is taken at the _very moment_ when you were informed by a member of
the house, that the governor had assured him of his having received
instructions from the proprietaries, to give his assent to the
taxation of their estates; in the _same manner_ that the estates
of other persons are to be taxed; and also _to confirm_, for the
public use, the several squares formerly _claimed_ by the city."
O the force of friendship! the power of interest! What politeness
they infuse into a writer, and what _delicate_ expressions they
produce!--The dispute between the proprietaries and us was about the
_quantum_, the _rate_ of their taxation, and not about the _manner_;
but now, when all the world condemns them for requiring a partial
exemption of their estates, and they are forced to submit to an
honest equality, it is called "_assenting_ to be taxed in the _same
manner_ with the people." Their _restitution_ of five public squares
in the plan of the city, which they had near forty years unjustly
and dishonourably seized and detained from us, (directing their
surveyor to map streets over them, in order to turn them into lots,
and their officers to sell a part of them;) this their _disgorging_
is softly called _confirming_ them for the public use; and instead
of the plain words "_formerly given_ to the city, by the first
proprietary, their father," we have the cautious pretty expression
of "formerly _claimed_ by the city:" Yes; not only _formerly_, but
_always_ claimed, ever since they were _promised_ and _given_ to
encourage the settlers; and ever will be _claimed_, till we are
put in actual possession of them. It is pleasant, however, to see
how lightly and tenderly you trip over these matters, as if you
trod upon eggs. But that "_very moment_," that precious moment!
Why was it so long delayed? Why were those healing instructions so
long withheld and concealed from the people? They were, it seems,
brought over by Mr. Allen:[70] intelligence was received by various
hands from London, that orders were sent by the proprietaries, from
which great hopes were entertained of an accommodation. Why was
the bringing and the delivery of such orders so long _denied_? The
reason is easily understood. Messieurs Barclays, friends to both
proprietaries and people, wished for that gentleman's happy arrival;
hoping his _influence_, added to the _power_ and _commissions_ the
proprietaries had vested him with, might prove effectual in restoring
harmony and tranquillity among us; but _he_, it seems, hoped his
_influence_ might do the business, without those additions. There
appeared on his arrival some prospect (from sundry circumstances) of
a _change_ to be made in the house by the approaching election. The
proprietary friends and creatures knew the heart of their master;
and how extremely disagreeable to him that _equal taxation_, that
_restitution_, and the other _concessions_ to be made for the sake of
a reconciliation, must necessarily be. They hoped therefore to spare
him all those mortifications, and thereby secure a greater portion
of his favour. Hence the instructions were not produced to the last
assembly, though they arrived before the September sitting, when the
governor was in town, and actually did business with the house. Nor
to the new assembly were they mentioned, till the "_very moment_,"
the fatal moment, when the house were on the point of choosing that
wicked adversary of the proprietary to be an _agent_ for the province
in England.
But I have, you say, a "fixed _enmity to the proprietaries_," and
"you believe it will _preclude all accommodation_ of our disputes
with them, even on just and reasonable terms." And why do you think
I have a fixed enmity to the proprietaries? I have never had any
personal difference with them. I am no land-jobber; and therefore
have never had any thing to do with their land-office or officers; if
I had, probably, like others, I might have been obliged to truckle
to their measures, or have had like causes of complaint. But our
private interests never clashed; and all their resentment against
me, and mine to them, has been on the public account. Let them do
justice to the people of Pensylvania, act honourably by the citizens
of Philadelphia, and become honest men; my enmity, if that's of
any consequence, ceases from the "_very moment_;" and, as soon as
I possibly can, I promise to love, honour and respect them. In the
mean time, why do you "believe it will preclude all _accommodation_
with them on just and reasonable terms?" Do you not boast, that their
gracious condescensions are in the hands of the governor; and that
"if this had been the usual time for business, his honour would have
sent them down in a message to the house." How then can my going
to England prevent this accommodation? The governor can call the
house when he pleases; and, one would think, that, at least in your
opinion, my being out of the way would be a favourable circumstance.
For then, by "cultivating the disposition shown by the proprietaries,
every _reasonable demand_ that can be made on the part of the people
might be obtained: in vigorously insisting on which, you promise to
unite most earnestly with the rest of the house." It seems then we
have "_reasonable demands_" to make, and, as you call them a little
higher, _equitable demands_. This is much for proprietary minions to
own; but you are all growing better, in imitation of your master,
which is indeed very commendable. And if the accommodation here
should fail, I hope, that though you dislike the person a majority
of two to one in the house have thought fit to appoint an agent,
you will nevertheless, in duty to your country, continue the noble
resolution of uniting with the rest of the house, in vigorously
insisting on that _equity_ and _justice_, which such an union will
undoubtedly obtain for us.
