servants, and slaves, will probably desert to them, and increase
their numbers and strength, to the lessening and weakening of ours.
4. They will cut us off from all commerce and alliance with the
western Indians, to the great prejudice of Britain, by preventing the
sale and consumption of its manufactures.
5. They will both in time of peace and war (as they have always done
against New England) set the Indians on to harrass our frontiers,
kill and scalp our people, and drive in the advanced settlers; and
so, in preventing our obtaining more subsistence by cultivating of
new lands, they discourage our marriages, and keep our people from
increasing; thus (if the expression may be allowed) killing thousands
of our children before they are born. -- -- --
If two strong colonies of English were settled between the Ohio and
lake Erie, in the places hereafter to be mentioned,--these advantages
might be expected:
1. They would be a great security to the frontiers of our other
colonies; by preventing the incursions of the French and French
Indians of Canada, on the back parts of Pensylvania, Maryland,
Virginia, and the Carolinas; and the frontiers of such new colonies
would be much more easily defended, than those of the colonies last
mentioned now can be, as will appear hereafter.
2. The dreaded junction of the French settlements in Canada with
those of Louisiana would be prevented.
3. In case of a war, it would be easy, from those new colonies, to
annoy Louisiana, by going down the Ohio and Mississippi; and the
southern part of Canada, by sailing over the lakes; and thereby
confine the French within narrower limits.
4. We should secure the friendship and trade of the Miamis or
Twigtwees (a numerous people, consisting of many tribes, inhabiting
the country between the west end of lake Erie, and the south end
of lake Hurons, and the Ohio) who are at present dissatisfied with
the French, and fond of the English, and would gladly encourage and
protect an infant English settlement in or near their country, as
some of their chiefs have declared to the writer of this memoir.
Further, by means of the lakes, the Ohio, and the Mississippi, our
trade might be extended through a vast country, among many numerous
and distant nations, greatly to the benefit of Britain.
5. The settlement of all the intermediate lands, between the present
frontiers of our colonies on one side, and the lakes and Mississippi
on the other, would be facilitated and speedily executed, to the
great increase of Englishmen, English trade, and English power.
The grants to most of the colonies are of long narrow slips of land,
extending west from the Atlantic to the South Sea. They are much too
long for their breadth; the extremes at too great a distance; and
therefore unfit to be continued under their present dimensions.
Several of the old colonies may conveniently be limited westward by
the Allegeny or Apalachian mountains; and new colonies formed west of
those mountains.
A single old colony does not seem strong enough to extend itself
otherwise than inch by inch: it cannot venture a settlement far
distant from the main body, being unable to support it: but if the
colonies were united under one governor-general and grand council,
agreeable to the Albany plan, they might easily, by their joint
force, establish one or more new colonies, whenever they should judge
it necessary or advantageous to the interest of the whole.
But if such union should not take place, it is proposed that two
charters be granted, _each_ for some considerable part of the lands
west of Pensylvania and the Virginian mountains, to a number of the
nobility and gentry of Britain; with such Americans as shall join
them in contributing to the settlement of those lands, either by
paying a proportion of the expence of making such settlements, or
by actually going thither in person, and settling themselves and
families.
That by such charters it be granted, that every actual settler be
intitled to a tract of [___] acres for himself, and [___] acres
for every poll in the family he carries with him; and that every
contributor of [___] guineas be intitled to a quantity of acres,
equal to the share of a single settler, for every such sum of [___]
guineas contributed and paid to the colony treasurer; a contributor
for [___] shares to have an additional share _gratis_; that settlers
may likewise be contributors, and have right of land in both
capacities.
That as many and as great privileges and powers of government be
granted to the contributors and settlers, as his majesty in his
wisdom shall think most fit for their benefit and encouragement,
consistent with the general good of the British empire; for
extraordinary privileges and liberties, with lands on easy terms,
are strong inducements to people to hazard their persons and
fortunes in settling new countries; and such powers of government as
(though suitable to the circumstances, and fit to be trusted with an
infant colony) might be judged unfit, when it becomes populous and
powerful; these might be granted for a term only; as the choice of
their own governor for ninety-nine years; the support of government
in the colonies of Connecticut and Rhode Island (which _now_ enjoy
that and other like privileges) being much less expensive, than in
the colonies under the immediate government of the crown, and the
constitution more inviting.
That the first contributors to the amount of [___] guineas be
empowered to choose a treasurer to receive the contribution.
That no contributions be paid till the sum of [___] thousand guineas
be subscribed.
