this end, security of dominion over our colonies? It is_, to leave
the French _in_ Canada, to "check" their growth; _for otherwise,
our people may "increase infinitely from all causes[48]."_ We have
already seen in what manner the French and their Indians check the
growth of our colonies. It is a modest word, this _check_, for
massacring men, women, and children. The writer would, if he could,
hide from himself as well as from the public, the horror arising from
such a proposal, by couching it in general terms: it is no wonder
he thought it a "subject not fit for discussion" in his letter;
though he recommends it as "a point that should be the constant
object of the minister's attention!" But if Canada is restored on
this principle, will not Britain be guilty of all the blood to be
shed, all the murders to be committed, in order to check this dreaded
growth of our own people? Will not this be telling the French in
plain terms, that the horrid barbarities they perpetrate with their
Indians on our colonists are agreeable to us; and that they need not
apprehend the resentment of a government, with whose views they so
happily concur? Will not the colonies view it in this light? Will
they have reason to consider themselves any longer as subjects and
children, when they find their cruel enemies hallooed upon them
by the country from whence they sprung; the government that owes
them protection, as it requires their obedience? Is not this the
most likely means of driving them into the arms of the French, who
can invite them by an offer of that security, their own government
chuses not to afford them? I would not be thought to insinuate, that
the remarker wants humanity. I know how little many good-natured
persons are affected by the distresses of people at a distance, and
whom they do not know. There are even those, who, being present, can
sympathize sincerely with the grief of a lady on the sudden death of
a favourite bird; and yet can read of the sinking of a city in Syria
with very little concern. If it be, after all, thought necessary to
check the growth of our colonies, give me leave to propose a method
less cruel. It is a method of which we have an example in scripture.
The murder of husbands, of wives, of brothers, sisters and children,
whose pleasing society has been for some time enjoyed, affects deeply
the respective surviving relations; but grief for the death of a
child just born is short, and easily supported. The method I mean is
that which was dictated by the Egyptian policy, when the "infinite
increase" of the children of Israel was apprehended as dangerous to
the state[49]. Let an act of parliament then be made, enjoining the
colony midwives to stifle in the birth every third or fourth child.
By this means you may keep the colonies to their present size. And
if they were under the hard alternative of submitting to one or the
other of these schemes for checking their growth, I dare answer for
them, they would prefer the latter.
_But all this debate about the propriety or impropriety of keeping or
restoring Canada_ is possibly too early. We have taken the capital
indeed, but the country is yet far from being in our possession;
and perhaps never will be: for if our m----rs are persuaded by such
counsellors as the remarker, that the French there are "not the
worst of neighbours," and that if we had conquered Canada, we ought,
for our own sakes, to restore it, as a check to the growth of our
colonies; I am then afraid we shall never take it. For there are many
ways of avoiding the completion of the conquest, that will be less
exceptionable and less odious than the giving it up.
[7. _Canada easily peopled_, without draining Great Britain _of any
of its inhabitants_.]
_The objection I have often heard, that if we had Canada we could not
people it, without draining Britain of its inhabitants, is founded
on ignorance of the nature of population in new countries._ When we
first began to colonize in America, it was necessary to send people,
and to send seed-corn; but it is not now necessary that we should
furnish, for a new colony, either one or the other. The annual
increment alone of our present colonies, without diminishing their
numbers, or requiring a man from hence, is sufficient in ten years
to fill Canada with double the number of English that it now has of
French inhabitants[50]. Those who are protestants among the French
will probably choose to remain under the English government; many
will choose to remove, if they can be allowed to sell their lands,
improvements, and effects: the rest in that thin-settled country will
in less than half a century, from the crowds of English settling
round and among them, be blended and incorporated with our people
both in language and manners.
[8. _The merits of Guadaloupe to Great Britain_ over-valued; _yet
likely to be paid_ much dearer for, _than Canada_.]
_In Guadaloupe the case is somewhat different_; and though I am far
from thinking[51] we have sugar-land enough[52], I cannot think
Guadaloupe is so desirable an increase of it, as other objects
the enemy would probably be infinitely more ready to part with. A
country, _fully inhabited_ by any nation, is no proper possession
for another of different languages, manners, and religion. It is
hardly ever tenable at less expence than it is worth. But the isle
of _Cayenne, and its appendix, Equinoctial-France_, having but very
few inhabitants, and these therefore easily removed, would indeed
be an acquisition every way suitable to our situation and desires.