I pass over the trivial charge against the assembly, that they "acted
with _unnecessary haste_ in proceeding to this appointment, without
making a small adjournment," &c. and your affected apprehensions of
danger from that haste. The necessity of expedition on this occasion
is as obvious to every one out of doors, as it was to those within;
and the fears you mention are not, I fancy, considerable enough
to break your rest. I come then to your _high_ charge against me,
"that I heretofore ventured, _contrary_ to an act of assembly, to
place the public money in the stocks; whereby this province suffered
a loss of 6000_l._ and that sum, added to the 5000_l._ granted for my
expences, makes the whole cost of my former voyage to England amount
to _eleven thousand pounds_!" How wisely was that form in our laws
contrived, which, when a man is arraigned for his life, requires
the evidence to speak _the truth_, the _whole truth_, and _nothing
but the truth_! The reason is manifest. A falshood may destroy the
innocent, so may _part of a truth_ without _the whole_; and a mixture
of truth and falshood may be full as pernicious. You, Mr. Chief
Justice, and the other justices among the protesters, and you, sir,
who are a counsellor at law, must all of you be well acquainted with
this excellent form; and when you arraigned my reputation (dearer
to me than life) before the assembly, and now at the respectable
tribunal of the public, would it not have well become your honours
to have had some small regard at least to the spirit of that form?
You might have mentioned, that the direction of the act, to lodge
the money in the bank, subject to the drafts of the trustees of the
loan-office here, was impracticable; that the bank refused to receive
it on those terms, it being contrary to their settled rules to take
charge of money subject to the orders of unknown people living in
distant countries. You might have mentioned, that the house being
informed of this, and having no immediate call for the money, did
_themselves_ adopt the measure of placing it in the stocks, which
then were low, where it might on a peace produce a considerable
profit, and in the mean time accumulate an interest: that they even
passed a bill, directing the subsequent sums granted by parliament to
be placed with the former: that the measure was prudent and safe; and
that the loss arose, not from _placing_ the money _in_ the stocks,
but from the imprudent and unnecessary _drawing it out_ at the very
time when they were lowest, on some slight uncertain rumours of a
peace concluded: that if the assembly had let it remain another year,
instead of losing they would have gained _six thousand pounds_; and
that after all, since the exchange at which they sold their bills
was near _twenty per cent_ higher when they drew than when the
stocks were purchased, the loss was far from being so great as you
represent it. All these things you might have said; for they are, and
you know them to be, part of the _whole truth_; but they would have
spoiled your accusation. The late speaker of your honourable house,
Mr. Norris, (who has, I suppose, all my letters to him, and copies
of his own to me, relating to that transaction) can testify with how
much integrity and clearness I managed the whole affair. All the
house were sensible of it, being from time to time fully acquainted
with the facts. If I had gone to gaming in the stocks with the
public money, and through my fault a sum was lost, as your protest
would insinuate, why was I not censured and punished for it when I
returned? You, honourable sir, (my enemy of seven years standing) was
then in the house. You were appointed on the committee for examining
my accounts; you reported, that you found them just, and signed
that report.[71] I never solicited the employ of agent; I made no
bargain for my future service, when I was ordered to England by the
assembly; nor did they vote me any salary. I lived there near six
years at my own expence, and I made no charge or demand when I came
home. You, sir, of all others, was the very member that proposed (for
the honour and justice of the house) a compensation to be made me
of the _five thousand pounds_ you mention. Was it with an intent to
reproach me thus publicly for accepting it? I thanked the house for
it then, and I thank you now for proposing it: though you, who have
lived in England, can easily conceive, that besides the prejudice to
my private affairs by my absence, a _thousand pounds_ more would not
have reimbursed me. The money voted was immediately paid me. But if
I had occasioned the loss of _six thousand pounds_ to the province,
here was a fair opportunity of securing easily the greatest part
of it; why was not the _five thousand pounds_ deducted, and the
remainder called for? The reason is, this accusation was not then
invented. Permit me to add, that supposing the whole _eleven thousand
pounds_ an expence occasioned by my voyage to England, yet the
taxation of the proprietary estate now established will, when valued
by years purchase, be found in time an advantage to the public, far
exceeding that expence. And if the expence is at present a burthen,
the odium of it ought to lie on those, who, by their injustice, made
the voyage necessary; and not on me, who only submitted to the orders
of the house in undertaking it.
