ATTACK ON YU-SHU-LING.
A DRAMATIC ENCOUNTER.
For dramatic incident, not less than tactical interest, the attack
on Yu-shu-ling--to which reference has been made in describing the
general advance on Liao-yang--is worthy of separate record. The
action which ended disastrously for the Russians brought into relief
the fighting qualities of the two armies, and proved once more that
superior numbers, even when joined with desperate courage and strength
of position, cannot avail against a skilful and determined foe. It
may be urged that the element of chance entered into the victory,
and that had it not been for the arrival of reinforcements from the
centre, the Russians might have remained undisturbed behind the barrier
which nature and military art opposed to the advance from the East.
But chance is always a factor in war, and the greatest general is he
who neglects no occasion for turning it to account. Nor could the
appearance of four battalions on the Russian flank be ascribed solely
to chance. Their presence was designed, their purpose was to threaten
the enemy’s right, and their dramatic success was due to the neglect
of a precaution as obvious as that which placed at the mercy of the
Japanese the sleeping camp on the left wing. Until the occupation of
Mou-tien-ling it might have been contended that in every encounter
with General Kuroki’s army the Russians were inferior in number, and
were fighting in country peculiarly adapted to the soldiers of a
mountainous island. This apology for defeat could be made no longer.
Since that date the enemy had been in greater force; their artillery
had been of greater weight and range and mobility; they had had the
choice of positions, whether for attack or for defence, yet every
engagement, offensive and defensive, showed more clearly their want of
skill in manœuvring, in determination, in enterprise, and initiative.
The absence of these qualities rendered of no avail the courage of the
infantry and the skill of the gunners, whose sole achievement in the
recent action had been to demonstrate that even Japanese soldiers might
be checked by the rifle fire of unshaken infantry properly entrenched.
The attack on Yu-shu-ling was part of an operation that extended as far
South as Hai-cheng, over a front of nearly seventy miles. Its effect
must be judged by the success or failure of the whole movement, the
purpose of which was to harass, if not to prevent, the retreat of the
main army under General Kuropatkin upon Liao-yang and Mukden. Yet, from
a tactical point of view, the attack may be treated as a separate and
an isolated engagement.
On the 19th of July the force composing our right wing drove the enemy
from Chaotoa, twenty miles to the north of Mou-tien-ling, and proceeded
to entrench themselves on the ridge West of this position. The right
was our exposed flank, and General Inouye neglected no precaution to
guard himself against surprise, keeping a vigilant eye on his front,
where the enemy were in force, and on his right flank, about which
hovered a brigade of Cossacks, who formed part of General Renenkampf’s
division. Toward the end of the month the Russians, who had entrenched
on the heights beyond Yu-shu-ling on both sides of the river Tai-tsu,
appeared to be concentrating for attack. Spies reported the arrival
of reinforcements along the Mukden road, and unwonted activity in the
camps about Yu-shu-ling. In order that he might not be taken unawares,
General Inouye advanced his outposts in front of the enemy’s flanks.
On the 28th and 29th of July a company of infantry and a squadron of
cavalry occupied Makura-yama or Pillow Mountain, facing the Russian
position on the north bank of the Tai-tsu, while a detachment of
infantry took possession of the heights of East Penlin, overlooking the
valley on the other side of which was the enemy’s right wing. On the
29th these outposts fell back on the main body entrenched on the range
West of Chaotoa, three Russian battalions having menaced Makura-yama
and a considerable force having appeared on the West and North of East
Penlin. The enemy was also in some strength at Ponchiho, six miles
north of Chaotoa on the road to Mukden, and a fight seemed imminent.
While our right wing was making ready to defend its position the order
came for a general attack along the line from Hai-cheng to Yu-shu-ling.
On the night of the 30th General Inouye disposed his force. The command
of the right was given to General Kigoshi, who had under him six
battalions of infantry, two squadrons of cavalry, one battery of field
guns, and four batteries of mountain guns. On the left was General
Sasaki with five battalions of infantry, one squadron of cavalry and
one mountain battery, and in the centre remained General Inouye with
three and a half battalions of infantry in reserve. Four battalions of
infantry detached from the centre of the main army were to march from
Shamatan, six miles North of Lien-cheng-kwan, to co-operate with the
right wing and to seize the heights of West Penlin--the enemy’s right
flank position. The field of operations covered a mountainous country
enclosed by two rivers, that flow into the Liao-yang river almost at
right angles, and intersected by roads running to Mukden and Am-ping
and Liao-yang. As the range begins here to descend into the plain
about Liao-yang the mountains are not so lofty and precipitous as in
the South and are more suitable for defensive tactics. The Russian
position was well chosen though it had one serious defect, inasmuch as
it was divided by a broad and deep river. According to their habit,
the centre was posted at the junction of two roads so as to give
lateral communications. North of the Tai-tsu river the enemy held the
summit and slope of a range of hills facing East and separated from
the parallel range of Makura-yama by a narrow valley along which is a
road. Here they camped under canvass in the corn fields to the West of
the valley road. South of the Tai-tsu the Russians were entrenched on a
range of hills running North and South and bending Eastward like a bow.
