WHY THE JAPANESE LINGERED AT FENG-HOANG-CHENG.
The Japanese have been blamed for not taking advantage of their victory
at the Yalu to press North without delay. There were many reasons for
hesitation. In the first place they did not know the strength of the
enemy, and feared that General Kuropatkin might descend upon them with
overwhelming force. Between the Yalu and Feng-hoang-cheng were several
strong positions, where the Russians might have made a stand. General
Kuroki accordingly determined to seize the heights about Hamatan,
and to await developments. Cavalry patrols were pushed forward, and
sent back word that the enemy had evacuated Feng-hoang-cheng. These
reports were hardly credited, for Feng-hoang-cheng was a point of great
strategic importance--the junction of many roads--where it was expected
that the Russians would offer strenuous resistance.
General Kuroki advanced upon Feng-hoang-cheng with the utmost caution,
separating his army into three columns so as to guard against
surprise. He was by no means certain that with the force under his
command it would be prudent to remain at Feng-hoang-cheng.
The landing of a small part of the Second Army in the Liao-tung
Peninsula on May 5th introduced a new factor into the calculations.
It was known that a large force of Russians confronted General Oku at
Kin-chow, and there was danger that they would be content with holding
him while the main army struck at General Kuroki. This was a movement
greatly feared by the Japanese and had a powerful influence upon their
plans. General Kuroki was of opinion that for three or four months
he must be prepared to encounter an enemy twice as numerous as his
own army. He had, however, the satisfaction of knowing that if the
Russians came upon him in force, the landing of the Second Army would
be assured. Accordingly he no sooner entered Feng-hoang-cheng than he
proceeded to fortify the surrounding hills. Though the position was
strong for defence, the perimeter was too extended for the force at
his disposal, and orders were given that in the event of attack the
Japanese were to leave the position and meet the enemy in front. The
Twelfth Division was posted on the East, the Second Division on the
West, and the Guard’s Division in the centre on the Pekin road.
On May 26th the battle of Nanshan was fought. Until that victory was
won in the Peninsula it was feared that General Oku would be attacked
by the Russian forces North and South of Nanshan, and that General
Kuroki would be compelled to relieve the pressure on the Second Army
by marching upon Hai-chung. The Russians missed a supreme opportunity.
What they ought to have done was to concentrate their forces and make
a determined assault upon the army in the Liao-tung Peninsula, or upon
the army at Feng-hoang-cheng. But General Kuropatkin’s vicious habit of
“nibbling” prevailed, and no big movement was attempted. The Russian
army was split into ineffectual fragments--some at Kin-chow, others at
Kai-ping, some at Liao-tung, others near Feng-hoang-cheng.
Through all these alarms General Kuroki held fast to his purpose
of accumulating stores and strengthening the position about
Feng-hoang-cheng. He was conscious that the Russians feared him, and
would not willingly leave open the road to Liao-tung, even in the hope
of crushing General Oku. When General Stakelberg moved south to fight
the battle of Te-li-tzu, it appeared as if the moment had arrived for a
rapid march on Liao-yang, but the Japanese knew that the Russian force
in front of them was strong.
Accordingly General Kuroki remained at Feng-hoang-cheng until he had
accumulated stores and munitions of war that made him independent
of the immediate control of the sea, and until there was no further
risk of the Russians concentrating all their forces against one of
the invading armies. The interval of forty-five days was not wasted.
Engineers were occupied in constructing a light railway from the port
of Antung, in building bridges across the winding stream of the Tsa-ho,
which follows the North as far as the pass of Mou-tien-ling, in making
and improving roads over mountains and along valleys, in entrenching
hills that command approaches from the North, and in erecting
bomb-proof shelters and gun emplacements. Warehouses arose outside the
ancient and decaying walls of the city, and were filled with rice and
the simple food of the Japanese soldier.
Nor were the combatants idle while this provision was being made for
their comfort and security. Mobile columns and strong patrols pushed
forward on every side, scouring the country for miles, penetrating
as far North as eighty miles due East of Mukden, and creating an
impression of bewildering activity. On the East a Russian cavalry
division, under General Renekampf--a soldier of great energy and
recognised ability--struggled for mastery along the banks of the Pa-tao
river, and for a week or more Saimaki became the objective of both
forces. Now the town was held by the Japanese, and now we learned that
two battalions of the enemy, with a field battery and a regiment of
cavalry were in occupation, and that the Japanese had fallen back upon
Nai-yang-meun on the Ai-ho. The presence of this force on our right
was an embarrassment, and might at a critical moment become a menace.
General Kuroki, accordingly, determined to remove the risk, and
despatched a brigade to Nai-yang-meun with orders to get behind the
enemy at Saimaki and thus cut off his retreat. As fate would have it,
the Russians chose the very hour of the arrival of these reinforcements
to attack the town, and were defeated. They retired in confusion,
leaving our right flank unassailed. On the West, at Siou-yen the Guards
joined hands with the Division landed at Takushan, and drove the enemy
in the direction of Hai-cheng.
General Kuropatkin, not being gifted with the power of divination,
was deceived by this activity. He evidently believed that General
Kuroki was moving Westward toward the railway, and would presently
join hands with the divisions in the Liao-tung Peninsula. Appearances
lent themselves to this deception. A force had landed at Takushan, two
brigades of Guards had occupied Siou-yen, and every day brought report
of encounters between patrols and small mobile bodies of the enemy. The
long halt at Feng-hoang-cheng helped to confirm the Russian commander
in his delusion.