CANAL PROJECTS.
It appears that the honour of first conceiving and proposing the project
of an artificial waterway through the isthmus belongs to Alvaro de
Saavedra Ceron, a cousin of Cortez, who had been with Balboa at Panama.
Ceron had been for twelve years engaged in the search for the strait,
and had finally begun to doubt its existence. His thoughts turned to the
isthmus at Panama, where the narrowness and low elevation of the land
seemed to offer the likeliest chance of an artificial canal. We learn
from the old historian Galvano that Ceron prepared plans for the
construction of a waterway there--almost precisely along the route
chosen for the American canal nearly four hundred years later. Ceron's
death, however, put an end to this early project.
It is interesting to find the Portuguese historian Galvano, who
flourished in the middle of the sixteenth century, mentioning four
possible routes for the canal--namely, Darien, Panama, Nicaragua, and
Tehuantepec. The choice, however, quickly confined itself to the Panama
and Nicaraguan lines. The reader may feel some surprise that at such an
early date as this an engineering project should be seriously considered
which was only accomplished in the end by the wealth and mechanical
resources of one of the greatest of modern Powers. The explanation is
that the tiny vessels of the early sixteenth century could have taken
advantage of the natural rivers and lakes in the isthmus, especially
those on the Nicaraguan route, and that far less artificial construction
would have been necessary than in these days of the mammoth liner and
warship.
Charles V., King of Spain, seems to have been quite alive to the
importance of these canal projects. In 1534 he directed the Governor of
Costa Firme, the old name for the Panama district, to survey the valley
of the Chagres, the river which supplies the water for the upper reaches
of the American canal. This gentleman, however, seems scarcely to have
shared the royal enthusiasm. He may be supposed to have known the
isthmus at these points very well, and his scepticism about the prospect
of canal construction there in those days was not wholly groundless. The
Spanish historian Gomara, who wrote a history of the Indies in 1551 and
dedicated it to Charles V., declared a canal to be quite feasible along
any of the four routes mentioned by Galvano. It is true he recognized
obstacles. "There are mountains," he wrote, "but there are also hands.
If determination is not lacking, means will not fail; the Indies, to
which the way is to be made, will furnish them. To a king of Spain,
seeking the wealth of Indian commerce, that which is possible is also
easy."
But Charles V. died without making any practical advance in this
enterprise, and a rather remarkable reaction took place under his
successor, Philip II. It should be noted that by this time a permanent
roadway had been established across the isthmus from Panama to Porto
Bello, along which the Spanish treasure-convoys passed from sea to sea
without much interruption. The rapidly growing power of the English at
sea made Philip fear that, if a canal were built, he would be unable to
control it, and would probably lose his existing monopoly of isthmian
transit. So he issued a veto against all projects of canal construction.
He even persuaded himself that it would be contrary to the Divine
purpose to link together two great oceans which God had set asunder, and
that any such attempt would be visited by a terrible nemesis.[2] So his
Majesty not only forbade all such schemes but declared the penalty of
death against any one who should attempt to make a better route across
Central America than the land-route between Panama and Porto Bello.
In course of time the king's beard was so horribly singed by English
navigators and adventurers in the Caribbean Sea that the Atlantic end of
the overland trail became almost useless, and the Spanish argosies were
compelled to sail homewards round the far Magellan Straits. But in 1579,
as we have seen, Sir Francis Drake ("El Draque" as he was called by the
terrified Spaniards) had suddenly attacked, captured, and scattered the
Spanish ships off the Pacific coast of South America. So the isthmian
land-route was once more resumed, and it took the Spaniard all his time
to hold that open.
For many years no progress was made with the idea of an isthmian canal.
War between England and Spain was the natural order of things in these
Central American regions. In 1655 the English seized Jamaica, and soon
afterwards established themselves on the coast of Honduras and
Nicaragua. The old city of Panama, of which only a picturesque
church-tower remains to-day, had been founded by a Spanish governor
named Pedrarias in 1519. In 1671 the city was destroyed by that wicked
Welsh buccaneer, Sir Henry Morgan. The town was rebuilt two years later
by Alonzo Mercado de Villacorta, five miles west of the old site.
