“Nothing new has happened except a few little adventures that, I am

sure, you will be glad to hear about. Paula Valeria, the sister of

Triarius, has divorced herself, without any reason, from her husband,

the very day he was to arrive from his province; she is going to marry

Decimus Brutus. Have you never suspected it? Since your absence

incredible things of this kind have happened. No one would have believed

that Servius Ocella was a man of intrigue, if he had not been caught in

the act twice in the space of three days. You will ask me where? In

truth it was where I should not wish it to be,[195] but I leave you

something to learn from others. I should be glad to think that a

victorious proconsul will go and ask everybody with what woman a man has

been caught.”[196]

Evidently he who wrote this entertaining letter was never so thoroughly

converted as Cicero made believe, and it seems to me that we still find

the harebrained young fellow who made so much racket in the streets of

Rome, and the lover of Clodia, in the man of wit who recounts so

pleasantly these trifling intrigues. We may affirm, then, without

temerity that, although from this moment his private life is unknown to

us, he never entirely renounced the dissipations of his youth, and that,

magistrate and politician as he was, he continued to the end to mix

pleasure with business.

II.

But Caelius was not only a hero of amorous adventures, and did not

content himself with the empty honour of giving the tone for elegance of

manners to the youth of Rome. He had more solid qualities. Thanks to

Cicero’s lessons he speedily became a great orator. A short time after

he had escaped from this honourable tutelage, he made a brilliant

commencement in a case in which he was opposed to Cicero himself, and

this time the disciple beat the master. Since this success his

reputation had continued to increase. There were orators in the Forum

that men of taste admired more, and whose gifts they considered more

perfect; there were none more dreaded than he, such was the violence of

his attack and the bitterness of his raillery. He excelled in seizing

the ridiculous side of his opponents, and in making, in a very few

words, those ironical and cutting observations on them which are never

forgotten. Quintilian quotes one as a model of its kind, which well

exemplifies the talent of this terrible wit. He is speaking, in this

passage, of that Antony who had been the colleague of Cicero in his

consulship, and who, in spite of all the eulogies that the Orations

against Catiline lavish on him, was but an inferior intriguer and a

coarse debauchee. After having, according to custom, pillaged Macedonia,

which he governed, he had attacked some neighbouring tribes in order to

obtain a pretext for a triumph. He counted upon an easy victory, but as

he was more taken up with his pleasures than with the war, he was

ignominiously beaten. Caelius, who attacked him on his return,

described, or rather imagined, in his speech, one of those orgies during

which the general, while dead drunk, allowed himself to be surprised by

the enemy.

“Women, his ordinary officers, fill the banqueting-hall, stretched on

all the couches, or lying about on the ground. When they learn that the

enemy is come, half-dead with fright, they try to awaken Antony; they

shout his name, they raise him up by the neck. Some whisper soft words

in his ear, others treat him more roughly and even strike him; but he,

who recognizes their voices and touch, stretches out his arms by habit,

seizes and wishes to embrace the first he meets with. He can neither

sleep, so much they shout to awaken him, nor wake, so drunk is he. At

last, powerless to shake off this drowsiness, he is carried off in the

arms of his centurions and his mistresses.”[197]

