TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE
Italic text is denoted by _underscores_.
Footnote anchors are denoted by [number], and the footnotes have been
placed at the end of the book.
All changes noted in the ERRATA on page 68 have been applied to the
etext. The erratum for p. 21 should have said l. 34, not l. 3.
Some minor changes to the text are noted at the end of the book.
CONSIDERATIONS
ON THE
PRESENT PEACE,
As far as it is relative to the
COLONIES,
AND THE
AFRICAN TRADE.
_Magna est veritas & prævalebit._
LONDON:
Printed for W. BRISTOW, at the West End of St. Paul’s
Church-yard. MDCCLXIII.
[Price One Shilling.]
TO THE
BRITISH PLANTERS.
GENTLEMEN,
An uninterested desire of rendering service to the public, and not an
idle whim, or vanity to appear in print, has induced the editors of
the following facts to publish them. Author is a title they lay no
claim to.
By their unornamented energy alone is meant to gain the reader’s
attention, and to enforce the facts advanced; therefore, without
further apology, they are presented to you in a plain dress, to point
out some measures that were taken to mislead the legislature, whereby
the African trade, in the year 1750, was put upon such a plan, as, by
the event, has proved extreamly detrimental to the British colonies.
On that account, the following sheets can be addressed to none so
properly as to you.
We flatter ourselves it will evidently appear by the contents of the
following pamphlet, that the forts on the coast of Africa, are by no
means upon a proper establishment; likewise that the present method
of carrying on the African trade to those parts where the forts are
situated, by the very high price given for Negroes there, which
occasions the profit arising to be divided between the _European_
merchants and the _African_ traders, but must become extreamly
burthensome and disadvantageous to you, we believe every _real
planter_ will allow.
We cannot admit certain individuals to be esteemed _real planters_,
notwithstanding they may have _one_ or _more plantations_, when
at the same time they are concerned as merchants in the colonies,
who procure the ships from the coast of Africa to be consigned to
them; of which it is conjectured (and not without foundation) many
of them are part owners; for these apparent reasons, it being their
interest to keep up the price of Negroes so consigned to them, as
all such advance encreases their commissions. Therefore, in our
humble opinion, no attention ought to be paid to any remonstrance
from people so much interested, or from those merchants who reside in
Europe, that are connected with them, against any proposals that may
be offered for the general utility of the colonies, which has been
the case; and in consequence, very detrimental measures have been
pursued through the misrepresentation of such opponents.
Should such destructive measures be continued, an absolute
diminution of the annual income from your estates in the colonies
must inevitably ensue, whether from the want of Negroes, or your
purchasing them at too high a rate. In either case, it will prevent
your being able to raise as much sugar, and other plantation-product
you would otherwise do, or to take off as great a quantity of the
manufactures of the mother-country, as were you to have a sufficient
number of Negroes at reasonable prices. Relying upon the above
allegations, with those you will find in the course of the following
pamphlet, the editors presume you will think it most expedient
and conducive for your interests, without loss of time, to apply
to the legislative power, in order that some speedy and effectual
measures be taken and carried into execution for _retrieving_, better
_regulating_ and _extending_ that valuable branch of the _British_
commerce, the _African trade_.
The present seems the most proper time for so great a national
purpose, in order to prevent the _French_ getting the start of you,
which they will exert all their _power_ and _abilities_ to _effect_;
for they are now not only making great preparations to carry on that
trade themselves, but they have already made several _contracts_
with _British_ merchants to supply them with _Negroes_. So intent
are they to secure, by every method they can contrive, as great a
number as possible of those useful people, on which the prosperity
of the _French_ colonies depend: besides, as _peace_ is concluded,
his majesty’s ministers, in whose department it is, will have leisure
to examine minutely into the reasons that induced you to make such
application. Therefore there cannot be a doubt from their known
_abilities_, and willingness to promote the _public good_ by their
care of the _trade_ and _commerce_ of these _kingdoms_, but they will
give their most serious attention to any proposal you may lay before
them for so good a purpose, as the _extending_ and _preserving_ the
_African trade_; and will be as desirous as yourselves to pursue
such plan as appears to them most reasonable for promoting the
general advantage of the _British colonies_, and consequently the
_mother-country_. The editors will not intrude farther on your time,
than to hope something will be done to secure that valuable branch
of commerce to the _British subjects_, they being very desirous to
promote the prosperity of the _British colonies_, and to assure you
that they are with great respect,
Gentlemen,
Your most obedient, and most
Humble servants,
London,
11 April, 1763.
The EDITORS.
Considerations on the Peace,
As far as it is relative to the
Colonies, and the African Trade.
Since the preliminary articles of peace were published by authority,
we have heard many persons in coffee-houses and other places, censure
and blame our negotiators, for their not having obtained better terms.
