HILLEL BEN SAMUEL
In the post-Maimonidean age all philosophical thinking is in the nature
of a commentary on Maimonides whether avowedly or not. The circle of
speculation and reflection is complete. It is fixed by the "Guide of the
Perplexed," and the efforts of those who followed Maimonides are to
elaborate in his spirit certain special topics which are treated in his
masterpiece in a summary way. In the case of the more independent
thinkers like Levi ben Gerson we find the further attempt to carry out
more boldly the implications of the philosophical point of view, which,
as the latter thought, Maimonides left implicit by reason of his
predisposition in favor of tradition. Hasdai Crescas went still farther
and entirely repudiated the authority of Aristotle, substituting will
and emotion for rationalism and logical inference. Not knowledge of God
as logically demonstrated is the highest aim of man, but love of God.
But even in his opposition Crescas leans on Maimonides's principles,
which he takes up one by one and refutes. Maimonides was thus the point
of departure for his more rigorous followers as well as for his
opponents. In the matter of external sources philosophical reflection
after Maimonides was enriched in respect to details by the works of
Averroes on the Arabic side and those of the chief Christian scholastics
among the Latin writers. Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas furnished
some material to men like Hillel of Verona in the thirteenth century and
Don Isaac Abarbanel in the fifteenth. Maimonides was limited to the
Aristotelian expositions of Alfarabi and Avicenna. The works of
Averroes, his contemporary, he did not read until toward the end of his
life. After his death Averroes gained in prestige and influence until he
succeeded in putting into the shade his Arabian predecessors and was
regarded by Jew and Christian alike as the Commentator of Aristotle _par
excellence_. His works were rapidly translated into Hebrew and Latin,
and the Jewish writers learned their Aristotle from Averroes. The
knowledge of the Arabic language was gradually disappearing among the
Jews of Europe, and they were indebted for their knowledge of science
and philosophy to the works translated. Philosophy was declining among
the Arabs themselves owing to the disfavor of the powers that be, and
many of the scientific writings of the Arabs owe their survival to the
Hebrew translations or transcriptions in Hebrew characters which escaped
the proscription of the Mohammedan authorities.
The one problem that came to the front as a result of Averroes's
teaching, and which by the solution he gave it formed an important
subject of debate in the Parisian schools of the thirteenth century, was
that of the intellect in man, whether every individual had his own
immortal mind which would continue as an individual entity after the
death of the body, or whether a person's individuality lasted only as
long as he was alive, and with his death the one human intellect alone
survived. This was discussed in connection with the general theory of
the intellect and the three kinds of intellect that were distinguished
by the Arabian Aristotelians, the material, the acquired and the active.
The problem goes back to Aristotle's psychology, who distinguishes two
intellects in man, passive and active (above, p. xxxvi). But the
treatment there is so fragmentary and vague that it gave rise to widely
varying interpretations by the Greek commentators of Aristotle,
Alexander of Aphrodisias and Themistius, as well as among the Arabs,
Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes. The latter insisted on the unity of the
intellect for the human race, thereby destroying individual immortality,
and this Averroistic doctrine, adopted by some Masters of Arts at the
University of Paris, was condemned among other heresies, and refuted in
the writings of Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas. Maimonides does not
discuss these problems in detail in his "Guide." He drops a remark
incidentally here and there, and it would appear that for him too, as
for Averroes, the intellect when in separation from the body is not
subject to individual distinction, that there cannot be several human
intellects, since matter is the principle of individuation and the
immaterial cannot embrace a number of individuals of the same
species.[320] The problem of immortality he does not treat _ex professo_
in the "Guide." Hence this was a matter taken up by his successors.
Hillel ben Samuel as well as Levi ben Gerson discuss this question in
detail.
