THE BOULOGNE FLOTILLA
The establishment of the Empire, as has been seen, provoked few signs
of opposition from the French armies, once renowned for their
Jacobinism; and by one or two instances of well-timed clemency, the
Emperor gained over even staunch republicans. Notably was this the
case with a brave and stalwart colonel, who, enraged at the first
volley of cheers for the Empire, boldly ordered "Silence in the
ranks." At once Napoleon made him general and appointed him one of his
aides-de-camp; and this brave officer, Mouton by name, was later to
gain glory and the title of Comte de Lobau in the Wagram campaign.
These were the results of a timely act of generosity, such as touches
the hearts of any soldiery and leads them to shed their blood like
water. And so when Napoleon, after the coronation, distributed to the
garrison of Paris their standards, topped now by the imperial eagles,
the great Champ de Mars was a scene of wild enthusiasm. The thunderous
shouts that acclaimed the prowess of the new Frankish leader were as
warlike as those which ever greeted the hoisting of a Carolingian King
on the shields of his lieges. Distant nations heard the threatening
din and hastened to muster their forces for the fray.
As yet only England was at war with the Emperor. Against her Napoleon
now prepared to embattle the might of his vast Empire. The
preparations on the northern coast were now wellnigh complete, and
there was only one question to be solved--how to "leap the ditch." It
seems strange to us now that no attempt was made to utilize the great
motive force of the nineteenth century--steam power. And the French
memoir-writers, Marmont, Bourrienne, Pasquier, and Bausset, have
expressed their surprise that so able a chief as Napoleon should have
neglected this potent ally.
Their criticisms seem to be prompted by later reflections rather
than based on an accurate statement of facts. In truth, the
nineteenth-century Hercules was still in his cradle. Henry Bell had in
1800 experimented with a steamer on the Clyde; but it aroused the same
trembling curiosity as Trevithick's first locomotive, or as Fulton's
first paddle-boat built on the Seine in 1803. In fact, this boat of
the great American inventor was so weak that, when at anchor, it broke
in half during a gale, thus ridding itself of the weight of its
cumbrous engine. With his usual energy, Fulton built a larger and
stronger craft, which not only carried the machinery, but, in August,
1803, astonished the members of the French Institute by moving, though
with much circumspection.
Fulton, however, was disappointed, and if we may judge from the scanty
records of his life, he never offered this invention to Napoleon.[321]
He felt the need of better machinery, and as this could only be
procured in England, he gave the order to a Birmingham firm, which
engined his first successful boat, the "Clermont," launched on the
Hudson in 1807. But for the war, perhaps, Fulton would have continued
to live in Paris and made his third attempt there. He certainly never
offered his imperfect steamship to the First Consul. Probably the fact
that his first boat foundered when at anchor in the Seine would have
procured him a rough reception, if he had offered to equip the whole
of the Boulogne flotilla with an invention which had sunk its first
receptacle and propelled the second boat at a snail's pace.
Besides, he had already met with one repulse from Napoleon. He had
offered, first to the Directory and later to the First Consul, a boat
which he claimed would "deliver France and the world from British
oppression."
This was a sailing vessel, which could sink under water and then
discharge under a hostile ship a "carcass" of gunpowder or
_torpedo_--another invention of his fertile brain. The Directory at
once repulsed him. Bonaparte instructed Monge, Laplace, and Volney to
report on this submarine or "plunging" boat, which had a partial
success. It succeeded in blowing up a small vessel in the harbour at
Brest in July, 1801; but the Commission seems to have reported
unfavourably on its utility for offensive purposes. In truth, as
Fulton had not then applied motive power to this invention, the name
"plunging boat" conveyed an exaggerated notion of its functions, which
were more suited to a life of ascetic contemplation than of
destructive activity.
It appears that the memoir-writers named above have confused the two
distinct inventions of Fulton just referred to. In the latter half of
1803 he repaired to England, and later on to the United States, and
after the year 1803 he seems to have had neither the will nor the
opportunity to serve Napoleon. In England he offered his torpedo
patent to the English Admiralty, expressing his hatred of the French
Emperor as a "wild beast who ought to be hunted down." Little was done
with the torpedo in England, except to blow up a vessel off Walmer as
a proof of what it could do. It is curious also that when Bell offered
his paddle-boat to the Admiralty it was refused, though Nelson is said
to have spoken in its favour. The official mind is everywhere hostile
to new inventions; and Marmont suggestively remarks that Bonaparte's
training as an artillerist, and his experience of the inconvenience
and expense resulting from the adoption of changes in that arm, had no
slight influence in setting him against all innovations.
But, to resume our description of the Boulogne flotilla, it may be of
interest to give some hitherto unpublished details about the
flat-bottomed boats, and then to pass in brief review Napoleon's plans
for assuring a temporary command of the Channel.
It is clear that he at first relied almost solely on the flotilla.
After one of his visits to Boulogne, he wrote on November 23rd, 1803,
to Admiral Gantheaume that he would soon have on the northern coast
1,300 flat-bottomed boats able to carry 100,000 men, while the Dutch
flotilla would transport 60,000. "Do you think it will take us to the
English coast? Eight hours of darkness which favour us would decide
the fate of the universe." There is no mention of any convoying fleet:
the First Consul evidently believed that the flotilla could beat off
any attack at sea. This letter offers a signal proof of his inability,
at least at that time, to understand the risks of naval warfare. But
though his precise and logical mind seems then to have been incapable
of fully realizing the conditions of war on the fickle, troublous, and
tide-swept Channel, his admirals urgently warned him against trusting
to shallow, flat-bottomed boats to beat the enemy out at sea; for
though these _praams_ in their coasting trips repelled the attacks of
British cruisers, which dared not come into shallow waters, it did not
follow that they would have the same success in mid-Channel, far away
from coast defences and amidst choppy waves that must render the guns
of keelless boats wellnigh useless.[320]
The present writer, after going through the reports of our admiral
stationed in the Downs, is convinced that our seamen felt a supreme
contempt for the flat-bottomed boats when at sea. After the capture of
one of them, by an English gun-brig, Admiral Montagu reported,
November 23rd, 1803:
"It is impossible to suppose for an instant that anything
effective can be produced by such miserable tools, equally
ill-calculated for the grand essentials in a maritime formation,
battle and speed: that floored as this wretched vessel is, she
cannot hug the wind, but must drift bodily to leeward, which
indeed was the cause of her capture; for, having got a little to
leeward of Boulogne Bay, it was impossible to get back and she was
necessitated to steer large for Calais. On the score of battle,
she has one long 18-pounder, without breeching or tackle,
traversing on a slide, which can only be fired stem on. The
8-pounder is mounted aft, but is a fixture: so that literally, if
one of our small boats was to lay alongside there would be nothing
but musketry to resist, and those [_sic_] placed in the hands of
poor wretches weakened by the effect of seasickness, exemplified
when this gun-boat was captured--the soldiers having retreated to
the hold, incapable of any energy or manly exertion.... In short,
Sir, these vessels in my mind are completely contemptible and
ridiculous, and I therefore conclude that the numbers collected at
Boulogne are to keep our attention on the _qui vive_, and to gloss
over the real attack meditated from other points."
The vessel which provoked the contempt of our admiral was not one of
the smallest class: she was 58-1/3 ft. long, 14-1/2 ft. wide, drew 3
ft. forward and 4 ft. aft: her sides rose 3 ft. above the water, and
her capacity was 35 tons. The secret intelligence of the Admiralty for
the years 1804 and 1805 also shows that Dutch sailors were equally
convinced of the unseaworthiness of these craft: Admiral Verhuell
plainly told the French Emperor that, however flatterers might try to
persuade him of the feasibility of the expedition, "nothing but
disgrace could be expected." The same volume (No. 426) contains a
report of the capture of two of the larger class of French _chaloupes_
off Cape La Hogue. Among the prisoners was a young French royalist
named La Bourdonnais: when forced by the conscription to enter
Napoleon's service, he chose to serve with the _chaloupes_ "because
of his conviction that all these flotillas were nothing but bugbears
and would never attempt the invasion so much talked of and in which so
few persons really believe." The same was the opinion of the veteran
General Dumouriez, who, now an exile in England, drew up for our
Government a long report on the proposed invasion and the means of
thwarting it. The reports of our spies also prove that all experienced
seamen on the Continent declared Napoleon's project to be either a
ruse or a foolhardy venture.
