CHAPTER XXV

America's Answer to the British Claim of the Right

of Search.

[=The Causes of the War of 1812=]

By their first war with Great Britain our forefathers asserted and

maintained their right to independent national existence; by their

second war with Great Britain, they claimed and obtained equal

consideration in international affairs. The War of 1812 was not based

on a single cause; it was undertaken from mixed motives,--partly

political, partly commercial, partly patriotic. It was always unpopular

with a great number of the American people; it was far from logical in

some of its positions; it was perhaps precipitated by party clamor.

But, despite all these facts, it remains true that this war established

once for all the position of the United States as an equal power among

the powers. Above all--clearing away the petty political and partisan

aspects of the struggle--we find that in it the United States stood

for a strong, sound, and universally beneficial principle, that of the

rights of neutral nations in time of war. "Free ships make free goods"

is a maxim of international law now universally recognized, but at the

opening of the century it was a theory, supported, indeed, by good

reasoning, but practically disregarded by the most powerful nations. It

was almost solely to the stand taken by the United States in 1812 that

the final settlement of this disputed principle was due.

[=British Impressment of American Seamen=]

The cause of the War of 1812, which appealed most strongly to the

patriotic feelings of the common people, though, perhaps, not in itself

so intrinsically important as that just referred to, was unquestionably

the impressment by Great Britain of sailors from American ships. No

doubt great numbers of English sailors did desert from their naval

vessels and avail themselves of the easier service and better treatment

of the American merchant ships. Great Britain, in the exigencies of

her desperate contest with Napoleon, was straining every nerve to

strengthen her already powerful navy, and the press-gang was constantly

at work in English seaports. Once on board a British man-of-war, the

impressed sailor was subject to overwork, bad rations, and the lash.

That British sailors fought as gallantly as they did under this regime

will always remain a wonder. But it is certain that they deserted

in considerable numbers, and that they found in the rapidly-growing

commercial prosperity of our carrying trade a tempting chance of

employment.

[=Outrages Upon American Ships and Sailors=]

Great Britain, with a large contempt for the naval weakness of the

United States, assumed, rather than claimed, the right to stop our

merchant vessels on the high seas, to examine their crews, and to

take as her own any British sailors among them. This was bad enough

in itself, but the way in which the search was carried out was worse.

Every form of insolence and overbearing was exhibited. The pretense of

claiming British deserters covered what was sometimes barefaced and

outrageous kidnapping of Americans. The British officers went so far

as to lay the burden of proof of nationality in each case upon the

sailor himself; if he were without papers proving his identity he was

at once assumed to be a British subject. To such an extent was this

insult to our flag carried, that our Government had the record of about

forty-five hundred cases of impressment from our ships between the

years of 1803 and 1810; and when the War of 1812 broke out the number

of American sailors serving against their will in British war vessels

was variously computed to be from six to fourteen thousand. It is even

recorded that in some cases American ships were obliged to return

home in the middle of their voyages because their crews had been so

diminished in number by the seizures made by British officers that they

were too short-handed to proceed. In not a few cases these depredations

led to bloodshed.

[=The Affair of the "Chesapeake" and the "Leopard"=]

The greatest outrage of all, and one which stirred the blood of

Americans to the fighting point, was the capture of an American war

vessel, the _Chesapeake_, by the British man-of-war, the _Leopard_. The

latter was by far the more powerful vessel, and the _Chesapeake_ was

quite unprepared for action; nevertheless, her commander refused to

accede to a demand that his crew be overhauled in search for British

deserters. Thereupon the _Leopard_ poured broadside after broadside

into her until her flag was struck. Three Americans were killed and

eighteen wounded; four were taken away as alleged deserters; of these,

three were afterwards returned, while in one case the charge was

satisfactorily proved and the man was hanged. The whole affair was

without the slightest justification under the law of nations and was

in itself ample ground for war. Great Britain, however, in a quite

ungracious and tardy way, apologized and offered reparation. This

incident took place six years before the actual declaration of war. But

the outrage rankled during all that time, and nothing did more to fan

the anti-British feeling which was already so strong in the rank and

file of Americans, especially in the Democratic (or, as it was then

often called, the Republican) party. It was such deeds as this that led

Henry Clay to exclaim, "Not content with seizing upon all our property

which falls within her rapacious grasp, the personal rights of our

countrymen--rights which must forever be sacred--are trampled on and

violated by the impressment of our seamen. What are we to gain by war?