Hillel ben Samuel does not tower as a giant in mediæval Jewish
literature. His importance is local, as being the first devotee of
Jewish learning and philosophy in Italy in the middle of the thirteenth
century, at the close of a period of comparative ignorance. The Italian
Jews before his time contributed little to knowledge and learning
despite their external circumstances, which were more favorable than in
some other countries. Hillel ben Samuel (1220-1295) was a strong admirer
of Maimonides and undertook to comment on the "Guide of the Perplexed."
He defended Maimonides against the aspersions of his opponents, and was
so confident in the truth of his master's teachings that he proposed a
conference of the learned men of Jewry to judge the works and doctrines
of Maimonides and to decide whether the "Guide" should be allowed to
live or should be destroyed. Another interest attaching to Hillel ben
Samuel is that he was among the first, if not the first Jew who by his
knowledge of Latin had access to the writings of the scholastics, to
whom he refers in his "Tagmule ha-Nefesh" (The Rewards of the Soul) as
the "wise men of the nations." He was also active as a translator from
the Latin.
His chief work, which entitles him to brief notice here, is the "Tagmule
ha-Nefesh" just mentioned.[321] He does not offer us a system of
philosophy, but only a treatment of certain questions relating to the
nature of the soul, its immortality and the manner of its existence
after the death of the body, questions which Maimonides passes over
lightly. With the exception of the discussion relating to the three
kinds of intellect and the question of the unity of the acquired
intellect for all mankind, there is not much that is new or remarkable
in the discussion, and we can afford to pass it by with a brief notice.
Men of science know, he tells us in the introduction, that the valuable
possession of man is the soul, and the happiness thereof is the final
purpose of man's existence. And yet the number of those who take pains
to investigate the nature of the soul is very small, not even one in a
hundred. And even the few who do undertake to examine this subject are
hindered by various circumstances from arriving at the truth. The matter
itself is difficult and requires long preparation and preliminary
knowledge. Then the vicissitudes of life and the shortness of its
duration, coupled with the natural indolence of man when it comes to
study, completely account for the lack of true knowledge on this most
important topic.
Induced by these considerations Hillel ben Samuel undertook to collect
the scattered notices in the extensive works of the philosophers and
arranged and expounded them briefly so as not to discourage those who
are in search of wisdom. His purpose is the knowledge of truth, which is
an end in itself. He desires to explain the existence of the soul, its
nature and reward. The soul is that which makes man man, hence we should
know the nature of that which makes us intelligent creatures, else we do
not deserve the name.
Another reason for the importance of knowing the nature of the soul is
that error in this matter may lead to more serious mistakes in other
departments of knowledge and belief. Thus if a man who calls himself
pious assumes that the soul after parting from the body is subject to
corporeal reward and punishment, as appears from a literal rendering of
passages in Bible and Talmud, he will be led to think that the soul
itself is corporeal. And since the soul, it is believed, comes from on
high, the upper world must have bodies and definite places, and hence
the angels too are bodies. But since the angels are emanations from the
divine splendor, God too is body! Thus you see how serious are the
consequences of a belief, in itself perhaps not so dangerous, as that of
the corporeality of the soul.[322]
We must first prove the existence of the soul. This can be shown in
various ways. We see that of natural bodies some take food, grow,
propagate their like, while others, like stones, do not do these things.
This shows that the powers and functions mentioned cannot be due to the
corporeal part of the objects performing them, else stones, too, would
have those powers, as they are also corporeal like the rest. There must
therefore be a different principle, not body, which is responsible for
those activities. We call it soul.
As all existents are divided into substance and accident, the soul must
be either the one or the other. Now an accident, according to Aristotle,
is that which may be or not be without causing the being or destruction
of the object in which it is. But the body cannot be a living body
without the soul. Hence the soul is not an accident; it is therefore a
substance. Substance may be corporeal or incorporeal. The soul cannot be
a corporeal substance, for all body is divisible, and subject to motion
and change, whereas the soul, as will be shown later, is not movable,
not changeable and not divisible. It might seem that the soul is subject
to motion, since it descends into the body and rises again when it
leaves the body. But this is not so. Descent and ascent when thus
applied to the soul are metaphorical. The union of soul and body is not
a spatial relation. The upper world from which the soul comes is not
corporeal, hence there is no such thing as place there, nor anything
limited by space. Hence the coming of the soul from the spiritual world
and its return thither are not motions at all. The relation of the soul
to the body is as that of form to matter, as Aristotle says.