The compiler of the Ney "Memoirs," who was certainly well acquainted
with the opinions of that Marshal, then commanding the troops at
Boulogne, also believed that the flotilla was only able to serve as a
gigantic ferry.[322] The French admirals were still better aware of
the terrible risks to their crowded craft in a fight out at sea. They
also pointed out that the difference in the size, draught, and speed
of the boats must cause the dispersion of the flotilla, when its parts
might fall a prey to the more seaworthy vessels of the enemy. Indeed,
the only chance of crossing without much loss seemed to be offered by
a protracted calm, when the British cruisers would be helpless against
a combined attack of a cloud of row-boats. The risks would be greater
during a fog, when the crowd of boats must be liable to collision,
stranding on shoals, and losing their way. Even the departure of this
quaint armada presented grave difficulties: it was found that the
whole force could not clear the harbour in a single tide; and a part
of the flotilla must therefore remain exposed to the British fire
before the whole mass could get under way. For all these reasons
Bruix, the commander of the flotilla, and Decrès, Minister of Marine,
dissuaded Napoleon from attempting the descent without the support of
a powerful covering fleet.
Napoleon's correspondence shows that, by the close of the year 1803,
he had abandoned that first fatuous scheme which gained him from the
wits of Paris the soubriquet of "Don Quixote de la Manche."[323] On
the 7th of December he wrote to Gantheaume, maritime prefect at
Toulon, urging him to press on the completion of his nine ships of the
line and five frigates, and sketching plans of a naval combination that
promised to insure the temporary command of the Channel. Of these only
two need be cited here:
1. "The Toulon squadron will set out on 20th _nivôse_ (January 10th,
1804), will arrive before Cadiz (or Lisbon), will find there the
Rochefort squadron, will sail on without making land, between Brest
and the Sorlingues, will touch at Cape La Hogue, and will pass in
forty-eight hours before Boulogne: thence it will continue to the
mouth of the Scheldt (there procuring masts, cordage, and all needful
things)--or perhaps to Cherbourg.
2. "The Rochefort squadron will set out on 20th _nivôse_, will reach
Toulon the 20th _pluviôse:_ the united squadrons will set sail in
_ventôse_, and arrive in _germinal_ before Boulogne--that is rather
late. In any case the Egyptian Expedition will cover the departure of
the Toulon squadron: everything will be managed _so that Nelson will
first sail for Alexandria_."
These schemes reveal the strong and also the weak qualities of
Napoleon. He perceived the strength of the central position which
France enjoyed on her four coasts; and he now contrived all his
dispositions, both naval and political, so as to tempt Nelson away
eastwards from Toulon during the concentration of the French fleet in
the Channel; and for this purpose he informed the military officers at
Toulon that their destination was Taranto and the Morea. It was to
these points that he wished to decoy Nelson; for this end had he sent
his troops to Taranto, and kept up French intrigues in Corfu, the
Morea, and Egypt; it was for this purpose that he charged that wily
spy Méhée to inform Drake that the Toulon fleet was to take 40,000
French troops to the Morea, and that the Brest fleet, with 200 highly
trained Irish officers, was intended solely for Ireland. But, while
displaying consummate guile, he failed to allow for the uncertainties
of operations conducted by sea. Ignoring the patent fact that the
Toulon fleet was blockaded by Nelson, and that of Rochefort by
Collingwood, he fixed the dates of their departure and junction as
though he were ordering the movements of a _corps d'armée_ in
Provence; and this craving for certainty was to mar his naval plans
and dog his footsteps with the shadow of disaster.[324]
The plan of using the Toulon fleet to cover an invasion of England was
not entirely new. As far back as the days of De Tourville, a somewhat
similar plan had been devised: the French Channel and Atlantic fleets
under that admiral were closely to engage Russell off the Isle of
Wight, while the Toulon squadron, sailing northwards, was to collect
the French transports on the coasts of Normandy for the invasion of
England. Had Napoleon carefully studied French naval history, he would
have seen that the disaster of La Hogue was largely caused by the
severe weather which prevented the rendezvous, and brought about a
hasty and ill-advised alteration in the original scheme. But of all
subjects on which he spoke as an authority, there was perhaps not one
that he had so inadequately studied as naval strategy: yet there was
none wherein the lessons of experience needed so carefully to be laid
to heart.
Fortune seemed to frown on Napoleon's naval schemes: yet she was
perhaps not unkind in thwarting them in their first stages. Events
occurred which early suggested a deviation from the combinations
noticed above. In the last days of 1803, hearing that the English
were about to attack Martinique, he at once wrote to Gantheaume,
urging him to despatch the Toulon squadron under Admiral
Latouche-Tréville for the rescue of this important island. The
commander of the troops, Cervoni, was to be told that the expedition
aimed at the Morea, so that spies might report this news to Nelson,
and it is clear from our admiral's despatches that the ruse half
succeeded. Distracted, however, by the thought that the French might,
after all, aim at Ireland, Nelson clung to the vicinity of Toulon, and
his untiring zeal kept in harbour the most daring admiral in the French
navy, who, despite his advanced age, excited an enthusiasm that none
other could arouse.
To him, in spite of his present ill-fortune, Napoleon intrusted the
execution of a scheme bearing date July 2nd, 1804. Latouche was
ordered speedily to put to sea with his ten ships of the line and four
frigates, to rally a French warship then at Cadiz, release the five
ships of the line and four frigates blockaded at Rochefort by
Collingwood, and then sweep the Channel and convoy the flotilla across
the straits. This has been pronounced by Jurien de la Gravière the
best of all Napoleon's plans: it exposed ships that had long been in
harbour only to a short ocean voyage, and it was free from the
complexity of the later and more grandiose schemes.
But fate interposed and carried off the intrepid commander by that
worst of all deaths for a brave seaman, death by disease in harbour,
where he was shut up by his country's foes (August 20th).
Villeneuve was thereupon appointed to succeed him, while Missiessy
held command at Rochefort. The choice of Villeneuve has always been
considered strange; and the riddle is not solved by the declaration of
Napoleon that he considered that Villeneuve at the Nile showed his
_good fortune_ in escaping with the only French ships which survived
that disaster. A strange reason this: to appoint an admiral commander
of an expedition that was to change the face of the world because his
good fortune consisted in escaping from Nelson![325]
Napoleon now began to widen his plans. According to the scheme of
September 29th, three expeditions were now to set out; the first was
to assure the safety of the French West Indies; the second was to
recover the Dutch colonies in those seas and reinforce the French troops
still holding out in part of St. Domingo; while the third had as its
objective West Africa and St. Helena. The Emperor evidently hoped to
daze us by simultaneous attacks in Africa, America, and also in Asiatic
waters. After these fleets had set sail in October and November, 1804,
Ireland was to be attacked by the Brest fleet now commanded by
Gantheaume. Slipping away from the grip of Cornwallis, he was to pass
out of sight of land and disembark his troops in Lough Swilly. These
troops, 18,000 strong, were under that redoubtable fighter, Augereau;
and had they been landed, the history of the world might have been
different. Leaving them to revolutionize Ireland, Gantheaume was to make
for the English Channel, touch at Cherbourg for further orders, and
proceed to Boulogne to convoy the flotilla across: or, if the weather
prevented this, as was probable in January, he was to pass on to the
Texel, rally the seven Dutch battleships and the transports with their
25,000 troops, beat back down the English Channel and return to Ireland.
Napoleon counted on the complete success of one or other of Gantheaume's
moves: "Whether I have 30,000 or 40,000 men in Ireland, or whether I am
both in England and Ireland, the war is ours."[326]
The objections to the September combination are fairly obvious. It was
exceedingly improbable that the three fleets could escape at the time
and in the order which Napoleon desired, or that crews enervated by
long captivity in port would succeed in difficult operations when
thrust out into the wintry gales of the Atlantic and the Channel.
Besides, success could only be won after a serious dispersion of
French naval resources; and the West Indian expeditions must be
regarded as prompted quite as much by a colonial policy as by a
determination to overrun England or Ireland.[327]
At any rate, if the Emperor's aim was merely to distract us by widely
diverging attacks, that could surely have been accomplished without
sending twenty-six sail of the line into American and African waters,
and leaving to Gantheaume so disproportionate an amount of work and
danger. This September combination may therefore be judged distinctly
inferior to that of July, which, with no scattering of the French
forces, promised to decoy Nelson away to the Morea and Egypt, while
the Toulon and Rochefort squadrons proceeded to Boulogne.
