CHAPTER XIV. SOCRATES PROPOSETH SOME REGULATIONS FOR THE BETTER

MANAGEMENT OF THEIR PUBLIC FEASTS.

Socrates having observed that in public suppers every one brought his own

dish of meat, and that sometimes some brought more and others less, was

wont, when this happened, to bid a servant set the least dish in the

middle of the table, and to give some of it to all the company. No man

could, in civility, refuse it, nor exempt himself from doing the like

with his own dish, insomuch that every man had a taste of the whole, and

all fared alike. This in some measure banished luxury and expensiveness

from these feasts. For they who would have laid out a great deal of

money in delicacies cared no longer to do so, because they would have

been as much for others as for themselves.

Being one day in these assemblies, and seeing a young man who ate his

meat without bread, he took occasion to rally him for it upon a question

that was started touching the imposing of names. "Can we give any

reasons," said he, "why a man is called flesh-eater--that is to say, a

devourer of flesh?--for every man eats flesh when he has it; and I do not

believe it to be upon that account that a man is called so." "Nor I

neither," said one of the company. "But," continued Socrates, "if a man

takes delight to eat his meat without bread, do you not take him to be,

indeed, a flesh-eater?" "I should think it difficult to find another who

better would deserve that name." Upon which somebody else taking the

word said, "What think you of him who, with a little bread only, eats a

great deal of flesh?" "I should," replied Socrates, "judge him, too, to

be a flesh-eater; and whereas others ask of the gods in their prayers to

give them an abundance of fruits, such men in their petitions it is

likely would pray only for abundance of flesh."

The young man whom Socrates had in mind, suspecting that he spoke upon

his account, took some bread, but continued still to eat a great deal of

flesh with it. Socrates perceived him, and showing him with his finger

to those that sat next to him, said to them, "Take notice of your

neighbour, and see whether it be the meat that makes him eat his bread,

or the bread that makes him eat his meat."

In a like occasion, seeing a man sop the same morsel of meat in several

sauces, he said, "Is it possible to make a sauce that will cost more, and

be not so good, as one that is made by taking out of several different

sauces at once? For there being more ingredients than usual, no doubt it

costs more; but then because we mix things together, which the cooks

never used to mingle, because they agree not well with one another, we

certainly spoil the whole; and is it not a jest to be curious in having

good cooks, and at the same time to be so fantastical as to alter the

relish of the dishes they have dressed? Besides, when we have once got a

habit of eating thus of several dishes at once, we are not so well

satisfied when we have no longer that variety. Whereas a man who

contents himself to eat but of one dish at a time finds no great

inconvenience in having but one dish of meat for his dinner."

He made likewise this remark: that to express what the other Greeks

called "to eat a meal," the Athenians said "to make good cheer;" and that

the word "good" shows us that we ought to eat such things only as will

neither disorder the body nor the mind, which are easily had, and

purchased without great expense. From whence he inferred that they alone

who live temperately and soberly can truly be said to make good

cheer--that is to say, to eat well.

BOOK IV.

CHAPTER I. THAT PERSONS OF GOOD NATURAL PARTS, AS WELL AS THOSE WHO HAVE

PLENTIFUL FORTUNES, OUGHT NOT TO THINK THEMSELVES ABOVE INSTRUCTION. ON

THE CONTRARY, THE ONE OUGHT, BY THE AID OF LEARNING, TO IMPROVE THEIR

GENIUS; THE OTHER, BY THE ACQUISITION OF KNOWLEDGE, TO RENDER THEMSELVES

VALUABLE.

There was always, as we have already remarked, some improvement to be

made with Socrates; and it must be owned that his company and

conversation were very edifying, since even now, when he is no more among

us, it is still of advantage to his friends to call him to their

remembrance. And, indeed, whether he spoke to divert himself, or whether

he spoke seriously, he always let slip some remarkable instructions for

the benefit of all that heard him.

He used often to say he was in love, but it was easy to see it was not

with the beauty of one's person that he was taken, but with the virtues

of his mind.

The marks of a good genius, he said, were these--a good judgment, a

retentive memory, and an ardent desire of useful knowledge; that is to

say, when a person readily learns what he is taught, and strongly retains

what he has learnt, as also when he is curious to know all that is

necessary to the good government either of a family or of a republic; in

a word, when one desires to obtain a thorough knowledge of mankind and of

whatever relates to human affairs. And his opinion was that when these

good natural parts are cultivated as they ought, such men are not only

happy themselves, and govern their families prudently, but are capable

likewise to render others happy, and to make republics flourish.

On the one hand, therefore, whenever he met with any who believed

themselves men of parts, and for that reason neglected to be instructed,

he proved to them that men of the best natural parts are they who have

most need of instruction; and to this purpose he alleged the example of a

high-mettled horse, who, having more courage and more strength than

others, does us very great service, if he be broke and managed in his

youth; but if that be neglected, he grows so vicious and unruly that we

know not what to do with him. Thus also dogs of a good breed, and that

by nature are the most strong and mettlesome, are excellent for game, if

they are well taught; otherwise they are apt to become high rangers and

at no command. In like manner among men they who are blessed with the

greatest advantages of Nature, to whom she has given the most courage and

the greatest strength to enable them to succeed in their undertakings,

are likewise the most virtuous, and do more good than others, when they

meet with a good education; but if they remain without instruction they

fall into an excess of ill, and become most pernicious to themselves and

others. Merely for want of knowing their duty they often engage

themselves in very wicked designs; and being imperious and violent, it is

very difficult to keep them within bounds and to make them change their

resolution, which is the reason they do a great deal of mischief.

On the other hand, when he saw any of those men who pique themselves on

their estates, and who believe because they are men of high condition

that they are above instruction, or have no need of it, because their

riches alone are sufficient to gain them the esteem of the world, and to

make them succeed in all their undertakings, he endeavoured to convince

them of their error, and to show them that they, too, have need of

instruction. He told them that that man is a fool who imagines with

himself that he can know the things that are useful from those that are

hurtful, without having ever learnt the difference; or who, not

discerning between them, fondly thinks that because he has wherewithal to

buy whatever he has a mind to, he can therefore do whatever may lend to

his advantage; or who, judging himself incapable to do what is useful for

himself, thinks, nevertheless, that he is well in the world, and in a

safe and happy condition of life. That it is likewise a folly for a man

to persuade himself that, being rich and having no merit, he will pass

for a man of parts; or that, not having the reputation of being a man of

parts, he shall nevertheless be esteemed.

CHAPTER II. CONFERENCE BETWEEN SOCRATES AND EUTHYDEMUS, IN WHICH HE

CONVINCES THAT YOUNG MAN, WHO HAD A GREAT OPINION OF HIMSELF, THAT HE

KNEW NOTHING.

When Socrates, on the other hand, found any who soothe themselves up in

the belief that they are well instructed, and who boast of their own

sufficiency, he never failed to chastise the vanity of such persons. Of

his conduct in this particular I will relate the following instance--

He had been told that Euthydemus had bought up several works of the most

celebrated poets and sophists, and that this acquisition had so puffed

him up with arrogance, that he already esteemed himself the greatest man

for learning and parts of any of the age, and pretended to no less than

being the first man of the city, either for negotiating or for

discoursing in public. Nevertheless, he was still so young that he was

not admitted into the assemblies of the people, and if he had any affair

to solicit he generally came and placed himself in one of the shops that

were near the courts of justice. Socrates, having observed his station,

failed not to go thither likewise with two or three of his friends; and

there, being fallen into discourse, this question was started: Whether it

was by the improving conversation of philosophers or by the strength of

his natural parts only, that Themistocles surpassed all his countrymen in

wisdom and valour, and advanced himself to such a high rank and to so

great esteem, that all the Republic cast their eyes upon him whenever

their affairs required the conduct of a man of bravery and wisdom?

Socrates, who had a mind to reflect upon Euthydemus, answered that "a man

must be very stupid to believe that mechanic arts (which are

comparatively things but of small importance) cannot be learnt without

masters; and yet that the art of governing of States, which is a thing of

the greatest moment and that requires the greatest effort of human

prudence, comes of itself into the mind." And this was all that passed

in this first interview.

