INTERSPERSED WITH MISCELLANEOUS OBSERVATIONS
In contemplating a subject that embraces with equatorial magnitude the
whole region of humanity it is impossible to confine the pursuit in one
single direction. It takes ground on every character and condition that
appertains to man, and blends the individual, the nation, and the world.
From a small spark, kindled in America, a flame has arisen not to be
extinguished. Without consuming, like the Ultima Ratio Regum, it winds
its progress from nation to nation, and conquers by a silent operation.
Man finds himself changed, he scarcely perceives how. He acquires
a knowledge of his rights by attending justly to his interest, and
discovers in the event that the strength and powers of despotism consist
wholly in the fear of resisting it, and that, in order "to be free, it
is sufficient that he wills it."
Having in all the preceding parts of this work endeavoured to establish
a system of principles as a basis on which governments ought to be
erected, I shall proceed in this, to the ways and means of rendering
them into practice. But in order to introduce this part of the subject
with more propriety, and stronger effect, some preliminary observations,
deducible from, or connected with, those principles, are necessary.
Whatever the form or constitution of government may be, it ought to have
no other object than the general happiness. When, instead of this, it
operates to create and increase wretchedness in any of the parts
of society, it is on a wrong system, and reformation is necessary.
Customary language has classed the condition of man under the two
descriptions of civilised and uncivilised life. To the one it has
ascribed felicity and affluence; to the other hardship and want. But,
however our imagination may be impressed by painting and comparison,
it is nevertheless true, that a great portion of mankind, in what are
called civilised countries, are in a state of poverty and wretchedness,
far below the condition of an Indian. I speak not of one country, but of
all. It is so in England, it is so all over Europe. Let us enquire into
the cause.
It lies not in any natural defect in the principles of civilisation,
but in preventing those principles having a universal operation; the
consequence of which is, a perpetual system of war and expense,
that drains the country, and defeats the general felicity of which
civilisation is capable. All the European governments (France
now excepted) are constructed not on the principle of universal
civilisation, but on the reverse of it. So far as those governments
relate to each other, they are in the same condition as we conceive of
savage uncivilised life; they put themselves beyond the law as well
of God as of man, and are, with respect to principle and reciprocal
conduct, like so many individuals in a state of nature. The inhabitants
of every country, under the civilisation of laws, easily civilise
together, but governments being yet in an uncivilised state, and almost
continually at war, they pervert the abundance which civilised life
produces to carry on the uncivilised part to a greater extent. By thus
engrafting the barbarism of government upon the internal civilisation of
a country, it draws from the latter, and more especially from the poor,
a great portion of those earnings, which should be applied to their
own subsistence and comfort. Apart from all reflections of morality and
philosophy, it is a melancholy fact that more than one-fourth of the
labour of mankind is annually consumed by this barbarous system. What
has served to continue this evil, is the pecuniary advantage which
all the governments of Europe have found in keeping up this state of
uncivilisation. It affords to them pretences for power, and revenue,
for which there would be neither occasion nor apology, if the circle
of civilisation were rendered complete. Civil government alone, or the
government of laws, is not productive of pretences for many taxes; it
operates at home, directly under the eye of the country, and precludes
the possibility of much imposition. But when the scene is laid in
the uncivilised contention of governments, the field of pretences is
enlarged, and the country, being no longer a judge, is open to every
imposition, which governments please to act. Not a thirtieth, scarcely
a fortieth, part of the taxes which are raised in England are either
occasioned by, or applied to, the purpose of civil government. It is
not difficult to see, that the whole which the actual government does
in this respect, is to enact laws, and that the country administers
and executes them, at its own expense, by means of magistrates, juries,
sessions, and assize, over and above the taxes which it pays. In this
view of the case, we have two distinct characters of government; the one
the civil government, or the government of laws, which operates at home,
the other the court or cabinet government, which operates abroad, on the
rude plan of uncivilised life; the one attended with little charge, the
other with boundless extravagance; and so distinct are the two, that if
the latter were to sink, as it were, by a sudden opening of the earth,
and totally disappear, the former would not be deranged. It would still
proceed, because it is the common interest of the nation that it should,
and all the means are in practice. Revolutions, then, have for their
object a change in the moral condition of governments, and with this
change the burthen of public taxes will lessen, and civilisation will be
left to the enjoyment of that abundance, of which it is now deprived.
In contemplating the whole of this subject, I extend my views into the
department of commerce. In all my publications, where the matter would
admit, I have been an advocate for commerce, because I am a friend to
its effects. It is a pacific system, operating to cordialise mankind, by
rendering nations, as well as individuals, useful to each other. As to
the mere theoretical reformation, I have never preached it up. The most
effectual process is that of improving the condition of man by means of
his interest; and it is on this ground that I take my stand. If commerce
were permitted to act to the universal extent it is capable, it would
extirpate the system of war, and produce a revolution in the uncivilised
state of governments. The invention of commerce has arisen since those
governments began, and is the greatest approach towards universal
civilisation that has yet been made by any means not immediately flowing
from moral principles. Whatever has a tendency to promote the civil
intercourse of nations by an exchange of benefits, is a subject as
worthy of philosophy as of politics. Commerce is no other than the
traffic of two individuals, multiplied on a scale of numbers; and by the
same rule that nature intended for the intercourse of two, she intended
that of all. For this purpose she has distributed the materials of
manufactures and commerce, in various and distant parts of a nation and
of the world; and as they cannot be procured by war so cheaply or so
commodiously as by commerce, she has rendered the latter the means
of extirpating the former. As the two are nearly the opposite of each
other, consequently, the uncivilised state of the European governments
is injurious to commerce. Every kind of destruction or embarrassment
serves to lessen the quantity, and it matters but little in what part
of the commercial world the reduction begins. Like blood, it cannot be
taken from any of the parts, without being taken from the whole mass in
circulation, and all partake of the loss. When the ability in any
nation to buy is destroyed, it equally involves the seller. Could the
government of England destroy the commerce of all other nations, she
would most effectually ruin her own. It is possible that a nation may be
the carrier for the world, but she cannot be the merchant. She cannot
be the seller and buyer of her own merchandise. The ability to buy must
reside out of herself; and, therefore, the prosperity of any commercial
nation is regulated by the prosperity of the rest. If they are poor she
cannot be rich, and her condition, be what it may, is an index of the
height of the commercial tide in other nations. That the principles
of commerce, and its universal operation may be understood, without
understanding the practice, is a position that reason will not deny; and
it is on this ground only that I argue the subject. It is one thing
in the counting-house, in the world it is another. With respect to its
operation it must necessarily be contemplated as a reciprocal thing;
that only one-half its powers resides within the nation, and that
the whole is as effectually destroyed by the destroying the half that
resides without, as if the destruction had been committed on that which
is within; for neither can act without the other. When in the last, as
well as in former wars, the commerce of England sunk, it was because the
quantity was lessened everywhere; and it now rises, because commerce is
in a rising state in every nation. If England, at this day, imports
and exports more than at any former period, the nations with which she
trades must necessarily do the same; her imports are their exports, and
vice versa. There can be no such thing as a nation flourishing alone
in commerce: she can only participate; and the destruction of it in any
part must necessarily affect all. When, therefore, governments are
at war, the attack is made upon a common stock of commerce, and the
consequence is the same as if each had attacked his own. The present
increase of commerce is not to be attributed to ministers, or to any
political contrivances, but to its own natural operation in consequence
of peace. The regular markets had been destroyed, the channels of trade
broken up, the high road of the seas infested with robbers of every
nation, and the attention of the world called to other objects. Those
interruptions have ceased, and peace has restored the deranged condition
of things to their proper order.*[25] It is worth remarking that every
nation reckons the balance of trade in its own favour; and therefore
something must be irregular in the common ideas upon this subject. The
fact, however, is true, according to what is called a balance; and it
is from this cause that commerce is universally supported. Every nation
feels the advantage, or it would abandon the practice: but the deception
lies in the mode of making up the accounts, and in attributing what are
called profits to a wrong cause. Mr. Pitt has sometimes amused himself,
by showing what he called a balance of trade from the custom-house
books. This mode of calculating not only affords no rule that is true,
but one that is false. In the first place, Every cargo that departs from
the custom-house appears on the books as an export; and, according to
the custom-house balance, the losses at sea, and by foreign failures,
are all reckoned on the side of profit because they appear as exports.