The September schemes hopelessly miscarried. Gantheaume did not elude
Cornwallis, and remained shut up in Brest. Missiessy escaped from
Rochefort, sailed to the West Indies, where he did some damage and
then sailed home again. "He had taken a pawn and returned to his own
square."[328] Villeneuve slipped out from Toulon (January 19th, 1805),
while Nelson was sheltering from westerly gales under the lee of
Sardinia; but the storm which promised to renew his reputation for
good luck speedily revealed the weakness of his ships and crews.
"My fleet looked well at Toulon," he wrote to Decrès, Minister of
Marine, "but when the storm came on, things changed at once. The
sailors were not used to storms: they were lost among the mass of
soldiers: these from sea-sickness lay in heaps about the decks: it was
impossible to work the ships: hence yard-arms were broken and sails
were carried away: our losses resulted as much from clumsiness and
inexperience as from defects in the materials delivered by the
arsenals."[329]
Inexperience and sea-sickness were factors that found no place in
Napoleon's calculations; but they compelled Villeneuve to return to
Toulon to refit; and there Nelson closed on him once more.
Meanwhile events were transpiring which seemed to add to Napoleon's
naval strength and to the difficulties of his foes. On January 4th,
1805, he concluded with Spain a treaty which added her naval resources
to those of France, Holland, and Northern Italy. The causes that led
to an open rupture between England and Spain were these. Spain had
been called upon by Napoleon secretly to pay him the stipulated sum of
72,000,000 francs a year (see p. 437), and she reluctantly consented.
This was, of course, a covert act of hostility against England; and
the Spanish Government was warned at the close of 1803 that, if this
subsidy continued to be paid to France, it would constitute "at any
future period, when circumstances may render it necessary, a just
cause of war" between England and Spain. Far from complying with this
reasonable remonstrance, the Spanish Court yielded to Napoleon's
imperious order to repair five French warships that had taken refuge
in Ferrol from our cruisers, and in July, 1804, allowed French seamen
to travel thither overland to complete the crews of these vessels.
Thus for some months our warships had to observe Ferrol, as if it were
a hostile port.
Clearly, this state of things could not continue; and when the
protests of our ambassador at Madrid were persistently evaded or
ignored, he was ordered, in the month of September, to leave that
capital unless he received satisfactory assurances. He did not leave
until November 10th, and before that time a sinister event had taken
place. The British Ministry determined that Spanish treasure-ships from
South America should not be allowed to land at Cadiz the sinews of war
for France, and sent orders to our squadrons to stop those ships. Four
frigates were told off for that purpose. On the 5th of October they
sighted the four rather smaller Spanish frigates that bore the ingots of
Peru, and summoned them to surrender, thereafter to be held in pledge.
The Spaniards, nobly resolving to yield only to overwhelming force,
refused; and in the ensuing fight one of their ships blew up, whereupon
the others hauled down their flags and were taken to England. Resenting
this action, Spain declared war on December 12th, 1804.
Stripped of all the rodomontade with which French historians have
enveloped this incident, the essential facts are as follows. Napoleon
compelled Spain by the threat of invasion to pay him a large subsidy:
England declared this payment, and accompanying acts, to be acts of
war; Spain shuffled uneasily between the two belligerents but
continued to supply funds to Napoleon and to shelter and repair his
warships; thereupon England resolved to cut off her American
subsidies, but sent a force too small to preclude the possibility of a
sea-fight; the fight took place, with a lamentable result, which
changed the covert hostility of Spain into active hostility.
Public opinion and popular narratives are, however, fashioned by
sentiment rather than founded on evidence; accordingly, Britain's
prestige suffered from this event. The facts, as currently reported,
seemed to convict her of an act of piracy; and few persons on the
Continent or among the Whig coteries of Westminster troubled to find
out whether Spain had not been guilty of acts of hostility and whether
the French Emperor was not the author of the new war. Undoubtedly it
was his threatening pressure on Spain that had compelled her to her
recent action: but that pressure had been for the most part veiled by
diplomacy, while Britain's retort was patent and notorious.
Consequently, every version of this incident that was based merely on
newspaper reports condemned her conduct as brutally piratical; and
only those who have delved into archives have discovered the real
facts of the case.[330] Napoleon's letter to the King of Spain quoted
on p. 437 shows that even before the war he was seeking to drag him
into hostilities with England, and he continued to exert a remorseless
pressure on the Court of Madrid; it left two alternatives open to
England, either to see Napoleon close his grip on Spain and wield her
naval resources when she was fully prepared for war, or to precipitate
the rupture. It was the alternative, _mutatis mutandis_, presented to
George III. and the elder Pitt in 1761, when the King was for delay
and his Minister was for war at once. That instance had proved the
father's foresight; and now at the close of 1804 the younger Pitt
might flatter himself that open war was better than a treacherous
peace.
In lieu of a subsidy Spain now promised to provide from twenty-five to
twenty-nine sail of the line, and to have them ready by the close of
March. On his side, Napoleon agreed to guarantee the integrity of the
Spanish dominions, and to regain Trinidad for her. The sequel will
show how his word was kept.
The conclusion of this alliance placed the hostile navies almost on an
equality, at least on paper. But, as the equipment of the Spanish
fleet was very slow, Napoleon for the present adhered to his plan of
September, 1804, with the result already detailed. Not until March
2nd, 1805, do we find the influence of the Spanish alliance observable
in his naval schemes. On that date he issued orders to Villeneuve and
Gantheaume, which assigned to the latter most of the initiative, as also
the chief command after their assumed junction. Gantheaume, with the
Brest fleet, after eluding the blockaders, was to proceed first to
Ferrol, capture the British ships off that port and, reinforced by the
French and Spanish ships there at anchor, proceed across the Atlantic to
the appointed rendezvous at Martinique. The Toulon squadron under
Villeneuve was at the same time to make for Cadiz, and, after collecting
the Spanish ships, set sail for the West Indies. Then the armada was to
return with all speed to Boulogne, where Napoleon expected it to arrive
between June 10th and July 10th.[331]
Diverse judgments have been passed on this, the last and grandest of
Napoleon's naval combinations. On the one hand, it is urged that, as
the French fleets had seen no active service, a long voyage was
necessary to impart experience and efficiency before matters were
brought to the touch in the Straits of Dover; and as Britain and
France both regarded their West Indian islands as their most valued
possessions, a voyage thither would be certain to draw British sails
in eager pursuit. Finally, those islands dotted over a thousand miles
of sea presented a labyrinth wherein it would be easy for the French
to elude Nelson's cruisers.
On the other hand, it may be urged that the success of the plan
depended on too many _ifs_. Assuming that the Toulon and Brest
squadrons escaped the blockaders, their subsequent movements would
most probably be reported by some swift frigate off Gibraltar or
Ferrol. The chance of our divining the French plans was surely as
great as that Gantheaume and Villeneuve would unite in the West
Indies, ravage the British possessions, and return in undiminished
force. The English fleets, after weary months of blockade, were adepts
at scouting; their wings covered with ease a vast space, their
frigates rapidly signalled news to the flagship, and their
concentration was swift and decisive. Prompt to note every varying
puff of wind, they bade fair to overhaul their enemies when the chase
began in earnest, and when once the battle was joined, numbers counted
for little: the English crews, inured to fights on the ocean, might be
trusted to overwhelm the foe by their superior experience and
discipline, hampered as the French now were by the lumbering and
defective warships of Spain.
Napoleon, indeed, amply discounted the chances of failure of his
ultimate design, the command of the Channel. The ostensible aims of
the expedition were colonial. The French fleets were to take on board
11,908 soldiers, of whom three-fourths were destined for the West
Indies; and, in case Gantheaume did not join Villeneuve at Martinique,
the latter was ordered, after waiting forty days, to set sail for the
Canaries, there to intercept the English convoys bound for Brazil and
the East Indies.
In the spring and summer of 1805 Napoleon's correspondence supplies
copious proof of the ideas and plans that passed through his brain.