After this Socrates, observing that Euthydemus always avoided being in

his company, lest he should be taken for one of his admirers, attacked

him more openly; and once when he happened to be where he was, addressed

himself to the rest of the company in these words:--"Certainly,

gentlemen, by what may be conjectured from the studies of this young man,

it is very likely that when he shall have attained the age that permits

him to be present in the assemblies of the people, if any important

affair come to be debated there, he will not fail to give his judgment of

it; and in my opinion he would introduce his harangue by a very pleasant

exordium, if he should begin with giving them to understand that he had

never learnt anything of any man whatsoever; he must address himself to

them in words to this purpose:--

"'Gentlemen, I have never been taught anything, I never frequented the

conversation of men of parts, I never gave myself the trouble to look out

for a master that was able to instruct me. On the contrary, gentlemen, I

have not only had an aversion to learn from others, but I should even

have been very sorry to have it believed I had done so; nevertheless, I

will venture to tell you what chance shall suggest to me in this present

occasion.' At this rate they who present themselves to be received

physicians might introduce a like discourse as thus:--'Gentlemen, I have

never had any master to teach me this science; for, indeed, I would never

learn it, nor even have the repute of having learnt it; nevertheless,

admit me a physician, and I will endeavour to become learned in the art

by making experiments on your own bodies.'"

All the company fell a-laughing at this pleasant preface, and from that

time Euthydemus never avoided Socrates' company as he had done before;

but he never offered to speak, believing that his silence would be an

argument of his modesty. Socrates, being desirous to rally him out of

that mistaken notion, spoke to him in this manner:--

"I wonder that they who desire to learn to play upon the lute, or to ride

well, do not endeavour to learn it alone by themselves; but that they

look out for masters, resolved to do everything they bid them, and to

believe all they say, there being no other way to arrive at perfection in

those arts; and that they who hope one day to govern the Republic, and to

declaim before the people, imagine they can become fit to do so of

themselves all of a sudden. Nevertheless, it must be owned that these

employments are more difficult than the others, since among the great

number of persons who push themselves into office so few discharge their

duty as they ought. This shows us that more labour and diligence is

required in such as would capacitate themselves for those offices than

for anything else."

By these discourses, Socrates having prepared the mind of Euthydemus to

hearken to what he intended to say to him, and to enter into conference

with him, he came another time by himself into the same shop, and taking

a seat next to this young man--"I have heard," said he to him, "that you

have been curious in buying a great many good books." "I have," said

Euthydemus, "and continue to do so every day, designing to have as many

as I can get." "I commend you very much," said Socrates, "for choosing

rather to hoard up a treasure of learning and knowledge than of money.

For you testify by so doing that you are not of opinion that riches, or

silver and gold, can render one more valuable, that is to say, a wiser or

a better man; but that it is only the writings and precepts of the

philosophers and other fine writers that are the true riches, because

they enrich with virtue the minds of those that possess them." Euthydemus

was pleased to hear him say this, believing that he approved his method;

and Socrates, perceiving his satisfaction, went on: "But what is your

design of making a collection of so many books? Do you intend to be a

physician? There are many books in that science." "That is not my

design," said Euthydemus. "Will you be an architect, then?" said

Socrates, "for that art requires a learned man. Or do you study geometry

or astrology?" "None of them." "Do you mean to be a reciter of heroic

verses?" continued Socrates, "for I have been told that you have all

Homer's works." "Not in the least," answered Euthydemus, "for I have

observed that men of that profession know indeed a great many verses by

heart, but for anything else they are for the most part very

impertinent." "Perhaps you are in love with that noble science that

makes politicians and economists, and that renders men capable to govern,

and to be useful to others and to themselves?" "That is what I endeavour

to learn," said Euthydemus, "and what I passionately desire to know." "It

is a sublime science," replied Socrates; "it is that we call the royal

science, because it truly is the science of kings. But have you weighed

this point, whether a man can excel in that science without being an

honest man?" "I have," said the young man, "and am even of opinion that

none but honest men can be good citizens." "And are you an honest man?"

said Socrates. "I hope I am," answered Euthydemus, "as honest a man as

another." "Tell me," said Socrates, "can we know who are honest men by

what they do, as we know what trade a man is of by his work?" "We may."

"Then," said Socrates, "as architects show us their works, can honest men

show us theirs likewise?" "No doubt of it," replied Euthydemus; "and it

is no difficult task to show you which are the works of justice, and

which those of injustice, that we so often hear mentioned." "Shall we,"

said Socrates, "make two characters, the one (J) to signify justice, the

other (I) to denote injustice; and write under one of them all the works

that belong to justice, and under the other all that belong to

injustice?" "Do," said Euthydemus, "if you think fit."

Socrates, having done what he proposed, continued thus his discourse:--"Do

not men tell lies?" "Very often," answered Euthydemus. "Under which

head shall we put lying?" "Under that of injustice," said Euthydemus.

"Do not men sometimes cheat?" "Most certainly." "Where shall we put

cheating?" said Socrates. "Under injustice." "And doing wrong to one's

neighbour?" "There too." "And selling of free persons into slavery?"

"Still in the same place." "And shall we write none of all these," said

Socrates, "under the head of justice?" "Not one of them," answered

Euthydemus; "it would be strange if we did." "But what," replied

Socrates, "when a general plunders an enemy's city, and makes slaves of

all the inhabitants, shall we say that he commits an injustice?" "By no

means." "Shall we own, then, that he does an act of justice?" "Without

doubt." "And when he circumvents his enemies in the war, does he not do

well?" "Very well." "And when he ravages their land, and takes away

their cattle and their corn, does he not do justly?" "It is certain he

does," said Euthydemus; "and when I answered you that all these actions

were unjust, I thought you had spoken of them in regard only of friend to

friend." "We must, therefore," replied Socrates, "put among the actions

of justice those very actions we have ascribed to injustice, and we will

only establish this distinction, that it is just to behave ourselves so

towards our enemies; but that to treat our friends thus is an injustice,

because we ought to live with them uprightly, and without any deceit." "I

think so," said Euthydemus. "But," continued Socrates, "when a general

sees that his troops begin to be disheartened, if he make them believe

that a great reinforcement is coming to him, and by that stratagem

inspires fresh courage into the soldiers, under what head shall we put

this lie?" "Under the head of justice," answered Euthydemus. "And when

a child will not take the physic that he has great need of, and his

father makes it be given him in a mess of broth, and by that means the

child recovers his health, to which shall we ascribe this deceit?" "To

justice likewise." "And if a man, who sees his friend in despair, and

fears he will kill himself, hides his sword from him, or takes it out of

his hands by force, what shall we say of this violence?" "That it is

just," replied Euthydemus. "Observe what you say," continued Socrates;

"for it follows from your answers that we are not always obliged to live

with our friends uprightly, and without any deceit, as we agreed we

were." "No; certainly we are not, and if I may be permitted to retract

what I said, I change my opinion very freely." "It is better," said

Socrates, "to change an opinion than to persist in a wrong one. But

there is still one point which we must not pass over without inquiry, and

this relates to those whose deceits are prejudicial to their friends; for

I ask you, which are most unjust, they who with premeditate design cheat

their friends, or they who do it through inadvertency?" "Indeed," said

Euthydemus, "I know not what to answer, nor what to believe, for you have

so fully refuted what I have said, that what appeared to me before in one

light appears to me now in another. Nevertheless, I will venture to say

that he is the most unjust who deceives his friend deliberately." "Do

you think," said Socrates, "that one may learn to be just and honest, as

well as we learn to read and write?" "I think we may." "Which," added

Socrates, "do you take to be the most ignorant, he who reads wrong on

purpose, or he who reads wrong because he can read no better?" "The last

of them," answered Euthydemus; "for the other who mistakes for pleasure

need not mistake when he pleases." "Then," inferred Socrates, "he who

reads wrong deliberately knows how to read; but he who reads wrong

without design is an ignorant man." "You say true." "Tell me likewise,"

pursued Socrates, "which knows best what ought to be done, and what

belongs to justice, he who lies and cheats with premeditate design, or he

who deceives without intention to deceive?" "It is most plain," said

Euthydemus, "that it is he who deceives with premeditate design." "But

you said," replied Socrates, "that he who can read is more learned than

he who cannot read?" "I did so." "Therefore he who best knows which are

the duties of justice is more just than he that knows them not." "It

seems to be so," answered Euthydemus, "and I know not well how I came to

say what I did." "Indeed," said Socrates, "you often change your

opinion, and contradict what you say; and what would you yourself think

of any man who pretended to tell the truth, and yet never said the same

thing; who, in pointing out to you the same road, should show you

sometimes east, sometimes west, and who, in telling the same sum, should

find more money at one time than another; what would you think of such a

man?" "He would make all men think," answered Euthydemus, "that he knew

nothing of what he pretended to know."