Secondly, Because the importation by the smuggling trade does not appear
on the custom-house books, to arrange against the exports.
No balance, therefore, as applying to superior advantages, can be
drawn from these documents; and if we examine the natural operation of
commerce, the idea is fallacious; and if true, would soon be injurious.
The great support of commerce consists in the balance being a level of
benefits among all nations.
Two merchants of different nations trading together, will both become
rich, and each makes the balance in his own favour; consequently, they
do not get rich of each other; and it is the same with respect to the
nations in which they reside. The case must be, that each nation must
get rich out of its own means, and increases that riches by something
which it procures from another in exchange.
If a merchant in England sends an article of English manufacture abroad
which costs him a shilling at home, and imports something which sells
for two, he makes a balance of one shilling in his favour; but this is
not gained out of the foreign nation or the foreign merchant, for he
also does the same by the articles he receives, and neither has the
advantage upon the other. The original value of the two articles in
their proper countries was but two shillings; but by changing their
places, they acquire a new idea of value, equal to double what they had
first, and that increased value is equally divided.
There is no otherwise a balance on foreign than on domestic commerce.
The merchants of London and Newcastle trade on the same principles, as
if they resided in different nations, and make their balances in the
same manner: yet London does not get rich out of Newcastle, any more
than Newcastle out of London: but coals, the merchandize of Newcastle,
have an additional value at London, and London merchandize has the same
at Newcastle.
Though the principle of all commerce is the same, the domestic, in a
national view, is the part the most beneficial; because the whole of the
advantages, an both sides, rests within the nation; whereas, in foreign
commerce, it is only a participation of one-half.
The most unprofitable of all commerce is that connected with foreign
dominion. To a few individuals it may be beneficial, merely because it
is commerce; but to the nation it is a loss. The expense of maintaining
dominion more than absorbs the profits of any trade. It does not
increase the general quantity in the world, but operates to lessen it;
and as a greater mass would be afloat by relinquishing dominion, the
participation without the expense would be more valuable than a greater
quantity with it.
But it is impossible to engross commerce by dominion; and therefore
it is still more fallacious. It cannot exist in confined channels, and
necessarily breaks out by regular or irregular means, that defeat
the attempt: and to succeed would be still worse. France, since the
Revolution, has been more indifferent as to foreign possessions, and
other nations will become the same when they investigate the subject
with respect to commerce.
To the expense of dominion is to be added that of navies, and when the
amounts of the two are subtracted from the profits of commerce, it will
appear, that what is called the balance of trade, even admitting it to
exist, is not enjoyed by the nation, but absorbed by the Government.
The idea of having navies for the protection of commerce is delusive.
It is putting means of destruction for the means of protection. Commerce
needs no other protection than the reciprocal interest which every
nation feels in supporting it--it is common stock--it exists by a
balance of advantages to all; and the only interruption it meets, is
from the present uncivilised state of governments, and which it is its
common interest to reform.*[26]
Quitting this subject, I now proceed to other matters.--As it is
necessary to include England in the prospect of a general reformation,
it is proper to inquire into the defects of its government. It is only
by each nation reforming its own, that the whole can be improved, and
the full benefit of reformation enjoyed. Only partial advantages can
flow from partial reforms.
France and England are the only two countries in Europe where a
reformation in government could have successfully begun. The one secure
by the ocean, and the other by the immensity of its internal strength,
could defy the malignancy of foreign despotism. But it is with
revolutions as with commerce, the advantages increase by their becoming
general, and double to either what each would receive alone.
As a new system is now opening to the view of the world, the European
courts are plotting to counteract it. Alliances, contrary to all former
systems, are agitating, and a common interest of courts is forming
against the common interest of man. This combination draws a line that
runs throughout Europe, and presents a cause so entirely new as to
exclude all calculations from former circumstances. While despotism
warred with despotism, man had no interest in the contest; but in a
cause that unites the soldier with the citizen, and nation with nation,
the despotism of courts, though it feels the danger and meditates
revenge, is afraid to strike.
No question has arisen within the records of history that pressed with
the importance of the present. It is not whether this or that party
shall be in or not, or Whig or Tory, high or low shall prevail; but
whether man shall inherit his rights, and universal civilisation take
place? Whether the fruits of his labours shall be enjoyed by himself
or consumed by the profligacy of governments? Whether robbery shall be
banished from courts, and wretchedness from countries?
When, in countries that are called civilised, we see age going to the
workhouse and youth to the gallows, something must be wrong in the
system of government. It would seem, by the exterior appearance of such
countries, that all was happiness; but there lies hidden from the eye of
common observation, a mass of wretchedness, that has scarcely any other
chance, than to expire in poverty or infamy. Its entrance into life is
marked with the presage of its fate; and until this is remedied, it is
in vain to punish.
Civil government does not exist in executions; but in making such
provision for the instruction of youth and the support of age, as to
exclude, as much as possible, profligacy from the one and despair from
the other. Instead of this, the resources of a country are lavished upon
kings, upon courts, upon hirelings, impostors and prostitutes; and even
the poor themselves, with all their wants upon them, are compelled to
support the fraud that oppresses them.
Why is it that scarcely any are executed but the poor? The fact is a
proof, among other things, of a wretchedness in their condition. Bred up
without morals, and cast upon the world without a prospect, they are
the exposed sacrifice of vice and legal barbarity. The millions that are
superfluously wasted upon governments are more than sufficient to reform
those evils, and to benefit the condition of every man in a nation, not
included within the purlieus of a court. This I hope to make appear in
the progress of this work.
It is the nature of compassion to associate with misfortune. In taking
up this subject I seek no recompense--I fear no consequence. Fortified
with that proud integrity, that disdains to triumph or to yield, I will
advocate the Rights of Man.
It is to my advantage that I have served an apprenticeship to life. I
know the value of moral instruction, and I have seen the danger of the
contrary.
At an early period--little more than sixteen years of age, raw and
adventurous, and heated with the false heroism of a master*[27] who
had served in a man-of-war--I began the carver of my own fortune,
and entered on board the Terrible Privateer, Captain Death. From
this adventure I was happily prevented by the affectionate and moral
remonstrance of a good father, who, from his own habits of life, being
of the Quaker profession, must begin to look upon me as lost. But the
impression, much as it effected at the time, began to wear away, and I
entered afterwards in the King of Prussia Privateer, Captain Mendez,
and went with her to sea. Yet, from such a beginning, and with all the
inconvenience of early life against me, I am proud to say, that with
a perseverance undismayed by difficulties, a disinterestedness that
compelled respect, I have not only contributed to raise a new empire in
the world, founded on a new system of government, but I have arrived at
an eminence in political literature, the most difficult of all lines to
succeed and excel in, which aristocracy with all its aids has not been
able to reach or to rival.*[28]
Knowing my own heart and feeling myself as I now do, superior to all the
skirmish of party, the inveteracy of interested or mistaken opponents,
I answer not to falsehood or abuse, but proceed to the defects of the
English Government.
I begin with charters and corporations.
It is a perversion of terms to say that a charter gives rights. It
operates by a contrary effect--that of taking rights away. Rights are
inherently in all the inhabitants; but charters, by annulling those
rights, in the majority, leave the right, by exclusion, in the hands of
a few. If charters were constructed so as to express in direct terms,
"that every inhabitant, who is not a member of a corporation, shall
not exercise the right of voting," such charters would, in the face, be
charters not of rights, but of exclusion. The effect is the same under
the form they now stand; and the only persons on whom they operate are
the persons whom they exclude. Those whose rights are guaranteed, by
not being taken away, exercise no other rights than as members of the
community they are entitled to without a charter; and, therefore, all
charters have no other than an indirect negative operation. They do not
give rights to A, but they make a difference in favour of A by taking
away the right of B, and consequently are instruments of injustice.
