THE TWO QUESTIONS BEFORE THE PUBLIC
The multitude of untroubled rules that men live by are of no concern
to the public. It has to deal only with the failures. Customs that are
accepted by all who are expected to follow them, contracts that are
carried out peaceably, promises that are kept, expectations fulfilled,
raise no issue. Even when there has been a breach of the rule, there is
no public question if the breach is clearly established, the aggression
clearly identified, the penalty determined and imposed. The aggressor
may be identified because he pleads guilty. He may be identified by
some due process though he denies his guilt. The rule, a term under
which I mean to include the method of detection, interpretation and
enforcement, as well as the precept, is in either case intact. The
force of the public can be aligned without hesitation on behalf of the
authorities who administer the rule.
There is no question for the public unless there is doubt as to the
validity of the rule,—doubt, that is to say, about its meaning, its
soundness or the method of its application. When there is doubt the
public requires simple, objective tests to help it decide where it will
enlist. These tests must, therefore, answer two questions:
First, Is the rule defective?
Second, How shall the agency be recognized which is most likely to mend
it?
These are, I should maintain, the only two questions which the public
needs to answer in order to exert the greatest influence it is capable
of exerting toward the solution of public problems. They are not,
please note, the only questions which anybody has to answer to solve a
problem. They are the only questions which a member of the public can
usefully concern himself with if he wishes to avoid ignorant meddling.
How then shall he know the rule is defective? How shall he recognize
the reformer? If he is to answer those questions at all, he must be
able to answer them quickly and without real understanding of the
problem. Is it possible for him to do that? Can he act intelligently
but in ignorance?
I think this apparently paradoxical thing can be done in some such way
as the next four chapters describe.