They say, that our acquisitions in North America are of little
consequence: yet when these acquisitions were in possession of
our enemies, they thought them of inestimable value. Can the
mere alienation of any property cause so sudden a diminution of
its original worth? Surely then pique or dislike to some of our
peace-makers, or private interest to have the war continued, must
have hurried these men beyond the bounds of reason. For if they
would give themselves the least time to reflect seriously, and judge
dispassionately, they would find, that by retaining our conquests
in North America (which are extended beyond our most sanguine
expectations) the greatest benefit and utility must arise to this
the mother-country; inasmuch as we have put ourselves in such a
situation not only in the north, but also in the southern parts,
that it is to be hoped our inland settlers will live in a perfect
state of tranquillity; and his majesty’s subjects carry on and
cultivate that great branch of the British commerce, without dread of
the Indians, or interruption from the subjects of any foreign nation.
This good effect surely must be allowed to be of immense importance
and advantage to Great Britain; and would not have been the case if
we had kept the sugar colonies ceded to France, instead of part of
our continental conquests.
What was the occasion of the war but the negotiators of the last
peace not settling the distinct limits and boundaries of the
territories we and the French were to have in North America? We
rejoice those limits are now settled, and hope so effectually as to
prevent future disputes.
Among the many altercations concerning the preliminary articles, and
the abilities of our negotiators, it must be allowed, with respect
to the commercial interest of this country, there is a noble Lord
in high office, and of the cabinet, whole acknowledged capacity,
great application, and long experience, at a board where he so
judiciously and eminently presided, made him a most competent judge
what measures were proper to be taken for the security, improvement,
and extension of the trade and commerce of Great-Britain and her
colonies. Therefore, we cannot doubt, but his majesty has been well
and faithfully advised as to that part of our pacific negotiations;
because the patriotic spirit, honour and integrity of that nobleman
are universally known and approved. It is not amiss to lay down as
a maxim, that in general the information of merchants is not to be
depended on by the legislature, with respect to trade and commerce,
for many other, besides this principal reason; to wit—A trade may be
very profitable to a particular merchant, city or town, and, at the
same time, be very pernicious to the general interest of the nation,
is a most notorious fact. Have we not heard many falsehoods asserted,
and seen many erroneous calculations laid before the public, with an
interested view of obtaining such private ends, and of defeating in
some very essential points the public welfare?
Whatever self-interested people may clamour to the contrary, there
cannot be a doubt but his majesty and his ministers, in their
negociations, have given the most serious attention to the universal
good of this country, without confining their views, or partially
regarding whether _North America_ is more valuable than the _Sugar
Islands_, because each merited their notice and care, being both
of inestimable value to the mother-country, and reciprocally so to
each other; and all three so essentially connected, that whatever
happens to the disadvantage of the one, must in proportion affect the
other. For the West India islands depend upon _North America_, in a
great measure, for provisions, mill, and other timber; as well as
for horses, cattle, and many things absolutely necessary for the use
of the plantations; which are paid for in _specie_, _sugar_, _rum_,
melasses, and other plantation-produce: moreover, the melasses being
distilled into rum in _North America_, are of great advantage to
the merchants there, in carrying on the African trade directly from
thence, which enables them to make returns for those manufactures,
_&c._ they receive from hence with greater facility. All possible
care should be taken to prevent his majesty’s subjects purchasing
sugar, rum, and particularly melasses, in the French islands, by
prohibiting their importation into North America, by laying a higher
duty upon those articles than that laid by an act, made in the sixth
year of his late majesty’s reign, entitled, “An act for the better
securing and encouraging the trade of his majesty’s sugar colonies,
_&c._” whereby such high duties were laid on all foreign sugars,
rums, and melasses, to be imported into any of his majesty’s colonies
in America, as, it was thought, would answer all the ends of a
prohibition.
But experience has shewn that law, and also those passed in the 12th
and 15th _Car._ II. are too weak to answer the purposes for which
they were designed; and that some more effectual remedies must be
found to prevent the British traders of North America importing
foreign sugar, rum, and melasses, which was a great trade carried on
by them from the French islands before the war; and by that means the
commodities from North America, wanted in the sugar islands, were
greatly advanced to the British planters. And as the northern traders
often refused to take any thing from them but ready money, which
drained them of almost all their gold and silver, for want of which
they were often brought into great distress; therefore all the money
the North American traders used to receive from the British planters,
was carried to foreign sugar colonies, and there laid out in the
purchase of sugar, rum, and melasses, which were carried to our
northern colonies, and there supplied the place of sugar, rum, and
melasses from the British sugar islands; and consequently robbed them
not only of the consumption of so much of their product, but also of
their gold and silver too.