Socrates urged him yet further, and asked him: "Have you ever heard say

that some men have abject and servile minds?" "I have." "Is it said of

them because they are learned or because they are ignorant?" "Surely

because they are ignorant." "Perhaps," said Socrates, "it is because

they understand not the trade of a smith?" "Not in the least for that."

"Is it because they know not how to build a house, or to make shoes?" "By

no means," said Euthydemus; "for most who are skilled in such professions

have likewise abject and servile minds." "This character, then," pursued

Socrates, "must be given to those who are ignorant of the noble sciences,

and who know not what is just nor what is honourable?" "I believe so."

"We ought, therefore, Euthydemus, to do all we can to avoid falling into

that ignominious ignorance that sinks us down so low." "Alas, Socrates!"

cried he out, "I will not lie for the matter; I thought I knew something

in philosophy, and that I had learnt whatever was requisite to be known

by a man who desired to make a practice of virtue; but judge how much I

am afflicted to see that, after all my labours, I am not able to answer

you concerning things which I ought chiefly to know; and yet I am at a

loss what method to pursue in order to render myself more capable and

knowing in the things I desire to understand." Upon this, Socrates asked

him whether he had ever been at Delphi, and Euthydemus answered that he

had been there twice. "Did you not take notice," said Socrates, "that

somewhere on the front of the temple there is this inscription, 'KNOW

THYSELF'?" "I remember," answered he, "I have read it there." "It is

not enough," replied Socrates, "to have read it. Have you been the

better for this admonition? Have you given yourself the trouble to

consider what you are?" "I think I know that well enough," replied the

young man, "for I should have found it very difficult to have known any

other thing if I had not known myself." "But for a man to know himself

well," said Socrates, "it is not enough that he knows his own name; for,

as a man that buys a horse cannot be certain that he knows what he is

before he has ridden him, to see whether he be quiet or restive, whether

he be mettlesome or dull, whether he be fleet or heavy--in short, before

he has made trial of all that is good and bad in him--in like manner, a

man cannot say that he knows himself before he has tried what he is fit

for, and what he is able to do." "It is true," said Euthydemus, "that

whoever knows not his own strength knows not himself." "But," continued

Socrates, "who sees not of how great advantage this knowledge is to man,

and how dangerous it is to be mistaken in this affair? for he who knows

himself knows likewise what is good for himself. He sees what he is able

to do, and what he is not able to do; by applying himself to things that

he can do, he gets his bread with pleasure, and is happy; and by not

attempting to do the things he cannot do, he avoids the danger of falling

into errors, and of seeing himself miserable. By knowing himself, he

knows likewise how to judge of others, and to make use of their services

for his own advantage, either to procure himself some good, or to protect

himself from some misfortune; but he who knows not himself, and is

mistaken in the opinion he has of his own abilities, mistakes likewise in

the knowledge of others, and in the conduct of his own affairs. He is

ignorant of what is necessary for him, he knows not what he undertakes,

nor comprehends the means he makes use of, and this is the reason that

success never attends his enterprises, and that he always falls into

misfortunes. But the man who sees clear into his own designs generally

obtains the end he proposes to himself, and at the same time gains

reputation and honour. For this reason, even his equals are well pleased

to follow his advices; and they whose affairs are in disorder implore his

assistance, and throw themselves into his hands, depending upon his

prudence to retrieve their affairs, and to restore them to their former

good condition. But he who undertakes he knows not what, generally makes

an ill choice, and succeeds yet worse; and the present damage is not the

only punishment he undergoes for his temerity. He is disgraced for ever;

all men laugh at him, all men despise and speak ill of him. Consider

likewise what happens to Republics who mistake their own strength, and

declare war against States more powerful than themselves; some are

utterly ruined, others lose their liberty, and are compelled to receive

laws from the conquerors."

"I am fully satisfied," said Euthydemus, "that a great deal depends on

the knowledge of oneself. I hope you will now tell me by what a man must

begin to examine himself." "You know," said Socrates, "what things are

good and what are bad?" "Indeed," answered Euthydemus, "if I knew not

that, I were the most ignorant of all men." "Then tell me your thoughts

of this matter," said Socrates. "First," said Euthydemus, "I hold that

health is a good and sickness an evil, and that whatever contributes to

either of them partakes of the same qualities. Thus nourishment and the

exercises that keep the body in health are very good; and, on the

contrary, those that cause diseases are hurtful." "But would it not be

better to say," replied Socrates, "that health and sickness are both good

when they are the causes of any good, and that they are both bad when

they are the causes of any ill?" "And when can it ever happen," said

Euthydemus, "that health is the cause of any ill, and sickness the cause

of any good?" "This may happen," answered Socrates, "when troops are

raised for any enterprise that proves fatal; when men are embarked who

are destined to perish at sea; for men who are in health may be involved

in these misfortunes, when they who, by reason of their infirmities, are

left at home, will be exempted from the mischiefs in which the others

perish." "You say true," said Euthydemus, "but you see, too, that men

who are in health are present in fortunate occasions, while they who are

confined to their beds cannot be there." "It must therefore be granted,"

said Socrates, "that these things which are sometimes useful and

sometimes hurtful are not rather good than bad." "That is, indeed, the

consequence of your argument," replied Euthydemus; "but it cannot be

denied that knowledge is a good thing; for what is there in which a

knowing man has not the advantage of an ignorant one?" "And have you not

read," said Socrates, "what happened to Daedalus for his knowing so many

excellent arts, and how, being fallen into the hands of Minos, he was

detained by force, and saw himself at once banished from his country and

stripped of his liberty? To complete his misfortune, flying away with

his son, he was the occasion of his being miserably lost, and could not,

after all, escape in his own person; for, falling into the hands of

barbarians, he was again made a slave. Know you not likewise the

adventure of Palamedes, who was so envied by Ulysses for his great

capacity, and who perished wretchedly by the calumnious artifices of that

rival? How many great men likewise has the King of Persia caused to be

seized and carried away because of their admirable parts, and who are now

languishing under him in a perpetual slavery?" "But, granting this to be

as you say," added Euthydemus, "you will certainly allow good fortune to

be a good?" "I will," said Socrates, "provided this good fortune

consists in things that are undoubtedly good." "And how can it be that

the things which compose good fortune should not be infallibly good?"

"They are," answered Socrates, "unless you reckon among them beauty and

strength of body, riches, honours, and other things of that nature." "And

how can a man be happy without them?" "Rather," said Socrates, "how can

a man be happy with things that are the causes of so many misfortunes?

For many are daily corrupted because of their beauty; many who presume

too much on their own strength are oppressed under the burden of their

undertakings. Among the rich, some are lost in luxury, and others fall

into the snares of those that wait for their estates. And lastly, the

reputation and honours that are acquired in Republics are often the cause

of their ruin who possess them." "Certainly," said Euthydemus, "if I am

in the wrong to praise good fortune, I know not what we ought to ask of

the Deity." "Perhaps, too," replied Socrates, "you have never considered

it, because you think you know it well enough.

"But," continued he, changing the subject of their discourse, "seeing you

are preparing yourself to enter upon the government of our Republic,

where the people are master, without doubt you have reflected on the

nature of this State, and know what a democracy is?" "You ought to

believe I do." "And do you think it possible," said Socrates, "to know

what a democracy or popular State is without knowing what the people is?"

"I do not think I can." "And what is the people?" said Socrates. "Under

that name," answered Euthydemus, "I mean the poor citizens." "You know,

then, who are the poor?" "I do," said Euthydemus. "Do you know, too,

who are the rich?" "I know that too." "Tell me, then, who are the rich

and who are the poor?" "I take the poor," answered Euthydemus, "to be

those who have not enough to supply their necessary expenses, and the

rich to be they who have more than they have occasion for." "But have

you observed," replied Socrates, "that there are certain persons who,

though they have very little, have nevertheless enough, and even lay up

some small matter out of it; and, on the contrary, there are others who

never have enough how great soever their estates and possessions are?"

"You put me in mind," said Euthydemus, "of something very much to the

purpose, for I have seen even some princes so necessitous that they have

been compelled to take away their subjects' estates, and to commit many

injustices." "We must, then," said Socrates, "place such princes in the

rank of the poor, and those who have but small estates, yet manage them

well, in the number of the rich." "I must give consent to all you say,"

answered Euthydemus, "for I am too ignorant to contradict you; and I

think it will be best for me, from henceforward, to hold my peace, for I

am almost ready to confess that I know nothing at all."