After firmly founding the new Empire, he journeyed into Piedmont,
thence to Milan for his coronation as King of Italy, and finally to
Genoa. In this absence of three months from Paris (April-July) many
lengthy letters to Decrès attest the alternations of his hopes and
fears. He now keeps the possibility of failure always before him: his
letters no longer breathe the crude confidence of 1803: and while
facing the chances of failure in the West Indies, his thoughts swing
back to the Orient:
"According to all the news that I receive, five or six thousand men
in the [East] Indies would ruin the English Company. Supposing that
our [West] Indian expedition is not fully successful, and I cannot
reach the grand end which will demolish all the rest, I think we
must arrange the [East] Indian expedition for September. We have
now greater resources for it than some time ago."[332]
How tenacious is his will! He here recurs to the plan laid down before
Decaen sailed to the East Indies in March, 1803. Even the prospects of
a continental coalition fail to dispel that gorgeous dream. But amid
much that is visionary we may discern this element of practicality: in
case the blow against England misses the mark, Napoleon has provided
himself with a splendid alternative that will banish all thought of
failure.
It is needless to recount here the well-known details of Villeneuve's
voyage and Nelson's pursuit. The Toulon and Cadiz fleets got clear
away to the West Indies, and after a last glance towards the Orient,
Nelson set out in pursuit. On the 4th of June the hostile fleets were
separated by only a hundred miles of sea; and Villeneuve, when off
Antigua, hearing that Nelson was so close, decided forthwith to return
to Europe. After disembarking most of his troops and capturing a fleet
of fourteen British merchantmen, he sailed for Ferrol, in pursuance of
orders just received from Napoleon, which bade him rally fifteen
allied ships at that port, and push on to Brest, where he must release
Gantheaume.
In this gigantic war game, where the Atlantic was the chess-board, and
the prize a world-empire, the chances were at this time curiously
even. Fortune had favoured Villeneuve but checked Gantheaume.
Villeneuve successfully dodged Nelson in the West Indies, but
ultimately the pursuer divined the enemy's scheme of returning to
Europe, and sent a swift brig to warn the Admiralty, which was thereby
informed of the exact position of affairs on July 8th, that is, twelve
days before Napoleon himself knew of the state of affairs. On July
20th, the French Emperor heard, _through English newspapers_, that his
fleet was on its return voyage: and his heart beat high with hope that
Villeneuve would now gather up his squadrons in the Bay of Biscay and
appear before Boulogne in overwhelming force; for he argued that, even
if Villeneuve should keep right away from Brest, and leave blockaders
and blockaded face to face, he would still be at least sixteen ships
stronger than any force that could be brought against him.
But Napoleon was now committing the blunder which he so often censured
in his inferiors. He was "making pictures" to himself, pictures in
which the gleams of fortune were reserved for the tricolour flag, and
gloom and disaster shrouded the Union Jack; he conceived that Nelson
had made for Jamaica, and that the British squadrons were engaged in
chasing phantom French fleets around Ireland or to the East Indies.
"We have not to do," he said, "with a far-seeing, but with a very
proud, Government."
In reality, Nelson was nearing the coast of Portugal, Cornwallis had
been so speedily reinforced as to marshal twenty-eight ships of the
line off Brest, while Calder was waiting for Villeneuve off Cape
Finisterre with a fleet of fifteen battleships. Thus, when Villeneuve
neared the north-west of Spain, his twenty ships of the line were
confronted by a force which he could neither overwhelm nor shake off.
The combat of July 22nd, fought amidst a dense haze, was unfavourable
to the allies, two Spanish ships of the line striking their colours to
Calder before the gathering fog and gloom of night separated the
combatants: on the next two days Villeneuve strove to come to close
quarters, but Calder sheered off; thereupon the French, unable then to
make Ferrol, put into Vigo, while Calder, ignorant of their position,
joined Cornwallis off Brest. This retreat of the British admiral
subjected him to a court-martial, and consternation reigned in London
when Villeneuve was known to be on the Spanish coast unguarded; but
the fear was needless; though the French admiral succeeded in rallying
the Ferrol squadron, yet, as he was ordered to avoid Ferrol, he put
into Corunna, and on August 15th he decided to sail for Cadiz.
To realize the immense importance of this decision we must picture to
ourselves the state of affairs just before this time.
Nelson, delayed by contrary winds and dogged by temporary ill-luck,
had made for Gibraltar, whence, finding that no French ships had
passed the straits, he doubled back in hot haste northwards, and there
is clear proof that his speedy return to the coast of Spain spread
dismay in official circles at Paris. "This unexpected union of forces
undoubtedly renders every scheme of invasion impracticable for the
present," wrote Talleyrand to Napoleon on August 2nd, 1805.[333]
Missing Villeneuve off Ferrol, Nelson joined Cornwallis off Ushant on
the very day when the French admiral decided to make for Cadiz.
Passing on to Portsmouth, the hero now enjoyed a few days of
well-earned repose, until the nation called on him for his final
effort.
Meanwhile Napoleon had arrived on August 3rd at Boulogne, where he
reviewed a line of soldiery nine miles long. The sight might well
arouse his hopes of assured victory. He had ground for hoping that
Villeneuve would soon be in the Channel. Not until August 8th did he
receive news of the fight with Calder, and he took pains to parade it
as an English defeat. He therefore trusted that, in the spirit of his
orders to Villeneuve dated July the 26th, that admiral would sail to
Cadiz, gather up other French and Spanish ships, and return to Ferrol
and Brest with a mighty force of some sixty sail of the line:
"I count on your zeal for my service, on your love for the
fatherland, on your hatred of this Power which for forty
generations has oppressed us, and which a little daring and
perseverance on your part will for ever reduce to the rank of the
small Powers: 150,000 soldiers ... and the crews complete are
embarked on 2,000 craft of the flotilla, which, despite the English
cruisers, forms a long line of broadsides from Etaples to Cape
Grisnez. Your voyage, and it alone, makes us without any doubt
masters of England."
Austria and Russia were already marshalling their forces for the war
of the Third Coalition. Yet, though menaced by those Powers, to whom
he had recently offered the most flagrant provocations, this
astonishing man was intent only on the ruin of England, and secretly
derided their preparations. "You need not" (so he wrote to Eugène,
Viceroy of Italy) "contradict the newspaper rumours of war, but make
fun of them.... Austria's actions are probably the result of
fear."--Thus, even when the eastern horizon lowered threateningly with
clouds, he continued to pace the cliffs of Boulogne, or gallop
restlessly along the strand, straining his gaze westward to catch the
first glimpse of his armada. That horizon was never to be flecked with
Villeneuve's sails: they were at this time furled in the harbour of
Cadiz.
Unmeasured abuse has been showered upon Villeneuve for his retreat to
that harbour. But it must be remembered that in both of Napoleon's
last orders to him, those of July 16th and 26th, he was required to
sail to Cadiz under certain conditions. In the first order prescribing
alternative ways of gaining the mastery of the Channel, that step was
recommended solely as a last alternative in case of misfortune: he was
directed not to enter the long and difficult inlet of Ferrol, but,
after collecting the squadron there, to cast anchor at Cadiz. In the
order of July 26th he was charged positively to repair to Cadiz: "My
intention is that you rally at Cadiz the Spanish ships there,
disembark your sick, and, without stopping there more than four days
at most, again set sail, return to Ferrol, etc." Villeneuve seems not
to have received these last orders, but he alludes to those of July
16th.[334]
These, then, were probably the last instructions he received from
Napoleon before setting sail from the roads of Corunna on August 13th.
The censures passed on his retreat to Cadiz are therefore based on the
supposition that he received instructions which he did not
receive.[335] He expressly based his move to Cadiz on Napoleon's
orders of July 16th. The mishaps which the Emperor then contemplated
as necessitating such a step had, in Villeneuve's eyes, actually
happened. The admiral considered the fight of July 22nd _la malheureuse
affaire;_ his ships were encumbered with sick; they worked badly; on
August 15th a north-east gale carried away the top-mast of a Spanish
ship; and having heard from a Danish merchantman the news--false news,
as it afterwards appeared--that Cornwallis with twenty-five ships was to
the north, he turned and scudded before the wind. He could not divine
the disastrous influence of his conduct on the plan of invasion. He did
not know that his master was even then beginning to hesitate between a
dash on London or a campaign on the Danube, and that the events of the
next few days were destined to tilt the fortunes of the world. Doubtless
he ought to have disregarded the Emperor's words about Cadiz and to have
struggled on to Brest, as his earlier and wider orders enjoined. But the
Emperor's instructions pointed to Cadiz as the rendezvous in case of
misfortune or great difficulty. As a matter of fact, Napoleon on July
26th ordered the Rochefort squadron to _meet Villeneuve at Cadiz;_ and
it is clear that by that date Napoleon had decided on that rendezvous,
apparently because it could be more easily entered and cleared than
Ferrol, and was safer from attack. But, as it happened, the Rochefort
squadron had already set sail and failed to sight an enemy or friend for
several weeks.