The project of a canal across the isthmus was never allowed entirely to
disappear. In 1694 a very determined attempt was made to plant a
British colony on the isthmus at Darien, a little east of the Panama
route. The pioneer was William Paterson, a Scotsman, who founded "the
Company of Scotland Trading to Africa and the Indies." Sir Walter Scott,
in his "Tales of a Grandfather," thus describes the project:--
The produce of China, Japan, the Spice Islands, and Eastern
India, brought to the Bay of Panama, were to be transferred
across the isthmus to the new settlement, and exchanged for
the commodities of Europe. In Paterson's enthusiastic words,
"This door of the seas and key of the universe will enable
its possessors to become the legislators of both worlds and
the arbitrators of commerce. The settlers at Darien will
acquire a nobler empire than Alexander or Caesar, without
fatigue, expense, or danger, as well as without incurring
the guilt and bloodshed of conquerors."
So 1,200 settlers set sail from Leith in July 1698, no doubt with a high
hope and courage. In November the expedition arrived and established
itself at a point of the coast still called Puerto Escoces, or Scotch
Port, in Caledonian Bay, also named from the same event. "New Edinburgh"
and "New St. Andrews" were founded, but the settlers soon got into
difficulties. The climate was intolerable, and the project was opposed
from the outset by the English and Dutch East India Companies, who were
alarmed on the score of their own exclusive rights, while Spaniards and
Indians were a perpetual menace. Broken down by these adversities the
original settlers left the place, but were succeeded at once by another
company which, after some successful fighting with the Spaniards, were
compelled by the superior forces of the enemy to evacuate the
settlements in the year 1700. It is possible that if this attempt at
colonization had been made after and not before the Union of Scotland
and Ireland it would have met with much less opposition in England,
perhaps would have received government sympathy and support. In that
case the isthmus would have been added to the British dominions, and a
waterway might have been constructed under the British flag. It should
be added that Paterson, who had personally surveyed the isthmus,
positively declared that the construction of a canal was a feasible
undertaking.
During the eighteenth century, though surveying was carried out in many
parts of the isthmus by European engineers, the project of a canal was
never seriously taken up. It may be remembered that in 1780 our own
Nelson was at Nicaragua, annexing the lake and getting control of the
interoceanic route in this region, but doing little more than injuring
his own health. With the nineteenth century, however, events began to
move at the isthmus. The great scientist, Alexander von Humboldt, spent
the first few years of the new century in Mexico and Central America. In
his "Political Essay on New Spain" he described the impervious isthmus,
"the barrier against the waves of the Atlantic," as for ages "the
bulwark of the independence of China and Japan."
The absence of any water communication at the isthmus between the two
oceans has indeed had highly important political and economic results.
It kept East and West far asunder. It removed the west coast of North
America from the colonizing rivalries of the Old World. England and the
United States seemed for long ages only semiconscious of their
territories on the Pacific which were awaiting colonization. Even in
recent times very few emigrants from Europe, who went out with the
intention of going far west, penetrated much further than Chicago or
Manitoba. Population and industrial enterprise were concentrated in the
east of Canada and the United States, and have only begun within modern
times to move effectually westwards. England was indeed so indifferent
about her territories along a far coast, which could be reached only
round the Horn or by an almost impossible land-transit, that in the
settlement of the Oregon boundary in the middle of last century she
accepted a Canadian frontier-line much further north than would
otherwise have contented her. She had at least as good a right to
California and the territories to the northwards as the descendants of
her revolted colonists. The absence of a waterway at the narrow lands
secured to the United States and to England their expansion westwards,
but imposed on the westward movement a very slow and gradual pace. One
result of the new canal will be a very rapid development of these
Pacific slopes, especially those of British Columbia.
The effect on South America of this complete severance of East and West
has also been very important. The republics on the Pacific have been
sheltered as much as possible from European influences. Immigration has
been naturally restricted, the population, especially that of Chile,
kept free from negro admixture, and the development of the countries
effectually checked. The opening of the canal will, of course, have a
contrary effect all along these lines.
