dr.

Medhurst, himself a zealous and enlightened medical missionary, that it

"has not even the semblance of truth, but is an outrageous exaggeration."

What the exact number of deaths from this cause may be is by no means so

easy to discover;[68] for, apart from the fact that there is no register

of deaths to appeal to, it would be impossible to decide how many even of

the deaths caused by opium could be attributed to the habit of smoking

opium as a luxury, for many of them, as has been pointed out, might be due

to suicide,[69] for self-destruction by opium[70] seems as common a

practice with the Chinese as suicide by drowning is with us. But there is

another and more fertile element of error; for many, and probably the vast

majority of cases so pathetically described by missionaries, of

victims[71] to the vice in hospitals and dying by the roadside, are cases

of men afflicted with some painful or incurable disorder who have taken to

opium-smoking, as De Quincey did to opium-eating, as a relief and a

solace. To such, indeed, it is a priceless boon, and it may well be

doubted whether it is not oftener the means of prolonging life than of

shortening it.[72] Much has been made of the evidence of T. T. Cooper

before the Parliamentary Commission in 1871, where he says that he

frequently saw men dying by the roadside, _simply from want of opium_. Yet

it is difficult to see how he ascertained the cause of death in each case.

He seems rather to have jumped at a conclusion, as he certainly did in

another part of his evidence, where he gravely affirms that, in his

opinion, were the opium supply to be suddenly cut off, _one-third_ of the

adult population of China would die! Why, to begin with, one-third of the

adult population do not even now, after the lapse of ten years, in which

the spread of the habit has been unchecked, smoke opium; no, nor any

number approaching it. Secondly, it has been proved in the case of

prisoners, whose supply of opium is always stopped when they enter the

jail,[73] that a sudden deprivation of the drug does not cause death.

Again, opium is held accountable for pauperism, dishonesty, crime, and

depravity of all sorts. That indulgence of any kind is a sign of moral

weakness, and likely further to deprave the moral nature, is undeniable,

but (and here we have Dr. Myers with us) "though excessive opium may

hasten the effects of a general moral depravity, we are inclined to think

that it is much more often rather a sequence than a cause." "In China,"

says Mr. Lay, "the spendthrift, the man of lewd habits, the drunkard, and

a large assortment of bad characters slide into the opium-smoker: hence

the drug seems chargeable with all the vices of the country." There will

be no need to point out that opium is not the cause of all the pauperism

and vice that exists among the Chinese people; for a vast amount of

pauperism is common to all Eastern races, and dishonesty, untruthfulness,

cruelty, and vice of the most revolting kind, were characteristic of the

Chinese long before opium was so common as it now is.

What, then, are the effects of opium-smoking on the Chinese individually

and as a nation? Had they been anything like what the anti-opiumists

assert they must be, surely the effect would be visible after all these

years in an increased death-rate or a decreased birth-rate. Needless to

say, no such aggregate result is observable. Where opium is most smoked,

there the population is most thriving and industrious,[74] and increases

the fastest. "No China resident," says Dr. Ayres, colonial surgeon at

Hongkong, "believes in the terrible frequency of the dull, sodden-witted,

debilitated opium-smoker, met with in print." Mr. Gregory, H.M.'s Consul

at Swatow, says: "I have _never_ seen a single case of opium intoxication,

although living with and travelling for months and hundreds of miles with

opium-smokers."[75] Dr. Myers, after ten years' medical practice in

different parts of China, confesses that his "preconceived prejudices with

reference to the universally baneful effects of the drug had been severely

shaken." Again, it was estimated by the colonial surgeon at Hongkong, in

1855, that there were more deaths from drunkenness in Hongkong among the

600 Europeans than from opium among the 60,000 Chinamen. Similar testimony

is borne by a recent medical report of the Straits Settlements,[76]

wherein, under the head "poisons," it appears that there were from

alcoholic poisoning thirty-nine deaths, of which twenty-six were

Europeans, three Chinese, one Malay, nine Indians; while from opium only

five in all--a result all the more significant as there are at least

300,000 Chinese in the Straits Settlements,[77] and only about 4,000

Europeans, including the military. Dr. Hobson, another medical missionary,

and as such entirely averse to the trade, says: "Opium-smoking is not

nearly so fatal to life as spirit-drinking is with us; its use is even

compatible with longevity." It is very common to hear Chinese acknowledge

that they have smoked opium for ten, twenty, or thirty years. Dr. Hobson

mentions one case in which the smoker began at nineteen, and smoked for

fifty-one years.[78] Further evidence is surely unnecessary to prove that

opium-smoking is not necessarily, nor even commonly, destructive of life.

Even opium-eating, _a far worse vice_, for it "sets up an incessant and

cumulative craving, so that a rapid increase of dose is necessary"--not

even opium-eating is inevitably fatal, as the case of the Rajpoots proves.

De Quincey, as is well known, took 8,000 drops of laudanum a day for some

time, which is equivalent to thirty-two grains, and two grains of opium

swallowed are equal in effects to fifty-eight grains (one mace) smoked,

three mace being a smoker's usual allowance.[79]

A Vindication of England's Policy with Regard to the Opium Trade · 第 5 / 7 题