Chapter X

THE MAIN VALUE OF PUBLIC DEBATE

The individual whose action is governed by a rule is interested in its

substance. But in those rules which do not control his own action his

chief interest is that there should be workable rules.

It follows that the membership of the public is not fixed. It changes

with the issue: the actors in one affair are the spectators of another,

and men are continually passing back and forth between the field

where they are executives and the field where they are members of a

public. The distinction between the two is not, as I said in Chapter

III, an absolute one: there is a twilight zone where it is hard to say

whether a man is acting executively on his opinions or merely acting

to influence the opinion of some one else who is acting executively.

There is often a mixture of the two types of behavior. And it is this

mixture, as well as the lack of a clear line of distinction in all

cases, which permits a very large confusion in affairs between a public

and a private attitude toward them. The public point of view on a

question is muddied by the presence in the public of spurious members,

persons who are really acting to bend the rule in their favor while

pretending or imagining that they are moved only by the common public

need that there shall be an acceptable rule.

At the outset it is important, therefore, to detect and to discount the

self-interested group. In saying this I do not mean to cast even the

slightest reflection on a union of men to promote their self-interest.

It would be futile to do so, because we may take it as certain that men

will act to benefit themselves whenever they think they conveniently

can. A political theory based on the expectation of self-denial and

sacrifice by the run of men in any community would not be worth

considering. Nor is it at all evident that the work of the world could

be done unless men followed their private interest and contributed to

affairs that direct inner knowledge which they thus obtain. Moreover,

the adjustments are likely to be much more real if they are made from

fully conscious and thoroughly explored special points of view.

Thus the genius of any illuminating public discussion is not to obscure

and censor private interest but to help it to sail and to make it sail

under its own colors. The true public, in my definition of that term,

has to purge itself of the self-interested groups who become confused

with it. It must purge itself not because private interests are bad

but because private interests cannot successfully be adjusted to each

other if any one of them acquires a counterfeit strength. If the true

public, concerned only in the fact of adjustment, becomes mobilized

behind a private interest seeking to prevail, the adjustment is false;

it does not represent the real balance of forces in the affair and the

solution will break down. It will break down because the true public

will not stay mobilized very long for anything, and when it demobilizes

the private interest which was falsely exalted will find its privileges

unmanageable. It will be like a man placed on Jack Dempsey’s chest by

six policemen, and then left there after the policemen have gone home

to dinner. It will be like France placed by the Allies upon a prostrate

Germany and then left there after the Allies have departed from Europe.

The separation of the public from the self-interested group will not

be assisted by the self-interested group. We may be sure that any body

of farmers, business men, trade unionists will always call themselves

the public if they can. How then is their self-interest to be detected?

No ordinary bystander is equipped to analyze the propaganda by which

a private interest seeks to associate itself with the disinterested

public. It is a perplexing matter, perhaps the most perplexing in

popular government, and the bystander’s only recourse is to insist upon

debate. He will not be able, we may assume, to judge the merits of the

arguments. But if he does insist upon full freedom of discussion, the

advocates are very likely to expose one another. Open debate may lead

to no conclusion and throw no light whatever on the problem or its

answer, but it will tend to betray the partisan and the advocate. And

if it has identified them for the true public, debate will have served

its main purpose.

The individual not directly concerned may still choose to join the

self-interested group and support its cause. But at least he will

know that he has made himself a partisan, and thus perhaps he may

be somewhat less likely to mistake a party’s purpose for the aim of

mankind.

The phantom public · 第 6 / 9 章