THE CLAYTON-BULWER TREATY AND THE SUEZ CANAL.
The treaty of 1850 was concerned primarily with a canal along the
Nicaraguan route--that is, as the preamble expresses it, a canal
"between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans by way of the river San Juan de
Nicaragua and either or both of the lakes of Nicaragua or Managua to any
port or place on the Pacific Ocean." But as Article VIII. says, it
established "a general principle" relating to any waterway across the
isthmus between North and South America. The two contracting parties
undertook in the treaty that neither should "obtain or maintain for
itself any exclusive control over the said canal," or "maintain any
fortifications commanding the same, or in the vicinity thereof," or
"occupy, or fortify, or colonize, or assume, or exercise any dominion
over Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito Coast, or any part of Central
America." This agreement, as I said, subsisted for fifty years, but it
was scarcely concluded when it was found inconsistent with the growing
importance and ambition of the United States, where a demand quickly
arose for an American-owned canal.
Again there followed a series of schemes for canal construction at
various points of the isthmus. For example, Dr. Edgar Cullen created
some excitement in England in the early Victorian days by giving a very
favourable account of the Caledonian route across the isthmus at Darien,
in a lecture to the Royal Geographical Society. The doctor was received
by the young queen and the Prince Consort, a corporation was formed, and
an engineer sent out to make surveys from Caledonian Bay. A British and
a French man-of-war were dispatched to the isthmus to make
investigations. But the surveyor was driven from Caledonian Bay by local
tribes, and so went on to Panama, giving a favourable report of that
route on his return to England. But nothing came of these incidents,
and the American Civil War in the early 'sixties diverted the attention
of the United States from isthmian affairs. At the end of the war
American interest revived, and public opinion set more and more against
the idea of sharing a canal with any other Power. In 1869 President
Grant gave the first public expression to the demand for an American
canal under American control. "I regard it," he said, "as of vast
political importance to this country that no European government should
hold such a work." Later, in an article in the _North American Review_,
he said, "I commend an American canal, on American soil, to the American
people."
Just before the President's declaration of policy the United States had
concluded an important treaty, known as the "Dickinson-Ayon Treaty,"
with Nicaragua, securing a right of way for a canal over the Nicaraguan
route; and, just afterwards, President Grant appointed an Interoceanic
Canal Commission which investigated four routes for a canal, and
finally, in 1875, reported unanimously in favour of the Nicaraguan route
from Grey town to the San Juan River, to Lake Nicaragua, through the Rio
del Medio and Rio Grande valleys, to Brito on the Pacific coast.
In 1869 an event occurred which was to have a very decisive effect on
isthmian affairs--the opening for traffic of the Suez Canal. These two
isthmuses in the eastern and western hemispheres have some obvious
features in common. They both link two vast continents and form a
barrier between two oceans or oceanic systems. They are fairly equal in
breadth--Suez, sixty miles, and Panama about fifty-four. The shortest
line across each runs almost exactly north and south. And they were both
until recent times uninhabited country. But there are many
dissimilarities. The isthmus at Suez is a flat and sterile desert; that
at Panama is hilly and covered with an almost impenetrable jungle of
tropical vegetation. Again, Suez is a healthy district, whereas Panama
was, until recent years, a pest-house as deadly as Sierra Leone or the
Guinea coast.
Mr. Bryce in his charming book on "South America" compares these two
inter-continental causeways from a more historical point of view. He
writes:--
A still more remarkable contrast, between these two necks of
land, lies in the part they have respectively played in
human affairs. The isthmus of Panama in far-off prehistoric
days has been the highway along which those wandering tribes
whose forefathers had passed in their canoes from
North-eastern Asia along the Aleutian Isles into Alaska
found their way, after many centuries, into the vast spaces
of South America. But its place in the annals of mankind,
during the four centuries that have elapsed since Balboa
gazed from a mountain top rising out of the forest upon the
far-off waters of the South Sea, has been small indeed
compared to that which the isthmus of Suez has held from the
beginning of history. It echoed to the tread of the armies
of Thothmes and Rameses marching forth on their invasions of
Western Asia. Along the edge of it Israel fled forth before
the hosts of Pharaoh. First the Assyrian and afterwards the
Persian hosts poured across it to conquer Egypt; and over
its sands Bonaparte led his regiments to Palestine in that
bold adventure which was stopped at St. Jean d'Acre. It has
been one of the great highways for armies for forty
centuries, as the canal cut through it is now one of the
great highways for commerce.