What are we not to lose by peace? Commerce, character, a nation's best

treasure, honor!"

[=The Era of Paper Blockades=]

The interference with American commerce was also a serious threat to

the cause of peace. In the early years of the century Great Britain

was at war not only with France, but with other European countries.

Both Great Britain and France adopted in practice the most extreme

theories of non-intercourse between neutral and hostile nations. It was

the era of "paper blockades." In 1806 England, for instance, declared

that eight hundred miles of the European coast were to be considered

blockaded, whereupon Napoleon, not to be outdone, declared the entire

Kingdom of Great Britain to be under blockade.

Up to a certain point the interruption of the neutral trade relations

between the countries of Europe was to the commercial advantage of

America. Our carrying trade grew and prospered wonderfully. Much of

this trade consisted in taking goods from the colonies of European

nations, bringing them to the United States, then trans-shipping them

and conveying them to the parent nation. This was allowable under the

international law of the time, although the direct carrying of goods

by the neutral ship from the colony to the parent nation (the latter,

of course, being at war) was forbidden. But by her famous "Orders in

Council" Great Britain absolutely forbade this system of trans-shipment

as to nations with whom she was at war. American vessels engaged in

this form of trade were seized and condemned by English prize courts.

Naturally, France followed Great Britain's example and even went

further. Our merchants, who had actually been earning double freights

under the old system, now found that their commerce was woefully

restricted. At first it was thought that the unfair restriction might

be punished by retaliatory measures, and a quite illogical analogy was

drawn from the effect produced on Great Britain before the Revolution

by the refusal of the colonies to receive goods on which a tax had been

imposed. So President Jefferson's administration resorted to the most

unwise measure that could be thought of--an absolute embargo on our own

ships, which were prohibited from leaving port.

[=Jefferson and the Embargo=]

[=War Declared Against Great Britain=]

This measure was passed in 1807, and its immediate result was to

reduce the exports of this country from nearly fifty million dollars'

worth to nine million dollars' worth in a single year. This was

evidently anything but profitable, and the act was changed so as to

forbid only commercial intercourse with Great Britain and France and

their colonies, with a proviso that the law should be abandoned as

regards either of these countries which should repeal its objectionable

decrees. The French government moved in the matter first, but only

conditionally. Our non-intercourse act, however, was after 1810 in

force only against Great Britain. That our claims of wrong were

equally, or nearly so, as great against France in this matter cannot be

doubted. But the popular feeling was stronger against Great Britain;

a war with England was popular with the mass of the Democrats; and

it was the refusal of England to accept our conditions which finally

led to the declaration of war. By a curious chain of circumstances it

happened, however, that between the time when Congress declared war

(June 18, 1812) and the date when the news of this declaration was

received in England, the latter country had already revoked her famous

"Orders in Council." In point of fact, President Madison was very

reluctant to declare war, though the Federalists always took great

pleasure in speaking of this as "Mr. Madison's war." The Federalists

throughout considered the war unnecessary and the result of partisan

feeling and unreasonable prejudice.

[=The British and American Navies Compared=]

It is peculiarly grateful to American pride that this war, undertaken

in defence of our maritime interests and to uphold the honor of our

flag upon the high seas, resulted in a series of naval victories

brilliant in the extreme. It was not, indeed, at first thought that

this would be chiefly a naval war. President Madison was at one time

strongly inclined to keep our war vessels in port; but, happily, other

counsels prevailed. The disparity between the American and British

navies was certainly disheartening. The United States had seven or

eight frigates and a few sloops, brigs, and gunboats, while the

sails of England's navy whitened every sea, and her ships certainly

outnumbered ours by fifty to one. On the other hand, her hands were

tied to a great extent by the stupendous European war in which she

was involved. She had to defend her commerce from formidable enemies,

and could spare but a small part of her naval strength for battle

with the new foe. That this new foe was despised by the great power

which claimed, not without reason, to be the mistress of the seas, was

not unnatural. But soon we find a lament raised in Parliament about

the reverses of its navy, which were such as "English officers and

English sailors had not before been used to, particularly from such

a contemptible navy as that of America had always been held to be."