This would hold all that migrate from Barbadoes, the Leeward Islands,
or Jamaica. It would certainly recal into an English government (in
which there would be room for millions) all who have before settled
or purchased in Martinico, Guadaloupe, Santa-Cruz, or St. John's;
except such as know not the value of an English government, and such
I am sure are not worth recalling.
But should we keep Guadaloupe, we are told it would _enable us to
export 300,000_l._ in sugars_. Admit it to be true, though perhaps
the amazing increase of English consumption might stop most of
it here,--to whose profit is this to redound? To the profit of
the French inhabitants of the island: except a small part, that
should fall to the share of the English purchasers, but whose whole
purchase-money must first be added to the wealth and circulation of
France. I grant, however, much of this 300,000_l._ would be expended
in British manufactures. Perhaps too, a few of the land-owners of
Guadaloupe might dwell and spend their fortunes in Britain (though
probably much fewer than of the inhabitants of North America.) I
admit the advantage arising to us from these circumstances (as far
as they go) in the case of Guadaloupe, as well as in that of our
other West-India settlements. Yet even this consumption is little
better than that of an allied nation would be, who should take our
manufactures and supply us with sugar, and put us to no great expence
in defending the place of growth. But though our own colonies expend
among us almost the whole produce of our sugar[53], _can we, or ought
we_ to promise ourselves this will be the case of Guadaloupe? One
100,000_l._ will supply them with British manufactures; and supposing
we can effectually prevent the introduction of those of France
(which is morally impossible in a country used to them) the other
200,000_l._ will still be spent in France, in the education of their
children and support of themselves; or else be laid up there, where
they will always think their home to be.
Besides this consumption of British manufactures, _much is said of
the benefit we shall have from the_ situation of Guadaloupe; and we
are told of a trade to the Caraccas and Spanish Main. In what respect
Guadaloupe is better situated for this trade than Jamaica, or even
any of our other islands, I am at a loss to guess. I believe it to be
not so well situated for that of the windward coast, as Tobago and
St. Lucia; which in this, as well as other respects, would be more
valuable possessions, and which, I doubt not, the peace will secure
to us. Nor is it nearly so well situated for that of the rest of
the Spanish Main as Jamaica. As to the greater safety of our trade
by the possession of Guadaloupe, experience has convinced us, that
in reducing a single island, or even more, we stop the privateering
business but little. Privateers still subsist, in equal if not
greater numbers, and carry the vessels into Martinico, which before
it was more convenient to carry into Guadaloupe. Had we all the
Caribbees, it is true, they would in those parts be without shelter.
Yet, upon the whole, I suppose it to be a doubtful point, and
well worth consideration, whether our obtaining possession of all
the Caribbees would be more than a temporary benefit; as it would
necessarily soon fill the French part of Hispaniola with French
inhabitants, and thereby render it five times more valuable in time
of peace, and little less than impregnable in time of war, and
would probably end in a few years in the uniting the whole of that
great and fertile island under a French government. It is agreed
on all hands, that our conquest of St. Christopher's, and driving
the French from thence, first furnished Hispaniola with skilful and
substantial planters, and was consequently the first occasion of
its present opulence. On the other hand, I will hazard an opinion,
that valuable as the French possessions in the West Indies are, and
undeniable the advantages they derive from them, there is somewhat
to be weighed in the opposite scale. They cannot at present make war
with England, without exposing those advantages, while divided among
the numerous islands they now have, much more than they would, were
they possessed of St. Domingo only; their own share of which would,
if well cultivated, grow more sugar, than is now grown in all their
West-India islands.
_I have before said, I do not deny the utility of the conquest, or
even of our future possession of Guadaloupe, if not bought too dear._
The trade of the West Indies is one of our most valuable trades. Our
possessions there deserve our greatest care and attention. So do
those of North America. I shall not enter into the invidious task of
comparing their due estimation. It would be a very long, and a very
disagreeable one, to run through every thing material on this head.
It is enough to our present point, if I have shown, that the value of
North America is capable of an immense increase, by an acquisition
and measures, that must necessarily have an effect the direct
contrary of what we have been industriously taught to fear; and that
Guadaloupe is, in point of advantage, but a very small addition to
our West-India possessions; rendered many ways less valuable to us,
than it is to the French, who will probably set more value upon it,
than upon a country [Canada] that is much more valuable to us than to
them.
There is a great deal more to be said on all the parts of these
subjects; but as it would carry me into a detail, that I fear
would tire the patience of my readers, and which I am not without
apprehensions I have done already, I shall reserve what remains till
I dare venture again on the indulgence of the public[54].