When a man possesses such a biting and incisive talent it is natural for

him to have an aggressive temper; nothing therefore suited Caelius

better than personal struggles. He liked and sought disputation because

he was sure to succeed in it, and because he could make use of those

violent modes of attack that could not be resisted. He wished to be

contradicted, for contradiction excited him and gave him energy. Seneca

relates that one day one of the clients of Caelius, a man of pacific

temper, and who, no doubt, had suffered from his rudeness, confined

himself during a meal to agreeing with him. Caelius at last grew enraged

because the man gave him no opportunity for getting angry, and

exclaimed: “Do contradict me that there may be two of us.”[198] The

talents of Caelius, such as I have just depicted them, marvellously

suited the time in which he lived. This thoroughly explains the

reputation that he enjoyed, and the important position he took among his

contemporaries. This fiery debater, this pitiless wit, this vehement

accuser would not have been altogether in his place in quiet times; but

in the midst of a revolution he became a valuable auxiliary whom all

parties contended for. Caelius was moreover a statesman as well as an

orator, and it is for this that Cicero most frequently praises him. “I

know no one, he told him, who is a better politician than you.”[199] He

knew men thoroughly, he had a clear insight into situations; he decided

quickly, a quality that Cicero much appreciated in others, for it was

just that which he most lacked, and when once he had decided, he set to

work with a vigour and force that gained him the sympathies of the

multitude. At a time when power belonged to those who were bold enough

to seize it, the audacity of Caelius seemed to promise him a brilliant

political future.

Nevertheless, he had also great defects, which sometimes arose from his

very good qualities. He knew men well, a great advantage no doubt, but

in studying them it was their bad side that struck him most. By dint of

trying them in every way, his startling penetration succeeded in laying

bare some weakness. He did not reserve his severity for his adversaries

only; his best friends did not escape his clear-sighted analysis. We see

in his private correspondence that he knew all their defects, and did

not stand on ceremony in speaking of them. Dolabella, his companion in

pleasure, is a poor babbler, “incapable of keeping a secret, even though

his imprudence should ruin him.”[200] Curio, his usual associate in

political intrigues, “is only an unstable busybody, changing with every

breath of wind, who can do nothing sensible,”[201] nevertheless, at the

time when he is treating them thus, Curio and Dolabella had sufficient

influence over him to draw him into Caesar’s party. As to Caesar

himself, he speaks no better of him, although he is preparing to embrace

his cause. This son of Venus, as he calls him, appears to him “but an

egotist who scoffs at the interests of the republic and only cares for

his own,”[202] and he has no scruple in confessing that in his camp,

where, nevertheless, he is going, there are only dishonourable men, “all

of whom have causes for apprehension in the past and criminal hopes for

the future.”[203] With such a disposition of mind, and so decided a

leaning to judge every one harshly, it was natural that Caelius should

not trust any one entirely, and that no one dared to count upon him with

confidence. To serve a cause usefully you must give yourself up to it

completely; now, how can you do so if you cannot shut your eyes a little

and not see too clearly its bad sides? Those cautious and clear-sighted

persons, who are entirely taken up with the fear of being dupes, and who

always see the faults of others so plainly, are never anything but

lukewarm friends and useless allies. While they inspire no confidence in

the party that they wish to serve, because they always make reservations

in serving it, they are not sufficiently enthusiastic to form a party

themselves, and always fall short of that degree of passion that leads a

man to undertake great things. Therefore it happens that, as they can

neither be chiefs nor privates, and cannot attach themselves to others

or attach others to themselves, they end by finding themselves alone.

Let us add that Caelius, who had no illusions about persons, seemed also

to have no preference for parties. He never sought the reputation of

being a man of principle, nor to put order and consistency into his

political life. In that, as in his private affairs, he lived from hand

to mouth. The circumstances of the moment, interest, or friendship, gave

him an accidental conviction to which he did not pretend to be long

faithful. He went over from Cicero to Catiline when Catiline seemed to

him the stronger; he returned to Cicero when Cicero was victorious. He

was the friend of Clodias as long as he remained Clodia’s lover; he

abandoned the brother at the same time that he left the sister, and

suddenly embraced Milo’s party. He passed several times from the people

to the senate, and from the senate to the people without scruple or

embarrassment. At bottom, the cause that he served was of little

consequence to him, and he had not to make much effort to disengage

himself from it. At the time that he seemed to be taking the most

trouble for it, he spoke of it in a tone that left people to imagine it

was quite foreign to him. Even in the gravest affairs, and when it was a

question of the fate of the republic, he did not appear to suppose that

it had anything to do with him, and that he was interested in its safety

or ruin. “It is your business, rich old men,”[204] he said. But what did

it matter to him? As he is always ruined he never has anything to lose.