Whereas if the planters in the foreign colonies were obliged to
purchase what they want from the British subjects with ready money
only, and not allowed to give their sugar, rum, and melasses in
barter for the same, it would make the balance of that trade for the
future much more in our favour than it has been against us; because
we having so greatly extended the British dominion on the continent
of America, the French in their sugar islands cannot be supplied with
what they want from thence but by the English; therefore the British
traders may chuse to be paid for their merchandizes in such manner
as they shall please, which the French will be under a necessity of
complying with.
It is well known to those who are acquainted with the sugar islands,
that the profits of the planter depend upon the vent he finds for
his rum and melasses; for if sugar only, and no rum and melasses
could be produced from the sugar cane, it would hardly pay the
expence of culture, and manufacturing it into sugar. Therefore as the
consumption of rum and melasses is stopped or increased, the sugar
colonies (whether English or foreign) must respectively thrive or
decline. And as rum is not allowed to be imported into old France, or
any of its colonies (because it interferes with brandy, which is the
product of the mother-country) this evidently shews how much it is in
the power of Great-Britain to check the progress of the French sugar
islands, and advance that of her own. For if the bringing French rum
and melasses into any of the British dominions, can be effectually
stopped, all the profits made by rum and melasses, in the French
sugar colonies, would be lost to them; because they could find no
vent for it in any other part of the world.
This point strictly attended, and invariably adhered to, and the
African trade secured to the British subjects, to the extent of their
natural and undoubted right, would diminish the growth of sugar in
the French islands, and increase it in our own; and might, with the
addition of our new acquisitions, very probably in the course of
some years, be a means of enabling the English to undersell them
at all foreign markets in Europe, and confine them to their own
consumption. Therefore it is humbly submitted to the consideration
of the legislative power, whether this trade, so apparently hurtful
to the national interest of this kingdom, (which will most certainly
be carried on in the same manner it was before the war) ought not
to be stopped without delay; and the importation of foreign sugar,
rum, or melasses, into any of the British colonies in North America,
prohibited under such penalties, and with such encouragements to
inform and seize, as may be adequate to the crime, in order to put an
effectual stop to such a pernicious and destructive commerce.
From what has been before observed, it will, it is presumed,
evidently appear how necessary it must be for the advantage of the
British sugar colonies, to promote as much as possible the sale and
consumption of rum and melasses, upon which, in a great measure, the
well-being and prosperity of the planters depend. On that account,
and in order to promote such desirable purpose, suppose the duties on
melasses, and the excise on rum, were to be lowered, such procedure
would favour our plantations in their rivalship with France, and
the lessening these duties will, in a great measure, prevent the
smuggling of foreign brandy to such a degree, as may probably augment
the revenue arising therefrom, by a greater quantity of rum and
melasses being disposed of, which consequently must considerably
encrease our navigation; and the disadvantage to our rivals in trade
will be in proportion to our success. Besides, rum, if it can be
got at a reasonable rate, will greatly increase the consumption of
malt spirits, by mixing them in such proportion as are suitable to
the palate of an infinite variety of people. This is evident from
the great quantities, and the various prices that spirits are sold
for under the denomination of rum, which are from 5_s._ or 7_s._ to
10_s._ _per_ gallon.
The trade carried on between Great Britain, Ireland, North America,
the West India islands and Africa, is of greater advantage to this
country, than all our other trades whatsoever, arising from the great
exportation of _British_ manufactures, _East India_ goods, provisions
as well as _linens_ from _Ireland_, which are paid for with _specie_,
_sugar_, _tobacco_, _rice_, _cotton_, and other plantation-produce;
and with the commodities of _Africa_, such as _gold dust_, _bees
wax_, _elephants teeth_, _gum Senegal_, various sorts of _dying
woods_, and particularly _Negroes for the plantations_; whence it
manifestly appears, upon the African trade, and the invaluable
commerce of our colonies, above two-thirds of the British navigation
depends; and for this very obvious reason it may be asserted, that in
the vessels employed for said traffic, the most useful sailors for
manning his majesty’s navy (the great bulwark of this nation) are
bred; because they are inured to the manner of living on board ships,
as well in the hot as in the cold climates; which is not the case of
sailors taken out of coasting vessels, colliers, and traders to the
north seas, as hath been frequently experienced by the many (very
useful) lives in our expeditions to the East and West Indies being
lost; and that fatality was chiefly owing to their not having been
accustomed to live on salt provisions, and to bear the excessive heat
of the climate, which they were unacquainted with, and unpractised in.
To prevent the like catastrophes hereafter, when occasion shall
require, we would propose the chusing out of the several ships
that may lie in the harbours of Great-Britain, such sailors only
as shall have been a voyage or more to the hot countries, to man
such expedition fleets for those parts of the world, where the sun’s
power is strong, as the more probable means of preserving the lives
of a great number of those valuable sailors, who may not have had a
seasoning, and have been mostly employed in the coasting trade and
short voyages.
