that is during all the late reign. The present parliament there,
has continued from the beginning of this reign; and probably
will continue to the end.
[44] I am informed, that within these few years, a petition was
presented to the House of Commons in Great-Britain, setting
forth, "that herrings were imported into Ireland, from some
foreign parts of the north so cheap, as to discourage the
British herring fishery, and therefore praying, that some remedy
might be applied in that behalf by parliament"--"That, upon this
petition, the House resolved to impose a duty of two shillings
sterling on every barrel of foreign herrings imported into
Ireland, but afterwards dropt the affair, for fear of engaging
in a dispute with Ireland about the right of taxing her."
So much higher was the opinion, which the House entertained of
the spirit of Ireland, than of that of these colonies.
I find in the last English papers, that the resolution and
firmness with which the people of that kingdom have lately
asserted their freedom, have been so alarming in Great-Britain,
that the Lord Lieutenant in his speech on the 20th of last
October, "recommended" to the parliament, "that such provision
may be made for securing the judges in the enjoyment of their
offices and appointments during their good behaviour, as shall
be thought most expedient."
What an important concession is thus obtained by making demands
becoming freemen, with a courage and perseverance becoming
freemen.
In the same manner shall we unquestionably be treated, as soon as
the late taxes, laid upon us, shall make posts in the "government,"
and the "administration of justice," here, worth the attention of
persons of influence in Great Britain. We know enough already to
satisfy us of this truth. But this will not be the worst part of our
case.
The principals in all great offices will reside in England, make
some paltry allowance to deputies for doing the business here. Let
any man consider what an exhausting drain this must be upon us, when
ministers are possessed of the power of affixing what salaries
they please to posts, and he must be convinced how destructive the
late act must be. The injured kingdom, lately mentioned, can tell
us the mischiefs of absentees; and we may perceive already the same
disposition taking place with us. The government of New York has
been exercised by a deputy. That of Virginia is now held so; and
we know of a number of secretaryships, collectorships, and other
offices held in the same manner.
True it is, that if the people of Great-Britain were not too much
blinded by the passions, that have been artfully excited in their
breasts, against their dutiful children, the colonists, these
considerations would be nearly as alarming to them as to us. The
influence of the crown was thought, by wise men many years ago, too
great, by reason of the multitude of pensions and places bestowed by
it; these have vastly increased since[45] and perhaps it would be no
difficult matter to prove that the people have decreased.
[45] One of the reasons urged by that great and honest statesman,
Sir William Temple, to Charles II. in his famous remonstrance to
dissuade him from aiming at arbitrary power, was, the "King had
few offices to bestow."
Hume's Hist. of England.
"Though the wings of prerogative have been clipt, the influence of
the crown is greater than ever it was in any period of our history.
For when we consider in how many burroughs the government has
the voters at command, when we consider the vast body of persons
employed in the collection of the revenue in every part of the
kingdom, the inconceivable number of placemen, and candidates for
places in the customs, in the excise, in the post-office, in the
dock-yards, in the ordnance, in the salt-office, in the stamps,
in the navy and victualling offices, and in a variety of other
departments; when we consider again the extensive influence of the
money corporations, subscription jobbers, and contractors: the
endless dependance created by the obligations conferred on the
bulk of the gentlemen's families throughout the kingdom, who have
relations preferred in our navy and numerous standing army; when, I
say, we consider how wide, how binding, a dependance on the crown
is created by the above enumerated particulars; and the great, the
enormous weight and influence which the crown derives from this
extensive dependance upon its favour and power; any lord in waiting,
any lord of the bedchamber, any man may be appointed minister."
"A doctrine to this effect is said to have been the advice of L----
H----."
Late News papers.
Surely, therefore, those who wish the welfare of their country,
ought seriously to reflect what may be the consequence of such a new
creation of offices, in the disposal of the crown. The army, the
administration of justice, and the civil government here, with such
salaries as the crown shall please to annex, will extend ministerial
influence, as much beyond its former bounds, as the late war did the
British dominions.
But whatever the people of Great-Britain may think on this occasion,
I hope the people of these colonies will unanimously join in
this sentiment, that the late act of parliament is injurious to
their liberty; and that this sentiment will unite them in a firm
opposition to it, in the same manner as the dread of the Stamp-act
did.
Some persons may imagine the sums to be raised by it, are but small,
and therefore may be inclined to acquiesce under it. A conduct
more dangerous to freedom, as before has been observed, can never
be adopted. Nothing is wanted at home but a precedent, the force
of which shall be established, by the tacit submission of the
colonies. With what zeal was the statute erecting the post-office,
and another relating to the recovery of debts in America, urged and
tortured, as precedents in the support of the Stamp-act, though
wholly inapplicable. If the parliament succeeds in this attempt,
other statutes will impose other duties. Instead of taxing ourselves
as we have been accustomed to do from the first settlement of these
provinces; all our useful taxes will be converted into parliamentary
taxes on our importations; and thus the parliament will levy upon
us such sums of money as they chuse to take, without any other
limitation than their pleasure.