Therefore all forms of government are indifferent to him, and curiosity

alone makes him take an interest in these struggles, in which,

nevertheless, he plays such an active part. If he plunges with so much

ardour into the tumult of public life, it is because events and men are

seen closer, and one can make piquant reflections on it, or find amusing

scenes in it. When he announces to Cicero, with remarkable perspicacity,

the approaching civil war and the misfortunes that are coming, he adds:

“If you were not running some risk, I should say that fortune was

preparing a great and curious spectacle for you!”[205] A cruel speech

that Caelius paid for dearly in the sequel, for one does not play at

these deadly games without peril, and often becomes a victim while

thinking to be only a spectator.

When this war, which he thus announced to Cicero, was on the point of

breaking out, Caelius had just been appointed aedile, and his great

anxiety was to have some Cilician panthers for the games that he wished

to give to the people. At this time, after having belonged more or less

to all parties, he made profession of defending the cause of the senate,

that is to say, that in speaking of the senators, he said, “our

friends,” and that he affected to call them “good citizens”; which did

not prevent him, according to his custom, having his eyes open to the

faults that the “good citizens” might commit, and scoffing at his

“friends” bitterly when the opportunity presented itself. Cicero thought

him cold and undecided; he would have wished to see him pledge himself

deeper. At the time of his departure for Cilicia, he did not cease to

extol the great qualities of Pompey to him: “Believe me, he said, trust

yourself to this great man, he will gladly welcome you.”[206] But

Caelius took good care not to do anything of the kind. He knew Pompey,

of whom he has drawn satirical portraits on different occasions; he did

not much admire him, and did not like him at all. If he kept aloof from

him at the time of his greatest power, he certainly would not, we can

well understand, throw himself into his arms when this power was

threatened. In proportion as the crisis that he had foreseen advanced,

he took more care to hold himself in reserve, and waited for the turn of

events.

It was, moreover, a time when the most honourable hesitated. This

irresolution, which does not seem to have been very surprising then, has

been much blamed in our days. It is easy, however, to understand this.

Questions do not present themselves to the eyes of contemporaries with

the same clearness as to those of posterity. When they are looked at

from a distance, and with a mind free from all prejudice; when, besides,

the results and the causes are taken in at the same time, and when we

can judge the causes by the results, nothing is easier than to come to a

decision; but it is not so when one lives in the midst of the events,

and too near them to take in the whole, when one’s mind is influenced by

previous ties or personal preferences, and when the decision one is

about to take may endanger one’s safety and fortune. It is not possible,

then, to see things so clearly. The state of anarchy in which the old

parties of the Roman republic were added to the confusion at that time.

To speak the truth, there were no longer parties, but coalitions. For

fifty years they had struggled, not for questions of principle, but for

personal questions. Parties being no longer organized as formerly, it

followed that timid minds which have need to attach themselves to

ancient traditions to guide them, drifted about, and often changed.

These striking changes of opinion in honourable and respected persons

disturbed the less settled minds, and rendered it difficult to make out

the right. Caesar, who knew of these vacillations, and hoped to profit

by them, did what he could to increase their causes. At the very moment

when he was preparing to destroy the constitution of his country, he had

the art to appear to respect it more than anybody. An expert judge in

these matters, and one who knows the Roman laws thoroughly, has

declared, after mature examination, that the law was on the side of

Caesar, and that the grievances he complained of were well founded.[207]