We have been induced to throw out this hint, in hopes that it may
engage the attention of some more able pen, to form a scheme for such
a good, humane, and noble end, before the commencement of another
war.[1]
It must be allowed by those who have a general knowledge of the
trade and commerce of _Great-Britain_ and _Ireland_, that the
_Negro-trade_ on the coast of _Africa_, is the chief and fundamental
support of the _British colonies_, by supplying them with that race
of useful people called Negroes, to be employed in cultivating the
lands. But when there is either a deficiency of them, or that they
are purchaseable but at high prices, then such checks must greatly
impoverish our British planters; and in consequence, considerably
diminish the wealth, power, trade and navigation of these kingdoms,
the encrease of which has been, in a great measure, owing to the
extensive commerce to and from our colonies and plantations:
therefore their not being properly supplied with Negroes, must
be extremely detrimental to them; which induces us to make some
observations upon a memorial taken notice of in the _Public Ledger_,
of the third of November last, wherein it was asserted, that sir
_William Meredith_, one of the representatives in parliament for the
town of _Liverpool_, had presented a memorial to the right honourable
the earl of _Egremont_, one of his majesty’s principal secretaries
of state, “setting forth the great advantages of the trade of
_Guadaloupe, where they received_ 334,605_l._ 11_s._ 2_d._[2] for
12,347 slaves, the cargoes of 41 ships, purchased in Africa with
British manufactures; praying that the possession of that island
might be thought of in the negotiation for peace, if not incompatible
with the general scheme of affairs.” This memorial we could not have
expected from that quarter, recollecting that the great _Hardman_ is
no more. Had he been living, it would not have been wondered at, as
he was noted for his contriving, and being industrious at procuring
and presenting, memorials and petitions. He even influenced some
_merchants_ of the town of Rippon in Yorkshire, to petition the
parliament, when that great and important trade to Africa was under
its consideration. He likewise prevailed on many other towns to
petition, all as little interested and connected with the trade of
Africa, as Rippon; and said Rippon was never famous for any other
manufactory, that we could hear of, but that of making spurs; and
the cream of the jest is, that not a single pair, as a commercial
article, was ever sent to Africa; at the same time many other
measures were pursued, very singular methods taken, and absolute
untruths asserted as facts, to mislead the legislature, in order, as
it is supposed, to prevent the forts and settlements being put upon
a proper establishment, that were all as inconsistent as the Rippon
petition.
It was at that period boldly advanced at the bar of the house of
Commons, and with great industry propagated among the members, that
the forts in _Africa_ were only useful, as marks of possession
and sovereignty; which, if true, why has 19,565_l._ 14_s._ 2_d._
sterling been expended in building part of a fort at _Anamaboa_, to
the 30th June, 1756, as appears by the African committee’s accounts
to that time, when the further building of that fort was put under
the direction of the board of ordnance[3]? which sum has been since
paid by the public more than the annual grant of 10,000_l._ then
insisted as sufficient for the support of the forts. But we have been
informed, those prevaricating advocates have since altered their
opinion, and think it a very inadequate sum for such purpose: and it
appears by the votes of the honourable house of Commons, application
has been made to parliament to enlarge the annual grant; and there
was granted for the year 1761, 13,000_l._ and for the year 1762, the
like sum, by which it is conjectured the said advocates have found
it absolutely necessary that the forts ought to be kept in a better
state than that of marks of _possession_ and _sovereignty_ only.
But that cannot be done, when we consider in what manner the money
granted by parliament to the African committee, is appropriated in
Africa, which the government never receives any account of.
The great argument made use of to the then ministers[4], to obtain
a dissolution of the late African company, by the advocates for
the present system, was, that 10,000_l._ was quite adequate and
sufficient for the support and maintenance of the forts. This, we
believe, was one of the strongest reasons for those ministers
adopting their scheme, which had as much truth in it, as many other
assertions at that time made use of.
The late company, from their experience, insisted that sum was very
insufficient; which it really was, even to give in presents annually
to the principal natives, to cultivate such an interest as is not
only necessary, but absolutely essential to support and promote the
honour, power, jurisdiction, and trade of Great Britain on the coast
of Africa. However, there has been granted, since the forts were put
under the care of the present Africa committee for their support,
from 2d February, 1751, to 2d February, 1763, 136,000_l._ which is
11,333_l._ 6_s._ 8_d._ _per annum_, exclusive of what was expended
in building the fort at Annamaboa. Notwithstanding said grants,
the forts have not been kept even[5] as marks of possession and
sovereignty; which undeniable truth the editors are ready to prove,
if called upon.