Such are the risks of naval warfare, in which even the greatest
geniuses at times groped but blindly. Nelson was not afraid to confess
the truth. The French Emperor, however, seems never to have made an
admission which would mar his claim to strategic infallibility. Even
now, when the Spanish ships were proved to clog the enterprise, he
persisted in merely counting numbers, and in asserting that Villeneuve
might still neutralize the force of Calder and Cornwallis. These hopes
he cherished up to August 23rd, when, as the next chapter will show,
he faced right about to confront Austria. His Minister of Marine, who
had more truly gauged the difficulties of all parts of the naval
enterprise, continued earnestly to warn him of the terrible risk of
burdening Villeneuve's ships with the unseaworthy craft of Spain and
of trusting to this ill-assorted armada to cover the invasion now that
their foes had divined its secret. The Emperor bitterly upbraided his
Minister for his timidity, and in the presence of Daru, Intendant
General of the army, indulged in a dramatic soliloquy against
Villeneuve for his violation of orders: "What a navy! What an admiral!
What sacrifices for nothing! My hopes are frustrated--- Daru, sit down
and write"--whereupon it is said that he traced out the plans of the
campaign which was to culminate at Ulm and Austerlitz.[336]
The question has often been asked whether Napoleon seriously intended
the invasion of England. Certainly the experienced seamen of England,
France, and Holland, with few exceptions, declared that the
flat-bottomed boats were unseaworthy, and that a frightful disaster
must ensue if they were met out at sea by our ships. When it is
further remembered that our coasts were defended by batteries and
martello towers, that several hundreds of pinnaces and row-boats were
ready to attack the flotilla before it could attempt the
disembarkation of horses, artillery, and stores, and that 180,000
regulars and militia, aided by 400,000 volunteers, were ready to
defend our land, the difficulties even of capturing London will be
obvious. And the capture of the capital would not have decided the
contest. Napoleon seems to have thought it would. In his voyage to St.
Helena he said: "I put all to the hazard; I entered into no
calculations as to the manner in which I was to return; I trusted all
to the impression the occupation of the capital would have
occasioned."[337]--But, as has been shown above (p. 441), plans had been
secretly drawn up for the removal of the Court and the national treasure
to Worcester; the cannon of Woolwich were to be despatched into the
Midlands by canal; and our military authorities reckoned that the
systematic removal of provisions and stores from all the districts
threatened by the enemy would exhaust him long before he overran the
home counties. Besides, the invasion was planned when Britain's naval
power had been merely evaded, not conquered. Nelson and Cornwallis and
Calder would not for ever be chasing phantom fleets; they would
certainly return, and cut Napoleon from his base, the sea.
Again, if Napoleon was bent solely on the invasion of England, why
should he in June, 1805, have offered to Russia and Austria so
gratuitous an affront as the annexation of the Ligurian Republic? He
must have known that this act would hurry them into war. Thiers
considers the annexation of Genoa a "grave fault" in the Emperor's
policy--but many have doubted whether Napoleon did not intend Genoa to
be the gate leading to a new avenue of glory, now that the success of
his naval dispositions was doubtful. Marbot gives the general opinion
of military circles when he says that the Emperor wanted to provoke a
continental war in order to escape the ridicule which the failure of
his Boulogne plans would otherwise have aroused. "The new coalition
came just at the right moment to get him out of an annoying
situation." The compiler of the Fouché "Memoirs," which, though not
genuine, may be accepted as generally correct, took the same view. He
attributes to Napoleon the noteworthy words: "I may fail by sea, but
not by land; besides, I shall be able to strike the blow before the
old coalition machines are ready: the kings have neither activity nor
decision of character: I do not fear old Europe." The Emperor also
remarked to the Council of State that the expense of all the
preparations at Boulogne was fully justified by the fact that they
gave him "fully twenty days' start over all enemies.... A pretext had
to be found for raising the troops and bringing them together without
alarming the Continental Powers: and that pretext was afforded me by
the projected descent upon England."[338]
It is also quite possible that his aim was Ireland as much as England.
It certainly was in the plan of September, 1804: and doubtless it
still held a prominent place in his mind, except during the few days
when he pictured Calder vanquished and Nelson scouring the West
Indies. Then he doubtless fixed his gaze solely upon London. But there
is much indirect evidence which points to Ireland as forming at least
a very important part of his scheme. Both Nelson and Collingwood
believed him to be aiming at Ireland.[339]
But indeed Napoleon is often unfathomable. Herein lies much of the
charm of Napoleonic studies. He is at once the Achilles, the Mercury,
and the Proteus of the modern world. The ease with which his mind
grasped all problems and suddenly concentrated its force on some new
plan may well perplex posterity as it dazed his contemporaries. If we
were dealing with any other man than Napoleon, we might safely say
that an invasion of England, before the command of the sea had been
secured, was infinitely less likely than a descent on Ireland. The
landing of a _corps d'armée_ there would have provoked a revolution;
and British ascendancy would have vanished in a week. Even had Nelson
returned and swept the seas, Ireland would have been lost to the
United Kingdom; and Britain, exhausted also by the expenses which the
Boulogne preparations had compelled her to make for the defence of
London, must have succumbed.
If ever Napoleon intended risking all his fortunes on the conquest of
England, it can be proved that his mind was gradually cleared of
illusions. He trusted that a popular rising would overthrow the British
Government: people and rulers showed an accord that had never been known
since the reign of Queen Anne. He believed, for a short space, that the
flotilla could fight sea-going ships out at sea: the converse was proved
up to the hilt. Finally, he trusted that Villeneuve, when burdened with
Spanish ships, would outwit and outmanoeuvre Nelson!
What then remained after these and many other disappointments? Surely
that scheme alone was practicable, in which the command of the sea
formed only an unimportant factor. For the conquest of England it was
an essential factor. In Ireland alone could Napoleon find the
conditions on which he counted for success--a discontented populace
that would throng to the French eagles, and a field of warfare where
the mere landing of 20,000 veterans would decide the campaign.[340]
And yet it is, on the whole, certain that his expedition for Ireland
was meant merely to distract and paralyze the defenders of Great
Britain, while he dealt the chief blow at London. Instinct and
conviction alike prompted him to make imposing feints that should lead
his enemy to lay bare his heart, and that heart was our great capital.
His indomitable will scorned the word _impossible_--"a word found only
in the dictionary of fools"; he felt England to be the sole barrier to
his ambitions; and to crush her power he was ready to brave, not only
her stoutest seamen, but also her guardian angels, the winds and
storms. Both the man and the occasion were unique in the world's
history and must not be judged according to tame probabilities. For
his honour was at stake. He was so deeply pledged to make use of the
vast preparations at his northern ports that, had all his complex
dispositions worked smoothly, he would certainly have attempted a dash
at London; and only after some adequate excuse could he consent to give
up that adventure.
The excuse was now furnished by Villeneuve's retreat to Cadiz; and
public opinion, ignorant of Napoleon's latest instructions on that
subject, and knowing only the salient facts of the case, laid on that
luckless admiral the whole burden of blame for the failure of the
scheme of invasion. With front unabashed and a mind presaging certain
triumphs, Napoleon accordingly wheeled his legions eastward to
prosecute that alluring alternative, the conquest of England through
the Continent.
APPENDIX
[_The two following State Papers have never before been published_]
No. I. is a despatch from Mr. Thornton, our _chargé d'affaires_ at
Washington, relative to the expected transfer of the vast region of
Louisiana from Spain to France (see ch. xv. of this vol.).
[In "F O.," America, No. 35.]
"WASHINGTON,
"26 _Jany._, 1802.
"MY LORD,
"... About four years ago, when the rumour of the transfer of
Louisiana to France was first circulated, I put into Mr.
Pickering's hands for his perusal a despatch written by Mr. Fauchet
about the year 1794, which with many others was intercepted by one
of H.M. ships. In that paper the French Minister urged to his
Government the absolute necessity of acquiring Louisiana or some
territory in the vicinity of the United States in order to obtain a
permanent influence in the country, and he alluded to a memorial
written some years before by the Count du Moutier to the same
effect, when he was employed as His Most Christian Majesty's
Minister to the United States. The project seems therefore to have
been long in the contemplation of the French Government, and
perhaps no period is more favourable than the present for carrying
it into execution.