The fact is, that the restriction of American commerce had made it

possible for our naval officers to take their pick of a remarkably

fine body of native American seamen, naturally brave and intelligent,

and thoroughly well trained in all seamanlike experiences. These men

were in many instances filled with a spirit of resentment at British

insolence, having either themselves been the victims of the aggressions

which we have described, or having seen their friends compelled to

submit to these insolent acts. The very smallness of our navy, too, was

in a measure its strength; the competition for active service among

those bearing commissions was great, and there was never any trouble in

finding officers of proved sagacity and courage.

[=The War on the Canada Border=]

At the outset, however, the policy determined on by the administration

was not one of naval aggression. It was decided to attack England

from her Canadian colonies. This plan of campaign, however reasonable

it might seem to a strategist, failed wretchedly in execution. The

first year of the war, so far as regards the land campaigns, showed

nothing but reverses and fiascoes. There was a long and thinly settled

border country, in which our slender forces struggled to hold their

own against the barbarous Indian onslaughts, making futile expeditions

across the border into Canada, and resisting with some success the

similar expeditions by the Canadian troops. One of the complaints which

led to the war was that the Indian tribes had been incited against our

settlers by the Canadian authorities and had been promised aid from

Canada. It is certain that after war was declared British officers not

only employed Indians as their allies, but, in some instances at least,

paid bounties for the scalps of American settlers.

[=Hull and the Surrender of Detroit=]

The Indian war planned by Tecumseh had just been put down by General

(afterward President) Harrison. No doubt Tecumseh was a man of more

elevated ambition and more humane instincts than one often finds in an

Indian chief. His hope to unite the tribes and to drive the whites out

of his country has a certain nobility of purpose and breadth of view.

But this scheme had failed, and the Indian warriors, still inflamed for

war, were only too eager to assist the Canadian forces in a desultory

but bloody border war. The strength of our campaign against Canada was

dissipated in an attempt to hold Fort Wayne, Fort Harrison, and other

garrisons against Indian attacks. Still more disappointing was the

complete failure of the attempt, under the command of General Hull, to

advance from Detroit into Canada. He was easily driven back to Detroit,

and, while the nation was confidently waiting to hear of a bold defence

of that place, it was startled by the news of Hull's surrender

without firing a gun, and under circumstances which seemed to indicate

either cowardice or treachery. Hull was, in fact, court-martialed and

condemned to death, and was only pardoned on account of his services in

the war of 1776.

[=The "Constitution" and the "Guerrière"=]

[=The Glorious Victory of the Frigate "Constitution"=]

