CHAPTER XI.

Washburne appointed Minister.--Declaration of War.--Thiers opposes

it.--The United States asked to protect Germans in France.--Fish's

Instructions.--Assent of French Government given.--Paris

in War-paint.--The Emperor opposed to War.--Not a Free

Agent.--His _Entourage_.--Marshal Le Bœuf.

In the month of May, 1869, Mr. Washburne arrived in France, and

entered upon the duties of his office. In the mean time I had been

promoted, at the request of General Dix, to be secretary of legation.

At Mr. Washburne's request, I was retained in that position. Paris

was uneasy and restless. Conspiracies against the empire were rife.

The Republicans, as they called themselves--Radicals is a better

name for the majority of them--became bold and defiant. France was

jealous, too, of the renown acquired by Prussia at Sadowa. She had

been so accustomed to consider herself, and to be considered, the

first military power in the world, that she could not bear the

semblance of a rival near the throne. The Emperor was suffering from

the disease of which he afterward died, and no longer governed with

"the hand of steel in the glove of silk" always needed in France.

The Church was alarmed at the rise of a great Protestant power, and

the Empress sympathized with her Church. In short, public sentiment

had reached such a pass in France, or rather in Paris, which is

France, that the Emperor was compelled to choose between war and

revolution. He naturally chose war. It was definitely resolved upon

on the 15th July, 1870, but not officially declared until the 19th. I

was _chargé d'affaires_, Mr. Washburne being absent at Carlsbad.

On the 13th of July I went to the sitting of the Corps Législatif

to learn what were the prospects of war. In the tribune of the

diplomatic corps I met the Spanish Embassador. He told me that peace

was assured, as he had persuaded Prince Hohenzollern to decline the

proffered crown of Spain, and that now nothing remained to fight

about. On the 14th, I went again. I found Lord Lyons there, and,

falling into conversation with him, he left the impression upon

my mind that there would be war, for the proffered mediation of

England had failed. Lord Lyons had come to the sitting expecting

to hear an authoritative declaration by the Government, and this

declaration he thought would be warlike. I at once telegraphed to

Mr. Fish that the chances were strongly in favor of war. This, and

all our subsequent telegrams in cipher, were delayed by the French

Government for twenty-four hours, probably with a view to decipher

them. On the 15th I was again at the _séance_, and heard the warlike

declaration made by the Government. It was not the formal declaration

of war, but was equivalent to it. Thereupon Mr. Thiers rose, and

attempted to address the House in a speech deprecating hostilities.

The scene that followed was indescribable and most disgraceful to

any legislative body. The great mass of the members sprung to their

feet, pointed their fingers at the orator, yelled, and shouted

"_Traître, traître! Allez à Berlin!_" The little man stood like a

rock, and when the tumult had somewhat subsided, I could hear his

shrill, piping voice raised in solemn warning against the step they

were about to take. The Government had stated that their embassador

had been insulted by the King of Prussia. Mr. Thiers asked that the

dispatches might be produced, that the Assembly might judge for

itself. This the Government refused; and, on a show of hands, but

twenty members--among whom were Favre, Arago, Simon, Pelletan, and

others, most of them afterward prominent in the Government of the

National Defense--voted with Thiers.

While the debate was proceeding I was called out by the messenger of

the Legation, with word that the German Embassador was very anxious

to see me. As soon as the proceedings in the Corps Législatif were

ended, I went to the German embassy. The embassador told me that

he had been instructed by his Government to ask the United States

Legation at Paris to assume the protection of the North Germans in

France during the coming war. I saw at once the importance of this

step, the compliment paid us by a great power like Germany, and the

advantages to the country. I replied that I felt confident that

my Government would gladly assume the charge; that if there were

no cable across the Atlantic, and it were necessary to say "Yes"

or "No" at once, I should say "Yes;" but as there was telegraphic

communication, and I could receive an answer in forty-eight hours, I

must ask instructions from Mr. Fish. He appeared to be disappointed,

and inquired when I could give him an answer, as he must leave Paris

in two days. He evidently desired the matter to be settled before

he left. I told him that I thought I should receive a reply within

that time. I went at once to the office, and telegraphed Mr. Fish as

follows. This telegram, like the other, was detained for twenty-four

hours by the French Government.

"Paris, July 15th, 1870.

"FISH--_Washington_:--War is certain. Can I take Prussian

subjects in France under our protection? Have promised answer

to-morrow.

"HOFFMAN."

On the 17th I received Mr. Fish's answer, as follows:

"Washington, July 16th, 1870.

"Protection of North Germans in French territory by American

representative can only be given at request of North Germany, and

with assent of France. Examine request of Mr. Moustier of July

16th, 1867, to United States to protect French in Mexico.

"FISH."

On receipt of this instruction, I wrote at once to the Duke de

Gramont, to ask for the assent of the French Government. My note was

as follows:

"Legation of the United States,

Paris, July 17th, 1870.

"SIR,--I was requested by the embassador of the North German

Confederation, before his departure from Paris, to take the

North German subjects residing on French territory under the

protection of this Legation. To-day I am in receipt of a telegram

from my Government authorizing me to do so, provided that it be

done with the assent of his majesty's Government. I have the

honor to apply for this assent.

"I have the honor, etc., etc., etc.,

"WICKHAM HOFFMAN.

"His Excellency the DUKE DE GRAMONT,

Etc., etc., etc."

