THE BATTLE OF LIAO-YANG.
PREPARING THE WAY.
During the last days of August every soldier felt that he was nearing
the end of the first phase of the war, and that a decisive battle
was impending. Three armies were concentrating upon Liao-yang, which
General Kuropatkin had fortified and provisioned to withstand prolonged
assault.
After the fight at Mou-tien-ling General Kuroki halted to complete his
preparations for the advance on Liao-yang. The rainy season, though
unusually short, gave some trouble, and for a time the position of the
First Army was by no means secure. Each division was widely separated
and extended over a broad front. Half the Guards Division was still at
Siou-yen, miles to the left rear, while the Twelfth Division on the
right flank was several miles from the centre and not in touch. This
distribution of the force could not be avoided, for the main road to
Liao-yang is too narrow to permit the simultaneous movement of two
divisions.
General Keller seized this critical moment to deliver his attack
on Mou-tien-ling, but failed owing to the want of energy and
determination. As the month of August drew near Russian activity
increased, and on the 25th of July the Twelfth Division was menaced by
the advance of two infantry divisions and six thousand cavalry, who
were riding from the neighbourhood of Ponchiho.
Deeming it imprudent to await attack in so divided a position, General
Kuroki resolved to become the assailant and to strike the enemy while
their preparations were incomplete. The Guards at Siou-yen were hurried
to Head-quarters, and the lines of communication were swept for men
to strengthen the Twelfth Division on the right. In five days General
Kuroki was ready to make his counter stroke, and To-wan, or the valley
of the White Tower, was captured.
The occupation of this important military position removed the peril
that had long threatened the First Army. The Second Division in the
centre was now free to move to the support of either flank, and to
hold its front with a comparatively small force. At the same time the
right flank near Ponchiho was strengthened by men drawn from the second
reserves, and the road was opened to Liao-yang.
Unfortunately, General Kuroki was not able to take full and immediate
advantage of this improvement in his position. He was only a pawn in
the game. The Central or Fourth Army was not ready to move. It awaited
reinforcements of infantry and artillery to extend the line toward
Hai-cheng, and two weeks were necessary to complete its preparations.
Field Marshal Oyama’s intention was to begin the assault on Liao-yang
on August 18th, but again the rains descended and the movement was
delayed until the 25th. The instructions issued from Grand Head
Quarters were that General Kuroki should attack the enemy on the left
bank of the Tan-ho which flows in front of Am-ping, while the combined
armies of the West assailed the position at Anshantien. The date fixed
for the movement against Anshantien was August 28th, and in order
that the flanking attack might be developed in time, General Kuroki
proceeded on the 26th to sweep the enemy from his front. This was a
most difficult operation. The main force of the Russians was on the
line Am-ping, Shanleishi, Tohi and Shankaen, with its left flank near
Housalien--not an easy position to assail. Its centre near Daitenshi
was naturally strong and had been fortified with earthworks upon which
the enemy had been engaged since the month of May.
The weakness of the Russian position was its extended front and the
comparative smallness of the force with which it was held. Of this
defect General Kuroki was quick to take advantage. Accordingly he gave
orders that both flanks were to be threatened, while a desperate night
assault was delivered against the centre.
The orders issued from the Head Quarters of the First Army are
interesting and instructive:
“Kinchapoatsa,
5 p.m. August 22nd.
(1) “The enemy in front of the First Army is composed of the
IX and XXXI Divisions and the greater part of the III and VI
Divisions. Its line extends from Kosalin through Kampalei and
Kynchorei to Daitenshi and Daisoton. At Ponchiho are a regiment
of infantry, six squadrons of cavalry, and a few guns. At
Liao-yang and on the right bank of the Tai-tsu is a superior
force of the enemy.
(2) “The Second and Fourth Armies expect to deliver their
attack on the position from Anshantien to West Togyoho--eight
kilometres West--and Kami-sekyo on the 28th inst.
(3) “The First Army will attack with its main force in the
direction of Am-ping, and with parts of its force on the
Liao-yang road.
(4) “The Twelfth Division, plus the mixed brigade of the Second
Reserve and minus the mountain battery, will attack in the
direction of Hichihanlei at dawn on the 26th.
(5) “The Second Division, minus one field battery and one
regiment of cavalry and plus the mountain battery of the Twelfth
Division, will attack South-west of Tsuego and Chorei before
dawn on the 26th.
(6) “The Imperial Guards Division, plus one regiment of cavalry
and one battery of field guns, will attack Daitenshi on the
Liao-yang main road at dawn on the 26th.
(7) “The G.O.C. will be found at Santolei after 6 p.m. on the
25th.”