Having said this, he withdrew, full of confusion and self-contempt,

beginning to be conscious to himself that he was indeed a person of

little or no account at all. Nor was he the only person whom Socrates

had thus convinced of their ignorance and insufficiency, several of whom

never came more to see him, and valued him the less for it. But

Euthydemus did not act like them. On the contrary, he believed it

impossible for him to improve his parts but by frequently conversing with

Socrates, insomuch that he never left him, unless some business of moment

called him away, and he even took delight to imitate some of his actions.

Socrates, seeing him thus altered from what he was, was tender of saying

anything to him that might irritate or discourage him; but took care to

speak more freely and plainly to him of the things he ought to know and

apply himself to.

CHAPTER III. PROOFS OF A KIND SUPERINTENDING PROVIDENCE.--WHAT RETURNS

OF GRATITUDE AND DUTY MEN OUGHT TO MAKE TO GOD FOR HIS FAVOURS.--AN

HONEST AND GOOD LIFE THE BEST SONG OF THANKSGIVING OR THE MOST ACCEPTABLE

SACRIFICE TO THE DEITY.

As Socrates considered virtue and piety as the two grand pillars of a

State, and was fully persuaded that all other qualifications whatever,

without the knowledge and practice of these, would, instead of enabling

men to do good, serve, on the contrary, to render them more wicked and

more capable of doing mischief. For that reason he never pressed his

friends to enter into any public office until he had first instructed

them in their duty to God and mankind. But, above all, he endeavoured to

instil into their minds pious sentiments of the Deity, frequently

displaying before them high and noble descriptions of the Divine power,

wisdom, and goodness. But seeing several have already written what they

had heard him say in divers occasions upon this subject, I will content

myself with relating some things which he said to Euthydemus when I

myself was present.

"Have you never reflected, Euthydemus, on the great goodness of the Deity

in giving to men whatever they want?" "Indeed, I never have," answered

he. "You see," replied Socrates, "how very necessary light is for us,

and how the gods give it us." "You say true," answered Euthydemus, "and

without light we should be like the blind." "But because we have need of

repose they have given us the night to rest in; the night, which, of all

times, is the fittest for repose." "You are in the right," said

Euthydemus, "and we ought to render them many praises for it."

"Moreover," continued Socrates, "as the sun is a luminous body, and by

the brightness of his beams discovers to us all visible things, and shows

us the hours of the day; and as, on the contrary, the night is dusky and

obscure, they have made the stars to appear, which, during the absence of

the day, mark the hours to us, by which means we can do many things we

have occasion for. They have likewise made the moon to shine, which not

only shows us the hours of the night, but teaches us to know the time of

the month." "All this is true," said Euthydemus. "Have you not taken

notice likewise that having need of nourishment, they supply us with it

by the means of the earth? How excellently the seasons are ordered for

the fruits of the earth, of which we have such an abundance, and so great

a variety, that we find, not only wherewith to supply our real wants but

to satisfy even luxury itself." "This goodness of the gods," cried

Euthydemus, "is an evidence of the great love they bear to men." "What

say you," continued Socrates, "to their having given us water, which is

so necessary for all things? For it is that which assists the earth to

produce the fruits, and that contributes, with the influences from above,

to bring them to maturity; it helps to nourish us, and by being mingled

with what we eat, makes it more easily got ready, more useful, and more

delightful; in short, being of so universal an use, is it not an

admirable providence that has made it so common? What say you to their

having given us fire, which defends us from cold, which lights us when it

is dark, which is necessary to us in all trades, and which we cannot be

without in the most excellent and useful inventions of men?" "Without

exaggeration," said Euthydemus, "this goodness is immense." "What say

you, besides," pursued Socrates, "to see that after the winter the sun

comes back to us, and that proportionably as he brings the new fruits to

maturity, he withers and dries those whose season is going over; that

after having done us this service he retires that his heat may not

incommode us; and then, when he is gone back to a certain point, which he

cannot transgress, without putting us in danger of dying with cold, he

returns again to retake his place in this part of the heavens, where his

presence is most advantageous to us? And because we should not be able

to support either cold or heat, if we passed in an instant from one

extreme to the other, do you not admire that this planet approaches us

and withdraws himself from us by so just and slow degrees, that we arrive

at the two extremes without almost perceiving the change?" "All these

things," said Euthydemus, "make me doubt whether the gods have anything

to do but to serve mankind. One thing puts me to a stand, that the

irrational animals participate of all these advantages with us." "How!"

said Socrates, "and do you then doubt whether the animals themselves are

in the world for any other end than for the service of man? What other

animals do, like us, make use of horses, of oxen, of dogs, of goats, and

of the rest? Nay, I am of opinion, that man receives not so much

advantage from the earth as from the animals; for the greatest part of

mankind live not on the fruits of the earth, but nourish themselves with

milk, cheese, and the flesh of beasts; they get the mastery over them,

they make them tame, and use them to their great advantage in war and for

the other necessities of life." "I own it," said Euthydemus, "for some

of them are much stronger than man, and yet are so obedient to him, that

he does with them whatever he pleases."

"Admire yet further the goodness of the gods," said Socrates, "and

consider, that as there is in the world an infinite number of excellent

and useful things, but of very different natures, they have given us

external senses, which correspond to each of those sensible objects, and

by means of which senses we can perceive and enjoy all of them. They

have, besides, endued us with reason and understanding, which enableth us

to discern between those things that the senses discover to us, to

inquire into the different natures of things useful and things hurtful,

and so to know by experience which to choose and which to reject. They

have likewise given us speech, by means whereof we communicate our

thoughts to each other, and instruct one another in the knowledge of

whatever is excellent and good; by which also we publish our laws and

govern States. In fine, as we cannot always foresee what is to happen to

us, nor know what it will be best for us to do, the gods offer us

likewise their assistance by the means of the oracles; they discover the

future to us when we go to consult them, and teach us how to behave

ourselves in the affairs of life."

Here Euthydemus, interrupting him, said, "And indeed these gods are in

this respect more favourable to you than to the rest of mankind, since,

without expecting you to consult them, they give you notice of what you

ought or ought not to do." "You will allow, therefore, that I told you

true," said Socrates, "when I told you there were gods, and that they

take great care of men; but expect not that they will appear to you, and

present themselves before your eyes. Let it suffice you to behold their

works, and to adore them, and be persuaded that this is the way by which

they manifest themselves to men, for among all the gods that are so

liberal to us there is not one who renders himself visible to confer on

us his favours. And that Supreme God, who built the universe, and who

supports this great work, whose every part is accomplished in beauty and

goodness; He, who is the cause that none of its parts grow old with time,

and that they preserve themselves always in an immortal vigour, who is

the cause, besides, that they inviolably obey His laws with a readiness

that surpasses our imagination; He, I say, is visible enough in the so

many wondrous works of which He is author, but our eyes cannot penetrate

even into His throne to behold Him in these great occupations, and in

that manner it is that He is always invisible. Do but consider that the

sun, who seems to be exposed to the sight of all the world, does not

suffer us to gaze fixedly upon him, and whoever has the temerity to

undertake it is punished with sudden blindness. Besides, whatever the

gods make use of is invisible; the thunder is lanced from above, it

shatters all it finds in its way, but we see it not fall, we see it not

strike, we see it not return. The winds are invisible, though we see the

desolations they daily make, and easily feel when they grow boisterous.

If there be anything in man that partakes of the divine nature it is his

soul, which, beyond all dispute, guides and governs him, and yet we

cannot see it. Let all this, therefore, teach you not to neglect or

disbelieve the Deity, because He is invisible; learn to know His presence

and power from the visible effects of it in the world around you; be

persuaded of the universal care and providence of the all-surrounding

Deity from the blessings He showers down upon all His creatures, and be

sure to worship and serve this God in a becoming manner."

"I am sure," said Euthydemus, "I shall never derogate from the respect

due to the gods; and I am even troubled that every man cannot

sufficiently acknowledge the benefits he receives from them." "Be not

afflicted at that," said Socrates, "for you know what answer the Delphian

Oracle is wont to return to those who inquire what they ought to do in

order to make an acceptable sacrifice. 'Follow the custom of your

country,' says he to them. Now, it is a custom received in all places

for every man to sacrifice to them according to his power; and by

consequence there is no better nor more pious a way of honouring the gods

than that, since they themselves ordain and approve it. It is indeed a

truth that we ought not to spare anything of what we are able to offer,

for that would be a manifest contempt. When, therefore, a man has done

all that is in his power to do, he ought to fear nothing and hope all;

for, from whence can we reasonably hope for more, than from those in

whose power it is to do us the greatest good? And by what other way can

we more easily obtain it, than by making ourselves acceptable to them?