The Duke de Gramont replied, on the 18th, that the French Government

gave its "entire assent," whereupon I telegraphed to Mr. Fish as

follows:

"FISH--_Washington_:--Consented to take North Germans under

protection on application of embassador, and with assent of

France. * * * * Washburne returns immediately.

"HOFFMAN."

I learned afterward that my note to the Duke de Gramont produced

quite a sensation in the Emperor's cabinet. The French Government

had already requested the good offices of Great Britain to protect

French subjects in North Germany, and it had fully expected that

North Germany would make a similar request. Speculation was therefore

rife in official circles as to what the action of Count Bismarck

meant. It was supposed that he anticipated a general European war,

into which Great Britain would necessarily be drawn; and preferred,

therefore, to ask the good offices of a power which under all

circumstances was likely to remain neutral.

The Duke de Gramont was then Minister of Foreign Affairs, and was

supposed to have had much to do with bringing on the war. The story

was current in Paris that, when he was embassador at Vienna, Bismarck

represented Prussia. They quarreled, and Bismarck remarked of him,

"_C'est l'homme le plus bête d'Europe._" He never forgave it. At

Vienna he naturally associated with the Viennese aristocracy, who

disliked the Prussians. From them he got the idea that Austria would

readily join France in a war against Prussia, and so reported to the

Emperor. He took no note of the all-powerful middle class, which

rules in constitutional countries. This class would not hear of

becoming allies of France in a war against Germany.

Late in the evening of the 18th of July, Mr. Washburne returned

to Paris. He had been at Carlsbad for his health, but on learning

the probability of hostilities, started at once on his return

to his post. We had telegraphed him, but he never received the

telegram. Few private telegrams were forwarded at all, and none with

promptitude, in those days.

Paris now put on its war-paint. The streets were gay with the

_pantalon rouge_, and all day long the French drum rat-a-tapped in

the streets. The Mobiles began to arrive, the National Guard to

parade--everywhere was heard the "Marseillaise." The forbidden air

was delightful to Parisian ears, because it was forbidden. Long

before the end of the siege it was rarely heard. The Parisians could

chant it as they pleased, so it soon lost its attractions.

The war was popular in Paris. The journals clamored for it, and the

violent republican papers, whatever they may now say to the contrary,

were among the most blatant. The Emperor, personally, was opposed to

war. He was suffering from the acute disease which afterward killed

him, and was naturally depressed and despondent. He would gladly have

avoided hostilities, but he was pushed into them. They persuaded him,

too, that the continuance of his dynasty, the succession of his son,

demanded war; and this was the one ruling motive which governed both

his conduct and that of the Empress. The Emperor was by no means

the omnipotent potentate he was popularly supposed to be. He was

scarcely a free agent. It was his misfortune to be surrounded by a

crowd of adventurers--French carpet-baggers. The best men of France,

the gentry of the country, held aloof. The Emperor felt this, and

often tried to reconcile them. Had he reigned ten years longer, I

think that he would have succeeded. There were signs of relenting. He

was consequently thrown, for his high officers of state, upon a class

of clever adventurers. Look at his last cabinet before the Revolution

of September. One member was most unenviably known for the loot of

the Summer Palace at Pekin; another is now in Mazas, convicted of

swindling; and a third, it was currently reported in Paris, received

one hundred thousand francs in the Transcontinental, Memphis, and

El Paso swindle; and I have heard from high Prussian authority that

when the gates of Paris were opened after the siege, and the Germans

sold flour and cattle and sheep to meet the pressing necessities of

the starving Parisians, of a flock of three thousand sheep not one

was permitted to enter the city till this gentleman had received two

francs a head.

I have said that the Emperor was scarcely a free agent. Here is an

anecdote in point. Prince Metternich, the Austrian Embassador,

returning from Vienna, called to pay his respects at the palace.

The Emperor asked him what military news there was in Austria. He

replied that they were arming with the Remington breech-loader. "The

Remington," said the Emperor, "what is that? I thought I knew all

the principal breech-loaders, but I never heard of that." Metternich

explained. "Where is Remington?" said the Emperor. The Prince replied

that he happened to be in Paris. "I wish you would bring him to me,

and do you bring him yourself; this will insure my seeing him."

Metternich brought him. The Emperor examined his piece, and was much

pleased with it. He wrote a note with his own hand to the Minister

of War, Le Bœuf, and told Remington to take it at once: of course he

was received without delay. "So, my good friend, you have seen the

Emperor, have you?" "Yes, sir, I had the honor to see his Majesty."

"Well, you won't see him again:" and he did not. This was the way

the Emperor was served. Le Bœuf was the capable and well-informed

Minister of War who stated in the Assembly that France was thoroughly

prepared for the field--"not a button on a gaiter was wanting." When

the sad truth became known, the French wits said that his statement

was literally correct, for there was not a gaiter in store.

But while the war was popular in Paris, it was not so in the

provinces. After the Revolution broke out, the Provisional Government

found in the Tuileries a number of important historical documents,

and among them reports from the prefects of the different departments

on this subject. They breathed one tone. The people wanted peace; but

if they were attacked, if the honor of France were at stake, they

were ready to fight. Considering the source whence this information

came, from imperial prefects, creatures of the Government, there was

no mistaking the pacific feeling of the country.

Camp, Court and Siege A Narrative of Personal Adventure and Observation During Two Wars: 1861-1865; 1870-1871 · 第 11 / 22 章