The mortification that followed the land campaign of 1812 was forgotten

in the joy at the splendid naval victories of that year. Pre-eminent

among these was the famous sea-duel between the frigates _Constitution_

and _Guerrière_. Every one knows of the glory of _Old Ironsides_, and

this, though the greatest, was only one of many victories through which

the name of the _Constitution_ became the most famed and beloved of all

that have been associated with American ships. She was a fine frigate,

carrying forty-four guns, and though English journals had ridiculed

her as "a bunch of pine boards under a bit of striped bunting," it was

not long before they were busily engaged in trying to prove that she

was too large a vessel to be properly called a frigate, and that she

greatly out-classed her opponent in metal and men. It is true that

the _Constitution_ carried six more guns and a few more men than the

_Guerrière_, but all allowances being made, her victory was a naval

triumph of the first magnitude. Captain Isaac Hull, who commanded

her, had just before the engagement proved his superior seamanship by

escaping from a whole squadron of British vessels, out-sailing and

out-manoeuvring them at every point. It was on August 19, 1812, that

he descried the Guerrière. Both vessels at once cleared for action

and came together with the greatest eagerness on both sides for the

engagement. Though the battle lasted but half an hour, it was one of

the hottest in naval annals. At one time the _Constitution_ was on

fire, and both ships were soon seriously crippled by injuries to their

spars. Attempts to board each other were thwarted on both sides by

the close fire of small arms. Here, as in later sea-fights of this

war, the accuracy and skill of the American gunners were something

marvelous. At the end of half an hour the _Guerrière_ had lost both

mainmast and foremast, and floated as a helpless hulk in the open sea.

Her surrender was no discredit to her officers, as she was almost in a

sinking condition. It was hopeless to attempt to tow her into port, and

Captain Hull transferred his prisoners to his own vessel and set fire

to his prize.

In this engagement the American frigate had only seven men killed

and an equal number wounded, while the British vessel had as many as

seventy-nine men killed or wounded. The conduct of the American seamen

was throughout gallant in the highest degree. Captain Hull put it on

record that "From the smallest boy in the ship to the oldest seaman

not a look of fear was seen. They all went into action giving three

cheers and requesting to be laid close alongside the enemy." The effect

of this victory in both America and England was extraordinary. English

papers long refused to believe in the possibility of the well-proved

facts, while in America the whole country joined in a triumphal shout

of joy, and loaded well-deserved honors on vessel, captain, officers,

and men.

[=The "Wasp" Captures the "Frolic"=]

The chagrin of the English public at the unexpected result of this

sea-battle was changed to amazement and vexation when, one after

another, there followed no less than six combats of the same duel-like

character, in all of which the American vessels were victorious. The

first was between the American sloop _Wasp_ and the English brig

_Frolic_, which was convoying a fleet of merchantmen. The fight was

one of the most desperate in the war; the two ships were brought so

close together that their gunners could touch the sides of the opposing

vessels with their rammers. Broadside after broadside was poured into

the _Frolic_ by the _Wasp_, which obtained the superior position; but

her sailors, too excited to await the victory which was sure to come

from the continued raking of the enemy's vessel, rushed upon her decks

without orders and soon overpowered her. Again the British loss in

killed and wounded was large; that of the Americans very small. It in

no wise detracted from the glory of this victory that both victor and

prize were soon captured by a British man-of-war of immensely superior

strength.

[=The "United States" and the "Macedonian"=]

Following this action, Commodore Stephen Decatur, in the frigate

_United States_, attacked the _Macedonian_, a British vessel of the

same class, and easily defeated her, bringing her into New York harbor

on New Year's Day, 1813, where he received an ovation equal to that

offered Captain Hull. The same result followed the attack of the

_Constitution_, now under the command of Commodore Bainbridge, upon

the British _Java_. The latter had her captain and fifty men killed

and about one hundred wounded, and was left such a wreck that it was

decided to blow her up, while the _Constitution_ suffered so little

that she was in sport dubbed _Old Ironsides_, a name now ennobled

by a poem which has been in every school-boy's mouth. Other naval

combats resulted, in the great majority of cases, in the same way; in

all unstinted praise was awarded by the nations of the world, even

including England herself, to the admirable seamanship, the wonderful

gunnery, and the personal intrepidity of our naval forces. When the

second year of the war closed our little navy had captured twenty-six

warships, armed with 560 guns, while it had lost only seven ships,

carrying 119 guns.

[=American Privateers and Their Work=]

But, if the highest honors of the war were thus won by our navy, the

most serious injury materially to Great Britain was in the devastation

of her commerce by American privateers. No less than two hundred and

fifty of these sea guerrillas were afloat, and in the first year of the

war they captured over three hundred merchant vessels, sometimes even

attacking and overcoming the smaller class of warships. The privateers

were usually schooners armed with a few small guns, but carrying one

long cannon mounted on a swivel so that it could be turned to any point

of the horizon, and familiarly known as Long Tom. Of course, the crews

were influenced by greed as well as by patriotism. Privateering is a

somewhat doubtful mode of warfare at the best; but international law

permits it, and, though it is hard to dissociate from it the aspect

of legalized piracy, it is recognized to this day. In the most recent

war, however, the Spanish-American, neither of the belligerent nations

indulged in this relic of barbarism.