But charters and corporations have a more extensive evil effect
than what relates merely to elections. They are sources of endless
contentions in the places where they exist, and they lessen the common
rights of national society. A native of England, under the operation of
these charters and corporations, cannot be said to be an Englishman in
the full sense of the word. He is not free of the nation, in the same
manner that a Frenchman is free of France, and an American of America.
His rights are circumscribed to the town, and, in some cases, to the
parish of his birth; and all other parts, though in his native land, are
to him as a foreign country. To acquire a residence in these, he must
undergo a local naturalisation by purchase, or he is forbidden or
expelled the place. This species of feudality is kept up to aggrandise
the corporations at the ruin of towns; and the effect is visible.
The generality of corporation towns are in a state of solitary decay,
and prevented from further ruin only by some circumstance in their
situation, such as a navigable river, or a plentiful surrounding
country. As population is one of the chief sources of wealth (for
without it land itself has no value), everything which operates to
prevent it must lessen the value of property; and as corporations have
not only this tendency, but directly this effect, they cannot but be
injurious. If any policy were to be followed, instead of that of general
freedom, to every person to settle where he chose (as in France or
America) it would be more consistent to give encouragement to new comers
than to preclude their admission by exacting premiums from them.*[29]
The persons most immediately interested in the abolition of corporations
are the inhabitants of the towns where corporations are established. The
instances of Manchester, Birmingham, and Sheffield show, by contrast,
the injuries which those Gothic institutions are to property and
commerce. A few examples may be found, such as that of London, whose
natural and commercial advantage, owing to its situation on the Thames,
is capable of bearing up against the political evils of a corporation;
but in almost all other cases the fatality is too visible to be doubted
or denied.
Though the whole nation is not so directly affected by the depression of
property in corporation towns as the inhabitants themselves, it partakes
of the consequence. By lessening the value of property, the quantity of
national commerce is curtailed. Every man is a customer in proportion
to his ability; and as all parts of a nation trade with each other,
whatever affects any of the parts must necessarily communicate to the
whole.
As one of the Houses of the English Parliament is, in a great measure,
made up of elections from these corporations; and as it is unnatural
that a pure stream should flow from a foul fountain, its vices are but a
continuation of the vices of its origin. A man of moral honour and good
political principles cannot submit to the mean drudgery and disgraceful
arts, by which such elections are carried. To be a successful candidate,
he must be destitute of the qualities that constitute a just legislator;
and being thus disciplined to corruption by the mode of entering into
Parliament, it is not to be expected that the representative should be
better than the man.
Mr. Burke, in speaking of the English representation, has advanced
as bold a challenge as ever was given in the days of chivalry. "Our
representation," says he, "has been found perfectly adequate to all
the purposes for which a representation of the people can be desired or
devised." "I defy," continues he, "the enemies of our constitution
to show the contrary."--This declaration from a man who has been in
constant opposition to all the measures of parliament the whole of his
political life, a year or two excepted, is most extraordinary; and,
comparing him with himself, admits of no other alternative, than that he
acted against his judgment as a member, or has declared contrary to it
as an author.
But it is not in the representation only that the defects lie, and
therefore I proceed in the next place to the aristocracy.
What is called the House of Peers, is constituted on a ground very
similar to that, against which there is no law in other cases. It
amounts to a combination of persons in one common interest. No better
reason can be given, why a house of legislation should be composed
entirely of men whose occupation consists in letting landed property,
than why it should be composed of those who hire, or of brewers, or
bakers, or any other separate class of men. Mr. Burke calls this house
"the great ground and pillar of security to the landed interest." Let us
examine this idea.
What pillar of security does the landed interest require more than any
other interest in the state, or what right has it to a distinct and
separate representation from the general interest of a nation? The only
use to be made of this power (and which it always has made), is to ward
off taxes from itself, and throw the burthen upon those articles of
consumption by which itself would be least affected.
That this has been the consequence (and will always be the consequence)
of constructing governments on combinations, is evident with respect to
England, from the history of its taxes.
Notwithstanding taxes have increased and multiplied upon every article
of common consumption, the land-tax, which more particularly affects
this "pillar," has diminished. In 1778 the amount of the land-tax was
L1,950,000, which is half-a-million less than it produced almost
a hundred years ago,*[30] notwithstanding the rentals are in many
instances doubled since that period.
Before the coming of the Hanoverians, the taxes were divided in nearly
equal proportions between the land and articles of consumption, the land
bearing rather the largest share: but since that era nearly thirteen
millions annually of new taxes have been thrown upon consumption. The
consequence of which has been a constant increase in the number and
wretchedness of the poor, and in the amount of the poor-rates. Yet here
again the burthen does not fall in equal proportions on the aristocracy
with the rest of the community. Their residences, whether in town or
country, are not mixed with the habitations of the poor. They live apart
from distress, and the expense of relieving it. It is in manufacturing
towns and labouring villages that those burthens press the heaviest; in
many of which it is one class of poor supporting another.
Several of the most heavy and productive taxes are so contrived, as to
give an exemption to this pillar, thus standing in its own defence. The
tax upon beer brewed for sale does not affect the aristocracy, who brew
their own beer free from this duty. It falls only on those who have
not conveniency or ability to brew, and who must purchase it in small
quantities. But what will mankind think of the justice of taxation,
when they know that this tax alone, from which the aristocracy are from
circumstances exempt, is nearly equal to the whole of the land-tax,
being in the year 1788, and it is not less now, L1,666,152, and with its
proportion of the taxes on malt and hops, it exceeds it.--That a single
article, thus partially consumed, and that chiefly by the working part,
should be subject to a tax, equal to that on the whole rental of a
nation, is, perhaps, a fact not to be paralleled in the histories of
revenues.
This is one of the circumstances resulting from a house of legislation,
composed on the ground of a combination of common interest; for whatever
their separate politics as to parties may be, in this they are united.
Whether a combination acts to raise the price of any article for sale,
or rate of wages; or whether it acts to throw taxes from itself upon
another class of the community, the principle and the effect are the
same; and if the one be illegal, it will be difficult to show that the
other ought to exist.
It is no use to say that taxes are first proposed in the House of
Commons; for as the other house has always a negative, it can
always defend itself; and it would be ridiculous to suppose that its
acquiescence in the measures to be proposed were not understood
before hand. Besides which, it has obtained so much influence by
borough-traffic, and so many of its relations and connections are
distributed on both sides the commons, as to give it, besides an
absolute negative in one house, a preponderancy in the other, in all
matters of common concern.
It is difficult to discover what is meant by the landed interest, if
it does not mean a combination of aristocratical landholders, opposing
their own pecuniary interest to that of the farmer, and every branch of
trade, commerce, and manufacture. In all other respects it is the
only interest that needs no partial protection. It enjoys the general
protection of the world. Every individual, high or low, is interested
in the fruits of the earth; men, women, and children, of all ages and
degrees, will turn out to assist the farmer, rather than a harvest
should not be got in; and they will not act thus by any other property.
It is the only one for which the common prayer of mankind is put up,
and the only one that can never fail from the want of means. It is the
interest, not of the policy, but of the existence of man, and when it
ceases, he must cease to be.
No other interest in a nation stands on the same united support.
Commerce, manufactures, arts, sciences, and everything else, compared
with this, are supported but in parts. Their prosperity or their decay
has not the same universal influence. When the valleys laugh and sing,
it is not the farmer only, but all creation that rejoice. It is a
prosperity that excludes all envy; and this cannot be said of anything
else.