He took good care not to disclose all his projects then, or to speak

with so much freedom as he did afterwards, when he was master. Sometimes

he presented himself as the successor of the Gracchi, and the defender

of popular rights; sometimes he affected to say, in order to reassure

everybody, that the republic was not interested in the dispute, and

reduced the quarrel to a struggle for influence between two powerful

competitors. While he was gathering his legions in the cities of Upper

Italy, he only spoke of his desire to preserve the public peace; in

proportion as his enemies became more violent he became more moderate,

and he never proposed conditions so acceptable as when he was sure that

the senate would not listen to them. On the other side, on the contrary,

in the camp where moderate and wise men ought to be found, there was

nothing but rashness and stupidity. Those who showed some repugnance to

civil war were treated as public enemies; they talked only of

proscribing and confiscating, and the example of Sulla was in every

one’s mouth. It happened then, by a strange contradiction, that it was

in the camp where profession was made of defending liberty, that

exceptional measures were most persistently demanded; and while the man

who expected everything from the war, and whose army was ready, offered

peace, those who had not a soldier under arms were eager to refuse it.

Thus the two sides exchanged characters, and each appeared to speak and

act contrary to its interests, or its principles. Is it surprising that

in the midst of such obscurity, and among so many reasons for

hesitation, honourable men like Sulpicius and Cicero, devoted to their

country, but fitter to serve it in quiet times than in these violent

crises, should not have decided at once?

Caelius also hesitated; but not altogether for the same reasons as

Cicero and Sulpicius. While they anxiously asked themselves where the

right lay, Caelius only sought where the superior force lay. He admitted

this himself with singular candour: “In intestine quarrels,” he writes

to Cicero, “as long as one struggles by legal means, and without having

recourse to arms, one ought to attach oneself to the most honourable

party; but when one comes to war it is necessary to turn towards the

stronger, and regard the safest party as the best.”[208] From the moment

that he was satisfied with simply comparing the strength of the two

rivals, his choice became easier; in order to decide it was enough to

open his eyes. On one side there were eleven legions, supported by tried

auxiliaries, and commanded by the greatest general of the republic,

ranged on the frontiers, and ready to open the campaign at the first

signal;[209] on the other, few or no trained troops, but a great number

of young men of illustrious families as incapable of commanding as they

were little disposed to obey, and many of those great names that honour

a party more than they help it; on one side, military rule and the

discipline of a camp; on the other, quarrels, disputes, resentments,

rival authorities, differences of opinion, in short, all the

inconvenient habits of civil life transported into a camp. These are the

ordinary difficulties of a party that claims to defend liberty, for it

is difficult to impose silence on people who fight to preserve the right

of free speech, and all authority quickly becomes suspected when men

have taken up arms to oppose an abuse of authority. But it was the

character of the two chiefs, more than anything else, that made the

difference between the two parties. Caesar appeared to all the world,

even to his greatest enemies, a prodigy of activity and foresight. As to

Pompey it was clearly seen that he committed only faults, and it was not

any easier then than it is now to explain his conduct. The war had not

taken him unawares; he told Cicero that he had foreseen it for a long

time.[210] There was no great difficulty in foreseeing it, he had

appeared to wish for it; Caesar’s proposals had been rejected by his

advice, and the majority of the senate did nothing without consulting

him. He had, then, seen the crisis approaching from afar, and during all

that long diplomatic war which preceded actual hostilities he had had

the time necessary to prepare himself. Every one, therefore, believed

that he was ready, although nothing showed it. When he said, with his

usual boastfulness, that he had only to stamp his foot to bring up

legions, it was supposed he meant to speak of secret levies, or of

alliances not generally known, that at the last moment would bring him

troops. His confidence restored courage to the most terror-stricken. In

truth, such a strange self-confidence in the midst of such real danger,

in a man who had conquered kingdoms, and conducted great affairs, passes

our comprehension.