If privateering were ever justifiable it was in the war now under

consideration. As Jefferson said, there were then tens of thousands

of seamen cut off by the war from their natural means of support and

useless to their country in any other way, while by "licensing private

armed vessels, the whole naval force of the nation was truly brought

to bear on the foe." The havoc wrought on British trade was widespread

indeed; altogether between fifteen hundred and two thousand prizes

were taken by the privateers. To compute the value of these prizes is

impossible, but some idea may be gained from the single fact that one

privateer, the _Yankee_, in a cruise of less than two months captured

five brigs and four schooners, with cargoes valued at over half a

million dollars. The men engaged in this form of warfare were bold to

recklessness, and their exploits have furnished many a tale to American

writers of romance.

[=The Fleets on the Lakes=]

[=Perry's Great Victory on Lake Erie=]

The naval combats thus far mentioned were almost always of single

vessels. For battles of fleets we must turn from the salt water to the

fresh, from the ocean to the great lakes. The control of the waters

of Lake Erie, Lake Ontario, and Lake Champlain was obviously of vast

importance, in view of the continued land-fighting in the West and of

the attempted invasion of Canada and the threatened counter-invasions.

The British had the great advantage of being able to reach the lakes

by the St. Lawrence, while our lake navies had to be constructed after

the war began. One such little navy had been built at Presque Isle,

now Erie, on Lake Erie. It comprised two brigs of twenty guns and

several schooners and gunboats. It must be remembered that everything

but the lumber needed for the vessels had to be brought through the

forests by land from the eastern seaports, and the mere problem of

transportation was a serious one. When finished, the fleet was put in

command of Oliver Hazard Perry. Watching his time (and, it is said,

taking advantage of the carelessness of the British commander, who

went on shore to dinner one Sunday, when he should have been watching

Perry's movements), the American commander drew his fleet over the

bar which had protected it while in harbor from the onslaughts of

the British fleet. To get the brigs over this bar was a work of time

and great difficulty; an attack at that hour by the British would

certainly have ended in the total destruction of the fleet. This feat

accomplished, Perry, in his flagship, the _Lawrence_, headed a fleet of

ten vessels, fifty-five guns and four hundred men. Opposed to him was

Captain Barclay with six ships, sixty-five guns, and also about four

hundred men. The British for several weeks avoided the conflict, but

in the end were cornered and forced to fight. It was at the beginning

of this battle that Perry displayed the flag bearing Lawrence's famous

dying words, "Don't give up the ship!" No less famous is his dispatch

announcing the result in the words, "We have met the enemy and they are

ours." The victory was indeed a complete and decisive one; all six of

the enemy's ships were captured, and their loss was nearly double that

of Perry's forces. The complete control of Lake Erie was assured; that

of Lake Ontario had already been gained by Commodore Chauncey.

[=The Battle of the Thames=]

Perry's memorable victory opened the way for important land operations

by General Harrison, who now marched from Detroit with the design of

invading Canada. He engaged with Proctor's mingled body of British

troops and Indians, and by the battle of the Thames drove back the

British from that part of Canada and restored matters to the position

in which they stood before Hull's deplorable surrender of Detroit--and,

indeed, of all Michigan--to the British. In this battle the Indian

chief, Tecumseh, fell, and about three hundred of the British and

Indians were killed on the field. The hold of our enemies on the Indian

tribes was greatly broken by this defeat.