And how can we better make ourselves acceptable to them, than by doing

their will?"

This is what Socrates taught, and by this doctrine, which was always

accompanied with an exemplary devotion, he greatly advanced his friends

in piety.

CHAPTER IV. INSTANCES OF THE INVIOLABLE INTEGRITY OF SOCRATES.--HIS

CONVERSATION WITH HIPPIAS CONCERNING JUSTICE.

Concerning justice, it cannot be said that Socrates concealed his opinion

of it, for he plainly revealed his sentiments by his actions, as well in

public as in private, making it his business to serve every man, and to

obey the magistrates and the laws; insomuch, that as well in the army as

in the city, his obedience and uprightness rendered him remarkable above

all others. He fully discovered the integrity of his soul, when he

presided in the assemblies of the people; he would never pass a decree

that was contrary to the laws; he alone defended the cause of justice

against the efforts of the multitude, and opposed a violence which no man

but himself was able to resist. Again, when the Thirty commanded him

anything that was unjust, he did not obey them. Thus, when they forbid

him to speak to the young men, he regarded not their inhibition, and when

they gave orders to him, as well as to some other citizens, to bring

before them a certain man, whom they intended to put to death, he alone

would do nothing in it, because that order was unjust. In like manner

when he was accused by Melitus, though in such occasions others endeavour

to gain their judges by flatteries and ignominious solicitations, which

often procure them their pardon, he would not put in practice any of

these mean artifices that are repugnant to the laws, and yet he might

very easily have got himself acquitted, if he could have prevailed with

himself to comply in the least with the custom, but he chose rather to

die in an exact observance of the laws, than to save his life by acting

contrary to them, for he utterly abhorred all mean or indirect practices;

and this was the answer he gave to several of his friends who advised him

to the contrary.

Since I am now illustrating the character of Socrates with regard to

justice, I will, at the same time, relate a conversation I remember he

had with Hippias of Elis on that subject.

It was a long while that Hippias had not been at Athens; and being

arrived there, he happened to come to a place where Socrates was

discoursing with some persons, and telling them that if any one had a

mind to learn a trade, there wanted not masters to teach him; nay, that

if one would have a horse trained up there were persons enough to

undertake it; but that if one desired to learn to be a good man, or to

have his son, or any of his family taught to be so, it would be difficult

to know to whom to apply himself. Hippias rallying him, said:--"What!

Socrates, you are still repeating the same things I heard you say so long

ago." "Nay, more," replied Socrates, "and always upon the same subject;

but you, perhaps, being learned as you are, do not always say the same

thing upon the same subject." "Indeed," said Hippias, "I always

endeavour to say something new." "Is it possible," replied Socrates?

"Pray tell me if you were asked how many letters there are in my name,

and which they are, would you answer sometimes in one manner and

sometimes in another? Or if you were asked whether twice five be not

ten, would you not always say the same thing?" "In subjects like those,"

said Hippias, "I should be obliged to say the same thing as well as you;

but since we are upon the theme of justice, I believe I can now say some

things of it, against which, neither you nor any man else can make any

objection." "Good God!" cried Socrates, "what a mighty boast is here!

Upon my word, Hippias, you have made an admirable discovery! and you have

reason to value yourself upon it; for, let me tell you, if you can

establish one single opinion of justice, the judges will be no longer

divided in their sentiments, there will be no more quarrels, no more

suits at law, no more seditions among citizens, no more wars between

republics. Indeed, it much troubles me to leave you before you have

taught me this secret, which you say you have discovered." "I give you

my word," answered Hippias, "that I will tell you nothing of it, till you

have first declared your own opinion concerning justice; for it is your

old way to interrogate others, and then to laugh at them by refuting what

they have said; but you never make known your own opinions, that you may

not be obliged to give a reason for them." "Why do you lay this to my

charge," said Socrates, "since I am continually showing to all the world

what are the things I believe to be just?" "How do you show it?" said

Hippias. "If I explain it not by my words," answered Socrates, "my

actions speak it sufficiently; and do you think that actions deserve not

rather to be believed than words?" "Much rather," said Hippias, "because

many may say one thing, and do another; nay, we see that, in fact, many

who preach up justice to others are very unjust themselves; but this

cannot be said of a man whose every action is good, and that never in his

life did an unjust thing." "Have you known, then," said Socrates, "that

I have accused any man out of malice, that I have sown dissension among

friends, that I have raised seditions in the Republic; in short, that I

have committed any other sort of injustice?" "Not in the least," said

he. "Well, then," added Socrates, "do you not take him to be just who

commits no manner of injustice?" "It is plain, now,'" said Hippias,

"that you intend to get loose, and that you will not speak your mind

freely, nor give us an exact definition of justice. For all this while

you have only shown what just men do not, but not what they do." "I

should have thought," said Socrates, "I had given at once a good

definition, and a clear instance of justice, when I called it an aversion

from doing injustice. But since you will not allow it to be so, see

whether this will satisfy you: I say, then, that justice 'is nothing but

the observance of the laws.'" "You mean," said Hippias, "that to observe

the laws is to be just?" "Yes," answered Socrates. "I cannot comprehend

your thought," said Hippias. "Do you not know," pursued Socrates, "what

the laws in a State are?" "The laws," answered Hippias, "are what the

citizens have ordained by an universal consent." "Then," inferred

Socrates, "he who lives conformably to those ordinances observes the

laws; and he who acts contrary to them is a transgressor of the laws."

"You say true." "Is it not likewise true," continued Socrates, "that he

who obeys these ordinances does justly, and that he obeys them not does

unjustly?" "Yes." "But," said Socrates, "he who acts justly is just,

and he who acts unjustly is unjust?" "Without doubt." "Therefore," said

Socrates, "whosoever observes the laws is just, and whosoever observes

them not is unjust." "But how can it be imagined," objected Hippias,

"that the laws are a good thing, and that it is good to obey them, since

even they that made them mend, alter, and repeal them so often?" To this

Socrates answered, "When you blame those who obey the laws, because they

are subject to be abrogated, you do the same thing as if you laughed at

your enemies for keeping themselves in a good posture of defence during

the war, because you might tell them that the peace will one day be made:

and thus you would condemn those who generously expose their lives for

the service of their country. Do you know," added he, "that Lycurgus

could never have rendered the Republic of Sparta more excellent than

other States if he had not made it his chief care to incline the citizens

most exactly to observe the laws? This, too, is what all good

magistrates aim at, because a Republic that is obedient to the laws is

happy in peace, and invincible in war. Moreover, you know that concord

is a great happiness in a State. It is daily recommended to the people;

and it is an established custom all over Greece to make the citizens

swear to live in good understanding with one another, and each of them

takes an oath to do so. Now, I do not believe that this unity is exacted

of them, only that they might choose the same company of comedians, or of

musicians, nor that they might give their approbation to the same poets,

or all take delight in the same diversions, but that they may all

unanimously obey the laws, because that obedience is the security and the

happiness of the State. Concord, therefore, is so necessary, that

without it good polity and authority cannot subsist in any State, nor

good economy and order in any family.

"In our private capacity, likewise, how advantageous is it to obey the

laws? By what means can we more certainly avoid punishments, and deserve

rewards? What more prudent conduct can we observe, always to gain our

suits at law, and never to be cast! To whom should we with greater

confidence trust our estates or our children, than to him who makes a

conscience of observing the laws? Who can deserve more of his country?

whom can she more safely entrust with public posts, and on whom can she

more justly bestow the highest honours, than on the good and honest man?

Who will discharge himself better of his duty towards his father or his

mother, towards his relations or his domestics, towards his friends, his

fellow-citizens, or his guests? To whom will the enemy rather trust for

the observing of a truce, or for the performance of a treaty of peace?

With whom would we rather choose to make an alliance? To whom will the

allies more readily give the command of their armies, or the government

of their towns? From whom can we rather hope for a grateful return of a

kindness than from a man who strictly obeys the laws? and, by

consequence, to whom will men be more ready to do good turns, than to him

of whose gratitude they are certain? With whom will men be better

pleased to contract a friendship, and, consequently, against whom will

men be less inclined to commit acts of hostility, than against that

person who has everybody for his well-wisher and friend, and few or none

for his ill-wishers or enemies? These, Hippias, are the advantages of

observing the laws. And now, having shown you that the observance of the

laws is the same thing with justice, if you are of another opinion, pray

let me know it." "Indeed, Socrates," answered Hippias, "what you have

said of justice agrees exactly with my sentiments of it." "Have you

never heard," continued Socrates, "of certain laws that are not written?"