FOOTNOTES:
[17] In the year 1760, upon the prospect of a peace with France,
the late Earl of Bath addressed a Letter to Two Great Men (Mr. Pitt
and the Duke of Newcastle) on the terms necessary to be insisted
upon in the negociation. He preferred the acquisition of Canada, to
acquisitions in the West Indies. In the same year there appeared
Remarks on the letter addressed to two great men, containing opposite
opinions on this and other subjects. At this moment a philosopher
stepped into the controversy, and wrote a pamphlet entitled, The
Interest of Great Britain considered, with Regard to her Colonies,
&c. The arguments he used, appear to have carried weight with them at
the courts of London and Paris, for Canada was kept by the peace.
The editor thinks it necessary to add the following further
explanations.--The above piece (which first came to his hands in the
shape of a pamphlet, printed for Becket, 1761, 2d edit.) has none
of the eight subdivisions it is now thrown into, marked out by the
author. He conceived however that they might be useful, and has taken
the liberty of making them, but guards it with this apology. The
better to suit his purpose, the division of the paragraphs, &c. and
the italics of the original, are not accurately adhered to. It was
impossible for him however to alter one word in the sense, style, or
disposition, of his author: this was a liberty for which he could
make no apology.
In the original, the author has added his observations concerning
the Increase of Mankind, Peopling of Countries, &c. [printed in the
2d Vol. of this work] and introduced it with the following note.
"In confirmation of the writer's opinion concerning population,
manufactures, &c. he has thought it not amiss to add an extract from
a piece written some years since in America, where the facts must
be well known, on which the reasonings are founded. It is entitled,
Observations, &c."
With respect to the arguments used by the authors of the Letter, and
of the Remarks, it is useless to repeat them here. As far as they
are necessary for the understanding of Dr. Franklin, they are to be
collected from his own work. B. V.
[18] Remarks, p. 6.
[19] Ibid. p. 7.
[20] Remarks, p. 7.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Remarks, p. 19.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Page 30, of the Letter, and p. 21, of the Remarks.
[25] Remarks, p. 28.
[26] A very intelligent writer of that country, Dr. Clark, in his
Observations on the late and present Conduct of the French, &c.
printed at Boston, 1755, says,
"The Indians in the French interest are, upon all proper
opportunities, _instigated by their priests_ (who have generally
the chief management of their public councils) to acts of hostility
against the English, even in time of profound peace between the two
crowns. Of this there are many undeniable instances: the war between
the Indians and the colonies of the Massachusett's Bay and New
Hampshire, in 1723, by which those colonies suffered so much damage,
was begun by the instigation of the French: their supplies were from
them; and there are now original letters of several Jesuits to be
produced, whereby it evidently appears, that they were continually
animating the Indians, when almost tired with the war, to a farther
prosecution of it. The French not only excited the Indians, and
supported them, but joined their own forces with them in all the late
hostilities that have been committed within his majesty's province
of Nova Scotia. And from an intercepted letter this year from the
Jesuits at Penobscot, and from other information, it is certain,
that they have been using their utmost endeavours to excite the
Indians to new acts of hostility against his majesty's colony of
the Massachusett's Bay; and some have been committed. The French
not only excite the Indians to acts of hostility, but reward them
for it, by _buying the English prisoners of them_: for the ransom
of each of which they afterwards demand of us the price that is
usually given for a slave in these colonies. They do this under the
specious pretence of rescuing the poor prisoners from the cruelties
and barbarities of the savages; but in reality to encourage them to
continue their depredations, as they can by this means get more by
hunting the English, than by hunting wild-beasts; and the French at
the same time are thereby enabled to keep up a large body of Indians,
entirely at _the expence of the English_."
[27] Remarks, p. 25.
[28] Remarks, p. 25.
[29] "Although the Indians live scattered, as a hunter's life
requires, they may be collected together from almost any distance; as
they can find their subsistence from their gun in their travelling.
But let the number of the Indians be what it will, they are not
formidable merely on account of their numbers; there are many other
circumstances that give them a great advantage over the English.