Previous to this the land campaigns had been marked by a succession of

minor victories and defeats. In the West a force of Americans under

General Winchester had been captured at the River Raisin, where there

took place an atrocious massacre of prisoners by the Indians, who were

quite beyond restraint from their white allies. On the other hand, the

Americans had captured the city of York, now Toronto, though at the

cost of their leader, General Pike, who, with two hundred of his men,

was destroyed by the explosion of a magazine. Fort George had also

been captured by the Americans and an attack on Sackett's Harbor had

been gallantly repulsed. Following the battle of the Thames, extensive

operations of an aggressive kind were planned, looking toward the

capture of Montreal and the invasion of Canada by way of Lakes Ontario

and Champlain. Unhappily, jealousy between the American Generals

Wilkinson and Hampton resulted in a lack of concert in their military

operations, and the expedition became a complete fiasco.

[=Lawrence's Famous Saying, "Don't Give Up the Ship."=]

One turns for consolation from the mortifying record of Wilkinson's

expedition to the story of the continuous successes which accompanied

the naval operations of 1813. Captain Lawrence, in the _Hornet_, won

a complete victory over the English brig _Peacock_; our brig, the

_Enterprise_, captured the _Boxer_, and other equally welcome victories

were reported. One distinct defeat marred the record--that of our

fine brig, the _Chesapeake_, commanded by Captain Lawrence, which was

captured after one of the most hard-fought contests of the war by the

British brig, the _Shannon_. Lawrence himself fell mortally wounded,

exclaiming as he was carried away, "Tell the men not to give up the

ship, but fight her till she sinks." It was a paraphrase of this

exclamation which Perry used as a rallying signal in the battle on Lake

Erie. Despite his one defeat, Captain Lawrence's fame as a gallant

seaman and high-minded patriot was untarnished, and his death was more

deplored throughout the country than was the loss of his ship.

[=Macdonough's Victory on Lake Champlain=]

In the latter part of the war England was enabled to send large

reinforcements both to her army and navy engaged in the American

campaigns. Events in Europe seemed in 1814 to insure peace for at least

a time. Napoleon's power was broken; the Emperor himself was exiled

at Elba; and Great Britain at last had her hands free. But before the

reinforcements reached this country, our army had won greater credit

and had shown more military skill by far than were evinced in its

earlier operations. Along the line of the Niagara River active fighting

had been going on. In the battle of Chippewa, the capture of Fort

Erie, the engagement at Lundy's Lane, and the defence of Fort Erie the

troops, under the command of Generals Winfield Scott and Brown, had

more than held their own against superior forces, and had won from

British officers the admission that they fought as well under fire as

regular troops. More encouraging still was the total defeat of the plan

of invasion from Canada undertaken by the now greatly strengthened

British forces. These numbered twelve thousand men and were supported

by a fleet on Lake Champlain. Their operations were directed against

Plattsburg, and in the battle on the lake, usually called by the name

of that town, the American flotilla, under the command of Commodore

Macdonough, completely routed the British fleet. As a result the

English army also beat a rapid and undignified retreat to Canada. This

was the last important engagement to take place in the North.

[=The Burning of the American Capital=]

Meanwhile expeditions of considerable size were directed by the

British against our principal Southern cities. One of these brought

General Ross with five thousand men, chiefly the pick of the Duke

of Wellington's army, into the Bay of Chesapeake. Nothing was more

discreditable in the military strategy of our administration than

the fact that at this time Washington was left unprotected, though

in evident danger. General Ross marched straight upon the capital,

easily defeated at Bladensburg an inferior force of raw militia--who

fought, however, with much courage--seized the city, and carried out

his intention of destroying the public buildings and a great part of

the town. Most of the public archives had been removed. Ross's conduct

in the burning of Washington, though of a character common enough in

modern warfare, has been condemned as semi-barbarous by many writers.

The achievement was greeted with enthusiasm by the English papers, but

was really of much less importance than they supposed. Washington at

that time was a straggling town of only eight thousand inhabitants; its

public buildings were not at all adequate to the demands of the future;

and an optimist might even consider the destruction of the old city as

a public benefit, for it enabled Congress to adopt the plans which have

since led to the making of the most beautiful city of the country, if

not of the world.

A similar attempt upon Baltimore was less successful The people

of that city made a brave defence and hastily threw up extensive

fortifications. In the end the British fleet, after a severe

bombardment of Fort McHenry, was driven off. The British admiral had

boasted that Fort McHenry would yield in a few hours; and two days

after, when its flag was still flying, Francis S. Key was inspired by

its sight to compose our far-famed national ode, the "Star Spangled

Banner."