The turn of the isthmus of Panama is now come, and,
curiously enough, it is the isthmus of Suez that brought
that turn, for it was the digging of a ship canal from the
Mediterranean to the Red Sea, and the vast expansion of
Eastern trade which followed, that led to the revival of the
old designs, mooted as far back as Philip II. of Spain, of
piercing the American isthmus. Thus the comparison of the
two isthmuses becomes now more interesting than ever, for
our generation will watch to see whether the commerce and
politics of the Western World will be affected by this new
route which is now being opened, as those of the Old World
have been affected by the achievement of Ferdinand de
Lesseps.
It will be seen from this quotation how the completion of the Suez Canal
affected the Panama project. Lesseps, fresh from his success at Suez
and not contented with his great achievement there, was easily attracted
by the schemes which were afoot for constructing a ship canal at another
land-barrier which, like the isthmus at Suez, had obstructed the
quickest lines of communication between East and West. In 1876 a
corporation was established, called "La Societe Civile Internationale du
Canal Interoceanique," for the purpose of promoting canal schemes on the
lower isthmus. Its head was Lieutenant Lucien Napoleon Bonaparte Wyse,
who easily obtained a canal concession at Bogota from the Colombian
government. In 1879 an International Engineering Congress was assembled
at Paris by Lesseps, whose partisans compelled a decision in favour of
the Panama route.
But the United States, determined by this time to construct a canal for
themselves without any joint control or international guarantee of
neutrality, opposed the French scheme from the outset. No amount of
bluff from the French promoters affected this opposition. The American
people had indeed some right to complain. The Colombian concession to
the French was quite inconsistent with the treaty of 1846 between this
South American republic and the United States. This treaty Lesseps tried
to induce Colombia to abrogate, and every effort, fair and foul, was
employed to overcome the American objection to the scheme. In 1880
Lesseps was feted at a public banquet at New York, but even the personal
presence of the great man failed to have the desired effect. President
Hayes addressed a strong message to the Senate on the subject, a few
passages of which are interesting as showing the very decided views now
held by the American government and people:--
An interoceanic canal across the American isthmus will
essentially change the geographical relations between the
Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the United States, and
between the United States and the rest of the world. It will
be the great ocean thoroughfare between our Atlantic and our
Pacific shores, and virtually a part of the coastline of the
United States. Our mere commercial interest in it is larger
than that of all other countries, while its relation to our
power and prosperity as a nation, to our means of defence,
our unity, peace, and safety, are matters of paramount
concern to the people of the United States. No other great
Power would, under similar circumstances, fail to assert a
rightful control over a work so closely and vitally
affecting its interests and welfare.
Without urging further the grounds of my opinion, I repeat,
in conclusion, that it is the right and the duty of the
United States to assert and maintain such supervision and
authority over any interoceanic canal across the isthmus
that connects North and South America as will protect our
national interests. This, I am quite sure, will be found not
only compatible with, but promotive of, the widest and most
permanent advantage to commerce and civilization.
The reader will see that all this is inconsistent with the
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, under which the United States had actually
undertaken to claim no such exclusive control as was now desired.
Lengthy negotiations were now set on foot with England for the
abrogation of a treaty which forbade the United States to build a canal
of their own and prevented them from effectually opposing the French
scheme. Lord Granville, however, saw no reason why England should
abandon the treaty solely in the interests of the United States, and the
negotiations were fruitless.
Meantime the French persisted in their undertaking. Their canal was to
be tide-level, twenty-eight feet deep, costing L26,400,000. A
corporation entitled the Compagnie Universelle du Canal Interoceanique
de Panama was formed in 1881, and in the same year the work of
construction was begun. So it looked as though the Americans were to
lose all chance of constructing an isthmian canal under their own
control. Events, however, were to decide otherwise.