But, to return from this digression, Humboldt described six routes in
Central America where a canal would be practicable, including that which
was afterwards adopted at Panama. He investigated and discussed many
physiographical questions in connection with the subject. There had
arisen a general belief that the level of the Pacific was much higher
than that of the Atlantic, and that a sea-level canal would therefore be
impossible. Humboldt declared against this theory. But it is curious to
find him favouring the idea that the construction of a tide-level canal
might have the effect of diverting the Gulf Stream from our shores, and
thus making the climate of our British islands much more rigorous and
inhospitable.
The researches of Humboldt in the West Indies and Central America much
interested the scientist's great fellow-countryman, Goethe. A passage
from Goethe's "Conversations with Eckermann" is worth quoting as an
example of prophecy wonderfully fulfilled:--
Humboldt [said Goethe] has with great practical knowledge
mentioned other points where, by utilizing some of the
rivers which flow into the Gulf of Mexico, the end could
perhaps be more advantageously attained than at Panama.
Well, all this is reserved for the future, and for a great
spirit of enterprise. But so much is certain: if a project
of the kind succeeded in making it possible for ships of
whatever lading or size to go through such a canal from the
Gulf of Mexico to the Pacific Ocean, quite incalculable
results would ensue for the whole of civilized and
uncivilized humanity. I should be surprised, however, if
the United States were to let the opportunity escape them of
getting such an achievement into their own hands. We may
expect this youthful Power, with its decided tendency
westwards, in thirty or forty years to have also occupied
and peopled the extensive tracts of land beyond the Rocky
Mountains. We may further expect that along the whole
Pacific coast, where Nature has already formed the largest
and safest harbours, commercial cities of the utmost
importance will gradually arise, to be the medium of trade
between China, together with the East Indies, and the United
States. Were this to happen, it would be not alone desirable
but even almost necessary that merchantmen as well as
men-of-war should maintain a more rapid connection between
the west and east coasts of North America than has
previously been possible by the wearisome, disagreeable, and
costly voyage round Cape Horn. I repeat, then: it is
absolutely indispensable for the United States to effect a
way through from the Gulf of Mexico to the Pacific Ocean,
and I am certain they will compass it. This I should like to
live to see, but I shall not. Secondly, I should like to
live to see a connection established between the Danube and
the Rhine. But this, too, is an undertaking so gigantic that
I doubt its being accomplished, especially when I consider
our German means. Thirdly and lastly, I should like to see
the English in possession of a Suez Canal. These three great
things I should like to live to see, and it would almost be
worth while for their sakes to hold out for some fifty
years.
Many projects for canal construction, chiefly by the Nicaraguan route,
were started and failed during the first half of the nineteenth century.
The second decade of that century witnessed the revolt one by one of all
the Spanish provinces in Central and South America. The Colombian
Confederation, comprising Venezuela, Ecuador, and New Granada, achieved
their independence in 1821. Panama quickly followed, and allied itself
with New Granada (now Colombia). In 1825 the Central American envoy to
the United States urged the American government to co-operate in the
canal enterprise with the states he represented. The result was that
Henry Clay, the American Secretary of State, ordered an official survey
at Nicaragua, and scheme followed scheme in quick succession. In 1829
the King of Holland was granted a canal concession by the Nicaraguan
government. This enterprise was frustrated by the outbreak of the
revolution in the Netherlands and Belgium. It would be tedious to
enumerate the many projects started during the following years. But it
is worth recalling that Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, who was then a
prisoner in the fortress of Ham, became interested in the subject, and
while still a captive obtained a concession and franchise for a canal
company from the Nicaraguan government. He published a pamphlet on the
Isthmian Canal question which aroused a good deal of attention, though
its author's interest was soon diverted to political events nearer home.