"You mean the laws," answered Hippias, "which are received all over the

earth." "Do you think, then," added Socrates, "that it was all mankind

that made them?" "That is impossible," said Hippias, "because all men

cannot be assembled in the same place, and they speak not all of them the

same language." "Who, then, do you think gave us these laws?" "The

gods," answered Hippias; "for the first command to all men is to adore

the gods." "And is it not likewise commanded everywhere to honour one's

father and mother?" "Yes, certainly," said Hippias. Socrates went

on:--"And that fathers and mothers should not marry with their own

children, is not that too a general command?" "No," answered Hippias,

"this last law is not a Divine law, because I see some persons transgress

it." "They observe not the others better," said Socrates; "but take

notice, that no man violates with impunity a law established by the gods.

There are unavoidable punishments annexed to this crime; but we easily

secure ourselves from the rigour of human laws, after we have

transgressed them, either by keeping ourselves hid, or defending

ourselves by open force." "And what is this punishment," said Hippias,

"which it is impossible for fathers, who marry with their own children,

to avoid?" "It is very great," said Socrates; "for what can be more

afflicting to men, who desire to have children than to have very bad

ones?" "And how do you know," pursued Hippias, "that they will have bad

children? What shall hinder them, if they are virtuous themselves, from

having children that are so likewise?" "It is not enough," answered

Socrates, "that the father and the mother be virtuous: they must,

besides, be both of them in the vigour and perfection of their age. Now,

do you believe, that the seed of persons who are too young, or who are

already in their declining age, is equal to that of persons who are in

their full strength?" "It is not likely that it is," said Hippias. "And

which is the best?" pursued Socrates. "Without doubt," said Hippias,

"that of a man in his strength." "It follows, then," continued Socrates,

"that the seed of persons who are not yet come to their full strength, or

who are past it, is not good." "In all appearance it is not." "In those

ages, then, we ought not to get children?" said Socrates. "I think so."

"Such, therefore, as indulge their lust in such untimely fruition will

have very weakly children?" "I grant they will." "And are not weakly

children bad ones?" "They are," said Hippias.

"Tell me, further," said Socrates, "is it not an universal law to do good

to those who have done good to us?" "Yes," said Hippias, "but many

offend against this law." "And they are punished for it," replied

Socrates, "seeing their best friends abandon them, and that they are

obliged to follow those who have an aversion for them. For are not they

the best friends who do kindnesses whenever they are desired? And if he

who has received a favour neglect to acknowledge it, or return it ill,

does he not incur their hate by his ingratitude? And yet, finding his

advantage in preserving their goodwill, is it not to them that he makes

his court with most assiduity?" "It is evident," said Hippias, "that it

is the gods who have ordered these things; for, when I consider that each

law carries with it the punishment of the transgressor, I confess it to

be the work of a more excellent legislator than man." "And do you

think," said Socrates, "that the gods make laws that are unjust?" "On

the contrary," answered Hippias, "it is very difficult for any but the

gods to make laws that are just." "Therefore, Hippias," said Socrates,

"according to the gods themselves 'to obey the laws is to be just.'"

This is what Socrates said on the subject of justice, and his actions

being conformable to his words, he from day to day created a greater love

of justice in the minds of those who frequented him.

CHAPTER V. OF THE MISCHIEFS OF INTEMPERANCE, AND THE ADVANTAGES OF

SOBRIETY.

I will now set down the arguments that Socrates used to bring his friends

to the practice of good actions, for being of opinion that temperance is

a great advantage to such as desire to do anything that is excellent, he

first showed them, by his way of living, that no man was more advanced

than himself in the exercise of that virtue; and in his conferences he

exhorted his hearers above all things to the practice of it, and his

thoughts being continually employed in the means of arriving to be

virtuous, he made it likewise the subject of all his discourses.

I remember that talking once with Euthydemus concerning temperance he

delivered himself to this effect:--"In your opinion, Euthydemus, is

liberty a very valuable thing?" "To be valued above all things,"

answered Euthydemus. "Do you believe that a man who is a slave to

sensual pleasures, and finds himself incapable of doing good, enjoys his

liberty?" "Not in the least." "You allow, then, that to do good is to

be free, and that to be prevented from doing it, by any obstacle

whatever, is not to be free?" "I think so," said Euthydemus. "You

believe, then," said Socrates, "that debauched persons are not free?" "I

do." "Do you believe likewise," continued Socrates, "that debauchery

does not only hinder from doing good, but compels to do ill?" "I think

it does." "What would you say, then, of a master who should hinder you

from applying yourself to what is honest, and force you to undertake some

infamous occupation?" "I would say he was a very wicked master,"

answered Euthydemus. "And which is the worst of all slaveries?" added

Socrates. "To serve ill masters," said Euthydemus. "Therefore,"

inferred Socrates, "the debauched are in a miserable slavery." "No doubt

of it." "Is it not debauchery, likewise," said Socrates, "that deprives

men of their wisdom, the noblest gift of the gods, and drives them into

ignorance and stupidity, and all manner of disorders? It robs them of

leisure to apply themselves to things profitable, while it drowns them in

sensual pleasures; and it seizes their minds to that degree that, though

they often know which is the best way, they are miserably engaged in the

worst." "They are so." "Nor can we expect to find temperance nor

modesty in a debauched person, since the actions of temperance and

debauchery are entirely opposite." "There is no doubt of it," said

Euthydemus. "I do not think neither," added Socrates, "that it is

possible to imagine anything that makes men neglect their duty more than

debauchery." "You say true." "Is there anything more pernicious to

man," said Socrates, "than that which robs him of his judgment, makes him

embrace and cherish things that are hurtful, avoid and neglect what is

profitable, and lead a life contrary to that of good men?" "There is

nothing," said Euthydemus. Socrates went on:--"And may we not ascribe

the contrary effects to temperance?" "Without doubt." "And is it not

likely to be true that the cause of the contrary effects is good?" "Most

certainly." "It follows, then, my dear Euthydemus," said Socrates, "that

temperance is a very good thing?" "Undoubtedly it is." "But have you

reflected," pursued Socrates, "that debauchery, which pretends to lead

men to pleasures, cannot conduct them thither, but deceives them, leaving

them in disappointment, satiety, and disgust? and have you considered

that temperance and sobriety alone give us the true taste of pleasures?

For it is the nature of debauchery not to endure hunger nor thirst, nor

the fatigue of being long awake, nor the vehement desires of love, which,

nevertheless, are the true dispositions to eat and drink with delight,

and to find an exquisite pleasure in the soft approaches of sleep, and in

the enjoyments of love. This is the reason that the intemperate find

less satisfaction in these actions, which are necessary and frequently

done. But temperance, which accustoms us to wait for the necessity, is

the only thing that makes us feel an extreme pleasure in these

occasions." "You are in the right," said Euthydemus. "It is this

virtue, too," said Socrates, "that puts men in a condition of bringing to

a state of perfection both the mind and the body, of rendering themselves

capable of well governing their families, of being serviceable to their

friends and their country, and of overcoming their enemies, which is not

only very agreeable on account of the advantages, but very desirable

likewise for the satisfaction that attends it. But the debauched know

none of this, for what share can they pretend to in virtuous actions,

they whose minds are wholly taken up in the pursuit of present

pleasures?" "According to what you say," replied Euthydemus, "a man

given to voluptuousness is unfit for any virtue." "And what difference

is there," said Socrates, "between an irrational animal and a voluptuous

man, who has no regard to what is best, but blindly pursues what is most

delightful? It belongs to the temperate only to inquire what things are

best and what not, and then, after having found out the difference by

experience and reasoning, to embrace the good and avoid the bad, which

renders them at once most happy, most virtuous, and most prudent."

This was the sum of this conference with Euthydemus. Now Socrates said

that conferences were so called because the custom was to meet and confer

together, in order to distinguish things according to their different

species, and he advised the frequent holding of these conferences,

because it is an exercise that improves and makes men truly great,

teaches them to become excellent politicians, and ripens the judgment and

understanding.

CHAPTER VI. SOCRATES' FRIENDS ATTAIN, BY FREQUENTING HIS CONVERSATION,

AN EXCELLENT WAY OF REASONING.--THE METHOD HE OBSERVED IN ARGUING SHOWN

IN SEVERAL INSTANCES.--OF THE DIFFERENT SORTS OF GOVERNMENT.--HOW

SOCRATES DEFENDED HIS OPINIONS.