We know how much labour and care have been bestowed by these
colonies, in laying taxes in such a manner, that they should be
most easy to the people, by being laid on the proper articles; most
equal, by being proportioned to every man's circumstances; and
cheapest by the method directed for collecting them.
But parliamentary taxes will be laid on us without any
consideration, whether there is any eassier mode. The only point
regarded will be, the certainty of levying the taxes, and not the
convenience of the people, on whom they are to be levied, and
therefore all statutes on this head will be such as will be most
likely, according to the favourite phrase, "to execute themselves."
Taxes in every free state have been, and ought to be as exactly
proportioned, as is possible, to the abilities of those who are to
pay them. They cannot otherwise be just. Even a Hottentot could
comprehend the unreasonableness, of making a poor man pay as much
for defending the property of a rich man, as the rich man pays
himself.
Let any person look into the late act of parliament, and he will
immediately perceive, that the immense estates of Lord Fairfax, Lord
Baltimore,[46] and our proprietors, which are amongst "his Majesty's
other dominions" to be "defended, protected and secured" by that act
will not pay a single farthing of the duties thereby imposed, except
Lord Fairfax wants some of his windows glazed. Lord Baltimore, and
our proprietors are quite secure, as they live in England.
[46] The people of Maryland and Pennsylvania have been engaged
in the warmest disputes, in order to obtain an equal and just
taxation of their proprietors estates; but the late act does
more for these proprietors than they themselves would venture to
demand. It totally exempts them from taxation.
I mention these particular cases as striking instances, how far the
late act is a deviation from that principle of justice, which has so
constantly distinguished our own laws on this continent.
The third consideration with our continental assemblies in laying
taxes has been the method of collecting them. This has been done by
a few officers under the inspection of the respective assemblies,
with moderate allowances. No more was raised from the subject, than
was used for the intended purposes. But by the late act, a minister
may appoint as many officers as he pleases for collecting the taxes;
may assign them what salaries he thinks "adequate" and they are to
be subject to no inspection but his own.
In short, if the late act of parliament takes effect, these colonies
must dwindle down into "common corporations," as their enemies in
the debates concerning the repeal of the Stamp-act, strenuously
insisted they were: and it is not improbable, that some future
historians will thus record our fall.
"The eighth year of this reign was distinguished by a very memorable
event, the American colonies then submitting for the first time, to
be taxed by the British parliament. An attempt of this kind had been
made two years before, but was defeated by the vigorous exertions
of the several provinces in defence of their liberties. Their
behaviour on that occasion rendered their name very celebrated for
a short time all over Europe; all states being extremely attentive
to a dispute between Great-Britain and so considerable a part of
her dominions. For as she was thought to be grown too powerful by
the successful conclusion of the late war she had been engaged
in, it was hoped by many, that as it had happened before to other
kingdoms, civil discords would afford opportunities of revenging
all the injuries supposed to be received from her. However the
cause of dissention was removed by a repeal of the statute, that
had given offense. This affair rendered the submissive conduct of
the colonies so soon after, the more extraordinary; there being no
difference between the modes of taxation which they opposed, and
that to which they submitted, but this, that by the first, they were
to be continually reminded that they were taxed, by certain marks
stampt on every piece of paper or parchment, they used. The authors
of that statute triumphed greatly on this conduct of the colonies,
and insisted that if the people of Great-Britain, had persisted
in enforcing it, the Americans would have been in a few months so
fatigued with the efforts of patriotism, that they would quickly
have yielded obedience.
"Certain it is, that though they had before their eyes so many
illustrious examples in their mother country, of the constant
success attending firmness and perseverance in opposition to
dangerous encroachments on liberty, yet they quietly gave up a
point of the last importance. From thence the decline of their
freedom began, and its decay was extremely rapid; for as money
was always raised upon them by the parliament, their assemblies
grew immediately useless and in a short time contemptible; and
in less than one hundred years, the people sunk down into that
tameness and supineness of spirit by which they still continue to be
distinguished."
_Et majores vestros et posteros cogitate._
Remember your ancestors and your posterity.
A FARMER.
LETTER XI.
_Beloved Countrymen,_
I have several times, in the course of these letters, mentioned the
late act of parliament, as being the foundation of future measures
injurious to these colonies; and the belief of this truth I wish to
prevail, because I think it necessary to our safety.