On the left of this position is the road from Chaotoa to Am-ping, and
on each side of the road were guns commanding the approach from the
East as well as the heights of Makura-yama, North of the river. Behind
these artillery positions rose another hill on which was posted a
battery with the same field of fire.
In all, the Russians had four field batteries of thirty-two guns
opposed to one field battery of six guns and five mountain batteries
of inferior weight and range. Behind the enemy’s position, South of
the Tai-tsu, was a broad plain covered with maize crops eight or nine
feet high, bounded on the West by a river, and traversed by the road
to Am-ping, through Lackanlei and Kuchaso. In front was the road from
Penlin to Yu-shu-ling. This road runs along the bottom of a valley,
shut in on the South by hills, and on the East by a ridge which extends
North almost to Yu-shu-ling. East of this ridge is another enclosed
valley sown with maize, and East of that again another ridge, on the
Northern spur of which was the Japanese gun position. Yet another
cultivated valley divided this ridge from the entrenched range which
ran North and South, the right flank overlooking the road to Am-ping
and the river Tai-tsu, and the left flank resting on the road leading
direct to Penlin.
Thus the two armies lay facing each other on the night of July 30th.
At four o’clock on the morning of the next day the force on our right
moved from its camp at Chaotoa, and fording the deep river advanced
rapidly and silently upon Makura-yama. Under cover of a ridge that
zigzags along the North bank of the Tai-tsu the Japanese reached the
foot of the Pillow Mountain, and a battalion crept noiselessly up the
peak. Below them lay the valley, and the slope of the Western hill
dotted with white tents. Roused by the picquets, the Russians sprang
from slumber with the cry “The enemy is upon us!” Men, scantily clad,
ran hither and thither with rifles in their hands. Some were in their
shirts, others in trousers and shirt; all were dazed by the unexpected
attack. Forming in the cornfields two battalions hurried up the hill
and came within ten yards of the crest, when the Japanese appeared and
poured upon them a rain of bullets. The slope was quickly strewn with
dead. Beyond that point advance was impossible. For thirty minutes the
Russians fought hard; then they turned and fled down the hill into the
valley and the cornfields pursued by a hailstorm of lead. Throwing
aside their weapons they took to their heels, leaving tents and carts
and cooking wagons and equipment. Some fled South-west toward Am-ping;
others North-west in the direction of Liao-yang, while some few brave
men rallied and strove to renew the fight. In the valley and among the
ripening corn lay three hundred slain Russian and many wounded. The
camp was a litter of dead horses, rifles, books, papers, letters, great
coats, sacks, cooking utensils, carts--all the paraphernalia of an army
on the march. One thousand and eighteen tents fell into our hands.
The peak of Makura-yama was seized at five o’clock and at ten minutes
to eight the ridge was occupied. Meanwhile the guns on both sides had
opened at a range of between two and three thousand mètres. Little
damage was done, the enemy failing to locate our batteries and firing
in all directions. No sooner, however, did the Japanese infantry appear
on the sky line above Makura-yama than the Russian artillery turned
their attention to that quarter, and at a range of fifteen hundred
mètres kept up a steady cannonade. Our right flank was powerless and
could do nothing more than entrench and await developments. But they
were not long idle. At ten o’clock the enemy appeared on the North-west
of the ridge with the object of taking it from the rear. To meet
this counter attack two companies were despatched from the reserves
at Hoachapaozu--a village between Chaotoa and Yu-shu-ling--together
with a detachment from the rear guard. Fording the river they moved
under cover of the zigzag range of hills and coming into the open
were under the fire of the Russian guns. The officer in command of
the reserves had his horse killed under him and was slightly wounded.
While delivering the counter attack the Russians renewed their effort
to assail the front with artillery and rifle, but the arrival of
reinforcements appeared to damp their ardour, and after a short though
sharp fight the Japanese were left in possession of Makura-yama.
During this long interval the centre and the left were not idle. A
regiment advanced along the main road to Am-ping and drove the enemy
from the Northern extremity of the ridge immediately in front of the
Russian position south of the Tai-tsu. The resistance was feeble, but
beyond that point the Japanese were unable to proceed. Below stretched
a wide open plain dominated by the sheer precipice that guarded the
enemy’s front. To scale the cliff would require wings. Our centre
accordingly determined to await developments elsewhere, and contented
itself with containing the Russian front.
