Germans forbidden to leave Paris.--Afterward expelled.--Large
Number in Paris.--Americans in Europe.--Emperor's Staff an Incumbrance.
--French Generals.--Their Rivalries.--False News from the Front.
--Effect in Paris.--Reaction.--Expulsion of Germans.--Sad
Scenes.--Washburne's Action.--Diplomatic Service.--Battle of
Sedan.--Sheridan at Sedan.
And now began our labors at the Legation, increasing from day
to day, until we had thirteen distinct nationalities under our
charge, European and South American. Nor was this all. The citizens
of other countries--countries which had not formally asked our
protection--came to us for assistance. This was particularly the
case with Mexico and Roumania. There was a large colony of Mexicans
in Paris, and Mexico had no representative in France. The diplomatic
relations which were suspended by the Mexican war are still
unrenewed, notwithstanding the friendly efforts of our Government.
As regards Roumania, its position is peculiar. Nominally it is under
the suzerainty of Turkey, and the Turk claims to represent it abroad.
But Roumania does not acquiesce in this claim, and appoints its
own agents, who are quasi-recognized by the powers to whom they are
accredited. There was a large number of Roumanian students in Paris
at the outbreak of the war. These young men were left quite destitute
during the siege. The French Government behaved very generously
by them. At Mr. Washburne's suggestion, it made them a monthly
allowance, sufficient for their support.
The French Government had at first decided that no German should
leave France to return home. The reason given for this harsh measure
was that every German was a soldier, and would go to swell the
enemy's ranks. It was very hard on the Germans in France. They
were thrown out of employment, insulted, liable to violence, and
sometimes assaulted, and, in addition to all this, were treated as
_insoumis_ at home, and subject to severe punishment for neglect
of military duty. Mr. Washburne remonstrated against this measure,
and wrote an able dispatch to the Duke de Gramont, claiming the
right of the Germans, under all recognized international law, to
leave France if they wished to do so. It was in vain. But now came
a change of ministry. The Prince de la Tour d'Auvergne became
Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Government took precisely
the opposite course, and decided to expel the Germans. Again Mr.
Washburne intervened, claiming that this was as much a violation
of international law as the other course. All he could obtain was,
that the decree should be executed with leniency, and that liberal
exceptions should be made in individual cases of special hardship.
But the French press called for the expulsion of the Germans, and the
Corps Législatif passed a resolution that they should be expelled _en
masse_.
As soon as the decree was published in the _Journal Officiel_,
and placarded on the walls of Paris, they came in shoals to the
Legation. From seven o'clock in the morning till five in the
afternoon, when we closed the office, they fairly besieged us. Five
hundred often collected in the street at once. We were compelled,
though reluctantly, to ask for the aid of the police, both as a
protection to the Germans themselves against the mob, and for our own
convenience. We had six gendarmes constantly on duty. It was almost
impossible to get up our own stairs, and Americans who had business
at the Legation complained of the impossibility of getting in. I
found a side-entrance through a neighbor's apartment, of which I
revealed the secret to some of my countrymen.
The French Government required that every German leaving Paris should
be furnished with a pass from us. At Mr. Washburne's request they
dispensed with the police _visa_, and so simplified matters. But
there were forty thousand Germans in Paris; of these about thirty
thousand went away. Allowing three persons to each pass, for many
had families, we issued about three thousand passes in six weeks.
Many needed assistance to enable them to leave Paris. The Prussian
Government, with great liberality, put fifty thousand thalers
(thirty-seven thousand five hundred dollars) at our disposition,
and this sum they afterward increased. We gave those who needed
them railroad tickets to the frontier of Germany and Belgium; there
the German Government took charge of them, or rather a charitable
organization under the presidency of the Empress Augusta, who showed
the most unwearying devotion in good works during the whole war.
Eight or ten thousand remained in Paris during the siege. Of those at
least one-third came upon the Legation for support, unwillingly in
most cases, and driven by necessity.
But while the Germans thus thronged our office, our own countrymen
were not wanting. In six weeks we issued eleven hundred passports.
Allowing an average of three persons to a passport, thirty-three
hundred Americans passed through Paris in those six weeks. To these
may be added another thousand who had passports from the State
Department. The question has often been asked me, How many Americans
do you suppose are in Europe? If to the above forty-three hundred we
add seventeen hundred for those who remained quietly where the war
found them, or procured their passports at other legations, we have
six thousand souls. At that time this was the average number of our
people temporarily in Europe. There are fewer now.