A perpetual jealousy respecting liberty, is absolutely requisite
in all free states. The very texture of their constitution, in
mixt governments, demands it. For the cautions with which power is
distributed among the several orders, imply, that each has that
share which is proper for the general welfare, and therefore, that
any further imposition mull be pernicious. [47]Machiavel employs
a whole chapter in his discourses, to prove that a state, to be
long lived, must be frequently corrected, and reduced to its first
principles. But of all states that have existed, there never was
any, in which this jealousy could be more proper than in these
colonies. For the government here is not only mixt, but dependant,
which circumstance occasions a peculiarity in its form, of a very
delicate nature.
[47] Machiavel's discourses. Book 3, chap. 1.
Two reasons induce me to desire, that this spirit of apprehension
may be always kept up among us, in its utmost vigilance. The first
is this, that as the happiness of these provinces indubitably
consists in their connection with Great-Britain, any separation
between them is less likely to be occasioned by civil discords, if
every disgusting measure is opposed singly, and while it is new: for
in this manner of proceeding, every such measure is most likely to
be rectified. On the other hand, oppressions and dissatisfactions
being permitted to accumulate--if ever the governed throw off the
load, they will do more. A people does not reform with moderation.
The rights of the subject therefore cannot be too often considered,
explained, or asserted: and whoever attempts to do this, shews
himself, whatever may be the rash and peevish reflections of
pretended wisdom, and pretended duty, a friend to those who
injudiciously exercise their power, as well as to them, over whom it
is so exercised.
Had all the points of prerogative claimed by Charles I. been
separately contested and settled in preceding reigns, his fate
would in all probability have been very different, and the people
would have been content with that liberty which is compatible with
regal authority. But[48] he thought, it would be as dangerous for
him to give up the powers which at any time had been by usurpation
exercised by the crown, as those that were legally vested in it.
This produced an equal excess on the part of the people. For when
their passions were excited by multiplied grievances, they thought
it would be as dangerous for them, to allow the powers that were
legally vested in the crown, as those which at any time had been by
usurpation exercised by it. Acts, that might by themselves have been
upon many considerations excused or extenuated, derived a contagious
malignancy and odium from other acts, with which they were
connected. They were not regarded according to the simple force of
each, but as parts of a system of oppression. Every one therefore,
however small in itself, being alarming, as an additional evidence
of tyrannical designs. It was in vain for prudent and moderate men
to insist, that there was no necessity to abolish royalty. Nothing
less than the utter destruction of monarchy, could satisfy those
who had suffered, and thought they had reason to believe, they
always should suffer under it.
[48] The author is sensible that this is putting the gentlest
construction on Charles' conduct; and that is one reason why he
chuses it. Allowance ought to be made for the errors of those men,
who are acknowledged to have been possessed of many virtues. The
education of that unhappy Prince, and his confidence in men not so
good and wise as himself, had probably filled him with mistaken
notions of his own authority, and of the consequences that would
attend concessions of any kind to a people, who were represented
to him as aiming at too much power.
The consequences of these mutual distrusts are well known: But there
is no other people mentioned in history, that I recollect, who have
been so constantly watchful of their liberty, and so successful in
their struggles for it, as the English. This consideration leads me
to the second reason, why I "desire that the spirit of apprehension
may be always kept up among us in its utmost vigilance."
The first principles of government are to be looked for in human
nature. Some of the best writers have asserted, and it seems with
good reason, that "government is founded on [49]opinion."
[49] "Opinion is of two kinds, viz. opinion of interest, and
opinion of right. By opinion of interest, I chiefly understand,
the sense of public advantage which is reaped from government;
together with the persuasion, that the particular government
which is established, is equally advantageous with any other,
that could be easily settled."
"Right is of two kinds, right to power, and right to property.
What prevalence opinion of the first kind has over mankind may
easily be understood, by observing the attachment which all
nations have to their ancient government, and even to those
names which have had the sanction of antiquity. Antiquity always
begets the opinion of right." "It is sufficiently understood,
that the opinion of right to property, is of the greatest moment
in all matters of government."
Hume's Essays.
Custom undoubtedly has a mighty force in producing opinion, and
reigns in nothing more arbitrarily than in public affairs. It
gradually reconciles us to objects even of dread and detestation;
and I cannot but think these lines of Mr. Pope, as applicable to
vice in politics, as to vice in ethics.
'Vice is a monster of so horrid mien,
As to be hated, needs but to be seen;
Yet seen too oft, familiar with her face,
We first endure, then pity, then embrace.'
When an act injurious to freedom has been once done, and the
people bear it, the repetition of it is most likely to meet
with submission. For as the mischief of the one was found to be
tolerable, they will hope that of the second will prove so too;
and they will not regard the infamy of the last, because they are
stained with that of the first.
Indeed, nations in general, are not apt to think until they feel;
and therefore nations in general have lost their liberty: For as
violations of the rights of the governed, are commonly not only
specious,[50] but small at the beginning, they spread over the
multitude in such a manner, as to touch individuals but slightly.