Why then, does Mr. Burke talk of his house of peers as the pillar of
the landed interest? Were that pillar to sink into the earth, the same
landed property would continue, and the same ploughing, sowing, and
reaping would go on. The aristocracy are not the farmers who work the
land, and raise the produce, but are the mere consumers of the rent; and
when compared with the active world are the drones, a seraglio of males,
who neither collect the honey nor form the hive, but exist only for lazy
enjoyment.
Mr. Burke, in his first essay, called aristocracy "the Corinthian
capital of polished society." Towards completing the figure, he has now
added the pillar; but still the base is wanting; and whenever a nation
choose to act a Samson, not blind, but bold, down will go the temple of
Dagon, the Lords and the Philistines.
If a house of legislation is to be composed of men of one class, for
the purpose of protecting a distinct interest, all the other interests
should have the same. The inequality, as well as the burthen of
taxation, arises from admitting it in one case, and not in all. Had
there been a house of farmers, there had been no game laws; or a house
of merchants and manufacturers, the taxes had neither been so unequal
nor so excessive. It is from the power of taxation being in the hands of
those who can throw so great a part of it from their own shoulders, that
it has raged without a check.
Men of small or moderate estates are more injured by the taxes being
thrown on articles of consumption, than they are eased by warding it
from landed property, for the following reasons:
First, They consume more of the productive taxable articles, in
proportion to their property, than those of large estates.
Secondly, Their residence is chiefly in towns, and their property in
houses; and the increase of the poor-rates, occasioned by taxes on
consumption, is in much greater proportion than the land-tax has
been favoured. In Birmingham, the poor-rates are not less than
seven shillings in the pound. From this, as is already observed, the
aristocracy are in a great measure exempt.
These are but a part of the mischiefs flowing from the wretched scheme
of an house of peers.
As a combination, it can always throw a considerable portion of taxes
from itself; and as an hereditary house, accountable to nobody, it
resembles a rotten borough, whose consent is to be courted by interest.
There are but few of its members, who are not in some mode or
other participators, or disposers of the public money. One turns a
candle-holder, or a lord in waiting; another a lord of the bed-chamber,
a groom of the stole, or any insignificant nominal office to which a
salary is annexed, paid out of the public taxes, and which avoids the
direct appearance of corruption. Such situations are derogatory to the
character of man; and where they can be submitted to, honour cannot
reside.
To all these are to be added the numerous dependants, the long list of
younger branches and distant relations, who are to be provided for
at the public expense: in short, were an estimation to be made of the
charge of aristocracy to a nation, it will be found nearly equal to that
of supporting the poor. The Duke of Richmond alone (and there are cases
similar to his) takes away as much for himself as would maintain two
thousand poor and aged persons. Is it, then, any wonder, that under such
a system of government, taxes and rates have multiplied to their present
extent?
In stating these matters, I speak an open and disinterested language,
dictated by no passion but that of humanity. To me, who have not only
refused offers, because I thought them improper, but have declined
rewards I might with reputation have accepted, it is no wonder that
meanness and imposition appear disgustful. Independence is my happiness,
and I view things as they are, without regard to place or person; my
country is the world, and my religion is to do good.
Mr. Burke, in speaking of the aristocratical law of primogeniture, says,
"it is the standing law of our landed inheritance; and which, without
question, has a tendency, and I think," continues he, "a happy tendency,
to preserve a character of weight and consequence."
Mr. Burke may call this law what he pleases, but humanity and impartial
reflection will denounce it as a law of brutal injustice. Were we not
accustomed to the daily practice, and did we only hear of it as the
law of some distant part of the world, we should conclude that
the legislators of such countries had not arrived at a state of
civilisation.
As to its preserving a character of weight and consequence, the case
appears to me directly the reverse. It is an attaint upon character;
a sort of privateering on family property. It may have weight among
dependent tenants, but it gives none on a scale of national, and much
less of universal character. Speaking for myself, my parents were not
able to give me a shilling, beyond what they gave me in education; and
to do this they distressed themselves: yet, I possess more of what is
called consequence, in the world, than any one in Mr. Burke's catalogue
of aristocrats.
Having thus glanced at some of the defects of the two houses of
parliament, I proceed to what is called the crown, upon which I shall be
very concise.
It signifies a nominal office of a million sterling a year, the business
of which consists in receiving the money. Whether the person be wise
or foolish, sane or insane, a native or a foreigner, matters not. Every
ministry acts upon the same idea that Mr. Burke writes, namely, that the
people must be hood-winked, and held in superstitious ignorance by some
bugbear or other; and what is called the crown answers this purpose, and
therefore it answers all the purposes to be expected from it. This is
more than can be said of the other two branches.
The hazard to which this office is exposed in all countries, is not from
anything that can happen to the man, but from what may happen to the
nation--the danger of its coming to its senses.
It has been customary to call the crown the executive power, and the
custom is continued, though the reason has ceased.
It was called the executive, because the person whom it signified
used, formerly, to act in the character of a judge, in administering
or executing the laws. The tribunals were then a part of the court. The
power, therefore, which is now called the judicial, is what was called
the executive and, consequently, one or other of the terms is redundant,
and one of the offices useless. When we speak of the crown now, it means
nothing; it signifies neither a judge nor a general: besides which it
is the laws that govern, and not the man. The old terms are kept up, to
give an appearance of consequence to empty forms; and the only effect
they have is that of increasing expenses.
Before I proceed to the means of rendering governments more conducive to
the general happiness of mankind, than they are at present, it will not
be improper to take a review of the progress of taxation in England.
It is a general idea, that when taxes are once laid on, they are never
taken off. However true this may have been of late, it was not always
so. Either, therefore, the people of former times were more watchful
over government than those of the present, or government was
administered with less extravagance.
It is now seven hundred years since the Norman conquest, and the
establishment of what is called the crown. Taking this portion of time
in seven separate periods of one hundred years each, the amount of the
annual taxes, at each period, will be as follows:
Annual taxes levied by William the Conqueror,
beginning in the year 1066 L400,000
Annual taxes at 100 years from the conquest (1166) 200,000
Annual taxes at 200 years from the conquest (1266) 150,000
Annual taxes at 300 years from the conquest (1366) 130,000
Annual taxes at 400 years from the conquest (1466) 100,000
These statements and those which follow, are taken from Sir John
Sinclair's History of the Revenue; by which it appears, that taxes
continued decreasing for four hundred years, at the expiration of which
time they were reduced three-fourths, viz., from four hundred thousand
pounds to one hundred thousand. The people of England of the present
day, have a traditionary and historical idea of the bravery of their
ancestors; but whatever their virtues or their vices might have been,
they certainly were a people who would not be imposed upon, and who kept
governments in awe as to taxation, if not as to principle. Though they
were not able to expel the monarchical usurpation, they restricted it to
a republican economy of taxes.
Let us now review the remaining three hundred years:
Annual amount of taxes at:
500 years from the conquest (1566) 500,000
600 years from the conquest (1666) 1,800,000
the present time (1791) 17,000,000
The difference between the first four hundred years and the last three,
is so astonishing, as to warrant an opinion, that the national character
of the English has changed. It would have been impossible to have
dragooned the former English, into the excess of taxation that now
exists; and when it is considered that the pay of the army, the navy,
and of all the revenue officers, is the same now as it was about a
hundred years ago, when the taxes were not above a tenth part of what
they are at present, it appears impossible to account for the enormous
increase and expenditure on any other ground, than extravagance,
corruption, and intrigue.*[31]
With the Revolution of 1688, and more so since the Hanover succession,
came the destructive system of continental intrigues, and the rage for
foreign wars and foreign dominion; systems of such secure mystery that
the expenses admit of no accounts; a single line stands for millions. To
what excess taxation might have extended had not the French revolution
contributed to break up the system, and put an end to pretences, is
impossible to say. Viewed, as that revolution ought to be, as the
fortunate means of lessening the load of taxes of both countries, it is
of as much importance to England as to France; and, if properly improved
to all the advantages of which it is capable, and to which it leads,
deserves as much celebration in one country as the other.