Granted that the soul's union with and separation from the body are not
motions, is not the soul subject to motion while in the body? Hillel's
answer is that it is not, and he proves his point in the prescribed
fashion by making use of Aristotle's classification of motion into (1)
genesis and (2) decay, (3) increase and (4) diminution, (5) qualitative
change and (6) motion proper, or motion of translation. He then
undertakes to show that the soul can have none of the kinds of motion
here enumerated. The arguments offer nothing striking or interesting,
and we can afford to omit them. It is worth while, however, to refer to
his interpretation of emotion. The passage of the soul from joy to
grief, from anger to favor, might seem to be a kind of motion. Hillel
answers this objection by saying that these emotions do not pertain to
the soul as such. Their primary cause is the state of mixture of the
humors in the body, which affects certain corporeal powers in certain
ways; and the soul shares in these affections only so far as it is
united with the body. In its own nature the soul has no emotions.
We can also prove that the soul is not divisible. For a divisible thing
must have parts. Now if the soul is divided or divisible, this means
either that every part of the soul, no matter how small, has the same
powers as the whole, or that the powers of the soul are the resultant of
the union of the parts. The first alternative is impossible, for it
leads us to the absurd conclusion that instead of one soul every person
has an infinite number of souls, or at least a great number of souls.
The second alternative implies that while the soul is not actually
divided, since its powers are the summation of the parts, which form a
unit, it is potentially divisible. But this signifies that at some time
this potential divisibility will be realized (or potentiality would be
vain and meaningless) and we are brought back to the absurdity of a
multiplicity of souls in the human body.
Having shown that the soul is not movable, changeable or divisible, we
are certain of its incorporeality, and we are ready to give a definition
of the soul. Hillel accordingly defines the soul as "a stage of
emanation, consisting of a formal substance, which subsists through its
own perfection, and occupies the fourth place in the emanatory process,
next to the Active Intellect. Its ultimate source is God himself, who is
the ultimate perfection and the Good, and it emanates from him
indirectly through the mediation of the separate Powers standing above
it in the scale of emanation. The soul constitutes the first entelechy
of a natural body."[323]
The above definition is interesting. It shows that Hillel did not
clearly distinguish the Aristotelian standpoint from the Neo-Platonic,
for in the definition just quoted, the two points of view are combined.
That all mediæval Aristotelianism was tinged with Neo-Platonism,
especially in the doctrine of the Active Intellect, is well known. But
in Hillel's definition of the soul we have an extreme form of this
peculiar combination, and it represents a step backward to the
standpoint of Pseudo-Bahya and Ibn Zaddik. The work of Ibn Daud and
Maimonides in the interest of a purer Aristotelianism seems not to have
enlightened Hillel. The Neo-Platonic emanation theory is clearly
enunciated in Hillel's definition. The soul stands fourth in the series.
The order he has in mind is probably (1) God, (2) Separate
Intelligences, (3) Active Intellect, (4) Soul. We know that Hillel was a
student of the Neo-Platonic "Liber de Causis" (_cf._ above, p. xx),
having translated some of it into Hebrew, and he might have imbibed his
Neo-Platonism from that Proclean book.
Continuing the description of the soul in man, he says that the noblest
part of matter, _viz._, the human body, is endowed with the rational
soul, and becomes the subject of the powers of the latter. Thereby it
becomes a man, _i. e._, a rational animal, distinguished from all other
animals, and similar to the nature of the angels.