"When I paid my respects to the Vice-President, Mr. Burr, on his
arrival at this place, he, of his own accord, directed conversation
to this topic. He owned that he had made some exertion indirectly
to discover the truth of the report, and thought he had reason to
believe it. He appeared to think that the great armament destined
by France to St. Domingo, had this ulterior object in view, and
expressed much apprehension that the transfer and colonization of
Louisiana were meditated by her with the concurrence or
acquiescence of His Maj'^{s} Gov^{t}. It was impossible for me to
give any opinion on this part of the measure, which, whatever may
be its ultimate tendency, presents at first view nothing but danger
to His Maj'^{s} Trans-Atlantic possessions.
"Regarding alone the aim of France to acquire a preponderating
influence in the councils of the United States, it may be very well
doubted whether the possession of Louisiana, and the means which
she would chose to employ are calculated to secure that end.
Experience seems now to have sanctioned the opinion that if the
provinces of Canada had been restored to France at the Peace of
Paris, and if from that quarter she had been left to press upon the
American frontier, to harass the exterior settlements and to mingle
in the feuds of the Indian Tribes, the colonies might still have
preserved their allegiance to the parent country and have retained
their just jealousy of that system of encroachment adopted by
France from the beginning of the last century. The present project
is but a continuance of the same system; and neither her power nor
her present temper leave room for expectation that she will pursue
it with less eagerness or greater moderation than before. Whether,
therefore, she attempt to restrain the navigation of the
Mississippi or limit the freedom of the port of New Orleans;
whether she press upon the Western States with any view to
conquest, or seduce them by her principles of fraternity (for which
indeed they are well prepared) she must infallibly alienate the
Atlantic States and force them into a straiter connection with
Great Britain.
"I have scarcely met with a person under whatever party he may rank
himself, who does not dread this event, and who would not prefer
almost any neighbours to the French: and it seems perfect
infatuation in the Administration of this country that they chose
the present moment for leaving that frontier almost defenceless by
the reduction of its military establishment.
"I have, etc.,
"[Signed] EDW'D THORNTON."
* * * * *
No. II. is a report in "F.O.," France, No. 71, by one of our spies in
Paris on the doings of the Irish exiles there, especially O'Connor,
whom Napoleon had appointed General of Division in Marshal Augereau's
army, then assembling at Brest for the expedition to Ireland. After
stating O'Connor's appointment, the report continues:
"About eighty Irishmen were sent to Morlaix to be formed into a
company of officers and taught how they were to discipline and
instruct their countrymen when they landed in Ireland. McShee,
Général de Brigade, commands them. He and Blackwell are, I
believe, the only persons among them of any consequence, who have
seen actual service. Emmett's brother and McDonald, who were
jealous of the attention paid to O'Connor, would not go to
Morlaix. They were prevailed on to go to Brest towards the end of
May, and there to join General Humbert. Commandant Dalton, a young
man of Irish extraction, and lately appointed to a situation in
the Army at Boulogne, translated everything between O'Connor and
the War Department at Paris. There is no Irish Committee at Paris
as is reported. O'Connor and General Hartry, an old Irishman who
has been long in the French service, are the only persons applied
to by the French Government, O'Connor for the expedition, and
Hartry for the Police, etc., of the Irish in France.
"O'Connor, though he had long tried to have an audience of
Bonaparte, never saw him till the 20th of May [1805], when he was
presented to him at the levee by Marshal Augereau. The Emperor and
the Empress complimented him on his dress and military appearance,
and Bonaparte said to him _Venez me voir en particulier demain
matin._ O'Connor went and was alone with him near two hours. On
that day Bonaparte did not say a word to him respecting his
intention on England; all their conversation regarded Ireland.
O'Connor was with him again on the Thursday and Friday following.
Those three audiences are all that O'Connor ever had in private
with Bonaparte.
"He told me on the Saturday evening that he should go to Court the
next morning to take public leave of the Emperor and leave Paris
as soon as he had received 10,000 livres which Maret was to give
him for his travelling expenses, etc., and which he was to have in
a day or two. His horses and all his servants but one had set off
for Brest some time before.
"Bonaparte told O'Connor, when speaking of the prospect of a
continental War, 'la Russie peut-être pourroit envoyer cette année
100,000 hommes contre la France, mais j'ai pour cela assez de
monde à ma disposition: je ferois même marcher, s'il le faut, une
armée contre la Russie, et si l'Empereur d'Allemagne refusoit un
passage à cette armée dans son pays, je la ferois passer malgré
lui.' He afterwards said--'il y a plusieurs moyens de détruire
l'Angleterre, mais celui de lui ôter Irlande est bon. Je vous
donnerai 25,000 bonnes troupes et s'il en arrive seulement 15,000,
ce sera assez. Vous aurez aussi 150,000 fusils pour armer vos
compatriotes, et un parc d'artillerie légère, des pièces de 4 et
de 6 livres, et toutes les provisions de guerre nécessaires.'
"O'Connor endeavoured to persuade Bonaparte that the best way to
conquer England was first to go to Ireland, and thence to England
with 200,000 Irishmen. Bonaparte said he did not think that would
do; _d'ailleurs,_ he added, _ce seroit trop long_. They agreed
that all the English in Ireland should be exterminated as the
whites had been in St. Domingo. Bonaparte assured him that, as
soon as he had formed an Irish army, he should be Commander in
Chief of the French and Irish forces. Bonaparte directed O'Connor
to try to gain over to his interest Laharpe, the Emperor of
Russia's tutor. Laharpe had applied for a passport to go to St.
Pétersbourg. He says he will do everything in his power to engage
the Emperor to go to war with Bonaparte. Laharpe breathes nothing
but vengeance against Bonaparte, who, besides other injuries,
turned his back on him in public and would not speak to him.
Laharpe was warned of O'Connor's intended visit, and went to the
country to avoid seeing him: The Senator Garat is to go to Brest
with O'Connor to write a constitution for Ireland. O'Connor is
getting out of favor with the Irish in France; they begin to
suspect his ambitious and selfish views. There was a coolness
between Admiral Truguet and him for some time previous to
Truguet's return to Brest. Augereau had given a dinner to all the
principal officers of his army then at Paris. Truguet invited all
of them to dine with him, two or three days after, except
O'Connor. O'Connor told me he would never forgive him for it."
* * * * *
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 1: From a French work, "Moeurs et Coutumes des Corses"
(Paris, 1802), I take the following incident. A priest, charged with
the duty of avenging a relative for some fourteen years, met his enemy
at the gate of Ajaccio and forthwith shot him, under the eyes of an
official--who did nothing. A relative of the murdered man, happening
to be near, shot the priest. Both victims were quickly buried, the
priest being interred under the altar of the church, "because of his
sacred character." See too Miot de Melito, "Mémoires," vol. i., ch.
xiii., as to the utter collapse of the jury system in 1800-1, because
no Corsican would "deny his party or desert his blood."]
[Footnote 2: As to the tenacity of Corsican devotion, I may cite a
curious proof from the unpublished portion of the "Memoirs of Sir
Hudson Lowe." He was colonel in command of the Royal Corsican Rangers,
enrolled during the British occupation of Corsica, and gained the
affections of his men during several years of fighting in Egypt and
elsewhere. When stationed at Capri in 1808 he relied on his Corsican
levies to defend that island against Murat's attacks; and he did not
rely in vain. Though confronted by a French Corsican regiment, they
remained true to their salt, even during a truce, when they could
recognize their compatriots. The partisan instinct was proof against
the promises of Murat's envoys and the shouts even of kith and kin.]
[Footnote 3: The facts as to the family of Napoleon's mother are given
in full detail by M. Masson in his "Napoléon Inconnu," ch. i. They
correct the statement often made as to her "lowly," "peasant" origin.
Masson also proves that the house at Ajaccio, which is shown as
Napoleon's birthplace, is of later construction, though on the same
site.]
[Footnote 4: See Jacobi, "Hist. de la Corse," vol. ii., ch. viii. The
whole story is told with prudent brevity by French historians, even by
Masson and Chuquet. The few words in which Thiers dismisses this
subject are altogether misleading.]