Mourn! mourn! O _Liverpool_, for the loss of thy great hero and
champion, who was at all times ready to enter the lists in defence
of thy trade and commerce. But, Britain rejoice; for what may have
been for the advantage of the town of _Liverpool_, might be greatly
detrimental and prejudicial to the general trade and commerce of
this country and its colonies; which surely must clearly appear from
the beforementioned memorial. For we believe it will be allowed,
if we were to encrease and extend the number of our colonies in
North America, and the West Indies, it would be disadvantageous to
Great Britain, unless they can be supplied with a sufficient number
of people for their defence and cultivation, at as reasonable
an expence as possible; without taking the hands that are useful
and necessary in husbandry, and the several manufactures of the
mother-country.
Then surely, as Guadaloupe was surrendered by capitulation to the
British arms, no longer than since the 4th day of May, 1759; and as
the merchants of _Liverpool_ had imported 12,347 Negroes into that
island some months ago, which must have been the case, or they could
not have had so exact an account; we may well conclude that a great
number of Negroes have also been carried to _Guadaloupe_, and the
other conquered islands, by the merchants of _London_, _Bristol_,
and other ports, that carry on a trade to _Africa_, and have been
carrying negroes from the time they had the last accounts, which we
may suppose to be at least six months preceding the merchants of
_Liverpool_’s memorial being presented to lord Egremont.
This must be undoubtedly of great advantage to the _French_ planters,
and extremely detrimental to our North American and West India
colonies, for want of the _Negroes_ that have been sold to those
conquered islands; which must consequently cause a scarcity, and
enhance the price of those carried to the real colonies of Great
Britain. Because the merchants of _Liverpool_, and others concerned
in the _African_ trade, must be truly sensible, that they can
find beneficial markets in our colonies for treble the number of
Negroes they can purchase with _British_ manufactures. So that the
consumption of those manufactures is not encreased, as they would
insinuate, by their selling Negroes to the _French islands_ (for
so we must call them while they have _French inhabitants_) when
the selling such Negroes is so apparently disadvantageous to our
colonies that are inhabited by British subjects; on which account
we submit, whether as we are to give back to France _Martinico_,
_Guadaloupe_, _Marigalante_, _Deserade_, and _St. Lucia_, orders
should not be immediately sent to the governors of such islands, to
prevent _British_ subjects selling any Negroes to the _French_, which
it would be impolitic to do, even were we to have kept possession of
them.
The ships that have been fitted out, and are upon their voyages with
an intention to sell Negroes on the _French islands_, may dispose
of them in the adjacent _British colonies_, where they will meet
with purchasers for any number, at such prices as will make their
voyages profitable. Therefore such order will not be hurtful to the
merchants, but of great advantage to the _British planters_, and
consequently so to this country.
It is for that reason we insist it was our interest to return those
islands to France, to whom (if proper steps are pursued by us) they
must and will become a continual expence, burthen and incumbrance;
nor would our retention of them have been an advantage to us: for as
the inhabitants are _French_, we must always have kept a military
force there at a very great expence, of which recruiting would be no
small part. And one great consideration ought to be, the _number of
British subjects that would die in that unhealthy climate_, if they
were only the soldiers that must annually be sent to complete the
regiments necessary to be kept on that service. That service alone
would be productive of a great expence; and the loss of so many
subjects would prove very detrimental to _Great Britain_.
Besides, for argument’s sake, let us suppose we had kept _Martinico_,
_Guadaloupe_, _St. Lucia_, _Marigalante_ and _Deserade_, it would
have been highly disadvantageous to the _British planters_, and
must prejudice them much in their circumstances, so as in a short
time to reduce the old _British_ sugar islands, now so populous
and flourishing, to such a state, that it made us tremble to think
of it; because the British _African_ traders would supply those
islands taken from the French with Negroes, in preference to the
old _British_ colonies; which fully appears by the number they have
been supplied with already; and as those islands are now ceded to
France, will be of great advantage to the planters therein, by
their having been in our possession, on account of the Negroes they
have purchased to cultivate their plantations. And had we kept
said islands, as soon as they had been sufficiently stock’d, they
would have carried on a trade for the redundant Negroes with their
countrymen at _St. Domingo_. Hence it appears, that great care must
be taken to prevent their having it in their power so to do after
those islands are restored to France; as we do not in the least
doubt, but from the intercourse our countrymen have had with them for
the sake of profit, contracts will be made for such anti-national
purpose. And such a commerce would enable them and the planters
of _St. Domingo_ to cultivate sugar and other plantation-produce
sufficient to supply all Europe; and by such means prevent Great
Britain’s reaping the advantage that she derives from the exportation
of the produce of her colonies: which is so essential a benefit to
her, and is one of the first causes of our receiving a balance of
trade from foreign countries, and in which the landed interest,
merchants and manufacturers of _Great Britain_ and _Ireland_, as also
the _planters_ and _merchants_ in our _colonies_, are so materially
concerned and interested. For the lands in Britain must always rise
and fall in proportion as our manufactures and navigation prosper or
decline, and the national revenue encrease or diminish, as the trade
of our colonies is in a more or less flourishing way.