On the 28th of July the Emperor started for the seat of war. He took
with him his Centgardes and a numerous staff. Nothing can be worse
for an army than to be encumbered with a large head-quarters staff.
It involves an immense amount of transportation, blocking up the
roads, and interfering with the march of the troops. Every thing must
give way to head-quarters trains, even supplies for the soldiers
and ammunition for the guns. This naturally breeds discontent, and
interferes with the efficiency of the army. A staff should consist
of the fewest possible number of working men, and they should be
restricted, like the line, to a limited amount of baggage. Sherman
gave an example of what a staff should be in this respect, on his
famous march to the sea.
Meantime rumors of disaster came thick and fast from the front. The
French had fought the battle of Wissembourg with great gallantry,
but they were outnumbered and outgeneraled. Indeed, it was their
misfortune in this war to have no great generals. I was reminded of
our own experience when our war broke out, and when we appointed to
high command men who had "the Spirit of the Lord, and a disposition
to storm works," which Mr. Stanton then declared to be all that was
necessary. He lived to change his mind, and to become one of the
strongest advocates of trained military talent. Happily for us,
the war lasted long enough to enable us to sift the wheat from the
chaff. Its close found in high command the very men best fitted
to be there. The good sense of our rulers and the tenacity of our
people had enabled us to effect this vital change. The French were
not so fortunate. Their generals in high command when the war broke
out were not equal to the situation, and their armies were defeated
and overwhelmed before the officers of ability, who were undoubtedly
to be found among them, but in inferior positions, had had the
opportunity to show what was in them. For the system of advancement
under the Empire was not calculated to bring the best men to the
front. I was told during the siege by General Berthaut, now Minister
of War, that an officer who studied was looked upon as a republican,
and passed over. The road to promotion lay through the _café_.
There were bitter rivalries, too, between the corps commanders. It
was stated, I do not know with what truth, that repeated messages
failed to bring up the supporting corps to MacMahon's assistance. The
same thing had happened at Solferino, where, as it was alleged, the
battle was nearly lost, because Canrobert would not support Niel.
A challenge passed between them, and nothing but the imperative
intervention of the Emperor prevented the scandal of a duel.
The defeat at Wissembourg was not published in Paris till several
hours after it had appeared in the London morning papers. The press
was muzzled. The depression produced was very great. Certain Bourse
operators took advantage of the inflammable state of public opinion.
One day a man in the uniform of a Government courier rode up to
the Bourse, and, calling out his confederate, delivered a dispatch
purporting to come from the front: "Great victory; total defeat of
the Prussians; capture of the Crown Prince; French army in full
march for Berlin!" Up went stocks. The crowd shouted, sung, wept for
joy, threw themselves into each other's arms, embraced, and kissed.
Popular actors and singers were recognized as they drove through the
streets, stopped, and compelled to sing or recite the "Marseillaise."
Paris was drunk with joy. Then came the reaction. The truth was
soon known. As they had been extreme in their joy, they were now
extreme in their grief. They were not only despondent, they were in
despair. As the poor Empress said at the time to Mr. Washburne, "They
have no for-ti-tude." The crowd collected in the streets, inveighed
against the Government, and, in a pouring rain, marched to Ollivier's
residence, in the Place Vendôme, and insisted upon his addresing
them. Ollivier was then the head of the Government. He had not much
to say, but he was an eloquent speaker, and partially pacified them.
But the defeats of the French and their consequent exasperation
reacted upon the Germans under our protection. Employers discharged
their workmen; those who would gladly have kept them dared not.
They lived in constant dread, and the number of those thronging
to the Legation to obtain the means of departure increased daily.
The suffering, both moral and physical, was very great. It must be
borne in mind that many of these people had been settled for years
in Paris; that they had married there; their children had been born
and had married there; their property and their business interests
all lay there. Yet they were pitilessly expelled, and not only their
business interests ruined, but the dearest family ties dissevered. We
have heard much in history and romance of the expulsion of the Moors
from Spain, and of the Huguenots from France, and our sympathies are
deeply stirred as we read of the misery endured by those poor exiles.
I do not see why the expulsion of the Germans does not rank with
these touching episodes, both in the suffering of the victims and the
pathos of their departure.