I am now to take leave (perhaps a last leave) of the country I
love, and in which I have spent the greatest part of my life.--ESTO
PERPETUA.--I wish every kind of prosperity to my friends,--and I
forgive my enemies.
B. FRANKLIN.
_Philadelphia, Nov. 5, 1764._
FOOTNOTES:
[70]
_Extract of a Letter, dated London, August 6, 1764, from David Barclay
and Sons, to Messieurs James and Drinker._
"We very much wish for William Allen's happy arrival on your side;
when we hope his influence, added to the _power_ and _commissions_
the proprietaries have invested him with, may prove effectual, in
restoring harmony and tranquillity among you, so much to be desired
by every well-wisher to your province. Pray be assured of our
sincerest and best wishes for the success of this salutary work,
and that nothing in our power, to contribute thereto, will ever be
wanting."
[71]
_Report of the Committee on Benjamin Franklin's Accounts._
"In obedience to the order of the house, we have examined the account
of Benjamin Franklin, Esq. with the vouchers to us produced in
support thereof, and do find the same account to be just, and that he
has expended, in the immediate service of this province, the sum of
_seven hundred and fourteen pounds, ten shillings and seven-pence_,
out of the sum of _fifteen hundred pounds_ sterling to him remitted
and paid, exclusive of any allowance or charge for his support and
services for the province.
JOHN MORTON, JOHN HUGHES,
WILLIAM ALLEN, SAMUEL RHOADS,
JOHN ROSS, JOHN WILKINSON,
JOHN MOOR, ISAAC PEARSON.
JOSEPH FOX,
February 19, 1763.
"The house taking the foregoing report of the committee of accounts
into consideration, and having spent some time therein,
"RESOLVED,
"That the sum of _five hundred pounds_ sterling _per annum_ be
allowed and given to Benjamin Franklin, Esq. late agent for the
province of Pensylvania at the court of Great Britain, during his
absence of six years from his business and connections, in the
service of the public; and that the thanks of this house be also
given to the said gentleman by Mr. Speaker, from the chair; as
well for the faithful discharge of his duty to this province in
particular, as for the many and important services done America in
general, during his residence in Great Britain."
_Thursday, March 31, 1763._
"Pursuant to a resolve of the nineteenth of last month, that the
thanks of this house be given to Benjamin Franklin, Esq. for his many
services not only to the province of Pensylvania, but to America in
general, during his late agency at the court of Great Britain; the
same were this day accordingly given in form from the chair.--To
which Mr. Franklin, respectfully addressing himself to the Speaker,
made answer, That he was thankful to the house, for the very
handsome and generous allowance they had been pleased to make him
for his services; but that the approbation of this house was, in his
estimation, far above every other kind of recompence." _Votes_, 1763.
_Remarks on a Plan for the future Management of Indian Affairs[72]._
The regulations in this plan seem to me to be in general very good:
but some few appear to want explanation, or farther consideration.
_Clause_ 3. Is it intended by this clause, to prevent the trade that
Indians, living near the frontiers, may choose to carry on with the
inhabitants, by bringing their skins into the [English] settlements?
This prevention is hardly practicable; as such trade may be carried
on in many places out of the observation of government; the frontier
being of great extent, and the inhabitants thinly settled in the
woods, remote from each other. The Indians too do not every where
live in towns sufficiently numerous to encourage traders to reside
among them, but in scattered families, here and there, often shifting
their situation for the sake of better hunting; and if they _are_
near the English settlements, it would seem to them very hard to be
obliged to carry their skins for sale to remote towns or posts, when
they could dispose of them to their neighbours, with less trouble,
and to greater advantage; as the goods they want for them, are and
must be dearer at such remote posts.
4. The colony "laws for regulating Indian affairs or commerce" are
the result of long experience, made by people on the spot, interested
to make them good; and it would be well to consider the matter
thoroughly, before they are repealed, to make way for new untried
schemes.
By whom are they to be repealed? By the colony assemblies, or by
parliament? Some difficulty will arise here.
13. The districts seem too large for this. The Indians under the care
of the northern superintendant, by this plan, border on the colonies
of Nova Scotia, Quebec, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut,
New York, New Jersey, Pensylvania, Maryland, Virginia: the
superintendant's situation, remote from many of these, may occasion
great inconvenience, if his consent is always to be necessary in such
cases.
14. This seems too much to be done, when the vastness of the district
is considered. If there were more districts and smaller, it might be
more practicable.