Whence then could this confidence come to Pompey? Had he no exact

information of the strength of his enemy? did he really believe, as he

said, that his troops were discontented, his generals unfaithful, and

that no one would follow him in the war he was going to wage against

his country? or did he reckon on the good fortune of his earlier

years, on the prestige of his name, on the happy chances that had

given him so many victories? It is certain that, at the moment when

the veterans of Alesia and Gergovia were assembling at Ravenna, and

approaching the Rubicon, Pompey imprudently exhibited a great disdain

for the general and for his troops, _vehementer contemnebat hunc

hominem!_[211] But this foolish boasting did not last long; on the

news that Caesar was marching resolutely on Rome, it ceased at once,

and this same man whom Cicero showed us just now disdaining his rival

and predicting his defeat, he shows us a few days later, terrified and

flying into the depths of Apulia without daring to halt or make a

stand anywhere. We have the letter that Pompey then wrote to the

consuls, and to Domitius, who attempted at least to hold out in

Corfinium: “Know, he tells them, that I am in great uneasiness

(_scitote me esse in summa sollicitudine_”).[212] What a contrast to

the over-confident words of just now! This is just the tone of a man

who, waking up with a start from exaggerated hopes, passes suddenly

from one extreme to another. He had prepared nothing because he had

been too well assured of success; he dared undertake nothing because

he was too certain of failure. He has no confidence or hope in any

one; all resistance seems to him useless; he does not even count upon

the awakening of a patriotic spirit, and it does not occur to him to

make an appeal to the republican youth of the Italian municipia. At

each step that his enemy takes in advance, he retreats still farther.

Brundusium itself, with its strong walls, does not give him

confidence; he thinks of quitting Italy, and does not believe that he

is safe until he has put the sea between himself and Caesar.

Caelius had not waited so long to take a side. Even before the struggle

commenced it was easy for him to see where the superior strength lay and

on which side victory would be. He had then boldly faced about and put

himself in the front rank among Caesar’s friends. He took his side

openly when he supported with his usual vigour the proposition of

Calidius, who demanded that Pompey should be sent back to his province

of Spain. When the hope of peace was completely lost, he left Rome with

his friends Curio and Dolabella, and went to join Caesar at Ravenna. He

followed him in his triumphal march through Italy; he saw him pardon

Domitius, who had been taken in Corfinium, pursue Pompey, and shut him

up closely in Brundusium. In the intoxication of these rapid successes

he wrote to Cicero: “Have you ever seen a man more foolish than your

Pompey, who brings us into such great troubles, and whose conduct is so

childish? On the other hand, have you ever read or heard of anything

that surpasses the ardour of Caesar in action and his moderation in

victory? What do you think of our soldiers, who, in the depth of winter,

notwithstanding the difficulties of a wild and frozen country, have

finished the war in an unopposed march?”[213]

When Caelius had once decided, his only thought was to draw Cicero after

him. He knew that he could do nothing more agreeable to Caesar.

Victorious though he was, Caesar, who did not delude himself about those

who served him, felt that he wanted a few honest men to give his party a

better appearance. The great name of Cicero would have sufficed to

correct the bad impression that the character of those about him

produced. Unfortunately it was very difficult to get Cicero to decide.

From the day when the Rubicon was passed till the capture of Brundusium

he wavered and changed his mind every day. Both sides were equally

anxious to secure him, and the two chiefs themselves approached him, but

in a very different manner. Pompey, always bungling, wrote him short and

imperious letters: “Take the Appian road as soon as possible, come and

join me at Luceria, at Brundusium, there you will be safe.”[214] Strange

language in the vanquished who persists in speaking as a superior!

Caesar was much more judicious: “Come, he says to him, come and aid me

with your counsel, your name, and your glory!”[215] This consideration,

these advances from a victorious general, who humbly solicited when he

had the right to command, could not fail to influence Cicero. At the

same time, to be more sure of gaining him over, Caesar got his dearest

friends to write to him, Oppius, Balbus, Trebatius, and especially

Caelius, who knew so well how to approach him. They attacked him on all

his weak sides at once; they revived his old grudges against Pompey;

they moved him by the picture of the misfortunes that threatened his

family; they excited his vanity by pointing out to him the honour of

reconciling parties and pacifying the republic.

Cicero and his friends · 第 13 / 30 段