In pursuing this subject, I shall begin with the matter that first
presents itself, that of lessening the burthen of taxes; and shall then
add such matter and propositions, respecting the three countries of
England, France, and America, as the present prospect of things appears
to justify: I mean, an alliance of the three, for the purposes that will
be mentioned in their proper place.
What has happened may happen again. By the statement before shown of
the progress of taxation, it is seen that taxes have been lessened to
a fourth part of what they had formerly been. Though the present
circumstances do not admit of the same reduction, yet they admit of such
a beginning, as may accomplish that end in less time than in the former
case.
The amount of taxes for the year ending at Michaelmas 1788, was as
follows:
Land-tax L 1,950,000
Customs 3,789,274
Excise (including old and new malt) 6,751,727
Stamps 1,278,214
Miscellaneous taxes and incidents 1,803,755
-----------
L15,572,755
Since the year 1788, upwards of one million new taxes have been laid on,
besides the produce of the lotteries; and as the taxes have in general
been more productive since than before, the amount may be taken, in
round numbers, at L17,000,000. (The expense of collection and the
drawbacks, which together amount to nearly two millions, are paid out of
the gross amount; and the above is the net sum paid into the exchequer).
This sum of seventeen millions is applied to two different purposes; the
one to pay the interest of the National Debt, the other to the current
expenses of each year. About nine millions are appropriated to the
former; and the remainder, being nearly eight millions, to the latter.
As to the million, said to be applied to the reduction of the debt, it
is so much like paying with one hand and taking out with the other, as
not to merit much notice. It happened, fortunately for France, that
she possessed national domains for paying off her debt, and thereby
lessening her taxes; but as this is not the case with England, her
reduction of taxes can only take place by reducing the current expenses,
which may now be done to the amount of four or five millions annually,
as will hereafter appear. When this is accomplished it will more than
counter-balance the enormous charge of the American war; and the saving
will be from the same source from whence the evil arose. As to the
national debt, however heavy the interest may be in taxes, yet, as it
serves to keep alive a capital useful to commerce, it balances by its
effects a considerable part of its own weight; and as the quantity
of gold and silver is, by some means or other, short of its proper
proportion, being not more than twenty millions, whereas it should be
sixty (foreign intrigue, foreign wars, foreign dominions, will in
a great measure account for the deficiency), it would, besides the
injustice, be bad policy to extinguish a capital that serves to supply
that defect. But with respect to the current expense, whatever is saved
therefrom is gain. The excess may serve to keep corruption alive, but it
has no re-action on credit and commerce, like the interest of the debt.
It is now very probable that the English Government (I do not mean
the nation) is unfriendly to the French Revolution. Whatever serves to
expose the intrigue and lessen the influence of courts, by lessening
taxation, will be unwelcome to those who feed upon the spoil. Whilst the
clamour of French intrigue, arbitrary power, popery, and wooden shoes
could be kept up, the nation was easily allured and alarmed into taxes.
Those days are now past: deception, it is to be hoped, has reaped its
last harvest, and better times are in prospect for both countries, and
for the world.
Taking it for granted that an alliance may be formed between England,
France, and America for the purposes hereafter to be mentioned, the
national expenses of France and England may consequently be lessened.
The same fleets and armies will no longer be necessary to either, and
the reduction can be made ship for ship on each side. But to accomplish
these objects the governments must necessarily be fitted to a common
and correspondent principle. Confidence can never take place while an
hostile disposition remains in either, or where mystery and secrecy on
one side is opposed to candour and openness on the other.
These matters admitted, the national expenses might be put back, for the
sake of a precedent, to what they were at some period when France and
England were not enemies. This, consequently, must be prior to the
Hanover succession, and also to the Revolution of 1688.*[32] The first
instance that presents itself, antecedent to those dates, is in the
very wasteful and profligate times of Charles the Second; at which time
England and France acted as allies. If I have chosen a period of great
extravagance, it will serve to show modern extravagance in a still worse
light; especially as the pay of the navy, the army, and the revenue
officers has not increased since that time.
The peace establishment was then as follows (see Sir John Sinclair's
History of the Revenue):
Navy L 300,000
Army 212,000
Ordnance 40,000
Civil List 462,115
-------
L1,014,115
The parliament, however, settled the whole annual peace establishment
at $1,200,000.*[33] If we go back to the time of Elizabeth the amount of
all the taxes was but half a million, yet the nation sees nothing during
that period that reproaches it with want of consequence.
All circumstances, then, taken together, arising from the French
revolution, from the approaching harmony and reciprocal interest of the
two nations, the abolition of the court intrigue on both sides, and
the progress of knowledge in the science of government, the annual
expenditure might be put back to one million and a half, viz.:
Navy L 500,000
Army 500,000
Expenses of Government 500,000
----------
L1,500,000
Even this sum is six times greater than the expenses of government are
in America, yet the civil internal government in England (I mean that
administered by means of quarter sessions, juries and assize, and which,
in fact, is nearly the whole, and performed by the nation), is
less expense upon the revenue, than the same species and portion of
government is in America.
It is time that nations should be rational, and not be governed like
animals, for the pleasure of their riders. To read the history of kings,
a man would be almost inclined to suppose that government consisted in
stag-hunting, and that every nation paid a million a-year to a huntsman.
Man ought to have pride, or shame enough to blush at being thus imposed
upon, and when he feels his proper character he will. Upon all subjects
of this nature, there is often passing in the mind, a train of ideas he
has not yet accustomed himself to encourage and communicate. Restrained
by something that puts on the character of prudence, he acts the
hypocrite upon himself as well as to others. It is, however, curious
to observe how soon this spell can be dissolved. A single expression,
boldly conceived and uttered, will sometimes put a whole company into
their proper feelings: and whole nations are acted on in the same
manner.
As to the offices of which any civil government may be composed, it
matters but little by what names they are described. In the routine of
business, as before observed, whether a man be styled a president, a
king, an emperor, a senator, or anything else, it is impossible that any
service he can perform, can merit from a nation more than ten thousand
pounds a year; and as no man should be paid beyond his services, so
every man of a proper heart will not accept more. Public money ought to
be touched with the most scrupulous consciousness of honour. It is
not the produce of riches only, but of the hard earnings of labour and
poverty. It is drawn even from the bitterness of want and misery. Not
a beggar passes, or perishes in the streets, whose mite is not in that
mass.
Were it possible that the Congress of America could be so lost to their
duty, and to the interest of their constituents, as to offer General
Washington, as president of America, a million a year, he would not, and
he could not, accept it. His sense of honour is of another kind. It
has cost England almost seventy millions sterling, to maintain a family
imported from abroad, of very inferior capacity to thousands in the
nation; and scarcely a year has passed that has not produced some new
mercenary application. Even the physicians' bills have been sent to
the public to be paid. No wonder that jails are crowded, and taxes and
poor-rates increased. Under such systems, nothing is to be looked for
but what has already happened; and as to reformation, whenever it come,
it must be from the nation, and not from the government.
To show that the sum of five hundred thousand pounds is more than
sufficient to defray all the expenses of the government, exclusive of
navies and armies, the following estimate is added, for any country, of
the same extent as England.
In the first place, three hundred representatives fairly elected, are
sufficient for all the purposes to which legislation can apply, and
preferable to a larger number. They may be divided into two or three
houses, or meet in one, as in France, or in any manner a constitution
shall direct.
As representation is always considered, in free countries, as the most
honourable of all stations, the allowance made to it is merely to defray
the expense which the representatives incur by that service, and not to
it as an office.
If an allowance, at the rate of five hundred pounds per
annum, be made to every representative, deducting for
non-attendance, the expense, if the whole number
attended for six months, each year, would be L 75,00
The official departments cannot reasonably exceed the
following number, with the salaries annexed:
Three offices at ten thousand pounds each L 30,000
Ten ditto, at five thousand pounds each 50,000
Twenty ditto, at two thousand pounds each 40,000
Forty ditto, at one thousand pounds each 40,000
Two hundred ditto, at five hundred pounds each 100,000
Three hundred ditto, at two hundred pounds each 60,000
Five hundred ditto, at one hundred pounds each 50,000
Seven hundred ditto, at seventy-five pounds each 52,500
--------
L497,500
If a nation choose, it can deduct four per cent. from all offices, and
make one of twenty thousand per annum.