The Active Intellect causes its light to emanate upon the rational soul,
thus bringing its powers out into actuality. The Active Intellect,
which is one of the ten degrees of angels, is related to the rational
power in man as the sun to the power of sight. The sun gives light,
which changes the _potentially_ seeing power into _actually_ seeing, and
the potentially visible object into the actually visible. Moreover, this
same light enables the sight to see the sun itself, which is the cause
of the actualization in the sight. So the Active Intellect gives
something to the rational power which is related to it as light to the
sight; and by means of this something the rational soul can see or
understand the Active Intellect itself. Also the potentially
intelligible objects become through this influence actually
intelligible, and the man who was potentially intelligent becomes
thereby actually intelligent.
_Intellect_ ("sekel") in man is distinguished from _wisdom_ ("hokmah").
By the former power is meant an immediate understanding of abstract
principles. The latter is _mediate_ understanding. Wisdom denotes
speculation about universals through inference from particulars.
Intellect applies directly to the universals and to their influence upon
the particulars.[324]
Hillel next discusses the live topic of the day, made popular by
Averroes, namely, whether there are in essence as many individual souls
as there are human bodies, or, as Averroes thought, there is only one
universal soul, and that its individualizations in different men are
only passing incidents, due to the association of the universal soul
with the human body, and disappear when the body dies. The "sages of the
Gentiles," Hillel tells us, regard Averroes's notion as heretical, and
leading besides to the absurd conclusion that the same soul is both
rewarded and punished; a view which upsets all religion. Averroes
employs a number of arguments to prove his point, among them being the
following. If there are many souls, they are either all existing from
eternity or they are created with the body. The first is impossible, for
since the soul is a form of the body, we should have actually an
infinite number of forms, and this would necessitate the actual
existence of an infinite number of bodies also; else the existence of
these souls for the purpose of joining the bodies would be in vain. But
it is absurd to suppose that there has been from eternity an infinite
number of bodies created like the number of souls, and yet they have not
become real bodies with souls until now.
The second alternative is also impossible. For if there are many souls
which came into being with the bodies, they either came from nothing or
from something. From nothing is impossible, for nothing comes from
nothing except by way of creation, which is a miracle; and we do not
believe in miracles unless we have to. That they came from something is
also impossible; for this something can be neither matter nor form. It
cannot be matter, for form, the actual and superior, cannot come from
the potential and inferior. It cannot be form, for then form would
proceed from form by way of genesis and dissolution, which is not true.
Matter is the cause of generation and dissolution, not form. We are thus
forced to the conclusion that the soul is one and eternal, one in
substance and number; and that it becomes many only _per accidens_, by
virtue of the multiplicity of its receiving subjects, comparable to the
light of the one sun, which divides into many rays.
The Bible cannot help us to decide this question, for its expressions
can be interpreted either way. Hillel then undertakes to adjudicate
between the contending views by striking a compromise. He feels that he
is contributing to the solution of an important problem by an original
suggestion, which he says is to be found nowhere else expressed with
such clearness and brevity.
Here again Hillel's Neo-Platonic tendencies are in evidence. For he
assumes both a universal soul and a great number of individual souls
emanating from it in a descending series. The objection that forms
cannot come from other forms by way of generation and dissolution,
Hillel says, is not valid, for no such process is here involved.
Generation and dissolution is peculiar to the action of body upon body,
which is by contact. A _spiritual_ form acts upon other forms not
through contact, because it is not limited by time or place. We know
concerning the Intelligences that each comes from the one previous to it
by way of emanation, and the same thing applies to the issue of many
human souls from the one universal soul. After death the rational part
of every soul remains; that part which every soul receives from the
Active Intellect through the help of the _possible_ or _material
intellect_, and which becomes identified with the Active and separate
Intellect. This is the part which receives reward and punishment,
whereas the one universal soul from which they all emanate is a divine
emanation, and is not rewarded or punished.[325]
We must now discuss further the nature of the three grades of intellect.