15 and 16. Are these agents or commissaries to try causes where life
is concerned? Would it not be better, to send the criminals into some
civil well settled government or colony for trial, where good juries
can be had?
18. "_Chief for the whole tribe; who shall constantly reside with the
commissary, &c._" Provision must then be made for his maintenance,
as particular Indians have no estates, but live by hunting, and
their public has no funds or revenues. Being used to rambling, it
would perhaps not be easy to find one, who would be obliged to this
constant residence; but it may be tried.
22. If the agent and his deputies, and the commissaries, are not to
trade, should it not be a part of their oath, that they will have no
concern in such trade, directly or indirectly? Private agreements
between them and the traders, for share of profits, should be guarded
against, and the same care taken to prevent, if possible, private
agreements between them and the purchasers of Indian lands.
31. ---- "or trading at any other post, &c." This should be so
expressed, as to make the master liable for the offence of the
servant; otherwise it will have no effect.
33. I doubt the settling of _tariffs_ will be a matter of difficulty.
There may be differences of fineness, goodness, and value, in the
goods of different traders, that cannot be properly allowed for by
general tariffs. And it seems contrary to the nature of commerce,
for government to interfere in the prices of commodities. Trade is a
voluntary thing between buyer and seller; in every article of which,
each exercises his own judgment, and is to please himself. Suppose
either Indian or trader is dissatisfied with the tariff, and refuses
barter on those terms, are the refusers to be compelled? if not, why
should an Indian be forbidden to take more goods for skins than your
tariff allows, if the trader is willing to give them, or a trader
more skins for his goods, if the Indian is willing to give them?
Where there are a number of different traders, the separate desire
of each to get more custom will operate in bringing down their goods
to a reasonable price. It therefore seems to me, that trade will
best find and make its own rates; and that government cannot well
interfere, unless it will take the whole trade into its own hands (as
in some colonies it does) and manage it by its own servants, at its
own risque.
38. I apprehend, that if the Indians cannot get _rum_ of fair
traders, it will be a great means of defeating all these regulations,
that direct the trade to be carried on at certain posts. The
countries and forests are so very large, it is scarce possible to
guard every part, so as to prevent unlicensed traders drawing the
Indians and the trade to themselves, by rum and other spiritous
liquors, which all savage people are so fond of. I think they will
generally trade where they can get rum, preferably to where it is
refused them; and the proposed prohibition will therefore be a great
encouragement to unlicensed traders, and promote such trade. If the
commissaries, or officers at the posts, can prevent the selling of
rum during the barter for other goods, and until the Indians are
about going away, it is perhaps all that is practicable or necessary.
The missionaries will, among other things, endeavour to prevail with
them to live soberly and avoid drunkenness.
39. The Indian trade, so far as _credit_ is concerned, has hitherto
been carried on wholly upon honour. They have among themselves no
such things as prisons or confinements for debt. This article seems
to imply, that an Indian may be compelled by law to pay a debt of
fifty shillings or under. Our legal method of compulsion is by
imprisonment: the Indians cannot and will not imprison one another;
and if we attempt to imprison them, I apprehend it would be generally
disliked by the nations, and occasion breaches. They have such
high ideas of the value of personal liberty, and such slight ones
of the value of personal property;[73] that they would think the
disproportion monstrous between the liberty of a man, and a debt of
a few shillings; and that it would be excessively inequitable and
unjust, to take away the one for a default in payment of the other.
It seems to me therefore best, to leave that matter on its present
footing; the debts _under_ fifty shillings as irrecoverable by law,
as this article proposes for the debts _above_ fifty shillings.
Debts of honour are generally as well paid as other debts. Where
no compulsion can be used, it is more disgraceful to be dishonest.
If the trader thinks his risque greater in trusting any particular
Indian, he will either not do it, or proportion his price to his
risque.
44. As the goods for the Indian trade all come from England, and the
peltry is chiefly brought to England; perhaps it will be best to lay
the duty here, on the exportation of the one, and the importation of
the other, to avoid meddling with the question, of the right to lay
duties in America by parliament here.
If it is thought proper to carry the trading part of this plan into
execution, would it not be well to _try it first in a few posts_,
to which the present colony laws for regulating the Indian trade do
not reach; that by experience its utility may be ascertained, or its
defects discovered and amended, before it is made general, and those
laws repealed to make way for it?--If the Indians find by experience,
that they are better used in their trade at the posts, under these
regulations, than at other places, may it not make them desirous of
having the regulations extended to other places; and when extended,
better satisfied with them upon reflection and comparison[74]?