[=Jackson and the Creek Indians=]

[=Jackson's Famous Great Victory at New Orleans=]

A still larger expedition of British troops soon after landed on the

Louisiana coast and marched to the attack of New Orleans. Here General

Andrew Jackson was in command. He had already distinguished himself

during the war by putting down with a strong hand the hostile Creek

Indians, who had been incited by English envoys to warfare against

our southern settlers; and in April, 1814, William Weathersford,

the half-breed chief, had surrendered in person to Jackson. General

Packenham, who commanded the five thousand British soldiers sent

against New Orleans, expected as easy a victory as that of General

Ross at Washington. But Jackson had summoned to his aid the stalwart

frontiersmen of Kentucky and Tennessee--men used from boyhood to

the rifle, and who made up what was in effect a splendid force of

sharp-shooters. Both armies threw up rough fortifications; General

Jackson made great use for that purpose of cotton bales, Packenham

employing the still less solid material of sugar barrels. As it proved

neither of these were suitable for the purpose, and they had to be

replaced by earthworks. Oddly enough, the final battle, and really

the most important one of the war, took place after the treaty of

peace between the two countries had been signed. The British were

repulsed again and again in persistent and gallant attacks on our

fortifications. General Packenham himself was killed, together with

many of his officers and seven hundred of his men. One British officer

pushed to the top of our earthworks and demanded their surrender,

whereupon he was smilingly asked to look behind him, and turning saw,

as he afterwards said, that the men he supposed to be supporting him

"had vanished as if the earth had swallowed them up." Of the Americans

only a few men were killed.

[=The Results of the War=]

The treaty of peace, signed at Ghent, December 24, 1814, has been

ridiculed because it contained no positive agreement as to many of the

questions in dispute. Not a word did it say about the impressment of

American sailors or the rights of neutral ships. Its chief stipulations

were the mutual restoration of territory and the appointing of a

commission to determine our northern boundary line. The truth is that

both nations were tired of the war; the circumstances that had led to

England's aggressions no longer existed; both countries were suffering

enormous commercial loss to no avail; and, above all, the United States

had emphatically justified by its deeds its claim to an equal place in

the council of nations. Politically and materially, further warfare was

illogical. If the two nations had understood each other better in the

first place; if Great Britain had treated our demands with courtesy and

justice instead of with insolence; if, in short, international comity

had taken the place of international ill-temper, the war might have

been avoided altogether. Its undoubted benefits to us were incidental

rather than direct. But though not formally recognized by treaty, the

rights of American seamen and of American ships were in fact no longer

infringed upon by Great Britain.

[=The Hartford Convention=]

One political outcome of the war must not be overlooked. The New

England Federalists had opposed it from the beginning, had naturally

fretted at their loss of commerce, and had bitterly upbraided the

Democratic administration for currying popularity by a war carried on

mainly at New England's expense. When, in the latter days of the war,

New England ports were closed, Stonington was bombarded, Castine in

Maine was seized, and serious depredations were threatened everywhere

along the northeastern coast, the Federalists complained that the

administration taxed them for the war but did not protect them.

The outcome of all this discontent was the Hartford Convention. In

point of fact it was a quite harmless conference which proposed some

constitutional amendments, protested against too great centralization

of dower, and urged the desirability of peace with honor. But the most

absurd rumors were prevalent about its intentions; a regiment of troops

was actually sent to Hartford to anticipate treasonable outbreaks;

and for many years good Democrats religiously believed that there had

been a plot to set up a monarchy in New England with the Duke of Kent

as king. Harmless as it was, the Hartford Convention caused the death

of the Federalist party. Its mild debates were distorted into secret

conclaves plotting treason, and, though the news of peace followed

close upon it, the Convention was long an object of opprobrium and a

political bugbear.

Famous Men and Great Events of the Nineteenth Century · 第 25 / 42 章