For this it will be necessary to lay down three preliminary
propositions.
1. There must be an intellect whose relation to the material intellect
is the same as that of the object of sense perception is to the sense.
This means that just as there must be a real and actual object to arouse
the sense faculty to perceive, so there must be an actual intelligible
object to stir the rational power to comprehend.
2. It follows from 1 that as the material sense has the power of
perceiving the sensible object, so the material intellect has the power
of perceiving this other intellect.
3. If it has this power, this must at some time be realized _in actu_.
Therefore at some time the material intellect is identified with the
other intellect, which is the Active Intellect.
We must now prove 1. This is done as follows: We all know that we are
potentially intelligent, and it takes effort and pains and study to
become actually intelligent. In fact the process of intellection has to
pass several stages from sense perception through imagination. Now our
intellect cannot make itself pass from potentiality to actuality. Hence
there must be something else as agent producing this change; and this
agent must be actually what it induces in us. Hence it is an active
intellect.
The material intellect has certain aspects in common with the sense
faculty, and in certain aspects it differs. It is similar to it in being
receptive and not active. But the mode of receptivity is different in
the two. As the intellect understands all forms, it cannot be a power
residing in a body in the sense of extending through it and being
divided with the division of the body, as we see in some of the powers
of sense. This we can prove as follows:
1. If the intellect were receptive in the same manner as the senses, it
would receive only a definite kind of form, as for example the sense of
sight does not receive taste.
2. If the intellect were a power in body and had a special form, it
could not receive that form, just as for example if the eye were
colored, it could not perceive colors.
3. If the intellect were a corporeal power, it would be affected by its
object and injured by a powerful stimulus, as is the case in the senses
of sight and hearing. A dazzling light injures the eye, a deafening
noise injures the ear, so that thereafter neither sense can perform its
normal function properly. This is not true with the intellect. An
unusually difficult subject of thought does not injure the intellect.
4. If the intellect were similar in its activity to sense perception, it
would not be self-conscious, as the sense faculties cannot perceive
themselves.
5. The intellect, if it were like sense, would not be able to comprehend
a thing and its opposite at the same time, or it would do so in a
confused manner, as is the case in the powers of sense.
6. The intellect perceives universals; the sense, particulars.
This being the case, there is a difference of opinion as to the nature
of the material intellect. Some say that it has no definite nature in
itself except that of possibility and capacity, though it is different
from other possibilities in this respect that it is not resident in, and
dependent upon a material subject like the others. That is why Aristotle
says that the material intellect is not anything before it intellects;
that it is in its essence potential with reference to the
_intelligibilia_, and becomes actual when it understands them actually.
Themistius says it is not any of the existents actually, but a potential
essence receiving material forms. Its nature is analogous to that of
prime matter; hence it is called _material_ intellect. It is best to
call it possible intellect. Being a potential existent it is not subject
to generation and dissolution any more than prime matter.
Alexander of Aphrodisias thinks the material intellect is only a
capacity, _i. e._, a power in the soul, and appears when the soul enters
the body, hence is not eternal _a parte ante_.
Averroes holds that the possible intellect is a separate substance, and
that the capacity is something it has by virtue of its being connected
with the body as its subject. Hence this capacity is neither entirely
distinct from it nor is it identical with it. According to him the
possible intellect is not a part of the soul.
Which of these views is correct, says Hillel, requires discussion, but
it is clear that whichever of these we adopt there is no reason opposing
the conjunction of the possible intellect with the Active. For if it is
an eternal substance, potential in its nature, like primary matter,
then it becomes actual when it understands the intelligible objects. The
same is true if it is a capacity residing in the soul.