Of course the French Government did not expel these poor people with
the _cœur léger_. They had their reasons. They said that in case of
siege there would be additional mouths to feed, and that it would be
a constant source of danger to have so many Germans residing in their
midst. But at that time a siege was not anticipated; and, except in
this case, there surely could have been no danger in their stay.
There were touching scenes at the Legation among the weeping crowd
of women. Some left children and grandchildren married to Frenchmen.
Some were not in a fit condition to travel, but required the comforts
of a home, and tender care. A child was born upon a bench in the
street in front of the Legation. (It was suggested to name it after
a distinguished American diplomate.) Every thing that energy and
kindness of heart could do to facilitate the departure of those poor
people, and to mitigate its severity, was done by our minister.
And here let me remark that no one could have been better fitted for
the difficult task he was suddenly called upon to undertake than Mr.
Washburne. He trusted to the dictates of a sound judgment, a kind
heart, and a fearless temperament; and these are pretty safe guides
in the long run. Had he been brought up in diplomacy, he would have
hesitated and read up for precedents which did not exist, and so let
the propitious moment pass. The result of my observation in Europe
during ten years of pretty active service is this: that while there
should be a permanent officer in every embassy--a _chancellier_,
as he is called in Paris--who can turn promptly to any page of
the archives, and is posted in the history of the relations of
the country in which he resides with his own; who knows the court
ceremonial, and is intimate with the court officials; in short,
"who knows the ropes"--it is quite as well that the head of the
embassy should be a _new_ man. He will attach much less importance
to trifles, and act more fearlessly in emergencies. Great Britain
and France have pursued this plan in several instances lately. The
old diplomates grumble, but it is clearly for the advantage of the
country.
News of reverses now poured in upon us, until they culminated in
the great disaster of Sedan. That this should have been so great a
calamity--a capitulation instead of a defeat--appears to have been
the fault of MacMahon. He was compelled by imperative orders from
Paris, and entirely against his own judgment, to go to the relief
of Bazaine, and to fight against overwhelming odds. But for the
tactical disposition of his forces, by which they were penned up
in a _cul-de-sac_ from which they had no line of retreat, he, as
commander-in-chief, is apparently responsible. But the French armies
seem from the beginning to have been badly organized, badly led, and
conscious that they were so, and discouraged accordingly. I have
General Sheridan's authority for saying that the position of the
French at Sedan was a very strong one; and while it was inevitable
that they should be defeated by superior numbers, they ought to have
held their ground for three days. I have no doubt that our troops
under Sheridan would have done so. He spoke in the highest terms
of the gallantry of the French cavalry, which was sacrificed to
encourage the infantry. The remark of a distinguished French general
upon the Charge of the Six Hundred, "_C'est magnifique, mais ce n'est
pas la guerre_," would have applied equally well to the charge of the
cuirassiers at Sedan.
Sheridan accompanied the King's head-quarters. We had asked
officially, at the commencement of the war, that he might be
permitted to accompany the French army, and been refused. The
Emperor subsequently told Dr. Evans that he had never heard of the
application. General orders had been issued that no foreign officer
should go with the army; but there was surely some difference between
the application of an officer for this permission on his own account,
and the request of a friendly Government that the Lieutenant-General
of its armies might be permitted to accompany the Emperor. The
application probably never got beyond the _chef du cabinet_ of the
Minister of Foreign Affairs. Nowhere in the world is bureaucracy
carried to the extent it is in France. A minister can scarcely
appoint a clerk in his office. The _chef du bureau_ is omnipotent in
his own department. The Republic promised to change all this; but its
ministers, after a gallant effort, have fallen in the struggle, and
things move on in the same old groove.
At the battle of Sedan, Sheridan stood near Count Bismarck. Toward
its close he shut up his glass, and, turning to Bismarck, said, "The
battle is won." The Count replied that he should be glad to think so,
but saw no signs of it yet. In a minute or two more the French gave
way. Turning his glass toward Sedan, Sheridan observed, "The Emperor
is there." Bismarck answered that it could not be; that the Emperor
was not such a fool as to place himself in that situation. Looking
again, Sheridan said, "He is there, anyhow." He had drawn his
conclusions from the immense staff he saw, and the confusion reigning
among them.
Sheridan was right. The Emperor and his staff were prisoners of war.
The Emperor had behaved with the greatest personal courage, and
subsequently, when dissensions arose between the French generals as
to who was responsible for the great disaster, he behaved with the
greatest generosity. But he should not have been at Sedan. The post
of usefulness and of danger for him was at Paris, and not with the
army.