That the money thus raised be applied to the purchase of the lands
from the Six Nations and other Indians, and of provisions, stores,
arms, ammunition, carriages, &c. for the settlers; who, after having
entered their names with the treasurer, or person by him appointed
to receive and enter them, are, upon public notice given for that
purpose, to rendezvous at a place to be appointed, and march in a
body to the place destined for their settlement, under the [charge]
of the government to be established over them. Such rendezvous and
march however not to directed, till the number of names of settlers
entered, capable of bearing arms, amount at least to [___] thousand.
-- -- --
It is apprehended, that a great sum of money might be raised in
America on such a scheme as this; for there are many who would be
glad of any opportunity, by advancing a small sum at present, to
secure land for their children, which might in a few years become
very valuable; and a great number it is thought of actual settlers
might likewise be engaged (some from each of our present colonies)
sufficient to carry it into full execution by their strength and
numbers; provided only, that the crown would be at the expence
of removing the little forts the French have erected in their
incroachments on his majesty's territories, and supporting a strong
one near the falls of Niagara, with a few small armed vessels, or
half-galleys to cruize on the lakes. * * * * * -- -- --
For the security of this colony in its infancy, a small fort might
be erected and for some time maintained at Buffalonic on the Ohio,
above the settlement; and another at the mouth of the Hioaga, on
the south side of lake Erie, where a port should be formed, and a
town erected, for the trade of the lakes.--The colonists for _this
settlement_ might march by land through Pensylvania. -- -- --
The river Siotha, which runs into the Ohio about two hundred miles
below Logs Town, is supposed the fittest seat for the _other colony_;
there being for forty miles on each side of it and quite up to its
heads a body of all rich land; the finest spot of its bigness in
all North America, and has the particular advantage of sea-coal in
plenty (even above ground in two places) for fuel, when the woods
shall be destroyed. This colony would have the trade of the Miamis or
Twigtwees; and should, at first, have a small fort near Hock-kockin,
at the head of the river; and another near the mouth of Wabash.
Sandoski, a French fort near the lake Erie, should also be taken; and
all the little French forts south and west of the lakes, quite to the
Mississippi, be removed, or taken and garrisoned by the English.--The
colonists for this settlement might assemble near the heads of the
rivers in Virginia, and march over land to the navigable branches
of the Kanhawa, where they might embark with all their baggage and
provisions, and fall into the Ohio, not far above the mouth of
Siotha. Or they might rendezvous at Will's Creek, and go down the
Mohingahela to the Ohio.
The fort and armed vessels at the strait of Niagara would be a vast
security to the frontiers of these new colonies against any attempts
of the French from Canada. The fort at the mouth of the Wabash would
guard that river, the Ohio, and Cutava river, in case of any attempt
from the French of Mississippi. (Every fort should have a small
settlement round it; as the fort would protect the settlers, and the
settlers defend the fort and supply it with provisions.) -- -- --
The difficulty of settling the first English colonies in America,
at so great a distance from England, must have been vastly greater,
than the settling these proposed new colonies: for it would be the
interest and advantage of all the present colonies to support these
new ones; as they would cover their frontiers, and prevent the growth
of the French power behind or near their present settlements; and the
new country is nearly at equal distance from all the old colonies,
and could easily be assisted from all of them.
And as there are already in the old colonies many thousands of
families that are ready to swarm, wanting more land; the richness
and natural advantage of the Ohio country would draw most of them
thither, were there but a tolerable prospect of a safe settlement.
So that the new colonies would soon be full of people; and from
the advantage of their situation, become much more terrible to the
French settlements, than those are now to us. The gaining of the
back Indian trade from the French, by the navigation of the lakes,
&c. would of itself greatly weaken our enemies:--it being now their
principal support, it seems highly probable, that in time they must
be subjected to the British crown, or driven out of the country.
Such settlements may better be made now, than fifty years hence,
because it is easier to settle ourselves, and thereby prevent the
French settling there as they seem now to intend, than to remove them
when strongly settled.
If these settlements are postponed, then more forts and stronger,
and more numerous and expensive garrisons must be established, to
secure the country, prevent their settling, and secure our present
frontiers; the charge of which may probably exceed the charge of the
proposed settlements, and the advantage nothing near so great.
The fort at Oswego should likewise be strengthened, and some armed
half-gallies, or other small vessels, kept there to cruise on lake
Ontario, as proposed by Mr. Pownall in his paper laid before the
commissioners at the Albany treaty[12].
If a fort was also built at Tirondequat on lake Ontario and a
settlement made there near the lake side, where the lands are said to
be good, (much better than at Oswego;) the people of such settlements
would help to defend both forts on any emergency[13]
FOOTNOTES:
[11] For the occasion which produced this plan, see what follows. I
apprehend it was given to Governor Pownall, 1754, for the purpose of
being inserted in his memorial; but this point of anecdote I cannot
sufficiently ascertain.