Hillel is thus of the opinion in this other question debated in those
days, whether the intellect of man is capable of conjunction during life
with the angelic Active Intellect, that it is. The Active Intellect, he
says, in actualizing the material intellect influences it not in the
manner of one body acting upon another, _i. e._, in the manner of an
efficient or material cause, but rather as its formal or final cause,
leading it to perfection. It is like the influence which the separate
Intelligences receive from one another, the influence of emanation, and
not a material influence comparable to generation. This reception of
influence from the Active Intellect on the part of the potential is
itself conjunction. It means that the agent and the thing acted upon
become one, and the same substance and species. The material intellect
becomes a separate substance when it can understand itself.[326]
Before taking up the more theological problem of reward and punishment,
he devotes the last section of the theoretical part of his book to a
discussion of the relation of the possible or material intellect to the
rest of the human soul. This problem also arose from Averroes's
interpretation of the Aristotelian psychology, and is closely related to
the other one of the unity of the human intellect. It is needless for us
to enter into the technical details which are a weariness to the flesh
of the modern student, but it is worth while to state briefly the
motives underlying the opposing views. Averroes, who had no theological
scruples, interpreted Aristotle to mean that the part of the soul which
was intimately associated with the body as its form, constituting an
indissoluble organism in conjunction with it, embraced its lower
faculties of sense, imagination and the more concrete types of judgment.
These are so intimately bound up with the life of the body that they die
with its death. The reason on the other hand, which has to do with
immaterial ideas, or intelligibles as they called them, is eternal and
is not the form of the body. It is a unitary immaterial substance and is
not affected by the life or death of the body. To be sure it comes in
contact with the human soul during the life of the body, thus bringing
into existence an individualized human reason as a passing episode. But
this individualized phase of the intellect's life is dependent upon the
body and ceases when the body dies, or is reabsorbed in the universal
intellect.
The theological implications of this view were that if there is any
reward and punishment after death, it would either have to be
administered to the lower faculties of the soul, which would have to be
made immortal for the purpose, or if the rational soul is the subject of
retribution, this cannot affect the individual, as there is no
individual rational soul. Hence the Christian opponents of Averroes,
like Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas (Hillel speaks of them here as
the "Religionists," or the "Sages who believe in religion"), endeavored
to vindicate for the Aristotelian definition of the soul as the form of
the body, also the rational part, thus maintaining the view that the
reason too has an individual existence both during life and after death.
Thomas Aquinas, as a truer interpreter of Aristotle, goes so far as to
maintain that the Active Intellect itself is also a part of the human
soul, and not one of the angelic separate Intelligences. Neither
Maimonides nor Hillel ben Samuel, nor any other Jewish philosopher was
able to depart so widely from their Arabian masters or to undertake an
independent study of Aristotle's text, as to come to a similar
conclusion. Hence the Active Intellect in Jewish Philosophy is
unanimously held to be the last of the Angelic substances, and the
proximate inspirer of the prophet. The discussion therefore in Hillel's
work concerns the possible intellect, and here he ventures to disagree
with Averroes and decides in favor of the possible intellect as a part
of the soul and the subject of reward and punishment.[327]
Concerning the nature of reward and punishment after death opinions are
divided. Some think that both reward and punishment are corporeal. Some
say reward is spiritual, punishment is corporeal; while a small number
are of the opinion that both are spiritual. Hillel naturally agrees with
the latter and gives reasons for his opinion. If the soul, as was shown
before, is incorporeal, immaterial and a _formal_ substance, it cannot
be influenced by corporeal treatment. For corporeal influence implies
motion on the part of agent and patient, and the pervasion of the
influence of the former through the parts of the latter; whereas a
spiritual substance has no parts. Besides, if reward and punishment are
corporeal, and Paradise is to be taken literally, then why separate the
soul from the body, why not reward the living person with eternal life
and give him the enjoyment of paradise while on earth? The effect would
be much greater upon the rest of mankind, who would see how the
righteous fare and the wicked. The objection that this would make people
mercenary does not hold, for they are mercenary in any case, since they
expect reward; whether in this life or in the next makes no difference.