All revenue officers are paid out of the monies they collect, and
therefore, are not in this estimation.
The foregoing is not offered as an exact detail of offices, but to show
the number of rate of salaries which five hundred thousand pounds will
support; and it will, on experience, be found impracticable to find
business sufficient to justify even this expense. As to the manner in
which office business is now performed, the Chiefs, in several offices,
such as the post-office, and certain offices in the exchequer, etc., do
little more than sign their names three or four times a year; and the
whole duty is performed by under-clerks.
Taking, therefore, one million and a half as a sufficient peace
establishment for all the honest purposes of government, which is
three hundred thousand pounds more than the peace establishment in the
profligate and prodigal times of Charles the Second (notwithstanding, as
has been already observed, the pay and salaries of the army, navy,
and revenue officers, continue the same as at that period), there will
remain a surplus of upwards of six millions out of the present current
expenses. The question then will be, how to dispose of this surplus.
Whoever has observed the manner in which trade and taxes twist
themselves together, must be sensible of the impossibility of separating
them suddenly.
First. Because the articles now on hand are already charged with the
duty, and the reduction cannot take place on the present stock.
Secondly. Because, on all those articles on which the duty is charged
in the gross, such as per barrel, hogshead, hundred weight, or ton, the
abolition of the duty does not admit of being divided down so as fully
to relieve the consumer, who purchases by the pint, or the pound. The
last duty laid on strong beer and ale was three shillings per barrel,
which, if taken off, would lessen the purchase only half a farthing per
pint, and consequently, would not reach to practical relief.
This being the condition of a great part of the taxes, it will be
necessary to look for such others as are free from this embarrassment
and where the relief will be direct and visible, and capable of
immediate operation.
In the first place, then, the poor-rates are a direct tax which every
house-keeper feels, and who knows also, to a farthing, the sum which
he pays. The national amount of the whole of the poor-rates is not
positively known, but can be procured. Sir John Sinclair, in his History
of the Revenue has stated it at L2,100,587. A considerable part of
which is expended in litigations, in which the poor, instead of being
relieved, are tormented. The expense, however, is the same to the parish
from whatever cause it arises.
In Birmingham, the amount of poor-rates is fourteen thousand pounds
a year. This, though a large sum, is moderate, compared with the
population. Birmingham is said to contain seventy thousand souls, and on
a proportion of seventy thousand to fourteen thousand pounds poor-rates,
the national amount of poor-rates, taking the population of England as
seven millions, would be but one million four hundred thousand pounds.
It is, therefore, most probable, that the population of Birmingham
is over-rated. Fourteen thousand pounds is the proportion upon fifty
thousand souls, taking two millions of poor-rates, as the national
amount.
Be it, however, what it may, it is no other than the consequence of
excessive burthen of taxes, for, at the time when the taxes were very
low, the poor were able to maintain themselves; and there were no
poor-rates.*[34] In the present state of things a labouring man, with a
wife or two or three children, does not pay less than between seven and
eight pounds a year in taxes. He is not sensible of this, because it is
disguised to him in the articles which he buys, and he thinks only of
their dearness; but as the taxes take from him, at least, a fourth part
of his yearly earnings, he is consequently disabled from providing for
a family, especially, if himself, or any of them, are afflicted with
sickness.
The first step, therefore, of practical relief, would be to abolish the
poor-rates entirely, and in lieu thereof, to make a remission of taxes
to the poor of double the amount of the present poor-rates, viz., four
millions annually out of the surplus taxes. By this measure, the poor
would be benefited two millions, and the house-keepers two millions.
This alone would be equal to a reduction of one hundred and twenty
millions of the National Debt, and consequently equal to the whole
expense of the American War.
It will then remain to be considered, which is the most effectual mode
of distributing this remission of four millions.
It is easily seen, that the poor are generally composed of large
families of children, and old people past their labour. If these two
classes are provided for, the remedy will so far reach to the full
extent of the case, that what remains will be incidental, and, in a
great measure, fall within the compass of benefit clubs, which, though
of humble invention, merit to be ranked among the best of modern
institutions.
Admitting England to contain seven millions of souls; if one-fifth
thereof are of that class of poor which need support, the number will be
one million four hundred thousand. Of this number, one hundred and forty
thousand will be aged poor, as will be hereafter shown, and for which a
distinct provision will be proposed.
There will then remain one million two hundred and sixty thousand
which, at five souls to each family, amount to two hundred and fifty-two
thousand families, rendered poor from the expense of children and the
weight of taxes.
The number of children under fourteen years of age, in each of those
families, will be found to be about five to every two families; some
having two, and others three; some one, and others four: some none,
and others five; but it rarely happens that more than five are under
fourteen years of age, and after this age they are capable of service or
of being apprenticed.
Allowing five children (under fourteen years) to every two families,
The number of children will be 630,000
The number of parents, were they all living, would be 504,000
It is certain, that if the children are provided for, the parents are
relieved of consequence, because it is from the expense of bringing up
children that their poverty arises.
Having thus ascertained the greatest number that can be supposed to need
support on account of young families, I proceed to the mode of relief or
distribution, which is,
To pay as a remission of taxes to every poor family, out of the surplus
taxes, and in room of poor-rates, four pounds a year for every child
under fourteen years of age; enjoining the parents of such children to
send them to school, to learn reading, writing, and common arithmetic;
the ministers of every parish, of every denomination to certify jointly
to an office, for that purpose, that this duty is performed. The amount
of this expense will be,
For six hundred and thirty thousand children
at four pounds per annum each L2,520,000
By adopting this method, not only the poverty of the parents will be
relieved, but ignorance will be banished from the rising generation, and
the number of poor will hereafter become less, because their abilities,
by the aid of education, will be greater. Many a youth, with good
natural genius, who is apprenticed to a mechanical trade, such as
a carpenter, joiner, millwright, shipwright, blacksmith, etc., is
prevented getting forward the whole of his life from the want of a
little common education when a boy.
I now proceed to the case of the aged.
I divide age into two classes. First, the approach of age, beginning at
fifty. Secondly, old age commencing at sixty.
At fifty, though the mental faculties of man are in full vigour, and
his judgment better than at any preceding date, the bodily powers for
laborious life are on the decline. He cannot bear the same quantity of
fatigue as at an earlier period. He begins to earn less, and is
less capable of enduring wind and weather; and in those more retired
employments where much sight is required, he fails apace, and sees
himself, like an old horse, beginning to be turned adrift.
At sixty his labour ought to be over, at least from direct necessity.
It is painful to see old age working itself to death, in what are called
civilised countries, for daily bread.
To form some judgment of the number of those above fifty years of age,
I have several times counted the persons I met in the streets of London,
men, women, and children, and have generally found that the average is
about one in sixteen or seventeen. If it be said that aged persons
do not come much into the streets, so neither do infants; and a great
proportion of grown children are in schools and in work-shops as
apprentices. Taking, then, sixteen for a divisor, the whole number of
persons in England of fifty years and upwards, of both sexes, rich and
poor, will be four hundred and twenty thousand.
The persons to be provided for out of this gross number will be
husbandmen, common labourers, journeymen of every trade and their wives,
sailors, and disbanded soldiers, worn out servants of both sexes, and
poor widows.
There will be also a considerable number of middling tradesmen,
who having lived decently in the former part of life, begin, as age
approaches, to lose their business, and at last fall to decay.
Besides these there will be constantly thrown off from the revolutions
of that wheel which no man can stop nor regulate, a number from every
class of life connected with commerce and adventure.