"Extract of a Memorial drawn up by Order of, and presented to his
Royal Highness the Duke of Cumberland, 1756, by T. Pownall.
"In other parts of our frontier, that are not the immediate residence
and country of Indians, some other species of barrier should be
thought of, of which nothing can be more effectual than a barrier
colony: but even this cannot be carried ... into execution and
effect, without the previous measure of _entrepôts_ in the country
between us and the enemy.... All mankind must know, that no body of
men, whether as an army, or as an emigration of colonists, can march
from one country to another, through an inhospitable wilderness,
without magazines; nor with any safety, without posts communicating
among each other by practicable roads, to which to retire in case of
accidents, repulse, or delay.
"It is a fact, which experience evinces the truth of, that we have
always been able to outsettle the French; and have driven the Indians
out of the country more by settling than fighting; and that whenever
our settlements have been wisely and completely made, the French,
neither by themselves nor their dogs of war, the Indians, have been
able to remove us. It is upon this fact I found the propriety of the
measure of settling a barrier colony in those parts of our frontiers,
_which are not the immediate residence or hunting-grounds of our_
Indians. This is a measure that will be effectual; and will not only
in time pay its expence, but make as great returns as any of our
present colonies do; will give a strength and unity to our dominions
in North America; and give us possession of the country, as well as
settlement in it. But above all this, the state and circumstances of
our settlements render such a measure not only proper and eligible,
but absolutely necessary. The English settlements, as they are at
present circumstanced, are absolutely at a stand; they are settled
up to the mountains: and in the mountains there is no where together
land sufficient for a settlement large enough to subsist by itself,
and to defend itself, and preserve a communication with the present
settlements.
"If the English would advance one step further, or cover themselves
where they are, it must be at once, by one large step over the
mountains, with a numerous and military colony. Where such should
be settled, I do not take upon me to say: at present I shall only
point out the measure and the nature of it, by inserting two schemes,
one of Mr. Franklin's, the other of your memorialist; and if I
might indulge myself with scheming, I should imagine that two such
were sufficient, and only requisite and proper: one at the back of
Virginia, filling up the vacant space between the five nations and
southern confederacy, and connecting, into one system, our barrier;
the other somewhere in the Cohass or Connecticut river, or wherever
best adapted to cover the New England colonies. These, with the
little settlements mentioned above in the Indian countries, complete
my idea of this branch." See Governor Pownall's Administration of the
Colonies. Vol. II. p. 228-231, 5th edition.
The reader must carry along with him a distinction between the plans
of Dr. Franklin and Governor Pownall here referred to. The first
(which is before him) is particular, and proposes a plan for _two_
settlements in the unlocated lands to the westward of Pensylvania
and the Virginian mountains, and is totally silent with respect to a
settlement in New England: the other treats of the mode of settling
new colonies in North America in general, leaving the precise
situation to be in some measure pointed out by the foregoing extract.
The copy from which this paper is printed, has appearances of being
rather incorrectly taken from the original. B. V.
[12] See his work above quoted, Vol. II. p. 234. _et seq._ and p.
179. _et seq._ B. V.
[13] This whole proposal was neglected, though the French thought
a considerable settlement very practicable, in order to get at the
Ohio. See Governor Pownall, Vol. II. p. 236.
Dr. Franklin also failed in another proposal for settling to the
south of the Ohio. B. V.
_Report of the Committee of Aggrievances of the Assembly of
Pensylvania, dated Feb. 22, 1757[14]._
In obedience to the order of the house, we have drawn up the heads
of the most important aggrievances that occur to us, which the
people of this province with great difficulty labour under; the many
infractions of the constitution (in manifest violation of the royal
grant, the proprietary charter, the laws of this province, and of the
laws, usages, and customs of our mother-country) and other matters;
which we apprehend call aloud for redress.
They are as follow:
_First_, By the royal charter (which has ever been, ought to be,
and truly is, the principal and invariable fundamental of this
constitution) King Charles the Second did give and grant unto William
Penn, his heirs and assigns, the province of Pensylvania; and also to
him and his heirs, and his or their _deputies_ or lieutenants, free,
full, and absolute power, for the good and happy government thereof,
to make and enact any laws, "according to their best discretion;
by and with the advice, assent, and approbation of the _freemen_
of the said country, or of their delegates or deputies;" for the
raising of money, or any other end appertaining to the public state,
peace, or safety of the said country. By the words of this grant,
it is evident, that full powers are granted to the _deputies_ and
lieutenants of William Penn and his heirs, to concur with the people
in framing laws for their protection and the safety of the province,
according to their best discretion; independent of any instructions
or directions they should receive from their _principals_. And it is
equally obvious to your committee, that the _people_ of this province
and their representatives were interested in this royal grant; and
by virtue thereof have an original right of legislation inherent in
them; which neither the proprietors nor any other person whatsoever
can divest them of, restrain, or abridge, without manifestly
violating and destroying the letter, spirit, and design of this grant.