Therefore is it not evident, that there is not a man in this kingdom,
who, in proportion to his possession and property in the community,
does not partake of the benefits and advantages accruing from the
_African_, _North American_, and _West Indian_ trades; and who would
not be a sufferer in proportion to his situation in life, should
they diminish, by falling into the hands of people belonging to any
other nation? where, supposing it to be the case, the profit of those
valuable trades must consequently center.
For notwithstanding the advantage the French inhabitants would have
had by our retention of those islands, they would take nothing from
us for the use of themselves, or their plantations, but what they
were obliged to out of the greatest necessity; as we have no wines
to supply them with, which are proper for that country: so that they
would have their wines, and every thing else they could possibly
procure, from France; having been accustomed from their infancy
to wear French, which they would ever look on as their own native
manufactures. And sorry we are to say, too many of them are used in
the British colonies, as well as in this country. For which reason
they would always have a dislike to British manufactures, and that
would induce them to pursue every measure to smuggle their own into
those islands; and for the sake of profit, many English traders would
be induced to carry them from the Isle of Man, Guernsey, Jersey, and
other places, in preference to those of their own country, which has
already been the case. But supposing it not so, the real profits
of those islands, while possessed by French inhabitants, would not
center in Great Britain, but in France; because, on account of the
difference in religion, they would send their children thither for
education, and make provision for themselves to retire there, always
looking upon it as their home. Even so our planters do in regard to
Great Britain; for all those who go to the West Indies, or are born
there, have no intention to end their days in that climate, but are
always aiming to lay by a sufficiency to go home, as they call it;
that is, the _English_ planters to come to _Great Britain_, and the
_French_ to _France_.
By what has hitherto been advanced, surely it will evidently appear
to every impartial reader, that had we retain’d the French sugar
islands, they would not have been of any advantage to this country,
but on the contrary. It is not the number of islands, where sugar,
tobacco, rice, and other plantation-products are raised, that will
be advantageous to this or any other country, without they can be
supplied with a sufficient number of Negroes for their cultivation;
the land being all tilled by hand-labour with the hoe, as there is no
ploughing with oxen and horses in the West Indies, except in Jamaica,
where two or three planters have used the plough to some part of
their plantations, where the soil was light, and of a sandy nature;
and all other work is done by _Negroes_, as Europeans cannot do any
laborious work there.
Their field _labourers_, sugar _boilers_, _distillers_, _coopers_,
_mill-wrights_, _carpenters_, _masons_, _builders_, _smiths_, and
house _servants_, are _blacks_; therefore it is not the number of
islands, but the greatest number of the _best Negroes_ that benefit
the mother-country, _which sort_ we can make appear, the French
since the year 1729, in times of peace, to the commencement of the
present war, have been constantly supplied with. That is one of the
true causes why they have produced such quantities of sugar, and
other plantation-product; that for several years before the war, they
were become our rivals at foreign markets, so far as to draw from
thence a great annual balance of trade in favour of France.[6] But
this _effect_ would have been prevented, if proper measures had been
pursued by us for the preservation of the _African_ trade, to that
part of _Africa_ where the hardy Negroes, who are inured to labour in
their own country, were to be purchased.
The French, from the year 1729, to the end of the year 1738, carried
from the _Gold Coast_, _Popo_ and _Whydah_, _fifteen_ or _seventeen
thousand_ of those valuable people annually; when _four thousand_,
in any one year during that period, were not carried to the British
plantations; which is the truest reason that can be assigned for the
prosperity of the French colonies, and the main spring of the great
increase of their product. For they do not understand the cultivation
and management of a plantation in any degree equal to the British
planters: therefore their advantage and success has been owing, in a
great measure, to the good and hardy labourers they have had to till
their land, and manufacture the product of it.
We doubt not but the merchants trading to Africa will say, they
have imported since the year 1729, more Negroes into the _British_
sugar islands, than the _French_ have to theirs in time of peace
(to the commencement of the present war). We admit they have, of
Negroes from _Gambia_, _Calabar_, _Boney_, _Benin_, the _windward
coast_, and _Angola_. But we take upon us to assert, they cannot
with truth say, they have imported to the colonies as many Negroes
from the _Gold Coast_, _Popo_, and _Whidah_, which are the most
valuable for the laborious cultivation of the sugar cane, and other
plantation-product, and manufacturing it into sugar and rum, for the
following seasons.