To provide for all those accidents, and whatever else may befall, I take
the number of persons who, at one time or other of their lives, after
fifty years of age, may feel it necessary or comfortable to be better
supported, than they can support themselves, and that not as a matter of
grace and favour, but of right, at one-third of the whole number, which
is one hundred and forty thousand, as stated in a previous page, and
for whom a distinct provision was proposed to be made. If there be more,
society, notwithstanding the show and pomposity of government, is in a
deplorable condition in England.
Of this one hundred and forty thousand, I take one half, seventy
thousand, to be of the age of fifty and under sixty, and the other half
to be sixty years and upwards. Having thus ascertained the probable
proportion of the number of aged persons, I proceed to the mode of
rendering their condition comfortable, which is:
To pay to every such person of the age of fifty years, and until he
shall arrive at the age of sixty, the sum of six pounds per annum out of
the surplus taxes, and ten pounds per annum during life after the age of
sixty. The expense of which will be,
Seventy thousand persons, at L6 per annum L 420,000
Seventy thousand persons, at L10 per annum 700,000
-------
L1,120,000
This support, as already remarked, is not of the nature of a charity but
of a right. Every person in England, male and female, pays on an average
in taxes two pounds eight shillings and sixpence per annum from the day
of his (or her) birth; and, if the expense of collection be added, he
pays two pounds eleven shillings and sixpence; consequently, at the end
of fifty years he has paid one hundred and twenty-eight pounds fifteen
shillings; and at sixty one hundred and fifty-four pounds ten shillings.
Converting, therefore, his (or her) individual tax in a tontine, the
money he shall receive after fifty years is but little more than the
legal interest of the net money he has paid; the rest is made up from
those whose circumstances do not require them to draw such support, and
the capital in both cases defrays the expenses of government. It is on
this ground that I have extended the probable claims to one-third of
the number of aged persons in the nation.--Is it, then, better that
the lives of one hundred and forty thousand aged persons be rendered
comfortable, or that a million a year of public money be expended on
any one individual, and him often of the most worthless or insignificant
character? Let reason and justice, let honour and humanity, let even
hypocrisy, sycophancy and Mr. Burke, let George, let Louis,
Leopold, Frederic, Catherine, Cornwallis, or Tippoo Saib, answer the
question.*[35]
The sum thus remitted to the poor will be,
To two hundred and fifty-two thousand poor families,
containing six hundred and thirty thousand children L2,520,000
To one hundred and forty thousand aged persons 1,120,000
----------
L3,640,000
There will then remain three hundred and sixty thousand pounds out of
the four millions, part of which may be applied as follows:--
After all the above cases are provided for there will still be a number
of families who, though not properly of the class of poor, yet find it
difficult to give education to their children; and such children, under
such a case, would be in a worse condition than if their parents were
actually poor. A nation under a well-regulated government should permit
none to remain uninstructed. It is monarchical and aristocratical
government only that requires ignorance for its support.
Suppose, then, four hundred thousand children to be in this condition,
which is a greater number than ought to be supposed after the provisions
already made, the method will be:
To allow for each of those children ten shillings a year for the
expense of schooling for six years each, which will give them six months
schooling each year, and half a crown a year for paper and spelling
books.
The expense of this will be annually L250,000.*[36]
There will then remain one hundred and ten thousand pounds.
Notwithstanding the great modes of relief which the best instituted and
best principled government may devise, there will be a number of smaller
cases, which it is good policy as well as beneficence in a nation to
consider.
Were twenty shillings to be given immediately on the birth of a child,
to every woman who should make the demand, and none will make it whose
circumstances do not require it, it might relieve a great deal of
instant distress.
There are about two hundred thousand births yearly in England; and if
claimed by one fourth,
The amount would be L50,000
And twenty shillings to every new-married couple who should claim in
like manner. This would not exceed the sum of L20,000.
Also twenty thousand pounds to be appropriated to defray the funeral
expenses of persons, who, travelling for work, may die at a distance
from their friends. By relieving parishes from this charge, the sick
stranger will be better treated.
I shall finish this part of the subject with a plan adapted to the
particular condition of a metropolis, such as London.
Cases are continually occurring in a metropolis, different from those
which occur in the country, and for which a different, or rather an
additional, mode of relief is necessary. In the country, even in large
towns, people have a knowledge of each other, and distress never rises
to that extreme height it sometimes does in a metropolis. There is no
such thing in the country as persons, in the literal sense of the word,
starved to death, or dying with cold from the want of a lodging. Yet
such cases, and others equally as miserable, happen in London.
Many a youth comes up to London full of expectations, and with little
or no money, and unless he get immediate employment he is already half
undone; and boys bred up in London without any means of a livelihood,
and as it often happens of dissolute parents, are in a still worse
condition; and servants long out of place are not much better off. In
short, a world of little cases is continually arising, which busy or
affluent life knows not of, to open the first door to distress. Hunger
is not among the postponable wants, and a day, even a few hours, in such
a condition is often the crisis of a life of ruin.
These circumstances which are the general cause of the little thefts
and pilferings that lead to greater, may be prevented. There yet remain
twenty thousand pounds out of the four millions of surplus taxes, which
with another fund hereafter to be mentioned, amounting to about twenty
thousand pounds more, cannot be better applied than to this purpose. The
plan will then be:
First, To erect two or more buildings, or take some already erected,
capable of containing at least six thousand persons, and to have in each
of these places as many kinds of employment as can be contrived, so that
every person who shall come may find something which he or she can do.
Secondly, To receive all who shall come, without enquiring who or what
they are. The only condition to be, that for so much, or so many hours'
work, each person shall receive so many meals of wholesome food, and a
warm lodging, at least as good as a barrack. That a certain portion of
what each person's work shall be worth shall be reserved, and given to
him or her, on their going away; and that each person shall stay as long
or as short a time, or come as often as he choose, on these conditions.
If each person stayed three months, it would assist by rotation
twenty-four thousand persons annually, though the real number, at all
times, would be but six thousand. By establishing an asylum of this
kind, such persons to whom temporary distresses occur, would have an
opportunity to recruit themselves, and be enabled to look out for better
employment.
Allowing that their labour paid but one half the expense of supporting
them, after reserving a portion of their earnings for themselves, the
sum of forty thousand pounds additional would defray all other charges
for even a greater number than six thousand.
The fund very properly convertible to this purpose, in addition to
the twenty thousand pounds, remaining of the former fund, will be the
produce of the tax upon coals, so iniquitously and wantonly applied to
the support of the Duke of Richmond. It is horrid that any man, more
especially at the price coals now are, should live on the distresses of
a community; and any government permitting such an abuse, deserves to
be dismissed. This fund is said to be about twenty thousand pounds per
annum.
I shall now conclude this plan with enumerating the several particulars,
and then proceed to other matters.
The enumeration is as follows:--
First, Abolition of two millions poor-rates.
Secondly, Provision for two hundred and fifty thousand poor families.
Thirdly, Education for one million and thirty thousand children.
Fourthly, Comfortable provision for one hundred and forty thousand aged
persons.
Fifthly, Donation of twenty shillings each for fifty thousand births.
Sixthly, Donation of twenty shillings each for twenty thousand
marriages.
Seventhly, Allowance of twenty thousand pounds for the funeral expenses
of persons travelling for work, and dying at a distance from their
friends.
Eighthly, Employment, at all times, for the casual poor in the cities of
London and Westminster.
By the operation of this plan, the poor laws, those instruments of civil
torture, will be superseded, and the wasteful expense of litigation
prevented. The hearts of the humane will not be shocked by ragged and
hungry children, and persons of seventy and eighty years of age, begging
for bread. The dying poor will not be dragged from place to place to
breathe their last, as a reprisal of parish upon parish. Widows will
have a maintenance for their children, and not be carted away, on the
death of their husbands, like culprits and criminals; and children will
no longer be considered as increasing the distresses of their parents.
