THE FIRST ENCOUNTER.
The moment was drawing near when the armies would meet and the vaunted
might of Russia would be put to the test. How would it fare with the
Japanese? Victorious at sea, would they be conquerors on land? The
people of Great Britain and the United States were divided between
amazement at the presumption and admiration of the daring of the
“little Japs.” Those who measure the strength of armies by statistics
of area and population, and by quotations from the Stock Exchange, had
no doubt that the bigger country would win. Military men, satisfied by
parades, manœuvres, and official reports, were convinced that Russia
would vindicate the laws of military science and crush her rival.
Politicians hoped for the best and feared the worst. One member of the
British Government discovered a new ground for faith. He was “sure the
Japanese would win, because every military man said they could not!”
As for the Japanese soldiers, never for a moment did they dream that
they could be beaten by “a corrupt, immoral, and illiterate people like
the Russians.” The worst they anticipated was a heavy casualty list.
General Fujii, mindful of the Russo-Turkish war, ordered the Medical
Staff to prepare for five thousand wounded.
The Russians had plenty of time to make their dispositions. For several
weeks they had held the north bank of the Ai-ho with twenty thousand
infantry and Cossacks and forty-eight guns. In contesting the passage
of a river it is obviously necessary to keep a large reserve with which
to strike the enemy when he attempts to cross. But in a country devoid
of lateral communications--like that occupied by the Russians--this
precaution could be adopted only on one condition: that the point of
attack was known. To concentrate at Antung, if the Japanese crossed
at Suikochin or at Fushan, would be fatal. The plan of defence must
be well conceived from the beginning or it was destined to fail. Now
the Russian General could not learn the direction of the attack. The
movements of the Japanese puzzled him, as it was intended that they
should. Some of the younger officers believed that the crossing would
be effected on the upper reaches of the Yalu near Suikochin, and urged
that the left flank should be strengthened. This theory met with no
support among the senior officers, who thought that no serious movement
could be made in such difficult country. Others maintained that the
Japanese would bridge the river between Wiju and Chiu-lien-cheng, and
would follow the Imperial Pekin road. But the weight of authority was
in favour of Antung, where it was comparatively easy to bridge the
Yalu. In that belief General Zasselitch was confirmed by the naval
demonstrations that took place in front of Antung, and he accordingly
posted his reserves near that place.
On the last day of April the Russian front extended along the North
bank of the river Ai for a distance of nearly eighteen miles. Their
right flank was at Antung, their centre at Chiu-lien-cheng, and their
left wing rested on the mountains near Wezukau. One regiment was
stationed at Antung, on the hill to the North of which was a battery
of eight guns; a regiment and a half, with two field batteries,
held Chiu-lien-cheng; at Yushukau was another regiment with one
battery; to the North of Wezukau were two companies of infantry and
one field battery, and in the heights about Hamatan, to the West
of Chiu-lien-cheng, where the road from Antung branches West to
Feng-hoang-cheng, were posted two regiments in reserve, with one
battery. Both flanks were protected by cavalry, General Mistchenko
being at Tajushan, some miles to the West of Antung, where it was
anticipated that the Japanese would attempt to land a small force. The
hills were entrenched at several points; trenches commanded the river
bank; upon summit and ridge were gun emplacements and sungars. These
works were constructed by the infantry, aided by Chinese, the engineers
being occupied with the roads and bridges on the line of communication
which passed through Feng-hoang-cheng to Liao-yang. No attempt had been
made to mask the trenches, which were of the most primitive design, and
gave neither head cover nor protection against shell fire.
The Japanese lay in the hills about Wiju on the South bank of the
Yalu--an army of three Divisions of forty-five thousand men, with
twelve batteries of field guns, six mountain batteries, and two
sections of five-inch howitzers. Their line extended from Suikochin to
the South-west of Wiju. Between the two armies was the valley of the
Yalu--a plain of sand and bush, intersected by rivers.
The position of the Russian flank and the nature of the terrain between
the Yalu and the Ai called for a movement which in face of an energetic
and well-informed enemy might have proved disastrous. A glance at the
map will show that if the attack on the Russian front and flank was to
be simultaneous the Twelfth Division must advance twenty-four hours
before the Divisions at the centre and on the left. To arrive in front
of the Russian position on the Ai-ho and to cover the crossing of the
other divisions the Twelfth had to traverse the mountainous country
between Suikochin and Litzuyen. General Kuroki determined to take the
risk of dividing his command by sending one division in advance across
the river. In order to divert attention from this movement the gunboat
Maya and two torpedo boats renewed their demonstration near Antung on
the morning of the 29th and bombarded the enemy’s position North of the
Yalu. At eleven o’clock forty or fifty Cossacks with two guns appeared
in front of Suikochin but were compelled to seek refuge in the hills.
The enemy’s outpost having been driven in, a covering party of one
battalion was ferried over under fire from the Russian guns.
The battery North of Wiju replied, and by two o’clock the battalion
occupied a position that gave security to the engineers, who
immediately began to bridge the river. This, as we have seen, was a
difficult task, the current being swift (1.80 mètres per second), the
water eight mètres deep and two or three anchors being required for
each pontoon. The bridge was completed by three o’clock on the morning
of the 30th, and the Twelfth Division crossed to the North bank of the
Yalu.
The night of the 29th of April was one of great anxiety to General
Kuroki and his staff. The army was divided by a deep river, and one
division, upon whose safety depended the success or failure of the
plan of attack, was executing the hazardous operation of deploying at
right angles to its line of march within easy range of the enemy’s
guns. At any moment the Russians might seize the occasion to deliver a
counter attack. General Kuroki had, however, the consolation of knowing
that in such difficult country it would take time to develop such an
attack, and that the Twelfth Division might be depended upon to hold
the line. Meanwhile, every precaution was taken to prevent surprise.
Three batteries and a regiment of infantry were posted on Kontonto
island; the guns North of Wiju were trained on the point of danger, and
two divisions concentrated at Wiju were ready to march at a moment’s
notice.