The strength of the Twelfth Division was equal to one and a half
divisions; that of the Second Division was about normal, though half
its artillery and the greater part of its cavalry had been transferred
to the Guards Division. A battery of mountain guns had however been
added to the Second Division, and proved so effective that the Japanese
resolved in future to carry a mountain battery behind the fighting
line. The Guards Division, in addition to the cavalry and guns of the
Second Division, was strengthened by a battery of Russian guns captured
at the Yalu, and had in all ten batteries of field guns. Besides these
forces was the Reserve--whose position was kept secret--under the
direct command of Head Quarters. This reserve--the 29th regiment of the
Second Reserves--was doing garrison duty at Feng-hoang-cheng on the
22nd when orders came that it must hurry to the front. After a forced
march of forty-eight hours the regiment arrived at Tien-sui-tien at
midnight on the 25th and was thrown into the fighting line. No one who
saw them marching to the sound of the guns next morning would have
dreamed that they had just performed so remarkable a feat of endurance.
Such was the force with which General Kuroki succeeded in driving in
the Russian left flank and compelling General Kuropatkin to evacuate
Aushantien and fall back on his last defences about Liao-yang. Let me
attempt to describe as clearly and as concisely as the multiplicity of
details allow, the manner in which this great victory was won.
In the last days of August, the army under General Kuropatkin,
estimated at two hundred thousand fighting men, held three defensive
lines stretching like bows over the hilly country to the South and
East of Liao-yang. The longest bow was drawn to the South of Am-ping
across the Pekin road; the shorter was North of the River Tang, while
the smallest and strongest bow masked Liao-yang from the low hills of
Shou-shan. The defensive works in front of the Pekin road had been
constructed months before, those in the neighbourhood of Am-ping were
begun after our advance from Mou-tien-ling on the 31st of July. The
nature and extent of the defences beyond the Tang-ho were not known
until a few days before the attack on Liao-yang; nor were we sure that
the enemy had entrenched the heights of Sou-shan. Divided into two
main bodies, with strong reserves on the inner lines of defence, the
Russians awaited our advance with the confidence inspired by numbers
and by the presence of General Kuropatkin. Our plan was simple. While
the Armies of the West and South attacked from Anshantien on the road
from Hai-cheng, the Army of the East, under General Kuroki, was to
force the defensive line on the Pekin road and at Am-ping.
Late in the afternoon of August 25th we left Tien-sui-tien--the village
near the foot of Mou-tien-ling Parr, where we had camped for nearly one
month. Our orders were to march with three days’ rations in our saddle
bags and to halt for the night in a glen four miles to the North-west.
We bivouacked among the mealies near a mountain torrent, and rose at
dawn with the consciousness that important events had happened in the
night. Before starting from Tien-sui-tien we were told that no match
was to be struck, no pipe or fire was to be lighted, and that restive
and noisy horses were to be kept in the rear. These precautions could
only portend some desperate enterprise under cover of darkness.
Forcing a path through the tangle of bush that dripped with heavy dew,
we reached the summit of a ridge and looked across the boundless ocean
of bare hills. Away to the right loomed a bold spur in the shadow of
which flowed the Tang-ho. Here the column, which formed our right
flank, was operating, though of its progress we saw no sign and heard
no sound. The heights on our left echoed the thunders of artillery,
telling us that our left flank had forced the Pass of Yang-shu-ling and
was hotly engaged. General Kuroki and his Staff watched from the ridge
to which we had ascended. Across a deep valley on the North ran another
steep ridge upon which stood General Nichi and his Staff. Here was the
centre of our advance.
The Russian line of defence, in front of which we found ourselves, was
strong by nature, and had been improved by art. It stretched across
hills, offering an extensive field of fire, and must be approached
by deep and exposed valleys. One weakness, however, it had, and the
Japanese were not slow to discover it. The line was too long to be
strongly defended, even by the force at General Kuropatkin’s command.
On an extended front the point for attack is the centre, and here
General Kuroki determined to drive in a wedge that would leave the
enemy no choice but to fall back on his second line beyond the river.
Artillery positions not being available owing to the precipitous
character of the country, he resolved upon the hazardous expedient
of a night attack with the bayonet. To ensure the success of such an
enterprise two conditions are essential. The ground over which the
troops are to advance in the darkness must be carefully studied. With
that object many reconnaisances were made, company after company being
sent out to learn the topographical features of the two mountains over
which the assault must pass. In the second place, it is necessary to
provide the enemy’s flanks with work that will prevent them from giving
effectual aid to the centre. This duty was assigned to the forces on
our flanks. Taking with them half the field guns of the Central Column,
our left wing marched from To-wan on August 22nd through the Pass of
Yang-shu-ling, drove in the enemy’s outposts on the Pekin road, and on
the morning of the 25th began their attack on the strong position of
Al-tan-ho, or Two River roads. Our right wing was ordered to assault
the Pass at Han-pa-ling on the Am-ping road and to seize the position
held by the Russian left, while a brigade was detached to contain the
force of seven or eight thousand left by the enemy at Pon-chi-ho to
guard the road to Mukden and, if practicable, to create a diversion on
our right rear.
These were the dispositions of General Kuroki’s army on the night of
August 25th, when the assault was made against the Russian centre at
Kuchorai, or Bowstring Pass. In front of this position were two ridges
held by the Russian outposts. The movement for the night attack began
at nine o’clock and at midnight the first position was taken. But the
really difficult task remained. At half-past two the stillness of the
night was unbroken save by the wolf-like bark of pariahs. Hill and
valley were wrapped in deep slumber that precedes the dawn and the moon
had veiled herself in darkness.