[Footnote 5: Much has been written to prove that Napoleon was born in
1768, and was really the eldest surviving son. The reasons, stated
briefly, are: (1) that the first baptismal name of Joseph Buonaparte
was merely _Nabulione_ (Italian for _Napoleon_), and that _Joseph_ was
a later addition to his name on the baptismal register of January 7th,
1768, at Corte; (2) certain statements that Joseph was born at
Ajaccio; (3) Napoleon's own statement at his marriage that he was born
in 1768. To this it maybe replied that: (_a_) other letters and
statements, still more decisive, prove that Joseph was born at Corte
in 1768 and Napoleon at Ajaccio in 1769; (_b_) Napoleon's entry in the
marriage register was obviously designed to lessen the disparity of
years of his bride, who, on her side, subtracted four years from her
age. See Chuquet, "La Jeunesse de Napoléon," p. 65.]
[Footnote 6: Nasica, "Mémoires," p. 192.]
[Footnote 7: Both letters are accepted as authentic by Jung,
"Bonaparte et son Temps," vol. i., pp. 84, 92; but Masson, "Napoléon
Inconnu," vol. i., p. 55, tracking them to their source, discredits
them, as also from internal evidence.]
[Footnote 8: Chaptal, "Mes Souvenirs sur Napoléon," p. 177.]
[Footnote 9: Joseph Buonaparte, "Mems.," vol. i., p. 29. So too Miot
de Melito, "Mems.," vol. i., ch. x.]
[Footnote 10: Chaptal, "Souvenirs sur Napoléon," p. 237. See too
Masson, "Napoléon Inconnu," vol. i., p. 158, note.]
[Footnote 11: In an after-dinner conversation on January 11th, 1803,
with Roederer, Buonaparte exalted Voltaire at the expense of Rousseau
in these significant words: "The more I read Voltaire, the more I like
him: he is always reasonable, never a charlatan, never a fanatic: he
is made for mature minds. Up to sixteen years of age I would have
fought for Rousseau against all the friends of Voltaire. Now it is the
contrary. _I have been especially disgusted with Rousseau since I
have seen the East. Savage man is a dog._" ("Oeuvres de Roederer,"
vol. iii., p. 461.)
In 1804 he even denied his indebtedness to Rousseau. During a family
discussion, wherein he also belittled Corsica, he called Rousseau "a
babbler, or, if you prefer it, an eloquent enough _idéalogue_. I never
liked him, nor indeed well understood him: truly I had not the courage
to read him all, because I thought him for the most part tedious."
(Lucien Buonaparte, "Mémoires," vol. ii., ch. xi.)
His later views on Rousseau are strikingly set forth by Stanislas
Girardin, who, in his "Memoirs," relates that Buonaparte, on his visit
to the tomb of Rousseau, said: "'It would have been better for the
repose of France that this man had never been born.' 'Why, First
Consul?' said I. 'He prepared the French Revolution.' 'I thought it
was not for you to complain of the Revolution.' 'Well,' he replied,
'the future will show whether it would not have been better for the
repose of the world that neither I nor Rousseau had existed.'" Méneval
confirms this remarkable statement.]
[Footnote 12: Masson, "Napoléon Inconnu," vol. ii., p. 53.]
[Footnote 13: Joseph Buonaparte, "Mémoires," vol. i, p. 44.]
[Footnote 14: M. Chuquet, in his work "La Jeunesse de Napoléon"
(Paris, 1898), gives a different opinion: but I think this passage
shows a veiled hostility to Paoli. Probably we may refer to this time
an incident stated by Napoleon at St. Helena to Lady Malcolm ("Diary,"
p. 88), namely, that Paoli urged on him the acceptance of a commission
in the British army: "But I preferred the French, because I spoke the
language, was of their religion, understood and liked their manners,
and I thought the Revolution a fine time for an enterprising young
man. Paoli was angry--we did not speak afterwards." It is hard to
reconcile all these statements.
Lucien Buonaparte states that his brother seriously thought for a time
of taking a commission in the forces of the British East India
Company; but I am assured by our officials that no record of any
application now exists.]
[Footnote 15: The whole essay is evidently influenced by the works of
the democrat Raynal, to whom Buonaparte dedicated his "Lettres sur la
Corse." To the "Discours de Lyons" he prefixed as motto the words
"Morality will exist when governments are free," which he modelled on
a similar phrase of Raynal. The following sentences are also
noteworthy: "Notre organisation animale a des besoins indispensables:
manger, dormir, engendrer. Une nourriture, une cabane, des vêtements,
une femme, sont donc une stricte nécessité pour le bonheur. Notre
organisation intellectuelle a des appétits non moins impérieux et dont
la satisfaction est beaucoup plus précieuse. C'est dans leur entier
développement que consiste vraiment le bonheur. Sentir et raisonner,
voilà proprement le fait de l'homme."]
[Footnote 16: Nasica; Chuquet, p. 248.]
[Footnote 17: His recantation of Jacobinism was so complete that some
persons have doubted whether he ever sincerely held it. The doubt
argues a singular _naïveté_ it is laid to rest by Buonaparte's own
writings, by his eagerness to disown or destroy them, by the testimony
of everyone who knew his early career, and by his own confession:
"There have been good Jacobins. At one time every man of spirit was
bound to be one. I was one myself." (Thibaudeau, "Mémoires sur le
Consulat," p. 59.)]
[Footnote 18: I use the term _commissioner_ as equivalent to the
French _représentant en mission,_ whose powers were almost limitless.]
[Footnote 19: See this curious document in Jung, "Bonaparte et son
Temps," vol. ii., p. 249. Masson ignores it, but admits that the
Paolists and partisans of France were only seeking to dupe one
another.]
[Footnote 20: Buonaparte, when First Consul, was dunned for payment by
the widow of the Avignon bookseller who published the "Souper de
Beaucaire." He paid her well for having all the remaining copies
destroyed. Yet Panckoucke in 1818 procured one copy, which preserved
the memory of Buonaparte's early Jacobinism.]
[Footnote 21: I have chiefly followed the careful account of the siege
given by Cottin in his "Toulon et les Anglais en 1793" (Paris, 1898).
The following official figures show the weakness of the British army.
In December, 1792, the parliamentary vote was for 17,344 men as
"guards and garrisons," besides a few at Gibraltar and Sydney. In
February, 1793, 9,945 additional men were voted and 100 "independent
companies": Hanoverians were also embodied. In February, 1794, the
number of British regulars was raised to 60,244. For the navy the
figures were: December, 1792, 20,000 sailors and 5,000 marines;
February, 1793, 20,000 _additional_ seamen; for 1794, 73,000 seamen
and 12,000 marines. ("Ann. Reg.")]
[Footnote 22: Barras' "Mémoires" are not by any means wholly his. They
are a compilation by Rousselin de Saint-Albin from the Barras papers.]
[Footnote 23: Jung, "Bonaparte et son Temps," vol. ii.]
[Footnote 24: M.G. Duruy's elaborate plea (Barras, "Mems.,"
Introduction, pp. 69-79) rests on the supposition that his hero
arrived at Toulon on September 7th. But M. Chuquet has shown
("Cosmopolis," January, 1897) that he arrived there not earlier than
September 16th. So too Cottin, ch, xi.]
[Footnote 25: As the burning of the French ships and stores has been
said to be solely due to the English, we may note that, _as early as
October 3rd_, the Spanish Foreign Minister, the Duc d'Alcuida,
suggested it to our ambassador, Lord St. Helens: "If it becomes
necessary to abandon the harbour, these vessels shall be sunk or set
on fire in order that the enemy may not make use of them; for which
purpose preparations shall be made beforehand."]
[Footnote 26: Thiers, ch. xxx.; Cottin, "L'Angleterre et les
Princes."]
[Footnote 27: See Lord Grenville's despatch of August 9th, 1793, to
Lord St. Helens ("F.O. Records, Spain," No. 28), printed by M. Cottin,
p. 428. He does not print the more important despatch of October 22nd,
where Grenville asserts that the admission of the French princes would
tend to invalidate the constitution of 1791, for which the allies were
working.]
[Footnote 28: A letter of Lord Mulgrave to Mr. Trevor, at Turin ("F.
O. Records, Sardinia," No. 13), states that he had the greatest
difficulty in getting on with the French royalists: "You must not send
us one _émigré_ of any sort--they would be a nuisance: they are all so
various and so violent, whether for despotism, constitution, or
republic, that we should be distracted with their quarrels; and they
are so assuming, forward, dictatorial, and full of complaints, that
no business could go on with them. Lord Hood is averse to receiving
any of them."