A passage from his little book is interesting for its strong advocacy of
the Nicaraguan route by the San Juan River and the lakes:--
The geographical position of Constantinople rendered her the
queen of the ancient world. Occupying, as she does, the
central point between Europe, Asia, and Africa, she could
become the entrepot of the commerce of all these countries,
and obtain over them immense preponderance; for in politics,
as in strategy, a central position always commands the
circumference. This is what the proud city of Constantine
could be, but it is what she is not, because, as Montesquieu
says, "God permitted that the Turks should exist on earth,
as a people most fit to possess uselessly a great empire."
There exists in the New World a state as admirably situated
as Constantinople, and we must say, up to this time, as
uselessly occupied. We allude to the State of Nicaragua. As
Constantinople is the centre of the Ancient World, so is the
town of Leon the centre of the New, and if the tongue of
land which separates its two lakes from the Pacific Ocean
were cut through, she would command by virtue of her central
position the entire coast of North and South America. The
State of Nicaragua can become, better than Constantinople,
the necessary route of the great commerce of the world, and
is destined to attain an extraordinary degree of prosperity
and grandeur. France, England, and Holland have a great
commercial interest in the establishment of a communication
between the two oceans, but England has more than the other
Powers--a political interest in the execution of this
project. England will see with pleasure Central America
becoming a powerful and flourishing state, which will
establish a balance of power by creating in Spanish America
a new centre of active enterprise, powerful enough to give
rise to a feeling of nationality, and to prevent, by backing
Mexico, any further encroachments from the north.
The idea of a trans-isthmian canal seemed likely in the 'fifties of last
century to prove a cause of discord, if not of war, between England and
the United States. Under the rather "pushful" foreign policy of Lord
Palmerston, England rapidly increased her influence and possessions in
Central America. In 1835 "British Honduras" was practically constituted
a British colony, and British influence was subsequently extended into
Nicaragua and Mosquitia, thus covering the favourite route for an
isthmian waterway. The United States were establishing themselves on the
Pacific through their encroachments on Mexico. In 1846 they acquired the
states of California, Nevada, Arizona, and New Mexico, and naturally
began to attach more importance to the canal project and to feel more
sensitive as regards rival ambitions in Central America. Soon after they
had acquired these Pacific territories, began the great rush for gold to
California, and some shorter way from east to west became necessary than
the sea-trail round the Horn or the weary wagon-trek over the broad
North American continent. Already in 1846, before the Mexican War and
the discovery of gold in California, the United States had made a treaty
with New Granada, by which the former secured rights of transit over the
isthmus "upon any modes of communication that now exist or may hereafter
be constructed," and by which they guaranteed the sovereignty of New
Granada over all the territories at the isthmus.
It was under this treaty that the Panama Railway was constructed which
brought the town of Colon (formerly Aspinwall) into existence, and was
subsequently taken over by the United States government. This railroad
made the isthmus for the first time a highway of world-traffic. It had a
monopoly of isthmian transportation, and was able to make any charges it
pleased. Steamship services to the southern and northern coasts of
America from Panama were developed, and the railway succeeded so well
that it paid down to 1895 an average dividend of 15 per cent. It was
bought by the first French Panama Company for the outrageously high sum
of L5,100,000. The existence of the railway really determined De
Lesseps' choice of the Panama route, and the immense amount of
excavation done by the French had a great deal to do in turn with the
American choice of the same route, so that the construction of the
Panama Railway was a highly important event at the isthmus. The United
States took over the railroad from the French with the unfinished
canal, together with a steamship service from Colon to New York, owned
by the railroad.
The rivalry between England and the United States along the Nicaraguan
route became so acute and dangerous that a very important treaty was
concluded between the two countries in 1850, when we may say that the
Panama Canal question entered the domain of modern politics. The
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, so-called from Mr. John M. Clayton, the American
Secretary of State, and Sir Henry Bulwer, British Minister at
Washington, who negotiated it, held the field for fifty years, and
became the subject of endless discussion between England and the United
States.
FOOTNOTES:
[2] Herodotus tells a story how the people of Knidos were forbidden by
the Delphic oracle to make a canal through the isthmus, along which
their Persian enemies could advance by land to attack them. The oracle
said that if Zeus had wished the place to be an island he would have
made it one. There is a curious resemblance between this story and that
related in the text.