Nevertheless we unfortunately find, that the proprietaries of this
province, regardless of this sacred fundamental of our rights and
liberties, have so abridged and restricted their late and present
_governor's_ discretion in matters of legislation, by their illegal,
impracticable, and unconstitutional instructions and prohibitions;
that no bill for granting aids and supplies to our most gracious
sovereign (be it ever so reasonable, expedient, and necessary for
the defence of this his majesty's colony, and safety of his people)
unless it be agreeable thereto, can meet with his approbation: by
means whereof the many considerable sums of money which have been
offered for those purposes, by the assemblies of this province (ever
anxious to maintain his honour and rights,) have been rejected; to
the great encouragement of his majesty's enemies, and the imminent
danger of the loss of this colony.
_Secondly_, The representatives of the people in general assembly
met, by virtue of the said royal grant, and the charter of privileges
granted by the said William Penn, and a law of this province, have
right to, and ought to enjoy all the powers and privileges of an
assembly, according to the rights of the free-born subjects of
England, and as is usual in any of the plantations in America: [also]
it is an indubitable and now an incontested right of the commons of
England, to _grant aids_ and supplies to his majesty in any manner
they think most easy to themselves and the people; and they [also]
are the sole judges of the _measure_, _manner and time_ of granting
and raising the same.
Nevertheless the proprietaries of this province, in contempt of the
said royal grant, proprietary charter, and law of their colony,
designing to subvert the fundamentals of this constitution, to
deprive the assembly and people of their rights and privileges, and
to assume an arbitrary and tyrannical power over the liberties and
properties of his majesty's liege subjects, have so restrained their
governors by the _despotic instructions_ (which are not to be varied
from, and are particularly directory in the framing and passing of
money-bills and supplies to his majesty, as to the mode, measure,
and time) that it is impossible for the assembly, should they lose
all sense of their most essential rights, and comply with those
instructions, to grant sufficient aids for the defence of this his
majesty's province from the common enemy.
_Thirdly_, In pursuance of sundry acts of general assembly, approved
of by the crown, [and] a natural right inherent in every man
antecedent to all laws, the assemblies of this province have had the
power of _disposing_ of the _public_ monies, that have been raised
for the encouragement of trade and support of government, by the
interest money arising by the loan of the bills of credit and the
excise. No part of these monies was ever paid by the _proprietaries_,
or ever raised on their estates; and therefore they can have no
pretence of right to a voice in the disposition of them. They
have ever been applied with prudent frugality to the honour and
advantage of the public, and the king's immediate service, to the
general approbation of the people: the credit of the government has
been preserved, and the debts of the public punctually discharged.
In short, no inconveniencies, but great and many advantages have
accrued, from the assembly's prudent care and management of these
funds.
Yet the proprietaries resolved to deprive the assemblies of the power
and means of _supporting an agent_ in England, and of prosecuting
their complaints and remonstrating their aggrievances, when injured
and oppressed, to his majesty and his parliament: and to rob them
of this natural right (which has been so often approved of by their
gracious sovereign) have, by their said instructions, prohibited
their governor from giving his assent to any laws emitting or
re-emitting any paper-currency or bills of credit, or for raising
money by excise or any other method; unless the governor or commander
in chief for the time being, by clauses to be inserted therein, has
_a negative in the disposition_ of the monies arising thereby; let
the languishing circumstances of our trade be ever so great, and a
further or greater medium be ever so necessary for its support.
_Fourthly_, By the laws and statutes of England, the chief rents,
honours, and castles of the crown are taxed, and _pay their
proportion_ to the supplies that are granted to the king for the
defence of the realm and support of government: his majesty,
the nobility of the realm, and all the British subjects, do now
actually contribute their proportion towards the defence of America
in general, and this province in particular: and it is in a more
especial manner the duty of the _proprietaries_ to pay their
proportion of a tax, for the immediate preservation of their own
estates, in this province. To exempt therefore any part of their
estates from their reasonable part of this necessary burthen, it is
unjust as it is illegal, and as new as it is arbitrary.
Yet the proprietaries, notwithstanding the general danger to which
the nation and its colonies are exposed, and great distress of this
province in particular, by their said instructions, have prohibited
their governors from passing laws for the raising supplies for its
defence; _unless_ all their located, unimproved, and unoccupied
lands, quit-rents, fines, and purchase monies on interest (the much
greater part of their enormous estates in this colony) are expressly
exempted from paying any part of the tax.