The _Gold Coast_, _Popo_, and _Whidah_ Negroes are born in a part
of Africa that is very barren; a small bullock carried thither from
another part, when fatted, will sell for near 32_l._ a sheep for
20_s._ four small fowls for 4_s._ sterling, and all other provisions
in proportion, except fish; and their coarse kind of bread, which
is their chief food. On that account, when able to take the hoe
in hand, they are obliged to go and cultivate the land for their
subsistance. They also live hardily; so that when they are carried
to our plantations (as they have been used to hard labour from their
infancy) they become a strong, robust people, and can live upon the
sort of food the planters allow them; which is, bread made of Indian
corn, and fish, such as herrings and pilchards sent from Britain,
and dried fish from North America, being such food as they lived
upon in their own country. Indeed they live better in general in our
plantations; and they are always ready, on their arrival there, to go
to the hard work necessary in planting and manufacturing the sugar
cane.
On the other hand, the _Gambia_, _Calabar_, _Boney_, and _Angola_
Negroes are brought from those parts of _Africa_, that are extremely
fertile, where every thing grows almost spontaneously; and where a
bullock may be bought for less than 20_s._ a sheep for 1_s._ and a
dozen of fowls for the same. They have every other necessary of life
in great plenty. On that account, the men never work, but lead an
indolent life, and are in general of a lazy disposition and tender
constitution; for the necessary work among them is done by the women,
which is little more than fetching wood to dress their victuals: so
that when those people are carried to our sugar islands, they are
obliged to be nursed, to be taken great care of, and brought to work
by degrees.
The planters, when the _Gold Coast_ and _Whidah_ Negroes were carried
to the sugar colonies, before the _French_ interfered in that trade,
found there was not a sufficient number to extend their cultivation,
by carrying on all the different planting business, and therefore
were accustomed to purchase those tender (the worst sort of) Negroes,
and employ them for household servants, to raise corn, aloes, look
after cattle, bring them up to trades and easy labour, knowing them
unfit for the hard work necessary in sugar-plantations.
The Negroes of the river _Gambia_ are better than the last-mentioned;
both of which are much more proper for the North American planters,
as they have plenty of provisions at a small expence, and, on that
account, can use them to gentle labour, and inure them, by degrees,
to work with the same sort of food they were accustomed to in their
own country.
But that is not the case of the planters in the sugar islands; which
sufficiently proves how disadvantageous it must be to have such
imported there, in preference to those that would be so immediately
useful and serviceable, or to let the French purchase the better sort.
Yet such has been the case, it being for the interest of the African
merchants to supply the _British_ planters with the inferior sort, as
each Negro costs much less on the coast of _Angola_, &c. than those
from the _Gold Coast_, &c. which saves a great deal in the outset of
the cargoes sent to _Africa_, and consequently greatly encreases the
net profit on the voyages, as the tender and worst sort of Negroes
will sell in the sugar islands for near as great a price each as the
best, provided there is none of the latter at market; and a greater
number of the former being subject to die, must encrease the demand.
This we thought proper to take notice of, to shew how necessary
it will be for the interest of this country, that the French
should not for the future be allowed to trade in _Africa_, at cape
_Appollonia_, or between it and the river _Volta_, where, and at
_Popo_ and _Whidah_, to the eastward of that river, the valuable
Negroes beforementioned, adapted by their natural constitution for
cultivating the sugar plantations, are to be purchased; otherwise
in times of peace, they will be constantly making encroachments as
heretofore; so that when the late company’s governor at _Cape Coast
Castle_ saw a _French_ vessel upon the Gold Coast, he used to order
an officer to go on board with a message to the following purport.
“You are ordered on board the _French_ vessel, to tell the master,
the governor and council do not make trade with the subjects of
_France_,[7] nor do they suffer the natives to trade with them.
But as there subsists a good friendship and alliance between the
king of Great Britain and the French king, if the master should be
distressed for water, or such like necessaries, he might have it
upon application, by admitting an officer on board, to prevent his
having intercourse with the natives, or others, till he should have
received such supplies; but that he should not be allowed to trade
to the westward of the river _Volta_, which if he attempted, proper
measures would be taken to prevent and obstruct his commerce.
Therefore, should he neglect those orders, and receive any damage
thereby, it would be his own fault; as the governor and council
held the trade of the _Gold Coast_, the indubitable right and
property of THE ROYAL AFRICAN COMPANY OF ENGLAND.”
This warning sometimes had the desired effect; at others, the
governor and council were obliged to arm vessels to drive them off,
which occasioned the masters of French ships to protest against the
said governor and council. The protests were sent to them by the
chevalier _Glandeuves_, commodore of _le Content_ and _Oriflamme_,
two French men of war, in his letters dated _Annamaboa Road_, the 9th
and 12th of February, 1751, wherein he insisted that the French had
an undoubted right to trade to any part of Africa, out of gun-shot of
any European fort.