The haunts of the wretched will be known, because it will be to their
advantage; and the number of petty crimes, the offspring of distress and
poverty, will be lessened. The poor, as well as the rich, will then be
interested in the support of government, and the cause and apprehension
of riots and tumults will cease.--Ye who sit in ease, and solace
yourselves in plenty, and such there are in Turkey and Russia, as well
as in England, and who say to yourselves, "Are we not well off?" have ye
thought of these things? When ye do, ye will cease to speak and feel for
yourselves alone.
The plan is easy in practice. It does not embarrass trade by a sudden
interruption in the order of taxes, but effects the relief by changing
the application of them; and the money necessary for the purpose can be
drawn from the excise collections, which are made eight times a year in
every market town in England.
Having now arranged and concluded this subject, I proceed to the next.
Taking the present current expenses at seven millions and an half, which
is the least amount they are now at, there will remain (after the sum of
one million and an half be taken for the new current expenses and four
millions for the before-mentioned service) the sum of two millions; part
of which to be applied as follows:
Though fleets and armies, by an alliance with France, will, in a great
measure, become useless, yet the persons who have devoted themselves to
those services, and have thereby unfitted themselves for other lines of
life, are not to be sufferers by the means that make others happy. They
are a different description of men from those who form or hang about a
court.
A part of the army will remain, at least for some years, and also of the
navy, for which a provision is already made in the former part of this
plan of one million, which is almost half a million more than the peace
establishment of the army and navy in the prodigal times of Charles the
Second.
Suppose, then, fifteen thousand soldiers to be disbanded, and that an
allowance be made to each of three shillings a week during life, clear
of all deductions, to be paid in the same manner as the Chelsea College
pensioners are paid, and for them to return to their trades and their
friends; and also that an addition of fifteen thousand sixpences per
week be made to the pay of the soldiers who shall remain; the annual
expenses will be:
To the pay of fifteen thousand disbanded soldiers
at three shillings per week L117,000
Additional pay to the remaining soldiers 19,500
Suppose that the pay to the officers of the
disbanded corps be the same amount as sum allowed
to the men 117,000
-------- L253,500
To prevent bulky estimations, admit the same sum
to the disbanded navy as to the army,
and the same increase of pay 253,500
--------
Total L507,000
Every year some part of this sum of half a million (I omit the odd seven
thousand pounds for the purpose of keeping the account unembarrassed)
will fall in, and the whole of it in time, as it is on the ground of
life annuities, except the increased pay of twenty-nine thousand
pounds. As it falls in, part of the taxes may be taken off; and as, for
instance, when thirty thousand pounds fall in, the duty on hops may be
wholly taken off; and as other parts fall in, the duties on candles and
soap may be lessened, till at last they will totally cease. There now
remains at least one million and a half of surplus taxes.
The tax on houses and windows is one of those direct taxes, which, like
the poor-rates, is not confounded with trade; and, when taken off, the
relief will be instantly felt. This tax falls heavy on the middle class
of people. The amount of this tax, by the returns of 1788, was:
Houses and windows: L s. d.
By the act of 1766 385,459 11 7
By the act be 1779 130,739 14 5 1/2
----------------------
Total 516,199 6 0 1/2
If this tax be struck off, there will then remain about one million of
surplus taxes; and as it is always proper to keep a sum in reserve, for
incidental matters, it may be best not to extend reductions further in
the first instance, but to consider what may be accomplished by other
modes of reform.
Among the taxes most heavily felt is the commutation tax. I shall
therefore offer a plan for its abolition, by substituting another in its
place, which will effect three objects at once: 1, that of removing
the burthen to where it can best be borne; 2, restoring justice among
families by a distribution of property; 3, extirpating the overgrown
influence arising from the unnatural law of primogeniture, which is
one of the principal sources of corruption at elections. The amount of
commutation tax by the returns of 1788, was L771,657.
When taxes are proposed, the country is amused by the plausible language
of taxing luxuries. One thing is called a luxury at one time, and
something else at another; but the real luxury does not consist in the
article, but in the means of procuring it, and this is always kept out
of sight.
I know not why any plant or herb of the field should be a greater luxury
in one country than another; but an overgrown estate in either is a
luxury at all times, and, as such, is the proper object of taxation. It
is, therefore, right to take those kind tax-making gentlemen up on their
own word, and argue on the principle themselves have laid down, that of
taxing luxuries. If they or their champion, Mr. Burke, who, I fear, is
growing out of date, like the man in armour, can prove that an estate of
twenty, thirty, or forty thousand pounds a year is not a luxury, I will
give up the argument.
Admitting that any annual sum, say, for instance, one thousand pounds,
is necessary or sufficient for the support of a family, consequently the
second thousand is of the nature of a luxury, the third still more so,
and by proceeding on, we shall at last arrive at a sum that may not
improperly be called a prohibitable luxury. It would be impolitic to set
bounds to property acquired by industry, and therefore it is right to
place the prohibition beyond the probable acquisition to which
industry can extend; but there ought to be a limit to property or the
accumulation of it by bequest. It should pass in some other line. The
richest in every nation have poor relations, and those often very near
in consanguinity.
The following table of progressive taxation is constructed on the above
principles, and as a substitute for the commutation tax. It will reach
the point of prohibition by a regular operation, and thereby supersede
the aristocratical law of primogeniture.
TABLE I
A tax on all estates of the clear yearly value of L50,
after deducting the land tax, and up
To L500 0s 3d per pound
From L500 to L1,000 0 6
On the second thousand 0 9
On the third " 1 0
On the fourth " 1 6
On the fifth " 2 0
On the sixth " 3 0
On the seventh " 4 0
On the eighth " 5 0
On the ninth " 6s 0d per pound
On the tenth " 7 0
On the eleventh " 8 0
On the twelfth " 9 0
On the thirteenth " 10 0
On the fourteenth " 11 0
On the fifteenth " 12 0
On the sixteenth " 13 0
On the seventeenth " 14 0
On the eighteenth " 15 0
On the nineteenth " 16 0
On the twentieth " 17 0
On the twenty-first " 18 0
On the twenty-second " 19 0
On the twenty-third " 20 0
The foregoing table shows the progression per pound on every progressive
thousand. The following table shows the amount of the tax on every
thousand separately, and in the last column the total amount of all the
separate sums collected.
TABLE II
An estate of:
L 50 per annum at 3d per pound pays L0 12 6
100 " " " " 1 5 0
200 " " " " 2 10 0
300 " " " " 3 15 0
400 " " " " 5 0 0
500 " " " " 7 5 0
After L500, the tax of 6d. per pound takes place on the second L500;
consequently an estate of L1,000 per annum pays L2l, 15s., and so on.
Total amount
For the 1st L500 at 0s 3d per pound L7 5s
2nd " 0 6 14 10 L21 15s
2nd 1000 at 0 9 37 11 59 5
3rd " 1 0 50 0 109 5
(Total amount)
4th 1000 at 1s 6d per pound L75 0s L184 5s
5th " 2 0 100 0 284 5
6th " 3 0 150 0 434 5
7th " 4 0 200 0 634 5
8th " 5 0 250 0 880 5
9th " 6 0 300 0 1100 5
10th " 7 0 350 0 1530 5
11th " 8 0 400 0 1930 5
12th " 9 0 450 0 2380 5
13th " 10 0 500 0 2880 5
14th " 11 0 550 0 3430 5
15th " 12 0 600 0 4030 5
16th " 13 0 650 0 4680 5
17th " 14 0 700 0 5380 5
18th " 15 0 750 0 6130 5
19th " 16 0 800 0 6930 5
20th " 17 0 850 0 7780 5
21st " 18 0 900 0 8680 5
(Total amount)
22nd 1000 at 19s 0d per pound L950 0s L9630 5s
23rd " 20 0 1000 0 10630 5
At the twenty-third thousand the tax becomes 20s. in the pound, and
consequently every thousand beyond that sum can produce no profit but by
dividing the estate. Yet formidable as this tax appears, it will not, I
believe, produce so much as the commutation tax; should it produce more,
it ought to be lowered to that amount upon estates under two or three
thousand a year.