FOOTNOTES:
[72] The plan remarked upon was under the consideration of ministry
before the close of the year 1766, and (as I am inclined to think)
after the commencement of 1765. I can go no nearer as to its date.
It is needless to enter into the particulars of it, as the remarks
explain themselves; except perhaps as to the following points. The
trade was to be open; there were to be two superintendants to it; in
the northern district the trade was to be carried on at fixed posts,
in the southern within the Indian town; the military were to have no
power over the superintendants or the Indian trade, even in war time,
unless with the superintendants' assent, or in great exigencies;
the superintendants, by themselves or deputies, were to make annual
visitations among the Indians, to see to justice, &c. and their
proceedings were to be very summary; and no credit was to be given to
the Indians beyond fifty shillings, for no higher debt was to be made
recoverable. B. V.
[73] For an account of the sentiments and manners of the Indians, see
an essay by our author in a subsequent part of this volume. _Editor._
[74] The editor has given the following memorandum of Indian
_fighting men_, inhabiting near the distant posts, in 1762; to
indulge the curious in future times. The paper is in Dr. Franklin's
hand-writing: but it must not be mistaken as containing a list of the
whole of the nations enumerated, but only such part of them as lived
near the places described. B. V.
A list of the number of fighting men of the different nations of
Indians, through which I (George Croghan) passed, living at or near
the several posts.
SANDUSKY.
Wyandotts and Mohickons 200
DETROIT.
Poutauwautimies 150
Ottawas 250
Wyandotts 250
Cheapwas 320 970
MICHILEMAKINAC.
Ottawas 250
Cheapwas 400 650
LA BAY.
Meynomeneys 110
Pervons 360
Sax 300
Reynard 320 1090
ST. JOSEPH'S.
Poutauwautimies 200
Ottawas (some distance) 150 350
THE MIAMIES.
Mincamies or Twigtwees 230
OUITANON.
Ouitanons 200
Thickapoose 180
Musquiton 90
Pyankishaws 100 570
SHAWANESE.
At the lower town, on Scioto 240
At the upper town, on Muskingum 60 300
----
4360
There is a nation, back of the Bay, who used formerly to come there
to visit the French when they were in possession of that post, called
_La Sieu_, computed to be 2500 fighting men; who have this summer
sent word to Mr. Gorrell, who commands there, that they purpose
paying him a visit late this fall or in the spring.
PAPERS
ON
AMERICAN SUBJECTS,
DURING THE
_REVOLUTIONARY TROUBLES_.
PAPERS
ON
AMERICAN SUBJECTS,
DURING THE
_REVOLUTIONARY TROUBLES_.
_Causes of the American Discontents before 1768[75]._
The waves never rise but when the winds blow.
PROV.
SIR,
As the cause of the present ill humour in America, and of the
resolutions taken there to purchase less of our manufactures, does
not seem to be generally understood, it may afford some satisfaction
to your readers, if you give them the following short historical
state of facts.
From the time that the colonies were first considered as capable
of _granting aids to the crown_, down to the end of the last war,
it is said, that the constant mode of obtaining those aids was,
by requisition made from the crown, through its governors, to the
several assemblies, in circular letters from the secretary of state,
in his majesty's name, setting forth the occasion, requiring them
to take the matter into consideration, and expressing a reliance on
their prudence, duty, and affection to his majesty's government, that
they would grant such sums, or raise such numbers of men, as were
suitable to their respective circumstances.
The colonies, being accustomed to this method, have from time to time
granted money to the crown, or raised troops for its service, in
proportion to their abilities, and, during all the last war, beyond
their abilities; so that considerable sums were returned them yearly
by parliament, as they had exceeded their proportion.
Had this happy method of requisition been continued (a method that
left the king's subjects in those remote countries the pleasure
of showing their zeal and loyalty, and of imagining that they
recommended themselves to their sovereign by the liberality of their
voluntary grants) there is no doubt, but all the money that could
reasonably be expected to be raised from them in any manner, might
have been obtained, without the least heart-burning, offence, or
breach of the harmony of affections and interests, that so long
subsisted between the two countries.
It has been thought wisdom in a government exercising sovereignty
over different kinds of people, to have _some regard to prevailing
and established opinions_ among the people to be governed, wherever
such opinions might in their effects obstruct or promote public
measures. If they tend to obstruct public service, they are to be
changed, if possible, before we attempt to act against them; and they
can only be changed by reason and persuasion. But if public business
can be carried on without thwarting those opinions, if they can be,
on the contrary, made subservient to it; they are not unnecessarily
to be thwarted, how absurd such popular opinions may be in their
nature.