How far the then governor and council were justifiable, in arming
private ships to defend and preserve the trade and commerce under
their care in time of peace, or any future council may be for
exerting themselves in a like manner, we will not undertake to say;
but are fully satisfied the French will go thither, and that the
governor of the fort at Annamaboa will not be able to prevent their
having intercourse with the natives, but by arming vessels to see
them to the eastward of the river _Volta_. For we are of opinion,
property and right are not to be tamely given up in that part of
the world, in hopes of relief from our administration at home; it
being so remote from the giving of immediate redress, and distant
from appeal; or at least, it has happened so in all complaints made
to former ministers. Many instances thereof can be given, which
induced us to lay before the public the foregoing observations, as
the present seems the most proper time to have such rights settled,
to prevent future disputes between the subjects of both nations,
which if not prevented in an effectual manner, by putting the forts
upon an establishment, that the officers commanding them may be in
such situation, as to protect the trade under their care from the
encroachments of any foreigners, will inevitably happen.
It is also necessary to remark, that the French should not be
permitted to re-settle a factory they had before the war at _Abreda_,
about a league below _James Fort_, in the river _Gambia_, which was
destroyed by that gallant sea officer, and brave commander Sir George
Pocock, in the year 1744, but settled again after the peace; and
again destroyed this war by Capt. Marsh, commander of his majesty’s
ship Harwich.
If they are not permitted to re-establish that factory, and the trade
of _Gambia_ and _Senegal_ rivers are pursued in a proper manner,
_Goree_ will be of no consequence, but an expence to France, for
many good reasons we think it improper at present to enlarge upon;
knowing there is a work in hand that will soon be published, wherein
all the advantages of the _African trade_ are fully considered from
the time LETTERS PATENT were granted by king Charles the second, the
27th day of September, 1672, to establish and incorporate the late
royal African company of England; shewing how the trade was carried
on by that company, and the true cause of their having been rendered
unable to support their forts and settlements without the aid of
government, with the ill consequences that attended the decay of that
valuable branch of British commerce, on which the prosperity of our
colonies, and so many branches of our manufactures, depend; followed
by observations on the qualities of manufactures sent thither, and
the regulations that it is necessary should be made regarding the
same. To which will be added, a plan to revive and extend that trade
to the inland parts of _Africa_, so as the most valuable Negroes may
be secured for the British planters, as the only means to prevent the
growth of the French colonies, or at least to make them extremely
expensive and burthensome to their mother-country; and, on the
contrary, ours to become of the greatest benefit and advantage to
Great Britain and Ireland.
Senegal is most certainly a great and valuable acquisition to this
country, if put upon a proper establishment, as it will secure to us
all the gum trade, so useful in our manufactures, and will greatly
encrease the slave, gold and ivory trades in _Gambia_ river. For
when Senegal was in possession of the French, by means of a fort
they had at _Gallam_, about five hundred miles from the sea up that
river (since the decline of the late Africa company, by no factory
being kept at _Fatatenda_, about the same distance up _Gambia_ river)
intercepted the greatest part of the slave, ivory and gold trades,
that came from the several inland countries to the north east of
those rivers: therefore, if proper steps are taken, those trades may
be greatly encreased and extended at an inconsiderable expence, not
having the subjects of any foreign nation to interest themselves
against such a scheme.
The African merchants, to vindicate themselves in carrying on the
trade for the _worst Negroes_ in preference to the other, give out,
that the better sort are not to be come at. But there is no other
grounds for such an assertion, than that the roads to those great
and populous inland countries lying at the back of the forts and
settlements on the _Gold Coast_, have been stopt since the year 1738,
which has prevented all intercourse with the natives, except those
who live within about fifty miles of the sea-coast; whereby a stop
was put to that great trade which came down, when the roads were
kept open by the power and influence of the company’s officers,
and by their alliance and friendship with the several princes and
people in power, living in the different _countries near_, and in the
_towns_ on the said _roads_, that were opened and settled by the late
company’s officers at a very great expence.
One great reason for the decline of their power and influence was,
by the masters of private trading vessels putting in practice every
measure they could invent to vilify and render the company’s officers
insignificant and contemptible to the inland people and Negroes under
their command.
By which sinister machinations, they lost that weight and authority
so necessary for them to act as protectors of the injured, and
mediators in adjusting and deciding disputes that frequently happen
between _African_ princes; which if the company’s officers cannot
accomplish by policy, presents, or amicable measures, they should
be maintained in such a respectable situation, as to be able to
join the injured party, and to compel the refractory to accommodate
matters[8], so as to procure peace, and bring the country to a state
of tranquillity.
For it is a mistaken notion, that the company’s officers (during
their command) created wars between the _African_ chiefs, in order
to purchase the prisoners, which should be made on either side. This
falsehood was propagated also at a certain time, to serve particular
purposes. On the contrary, slaves are bred in the inland parts of
_Africa_, and sent for sale, according to the want those people are
in for _European_ manufactures; the same as an ox or horse is taken
to market, when a farmer in England wants money to pay his rent, or
for other purposes. Every man in Africa is looked upon to be a man
of property and power in proportion to the number of Negroes he is
possessed of.