The English inhabitants, though numerous, are extended over a large
tract of land, five hundred leagues in length on the sea shore;
and although some of their trading towns are thick settled, their
settlements in the country towns must be at a distance from each
other: besides, that in a new country where lands are cheap, people
are fond of acquiring large tracts to themselves; and therefore in
the out-settlements, they must be more remote: and as the people that
move out are generally poor, they sit down either where they can
easiest procure land, or soonest raise a subsistence. Add to this,
that the English have fixed settled habitations, the easiest and
shortest passages to which the Indians, by constantly hunting in the
woods, are perfectly well acquainted with; whereas the English know
little or nothing of the Indian country, nor of the passages through
the woods that lead to it. The Indian way of making war is by sudden
attack upon exposed places; and as soon as they have done mischief,
they retire, and either go home by the same or some different route,
as they think safest; or go to some other place at a distance, to
renew their stroke. If a sufficient party should happily be ready to
pursue them, it is a great chance, whether in a country consisting
of woods and swamps, which the English are not acquainted with, the
enemy do not lie in ambush for them in some convenient place, and
from thence destroy them. If this should not be the case, but the
English should pursue them, as soon as they have gained the rivers,
by means of their canoes (to the use of which they are brought up
from their infancy) they presently get out of their reach: further,
if a body of men were to march into their country, to the place where
they are settled, they can, upon the least notice, without great
disadvantage, quit their present habitation, and betake themselves to
new ones." _Clark's Observations_, p. 13.
"It has been already remarked, that the tribes of the Indians, living
upon the lakes and rivers that run upon the back of the English
settlements in North America, are very numerous, and can furnish a
great number of fighting men, all perfectly well acquainted with the
use of arms as soon as capable of carrying them, as they get the
whole of their subsistence from hunting; and that this army, large
as it may be, can be maintained by the French without any expence.
From their numbers, their situation, and the rivers that run into the
English settlements, it is easy to conceive, that they can at any
time make an attack upon, and constantly annoy as many of the exposed
English settlements as they please, and those at any distance from
each other. The effects of such incursions have been too severely
felt by many of the British colonies, not to be very well known. The
entire breaking up places, that had been for a considerable time
settled at a great expence both of labour and money; burning the
houses, destroying the flock, killing and making prisoners great
numbers of the inhabitants, with all the cruel usage they meet with
in their captivity, is only a part of the scene. All other places
that are exposed are kept in continual terror; the lands lie waste
and uncultivated, from the danger that attends those that shall
presume to work upon them: besides the immense charge the governments
must be at in a very ineffectual manner to defend their extended
frontiers; and all this from the influence the French have had over,
but comparatively, a few of the Indians. To the same or greater evils
still will every one of the colonies be exposed, whenever the same
influence shall be extended to the whole body of them." Ibid. p. 20.
[30] Remarks, p. 26.
[31] Douglass.
[32] Remarks, p. 25.
[33] Remarks, p. 26.
[34] This I believe is meant for Dr. Adam Smith, who seems not at
this time to have printed any of his political pieces. B. V.
[35] Remarks, p. 27.
[36] Remarks, p. 50, 51.
[37] Remarks, p. 50, 51.
[38] The reason of this greater increase in America than in Europe
is, that in old settled countries, all trades, farms, offices, and
employments are full; and many people refrain marrying till they see
an opening, in which they can settle themselves, with a reasonable
prospect of maintaining a family: but in America, it being easy to
obtain land, which, with moderate labour will afford subsistence and
something to spare, people marry more readily and earlier in life,
whence arises a numerous offspring and the swift population of those
countries. It is a common error, that we cannot fill our provinces
or increase the number of them, without draining this nation of its
people. The increment alone of our present colonies is sufficient for
both those purposes. [Written in 1760.]
[39] Viz. forty sail, none of more than forty guns.
[40] Sir C. Whitworth has the following assertion: "Each state
in Germany is jealous of its neighbours; and hence, rather than
facilitate the export or transit of its neighbours' products or
manufactures, they have all recourse to strangers." State of Trade,
p. xxiv. B. V.
[41] From New York into lake Ontario, the land-carriage of the
several portages altogether, amounts to but about twenty-seven miles.
From lake Ontario into lake Erie, the land-carriage at Niagara is
but about twelve miles. All the lakes above Niagara communicate by
navigable straits, so that no land-carriage is necessary, to go out
of one into another. From Presqu'isle on lake Erie, there are but
fifteen miles land-carriage, and that a good waggon-road, to Beef
River, a branch of the Ohio; which brings you into a navigation
of many thousand miles inland, if you take together the Ohio, the
Mississippi, and all the great rivers and branches that run into them.