On our left was great activity and early promise of another disaster
to the Russians. The force under General Sasaki left Hoachapaozu at
half past three in the morning and marched South to the heights about
Penlin. This is the name given to mountains that form the East, West
and North boundaries of a triangular plain opening to the South. From
East Penlin General Sasaki saw the Russians erecting earthworks.
Though ignorant of the enemy’s strength and unfamiliar with the
physical features of the country, he resolved to attack. Accordingly he
led his troops across the valley to the foot of a gentle slope dotted
with trees and scrub. Fortunately there were no guns to oppose his
advance, but it was soon discovered that the Russians were in greater
force than had been anticipated, and that the fight would be stubborn.
The enemy were not entrenched, but had for breastwork the ridge of the
hills, immediately below which ran a pathway. Our guns came to the aid
of the infantry which was reinforced by one battalion, and the advance
went on slowly and steadily. Suddenly the extreme right of the Russian
force changed front to meet an unexpected attack from the South-east.
Realising that powerful help was at hand and that the enemy were shaken
by the unexpected menace to their rear, the Japanese pressed forward
with the utmost speed. They raced up the hill shouting “Banzai!” and
found the Russians already in retreat.
In order to explain this diversion on the enemy’s right it is necessary
to recall the fact that four battalions from the main centre were
ordered to co-operate with the right wing at West Penlin. At eight
o’clock in the morning these reinforcements arrived at Cho-bai-rai--an
eminence on the South-west of West Penlin. Hearing the sound of
heavy firing, and realising that the enemy’s front was occupied, the
commander resolved to strike from the rear, and urged his troops
through the Pass along the road to the back of West Penlin. Along this
road the Russians were retreating in great confusion. Precipitous hills
enclose the road along which they hurried like a flock of sheep. No
precaution had been taken to secure these hills in order to cover the
retirement. A Japanese lieutenant, running up the slope, beheld the
enemy in the trap and signalled to his comrades to make haste. Then
began another race for life. The Russians saw the danger and sought
to avert it by seizing the commanding position. Throwing aside great
coats and every impedimenta they strove with every nerve and sinew to
outstrip their competitors in the race. But they were too late. The
Japanese, having dropped their knapsacks, were already lining the cliff
overhanging the road and emptying their rifles into the struggling mass
below.
Shouts of “Banzai!” mingled with the rattle of musketry. It was a scene
of the wildest excitement. For the enemy below there was no escape:
they must run this fiery gauntlet. To attempt any reply with rifles was
impossible, for the Japanese were sheltered by the ledge of the cliff.
In a few moments the road was strewn with the dead and dying. Ambulance
wagons came to pick up the wounded and the Japanese chivalrously
suspended fire though no white flag had been raised. Under cover of
the Red Cross the Russians carried away their wounded, together with
many rifles and great coats. Yet three hundred dead were buried by
the Japanese, whose casualties were not a dozen. Among the wounded was
Lieut. R. Nishii, who was the first to reach the cliff and to signal to
his comrades.
At noon the range from which the enemy had retired was occupied by
the Japanese, and the battalions from the centre went in pursuit, but
were checked by guns stationed at Rihikoku and Kuchazu on the North
Road. At three o’clock the Russian right flank had disappeared, leaving
the centre undisturbed, and the left flank seriously weakened. Later
in the afternoon another attempt was made to drive the Japanese from
Makura-yama. A small force again appeared on the North-west of the
position, but the counter attack no longer had the full support of the
artillery beyond Yu-shu-ling, some of the guns having been withdrawn to
Kuchazu. The attack was a half-hearted affair, and was easily repelled.
Meanwhile, our left flank made strenuous effort to drive the enemy
from their strong position in the centre, and succeeded in capturing
two peaks. But the valley was deep and exposed, and the mountain was
steep. The assault was accordingly put off till to-morrow, and the
victorious Japanese bivouacked in battle array before the last Russian
position. At dawn they arose to renew the encounter, and found the
enemy retiring. Our left flank was the first to discover the movement,
and, hurrying up the heights, saw the Russian infantry streaming along
the road through Laokanlei in the direction of Am-ping.
In this engagement the Russians had 39 battalions of infantry, 32 guns,
2,000 cavalry, two companies of engineers, and three balloons. Their
casualties were over 2,000. 600 bodies were buried on the field, and
more than 200 prisoners were taken. Among the spoils were 800 rifles,
20,000 rounds of rifle ammunition, 400 engineers tools, 1,018 tents,
three cooking carts, six ammunition wagons, 1,400 sacks of clothing and
camp equipment. From the diary of an officer we learned that General
Kuropatkin was at Am-ping on the 23rd and 24th July, and was expected
on the 31st to direct the operations in front of General Kuroki’s
army. The Japanese casualties were 416, of whom fourteen officers were
wounded and two killed.
[Illustration: LIAO-YANG
DRAWN BY A JAPANESE OFFICER.]