I will show, in the next place, how Socrates' friends learnt to reason so

well by frequenting his conversation. He held that they who perfectly

understand the nature of things can explain themselves very well

concerning them, but that a man who has not that knowledge often deceives

himself and others likewise. He therefore perpetually conferred with his

friends without ever being weary of that exercise. It would be very

difficult to relate how he defined every particular thing. I will

therefore mention only what I think sufficient to show what method he

observed in reasoning. And, in the first place, let us see how he argues

concerning piety.

"Tell me," said he to Euthydemus, "what piety is?" "It is a very

excellent thing," answered Euthydemus. "And who is a pious man?" said

Socrates. "A man who serves the gods." "Is it lawful," added Socrates,

"to serve the gods in what manner we please?" "By no means," said

Euthydemus; "there are laws made for that purpose, which must be kept."

"He, then, who keeps these laws will know how he ought to serve the

gods?" "I think so." "And is it not true," continued Socrates, "that he

who knows one way of serving the gods believes there is no better a way

than his?" "That is certain." "And will he not be careful how he does

otherwise?" "I believe he will." "He, then, who knows the laws that

ought to be observed in the service of the gods, will serve them

according to the laws?" "Without doubt." "But he who serves the gods as

the laws direct, serves them as he ought?" "True, he does." "And he who

serves the gods as he ought is pious?" "There can be no doubt of it."

"Thus, then," said Socrates, "we have the true definition of a pious man:

He who knows in what manner he ought to serve the gods?" "I think so,"

said Euthydemus.

"Tell me further," continued Socrates, "is it lawful for men to behave

themselves to one another as they please?" "In nowise," answered

Euthydemus; "there are also certain laws which they ought to observe

among themselves." "And do they," said Socrates, "who live together

according to those laws, live as they ought?" "Yes." "And do they who

live as they ought live well?" "Certainly they do." "And does he who

knows how to live well with men understand well how to govern his

affairs?" "It is likely that he may." "Now, do you believe," said

Socrates, "that some men obey the laws without knowing what the laws

command?" "I do not believe it." "And when a man knows what he ought to

do, do you think he believes that he ought not to do it?" "I do not

think so." "And do you know any men who do otherwise than they believe

they ought to do?" "None at all." "They, then, who know the laws that

men ought to observe among themselves, do what those laws command?" "I

believe so." "And do they who do what the laws command, do what is

just?" "Most surely." "And they who do what is just are just likewise?"

"None but they are so." "We may, therefore, well conclude," said

Socrates, "that the just are they who know the laws that men ought to

observe among themselves?" "I grant it," said Euthydemus.

"And as for wisdom," pursued Socrates, "what shall we say it is? Tell me

whether are men said to be wise in regard to the things they know, or in

regard to those they do not know?" "There can be no doubt," answered

Euthydemus, "but that it is in consideration of what they know; for how

can a man be wise in things he knows not?" "Then," said Socrates, "men

are wise on account of their knowledge?" "It cannot be otherwise." "Is

wisdom anything but what renders us wise?" "No." "Wisdom therefore is

only knowledge?" "I think so." "And do you believe," said Socrates,

"that it is in the power of a man to know everything?" "Not so much as

even the hundredth part." "It is, then, impossible," said Socrates, "to

find a man who is wise in all things?" "Indeed it is," said Euthydemus.

"It follows, then," said Socrates, "that every man is wise in what he

knows?" "I believe so."

"But can we, by this same way of comparison, judge of the nature of

good?" "As how?" said Euthydemus. "Do you think," said Socrates, "that

the same thing is profitable to all men?" "By no means." "Do you

believe that the same thing may be profitable to one and hurtful to

another?" "I think it may." "Then is it not the good that is

profitable?" "Yes, certainly." "Therefore, 'what is profitable is a

good to him to whom it is profitable.'" "That is true."

"Is it not the same with what is beautiful? For, can you say that a body

or a vessel is beautiful and proper for all the world?" "By no means."

"You will say, then, that it is beautiful in regard to the thing for

which it is proper?" "Yes." "But tell me whether what is reputed

beautiful for one thing has the same relation to another as to that to

which it is proper?" "No." "Then 'whatever is of any use is reputed

beautiful in regard to the thing to which that use relates?'" "I think

so."

"And what say you of courage?" added Socrates. "Is it an excellent

thing?" "Very excellent," answered Euthydemus. "But do you believe it

to be of use in occasions of little moment?" "Yes; but it is necessary

in great affairs." "Do you think it of great advantage in dangers,"

continued Socrates, "not to perceive the peril we are in?" "I am not of

that opinion." "At that rate," said Socrates, "they who are not

frightened because they see not the danger are in nowise valiant." "There

is no doubt of it," said Euthydemus, "for otherwise there would be some

fools, and even cowards, who must be accounted brave." "And what are

they who fear what is not to be feared?" "They are less brave than the

others," answered Euthydemus. "They therefore," said Socrates, "who show

themselves valiant in dangerous occasions, are they whom you call brave;

and they who behave themselves in them unworthily, are they whom you call

cowards?" "Very right." "Do you think," added Socrates, "that any men

are valiant in such occasions except they who know how to behave

themselves in them?" "I do not think there are." "And are not they, who

behave themselves unworthily, the same as they who know not how to behave

themselves?" "I believe they are." "And does not every man behave

himself as he believes he ought to do?" "Without doubt." "Shall we say,

then, that they who behave themselves ill know how they ought to behave

themselves?" "By no means." "They, therefore, who know how to behave

themselves, are they who behave themselves well?" "They and no others."

"Let us conclude, then," said Socrates, "that they who know how to behave

themselves well in dangers and difficult occasions are the brave, and

that they who know not how to do so are the cowards." "That is my

opinion," said Euthydemus.

Socrates was wont to say, that a kingly government and a tyrannical

government were indeed two sorts of monarchy, and that there was this

difference between them; that, under a kingly government, the subjects

obeyed willingly, and that everything was done according to the laws of

the State; but that, under a tyrannical government, the people obeyed by

force, and that all the laws were reduced to the sole will of the

sovereign.

Concerning the other sorts of government, he said: That when the offices

of a Republic are given to the good citizens, this sort of State was

called aristocracy, or government of good men; when, on the contrary, the

magistrates were chosen according to their revenues, it was called a

plutocracy, or government of the rich; and when all the people are

admitted, without distinction, to bear employments, it is a democracy, or

popular government.

If any one opposed the opinion of Socrates, on any affair whatever,

without giving a convincing reason, his custom was to bring back the

discourse to the first proposition, and to begin by that to search for

the truth. For example: if Socrates had commended any particular person,

and any stander-by had named another, and pretended that he was more

valiant, or more experienced in affairs, he would have defended his

opinion in the following manner:--

"You pretend," would he have said, "that he of whom you speak is a better

citizen than the person whom I was praising. Let us consider what is the

duty of a good citizen, and what man is most esteemed in a Republic. Will

you not grant me, that in relation to the management of the public

revenue, he is in the highest esteem who, while he has that office, saves

the Republic most money? In regard to the war, it is he who gains most

victories over the enemies. If we are to enter into a treaty with other

States, it is he who can dexterously win over to the party of the

Republic those who before opposed its interests. If we are to have

regard to what passes in the assemblies of the people, it is he who

breaks the cabals, who appeases the seditious, who maintains concord and

unity among the citizens." This being granted him, he applied these

general rules to the dispute in question, and made the truth plainly

appear, even to the eyes of those who contradicted him. As for himself,

when he undertook to discourse of anything, he always began by the most

common and universally received propositions, and was wont to say, that

the strength of the argumentation consisted in so doing. And, indeed, of

all the men I have ever seen, I know none who could so easily bring

others to own the truth of what he had a mind to prove to them. And he

said that Homer, speaking of Ulysses, called him "the certain or never-

failing orator," because he had the art of supporting his arguments upon

principles that were acknowledged by all men.

CHAPTER VII. METHOD TO BE OBSERVED IN STUDY.--ARTS AND SCIENCES NO

FURTHER USEFUL, THAN THEY CONTRIBUTE TO RENDER MEN WISER, BETTER, OR

HAPPIER.--VAIN AND UNPROFITABLE KNOWLEDGE TO BE REJECTED.