[42] I beg pardon for attempting to remind the reader that he must
not confound the river Duna, with the river Dwina.--The fork of the
Ohio is about four hundred miles distant from the sea, and the fork
of the Mississippi about nine hundred: it is four hundred miles from
Petersburgh to Moscow, and very considerably more than four thousand
from Petersburgh to Pekin. This is enough to justify Dr. Franklin's
positions in the page above, without going into farther particulars.
B. V.
[43] Remarks, p. 47, 48, &c.
[44] The writer has [since] obtained accounts of the exports to
North America, and the West India Islands; by which it appears, that
there has been some increase of trade to those islands as well as to
North America, though in a much less degree. The following extract
from these accounts will show the reader at one view the amount of
the exports to each, in two different terms of five years; the terms
taken at ten years distance from each other, to show the increase,
viz.
_First term, from 1744 to 1748, inclusive._
_Northern Colonies._ _West India Islands._
1744 £.640,114 12 4 £.796,112 17 9
1745 534,316 2 5 503,669 19 9
1746 754,945 4 3 472,994 19 7
1747 726,648 5 5 856,463 18 6
1748 830,243 16 9 734,095 15 3
--------------- ---------------
Total, £.3,486,261 1 2 Tot. £.3,363,337 10 10
Difference, 122,930 10 4
-------------
£.3,486,268 1 2
_Second term, from 1754 to 1758, inclusive._
_Northern Colonies._ _West India Islands._
1754 1,246,615 1 11 685,675 3 0
1755 1,177,848 6 10 694,667 13 3
1756 1,428,720 18 10 733,458 16 3
1757 1,727,924 2 10 776,488 0 6
1758 1,832,948 13 10 877,571 19 11
--------------- ---------------
Total, £.7,414,057 4 3 Tot. £.3,767,841 12 11
Difference, 3,646,215 11 4
---------------
£.7,414,057 4 3
In the first term, total of West India islands, 3,363,337 10 10
In the second term, ditto 3,767,841 12 11
---------------
Increase, only £.0,404,504 2 1
In the first term, total for Northern Colonies, 3,486,268 1 2
In the second term, ditto 7,414,057 4 3
---------------
Increase, £.3,927,789 3 1
By these accounts it appears, that the exports to the West India
islands, and to the northern colonies, were in the first term
nearly equal (the difference being only 122,936_l._ 10s. 4d.) and in
the second term, the exports to those islands had only increased
404,504_l._ 2s. 1d.--Whereas the increase to the northern colonies is
3,927,789_l._ 3s. 1d. almost _four millions_.
Some part of this increased demand for English goods may be ascribed
to the armies and fleets we have had both in North America and the
West Indies; not so much for what is consumed by the soldiery; their
clothing, stores, ammunition, &c. sent from hence on account of the
government, being (as is supposed) not included in these accounts of
merchandize exported; but, as the war has occasioned a great plenty
of money in America, many of the inhabitants have increased their
expence.
N. B. These accounts do not include any exports from Scotland to
America, which are doubtless proportionally considerable; nor the
exports from Ireland.
[I shall carry on this calculation where Dr. Franklin left it. For
four years, from 1770 to 1773 inclusively, the same average _annual_
exports to the same ports of the West Indies is 994,463_l._, and to
the same ports of the North American plantations 2,919,669_l._ But the
annual averages of the first and second terms of the former were
672,668_l._ and 753,568_l._: of the latter, 697,254_l._ and 1,482,811_l._
In ten years therefore (taking the middle years of the terms) the
North American trade is found to have _doubled_ the West Indian: in
the next sixteen years it becomes greater by _three-fold_.--With
respect to itself, the North American trade in 32 years (taking the
extremes of the terms) has quadrupled; while the West Indian trade
increased only one half; of which increase I apprehend Jamaica has
given more than one-third, chiefly in consequence of the quiet
produced by the peace with the maroon negroes.--Had the West Indian
trade continued stationary, the North American trade would have
quadrupled with respect to it, in 26 years; and this, notwithstanding
the checks given to the latter, by their non-importation agreements
and the encouragement of their own manufactures.
There has been an accession to both these trades, produced by the
cessions at the treaty of Paris, not touched upon by Dr. Franklin.
The average _annual_ export-trade, from 1770 to 1773 inclusively, to
the ceded West India islands, amounted to 258,299_l._: to the ceded
North American territory it has been 280,423_l._ See Sir Charles
Whitworth's State of Trade. B. V.]
[45] _Copy of the Report of Governor Hopkins to the Board of Trade,
on the Numbers of People in Rhode-Island._