NOTE TO THE THIRD EDITION.--From the information which Mr. Spenser
Wilkinson has recently supplied in his article in "The Owens College
Hist. Essays" (1902), it would seem that Buonaparte's share in
deciding the fate of Toulon was somewhat larger than has here been
stated; for though the Commissioners saw the supreme need of attacking
the fleet, they do not seem, as far as we know, to have perceived that
the hill behind Fort L'Eguillette was the key of the position.
Buonaparte's skill and tenacity certainly led to the capture of this
height.]
[Footnote 29: Jung, "Bonaparte et son Temps," vol. ii., p. 430.]
[Footnote 30: "Mémorial," ch. ii., November, 1815. See also
Thibaudeau, "Mémoires sur le Consulat," vol. i., p. 59.]
[Footnote 31: Marmont (1774-1852) became sub-lieutenant in 1789,
served with Buonaparte in Italy, Egypt, etc., received the title Duc
de Ragusa in 1808, Marshal in 1809; was defeated by Wellington at
Salamanca in 1812, deserted to the allies in 1814. Junot (1771-1813)
entered the army in 1791; was famed as a cavalry general in the wars
1796-1807; conquered Portugal in 1808, and received the title Duc
d'Abrantès; died mad.]
[Footnote 32: M. Zivy, "Le treize Vendémiaire," pp.60-62, quotes the
decree assigning the different commands. A MS. written by Buonaparte,
now in the French War Office Archives, proves also that it was Barras
who gave the order to fetch the cannon from the Sablons camp.]
[Footnote 33: Buonaparte afterwards asserted that it was he who had
given the order to fire, and certainly delay was all in favour of his
opponents.]
[Footnote 34: I caution readers against accepting the statement of
Carlyle ("French Revolution," vol. iii. _ad fin_.) that "the thing we
specifically call French Revolution is blown into space by the whiff
of grapeshot." On the contrary, it was perpetuated, though in a more
organic and more orderly governmental form.]
[Footnote 35: Chaptal, "Mes Souvenirs sur Napoléon," p. 198.]
[Footntoe 36: Koch, "Mémoires de Masséna," vol. ii., p. 13, credits
the French with only 37,775 men present with the colours, the
Austrians with 32,000, and the Sardinians with 20,000. All these
figures omit the troops in garrison or guarding communications.]
[Footnote 37: Napoleon's "Correspondence," March 28th, 1796.]
[Footnote 38: See my articles on Colonel Graham's despatches from
Italy in the "Eng. Hist. Review" of January and April, 1899.]
[Footnote 39: Thus Mr. Sargent ("Bonaparte's First Campaign") says
that Bonaparte was expecting Beaulieu to move on Genoa, and saw herein
a chance of crushing the Austrian centre. But Bonaparte, in his
despatch of April 6th to the Directory, referring to the French
advance towards Genoa, writes: "J'ai été très fâché et extrêmement
mécontent de ce mouvement sur Gênes, d'autant plus déplacé qu'il a
obligé cette république à prendre une attitude hostile, et a réveillé
l'ennemi que j'aurais pris tranquille: ce sont des hommes de plus
qu'il nous en coûtera." For the question how far Napoleon was indebted
to Marshal Maillebois' campaign of 1745 for his general design, see
the brochure of M. Pierron. His indebtedness has been proved by M.
Bouvier ("Bonaparte en Italie," p. 197) and by Mr. Wilkinson ("Owens
Coll. Hist. Essays").]
[Footnote 40: Nelson was then endeavouring to cut off the vessels
conveying stores from Toulon to the French forces. The following
extracts from his despatches are noteworthy. January 6th, 1796: "If
the French mean to carry on the war, they must penetrate into Italy.
Holland and Flanders, with their own country, they have entirely
stripped: Italy is the gold mine, and if once entered, is without the
means of resistance." Then on April 28th, after Piedmont was
overpowered by the French: "We English have to regret that we cannot
always decide the fate of Empires on the Sea." Again, on May 16th: "I
very much believe that England, who commenced the war with all Europe
for her allies, will finish it by having nearly all Europe for her
enemies."]
[Footnote 41: The picturesque story of the commander (who was not
Rampon, but Fornésy) summoning the defenders of the central redoubt to
swear on their colours and on the cannon that they would defend it to
the death has been endlessly repeated by historians. But the documents
which furnish the only authentic details show that there was in the
redoubt no cannon and no flag. Fornésy's words simply were: "C'est
ici, mes amis, qu'il faut vaincre ou mourir"--surely much grander than
the histrionic oath. (See "Mémoires de Masséna," Yol. ii.;" Pièces
Just.," No. 3; also Bouvier, _op. cit._)]
[Footnote 42: Jomini, vol. viii., p. 340; "Pièces Justifs."]
[Footnote 43: "Un Homme d'autrefois," par Costa de Beauregard.]
[Footnote 44: These were General Beaulieu's words to Colonel Graham on
May 22nd.]
[Footnote 45: Periods of ten days, which, in the revolutionary
calendar, superseded the week.]
[Footnote 46: I have followed the accounts given by Jomini, vol.
viii., pp. 120-130; that by Schels in the "Oest. Milit. Zeitschrift"
for 1825, vol. ii.; also Bouvier "Bonaparte en Italie," ch. xiii.; and
J.G.'s "Etudes sur la Campagne de 1796-97." Most French accounts,
being based on Napoleon's "Mémoires," vol. iii., p. 212 _et seq_., are
a tissue of inaccuracies. Bonaparte affected to believe that at Lodi
he defeated an army of sixteen thousand men. Thiers states that the
French cavalry, after fording the river at Montanasso, influenced the
result: but the official report of May 11th, 1796, expressly states
that the French horse could not cross the river at that place till the
fight was over. See too Desvernois, "Mems.," ch, vii.]
[Footnote 47: Bouvier (p. 533) traces this story to Las Cases and
discredits it.]
[Footnote: 48 Directorial despatch of May 7th, 1796. The date rebuts
the statement of M. Aulard, in M. Lavisse's recent volume, "La
Révolution Française," p. 435, that Bonaparte suggested to the
Directory the pillage of Lombardy.]
[Footnote 49: "Corresp.," June 6th, 1797.]
[Footnote 50: "Corresp.," June 1st, 1796.]
[Footnote 51: Gaffarel, "Bonaparte et les Républiques Italiennes," p.
22.]
[Footnote 52: "Corresp.," May 17th, 1796.]
[Footnote 53: Virgil, Aeneid, x. 200.]
[Footnote 54: Colonel Graham's despatches.]
[Footnote 55: "Corresp.," June 26th, 1796.]
[Footnote 56: Despatch of Francis to Würmser, July 14th, 1796.]
[Footnote 57: Jomini (vol. viii., p. 305) blames Weyrother, the chief
of Würmser's staff, for the plan. Jomini gives the precise figures of
the French on July 25th: Masséna had 15,000 men on the upper Adige;
Augereau, 5,000 near Legnago; Sauret, 4,000 at Salo; Sérurier, 10,500
near Mantua; and with others at and near Peschiera the total fighting
strength was 45,000. So "J.G.," p. 103.]
[Footnote 58: See Thiébault's amusing account ("Memoirs," vol. i., ch.
xvi.) of Bonaparte's contempt for any officer who could not give him
definite information, and of the devices by which his orderlies played
on this foible. See too Bourrienne for Bonaparte's dislike of new
faces.]
[Footnote 59: Marbot, "Mémoires," ch. xvi. J.G., in his recent work,
"Etudes sur la Campagne de 1796-97," p. 115, also defends Augereau.]
[Footnote 60: Jomini, vol. viii., p. 321.]
[Footnote 61: "English Hist. Review," January, 1899]
[Footnote 62: Such is the judgment of Clausewitz ("Werke," vol. iv.),
and it is partly endorsed by J.G. in his "Etudes sur la Campagne de
1796-97." St. Cyr, in his "Memoirs" on the Rhenish campaigns, also
blames Bonaparte for not having _earlier_ sent away his siege-train to
a place of safety. Its loss made the resumed siege of Mantua little
more than a blockade.]
[Footnote 63: Koch, "Mémoires de Masséna," vol. i., p. 199.]
[Footnote 64: "Corresp.," October 21st, 1796.]
[Footnote 65: "Corresp.," October 24th, 1796. The same policy was
employed towards Genoa. This republic was to be lulled into security
until it could easily be overthrown or absorbed.]
[Footnote 66: "Ordre du Jour," November 7th, 1796.]