Suddenly the fields of giant maize and millet were stirred as by a
breeze. Yet no wind blew from any point on the black horizon. Ghostly
forms flitted across the valley. At first a score, the number swelled
into legions, until it seemed as if all the graves of all the townships
had given up their dead and an army of shades was marching through
space. Not a sound was heard--no footfall, not a breath. Yet fifteen
thousand men were advancing with rifle in hand and desperate purpose
in their hearts. Swiftly and in silence they moved until they gained
the foot of the heights. Then they glided upward, still swiftly and
in silence. A shot rang out, piercing the night with a shrill note
of alarm, and a tidal wave of humanity, rising from earth, swept
onward and upward with irresistible fury. Nothing could withstand that
steel-crested wave. Not a shot was fired. The position was won. It was
a magnificent feat of arms, which the Japanese declare is without
parallel--a whole division of infantry charging in the night with the
bayonet. Swept off their feet by this stupendous assault, the Russians
rallied at a point not far distant and appeared to be preparing a
counter attack. The mountain battery borrowed from our right wing had
followed hard on the heels of the division, and, coming into action at
close range, quickly dislodged the enemy and put an end to all fear of
counter-assault.
The success of this onslaught in the darkness may be ascribed to the
vigour and secrecy with which it was delivered. Not a single foreign
_attaché_ or correspondent who slept upon the wet ground that night
with only a blanket round him dreamed that a stupendous struggle was
raging on the other side of the mountain. Some credit also is due to
the divisions co-operating on the flanks.
In order to reach their position on the 26th the Guards Division began
their advance three days before. The roads were quagmires, and had to
be made good for the passage of field guns. Reaching Karoko on the
morning of the 23rd the fighting force repaired the road, and on the
following day came to the high ground North-west of Henkowan, and South
of Sanuipu where it encountered three battalions of Russian infantry
from Daisotung and a smart skirmish took place. On the 25th, after
another contact with the enemy, the division advanced to the appointed
line of Heilintzu. The Guards having begun their march a little earlier
than the rest of the army, General Kuropatkin withdrew part of his
force from Am-ping and Liao-yang, and strengthened his army to meet
the attack on the main road. This movement, while endangering the
position of the Guards, proved to be of benefit to the general plan of
the Japanese, for it relieved the pressure on the Twelfth Division.
Four battalions of this division--the Unizawa Brigade--had been ordered
to Kiao-tao to protect the right flank against a force of the enemy
coming from Ponchiho, while the main body of the division advanced from
Yu-shu-ling, and assumed the offensive at dawn on the 26th, after the
attack made by the Second Division. The reason for this was obvious.
The country in front of the Twelfth Division was especially difficult,
and they were in close contact with the main force of the Russians, who
occupied a very strong position. Any advance of the Second Division
would, therefore, be useful to the Twelfth Division, whose mountain
guns meanwhile were able to harass the enemy.
The situation on the left flank did not improve, and threatened to
become critical, for the enemy continued to strengthen his front.
General Kuroki accordingly despatched his reserves to reinforce
the Guards. This decision was arrived at after the most careful
deliberation, and was fraught with immediate consequences that menaced
the advance of the Second Division. Scarcely had the reserves moved
away to the assistance of the Guards than the enemy delivered a
vigorous counter attack against the left flank of the Second Division.
This movement was unexpected. It was too late, however, to recall the
reserves, and General Kuroki had no choice but to order the Guards
Division instantly to press their attack on the left, in the hope that
this would lighten the unforeseen strain on his centre.
Though successful in the night attack, the Second Division had not been
able to make the immediate advance anticipated. On the other side of a
narrow valley, fronting the ridge which had been carried at the point
of the bayonet, ran another ridge with a razor like summit flanked by
conical peaks and traversed by a buttress of rock descending almost at
right angles from the enemy’s trenches. There the Russians, reinforced
from Am-ping and covered by guns that kept up a heavy bombardment, made
an obstinate defence.
From the hill in front I watched the Japanese infantry as they moved
slowly and cautiously up the slope toward the buttress of rock, while
another body of riflemen advanced from the left and four mountain guns
were visible on the sky line to the right. The day was hot and many of
the soldiers had laid aside their tunics so that the slope was dotted
with white sleeves that made every step and every figure clear against
the greens and browns. Steadily the infantry advanced, taking cover and
extending until they gained the shelter of the buttress of rock from
behind which they opened a fusilade against the trenches between the
conical peaks. Their fire was hotly returned, and the shells of field
guns in the valley beyond began to search the slope near the mountain
guns. For two hours the situation was unchanged, each side holding its
own and maintaining its fire. After a time the Russian guns compelled
the mountain battery to retire a little down the slope where two guns
were directed to keep down the fire from the trenches and two guns
among the mealies in the valley covered the advance of the rifles.
The effect was magical. In a few minutes the fusilade slackened; the
Japanese seized the opportunity to press forward, and before noon the
flag of the Rising Sun shone blood red on the summit. The wedge of
steel had been driven hard and fast into the heart of the enemy.