I presume now, that what I have said has been a sufficient evidence of

the frankness and sincerity with which Socrates conversed with his

friends, and made known his opinions to them. It remains now that I

should say something of the extreme care Socrates showed for the

advancement of his friends, and how much he had at heart that they might

not be ignorant of anything that could be useful to them, to the end they

might not want the assistance of others in their own affairs. For this

reason, he applied himself to examine in what each of them was knowing;

then, if he thought it in his power to teach them anything that an honest

and worthy man ought to know, he taught them such things with incredible

readiness and affection; if not, he carried them himself to masters who

were able to instruct them. But he resolved within himself how far a

person who was well-educated in his studies ought to learn everything.

Thus for geometry he said, that we ought to know enough of it not to be

imposed upon in measure when we buy or sell land, when we divide an

inheritance into shares, or measure out the work of a labourer, and that

it was so easy to know this, that if a man applied himself ever so little

to the practice of such things, he would soon learn even the extent and

circumference of the whole earth, and how to measure it; but he did not

approve that a man should dive into the very bottom of this science, and

puzzle his brains with I know not what figures, though he himself was

expert in it, for he said he could not see what all those niceties and

inventions were good for, which take up the whole life of a man, and

distract him from other more necessary studies.

In like manner he was of opinion that a man should employ some time in

astronomy, that he might know by the stars the hour of the night, what

day of the month it is, and what season of the year we are in, in order

that we might know when to relieve a sentinel in the night, and when it

is best to venture out to sea, or undertake a journey, and, in short,

that we might know how to do everything in its proper season. He said

that all this was easily learnt by conversing with seamen, or with such

as go a-hunting by night, or others who profess to know these things; but

he dissuaded very much from penetrating farther into this science, as

even to know what planets are not in the same declination, to explain all

their different motions, to know how far distant they are from the earth,

in how long time they make their revolutions, and what are their several

influences, for he thought these sciences wholly useless, not that he was

ignorant of them himself, but because they take up all our time, and

divert us from better employments. In fine, he could not allow of a too

curious inquiry into the wonderful workmanship of the Deity in the

disposition of the universe, that being a secret which the mind cannot

comprehend, and because it is not an action acceptable to God to

endeavour to discover what He would hide from us. He held, likewise,

that it was dangerous to perplex the mind with these sublime

speculations, as Anaxagoras had done, who pretended to be very knowing in

them, for in teaching that the sun was the same thing as fire, he does

not consider that fire does not dazzle the eyes, but that it is

impossible to support the splendour of the sun. He did not reflect,

neither, that the sun blackens the sky, which fire does not; nor lastly,

that the heat of the sun is necessary to the earth, in order to the

production of trees and fruits, but that the heat of fire burns and kills

them. When he said, too, that the sun was only a stone set on fire, he

did not consider that a stone glitters not in the fire, and cannot last

long in it without consuming, whereas the sun lasts always, and is an

inexhaustible source of light.

Socrates advised, likewise, to learn arithmetic, but not to amuse

ourselves with the vain curiosities of that science, having established

this rule in all his studies and in all his conferences, never to go

beyond what is useful.

He exhorted his friends to take care of their health, and to that purpose

to consult with the learned; and to observe, besides, each in his own

particular, what meat, what drink, and what exercise is best for him, and

how to use them to preserve himself in health. For when a man has thus

studied his own constitution, he cannot have a better physician than

himself.

If any one desired to attempt or to learn things that were above the

power or capacity of human nature, he advised him to apply himself to

divination; for he who knows by what means the gods generally signify

their mind to men, or how it is they used to give them counsel and aid,

such a person never fails to obtain from the Deity all that direction and

assistance that is necessary for him.

CHAPTER VIII. BEHAVIOUR OF SOCRATES FROM THE TIME OF HIS CONDEMNATION TO

HIS DEATH.--HIS CHARACTER SUMMED UP IN A FEW WORDS.

To conclude: if, because Socrates was condemned to death, any one should

believe that he was a liar to say that he had a good demon that guided

him, and gave him instructions what he should or should not do, let him

consider, in the first place, that he was arrived to such an age that if

he had not died when he did, he could not have lived much longer; that by

dying when he did he avoided the most toilsome part of life, in which the

mind loses much of its vigour; and that in amends for it he discovered to

the whole world the greatness of his soul, acquired to himself an

immortal glory, by the defence he made before his judges, in behaving

himself with a sincerity, courage, and probity that were indeed

wonderful, and in receiving his sentence with a patience and resolution

of mind never to be equalled; for it is agreed by all that no man ever

suffered death with greater constancy than Socrates.

He lived thirty days after his condemnation, because the Delian feasts

happened in that month, and the law forbids to put any man to death till

the consecrated vessel that is sent to the Isle of Delos be come back to

Athens. During that time his friends, who saw him continually, found no

change in him; but that he always retained that tranquillity of mind and

agreeableness of temper which before had made all the world admire him.

Now, certainly no man can die with greater constancy than this; this is

doubtless the most glorious death that can be imagined; but if it be the

most glorious, it is the most happy; and if it be the most happy, it is

the most acceptable to the Deity.

Hermogenes has told me, that being with him a little after Melitus had

accused him, he observed, that he seemed to decline speaking of that

affair: from whence he took occasion to tell him that it would not be

amiss for him to think of what he should answer in his own justification.

To which Socrates replied: "Do you believe I have done anything else all

my life than think of it?" And Hermogenes asking him what he meant by

saying so? Socrates told him that he had made it the whole business of

his life to examine what was just and what unjust; that he had always

cherished justice and hated injustice, and that he did not believe there

was any better way to justify himself.

Hermogenes said further to him--"Do you not know that judges have often

condemned the innocent to death, only because their answers offended

them, and that, on the contrary, they have often acquitted the guilty?"

"I know it very well," answered Socrates; "but I assure you, that having

set myself to think what I should say to my judges, the demon that

advises me dissuaded me from it." At which Hermogenes seeming surprised,

Socrates said to him, "Why are you surprised that this God thinks it

better for me to leave this world than to continue longer in it? Sure,

you are not ignorant that I have lived as well and as pleasantly as any

man, if to live well be, as I take it, to have no concern but for virtue,

and if to live pleasantly be to find that we have made some progress in

it. Now, I have good reason to believe that this is my happy case, that

I have always had a steady regard for virtue, and made progress in it,

because I perceive that my mind, at this time, doth not misgive me, nay,

I have the sincere testimony of my conscience that I have done my duty;

and in this belief I strengthen myself by the conversation I have had

with others, and by comparing myself with them. My friends, too, have

believed the same thing of me, not because they wish me well, for in that

sense every friend would think as much of his friend, but because they

thought they advanced in virtue by my conversation.

"If I were to live longer, perhaps I should fall into the inconveniences

of old age: perhaps my sight should grow dim, my hearing fail me, my

judgment become weak, and I should have more trouble to learn, more to

retain what I had learnt; perhaps, too, after all, I should find myself

incapable of doing the good I had done before. And if, to complete my

misery, I should have no sense of my wretchedness, would not life be a

burden to me? And, on the other hand, say I had a sense of it, would it

not afflict me beyond measure? As things now stand, if I die innocent

the shame will fall on those who are the cause of my death, since all

sort of iniquity is attended with shame. But who will ever blame me

because others have not confessed my innocence, nor done me justice? Past

experience lets us see that they who suffer injustice, and they who

commit it, leave not a like reputation behind them after their death. And

thus, if I die on this occasion, I am most certain that posterity will

more honour my memory than theirs who condemn me; for it will be said of

me, that I never did any wrong, never gave any ill advice to any man; but

that I laboured all my life long to excite to virtue those who frequented

me."

This was the answer that Socrates gave to Hermogenes, and to several

others. In a word, all good men who knew Socrates daily regret his loss

to this very hour, reflecting on the advantage and improvement they made

in his company.

For my own part, having found him to be the man I have described, that is

to say, so pious as to do nothing without the advice of the Deity; so

just as never to have in the least injured any man, and to have done very

signal services to many; so chaste and temperate as never to have

preferred delight and pleasure before modesty and honesty; so prudent as

never to have mistaken in the discernment of good and evil, and never to

have had need of the advice of others, to form a right judgment of

either; moreover, most capable to deliberate and resolve in all sorts of

affairs, most capable to examine into men, to reprehend them for their

vices, and to excite them to virtue; having, I say, found all these

perfections in Socrates, I have always esteemed him the most virtuous and

most happy of all men; and if any one be not of my opinion, let him take

the pains to compare him with other men, and judge of him afterwards.