Thus they are disregarded.[51] The power or profit that arises
from these violations, centering in few persons, is to them
considerable. For this reason the governors having in view their
particular purposes, successively preserve an uniformity of conduct
for attaining them. They regularly increase and multiply the first
injuries, till at length the inattentive people are compelled to
perceive the heaviness of their burdens.--They begin to complain and
enquire--but too late.--They find their oppressors so strengthened
by success, and themselves so entangled in examples of express
authority on the part of their rulers, and of tacit recognition
on their own part, that they are quite confounded: For millions
entertain no other idea of the legality of power, than that it is
founded on the exercise of power. They voluntarily fatten their
chains, by adopting a pusillanimous opinion, "that there will be
too much danger in attempting a remedy," or another opinion no less
fatal, "that the government has a right to treat them as it does."
They then seek a wretched relief for their minds, by persuading
themselves, that to yield their obedience is to discharge their
duty. The deplorable poverty of spirit, that prostrates all the
dignity bestowed by divine providence on our nature--of course
succeeds.
[50] _Omnia mala exampla ex bonis initiis orta sunt._
Sallust. Bell. Cat. S. 50.
[51] "The Republic is always attacked with greater vigour than it
is defended, for the audacious and profligate, prompted by their
natural enmity to it, are easily impelled to act upon the least
nod of their leaders; whereas the honest, I know not why, are
generally slow and unwilling to stir; and neglecting always the
beginnings of things, are never roused to exert themselves, but
by the last necessity; so that through irresolution and delay,
when they would be glad to compound at last for their quiet, at
the expence even of their honour, they commonly lose them both."
Cicero's Orat. for Sextius.
Such were the sentiments of this great and excellent man whose vast
abilities, and the calamities of the time in which he lived, enabled
him, by mournful experience, to form a just judgement on the conduct
of the friends and enemies of liberty.
From these reflections I conclude, that every free State should
incessantly watch, and instantly take alarm on any condition being
made to the power exercised over them, innumerable instances might
be produced to shew, from what slight beginnings the most extensive
consequences have flowed: but I shall select two only from the
history of England.
Henry the seventh was the first monarch of that kingdom, who
established a standing body of armed men. This was a band of
50 archers, called yeomen of the guard: And this institution,
notwithstanding the smallness of the number, was, to prevent
discontent, [52]"disguised under the pretence of majesty and
grandeur." In 1684, the standing forces were so much augmented, that
Rapin says--"The King, in order to make his people fully sensible
of their new slavery, affected to muster his troops, which amounted
to 4000 well armed and disciplined men." I think our army, at this
time, consists of more than seventy regiments.
[52] Rapin's History of England.
The method of taxing by excise was first introduced amidst the
convulsions of civil wars. Extreme necessity was pretended, and
its short continuance promised. After the restoration, an excise
upon beer, ale and other liquors, was granted to the[53] King, one
half in fee, the other for life, as an equivalent for the court of
wards. Upon James the second's accession, the parliament[54] gave
him the first excise, with an additional duty on wine, tobacco,
and some other things. Since the revolution it has been extended
to salt, candles, leather, hides, hops, soap, paper, paste-board,
mill-boards, scaleboards, vellum, parchment, starch, silks,
calicoes, linens, stuffs, printed, stained, &c. wire, wrought plate,
coffee, tea, chocolate, &c.
[53] 12 Car. II. Chap. 23, and 24.
[54] James II. Chap. 1, and 4.
Thus a standing army and excise have, from the first slender
origins, tho' always hated, always feared, always opposed, at length
swelled up to their vast present bulk.
These facts are sufficient to support what I have said. 'Tis true
that all the mischiefs apprehended by our ancestors from a standing
army and excise, have not yet happened: but it does not follow
from thence, that they will not happen. The inside of a house may
catch fire, and the most valuable apartments be ruined, before the
flames burst out. The question in these cases is not, what evil has
actually attended particular measures--but what evil, in the nature
of things, is likely to attend them. Certain circumstances may for
some time delay effects, that were reasonably expected, and that
must ensue. There was a long period, after the Romans had prorogued
the command to [55]Q. Publilius Philo, before that example destroyed
their liberty. All our kings, from the revolution to the present
reign have been foreigners. Their ministers generally continued but
a short time in authority;[56] and they themselves were mild and
virtuous princes.
[55] In the year of the city 428, "_Duo singularia hæc ei viro
primum contigere; prorogatio imperii non ame in ullo fucto et acta
honore triumphus_." Liv. B. 8. Chap. 23. 26.
"Had the rest of the Roman citizens imitated the example of L.
Quintus, who refused to have his consulship continued to him,
they had never admitted that custom of proroguing magistrates,
and then the prolongation of their commands, the army had never
been introduced, which very thing was at length the ruin of that
commonwealth."
Machiavel's discourses, B. 3. Chap. 24.