Reward must therefore be spiritual, and so must punishment, since the
two go together.[328]
When God in his kindness favored the human race by giving them a soul,
which he united with the body, he also gave them the possibility of
attaining eternal happiness. For this purpose he arranged three grades
of ascent, _viz._, the three intellects spoken of above, the material or
possible intellect, the acquired intellect (this is the actual
functioning of the possible intellect and the result thereof) and the
active intellect. The second intellect is partly speculative or
theoretical and partly practical. The theoretical intellect studies and
contemplates all intelligible existents which are separate from matter.
There is nothing practical in this contemplation, it is just the
knowledge of existents and their causes. This is called the science of
truth, and is the most important part of philosophy.
The practical intellect is again divided into the _cogitative_ and the
_technological_. The former decides whether a thing should be done or
not, and discriminates between the proper and the improper in human
actions and qualities. It is important as a guide to the happiness of
the soul because it instructs the appetitive power in reference to those
things which are subject to the will, and directs it to aim at the good
and to reject the evil.
The technological intellect is that by which man learns arts and trades.
The practical intellect is also theoretical in the sense that it has to
think in order to discriminate between the proper and the improper, and
between the beneficial and injurious in all things pertaining to
practice. The difference between the speculative and practical
intellects is in the respective objects of their comprehension, and
hence is accidental and not essential. The objects of the theoretical
intellect are the true and the false; of the practical, the good and the
bad. The acquired intellect gives these intelligibles to the soul
through the possible intellect, and is intermediate between the latter
and the Active Intellect, which is one of the separate Intelligences
above soul. The Active Intellect watches over the rational animal that
he may attain to the happiness which his nature permits.
Men differ according to their temperamental composition and their human
conduct. This leads to differences in the power of understanding and in
the amount of influence received from the Active Intellect. Hillel
quotes Maimonides in support of his view that the prophetic stage is an
emanation of glory from God through the medium of the Active Intellect,
which exerts its influence upon the rational power and upon the
imagination, so that the prophet sees his vision objectified _extra
animam_. The three conditions requisite for prophecy are perfection in
theory, perfection in imagination and perfection in morals. The first
without the second and third produces a philosopher; the second without
the first and third gives rise to a statesman or magician.
It is important to know, he tells us, that the cultivation of the reason
and imagination alone is not sufficient. Practice of the commandments is
very important. Hence a man must guide properly the two powers of sense
perception and desire, which are instruments of the rational power. For,
as Maimonides says in his commentary on Aboth (_cf._ p. 282), all
observance and violation of the commandments, good and bad qualities
depend upon those two powers. Without a proper training of these the
influence of the active intellect upon the reason and imagination may
lead to evil.
Beginning with sense perception a man must train all his five senses to
attend only to what is good and to turn away from evil. When he
satisfies his sensuous desires, he must do this in order to preserve his
body that he may be enabled to serve God in the best possible way.
The same applies to the power of desire. This is the power which directs
one to pursue the agreeable and shun the disagreeable. From it proceed
also courage, confidence, anger, good will, joy, sorrow, humility,
pride. All these qualities must be used in the service of God. If a man
do this, he will attain the grade of an angelic being even during life,
and will be able to perform miracles like the prophets and the sages of
the Talmud.
After death the souls of such men reach even a higher degree than they
had before entering the body, as a reward for not allowing themselves
to be degraded by their corporeal desires, but on the contrary directing
these to higher aims.[329]
As for the nature of reward and punishment more particularly, we may say
that the soul of the wicked loses all the glory promised to her and
descends to a position lower than was hers originally. She is expelled
from the land of life and remains in darkness forever, without returning
to her original station. Knowing what she has lost, she will feel
continuous distress, sorrow and fear, for the power of imagination
remains with the soul after death. But there is no physical burning with
fire. On the other hand, the soul of the righteous will return to God.
The doctrine of the resurrection and the explanation for it are a
further proof that the soul after death is not punished corporeally. The
motive of the resurrection is that the soul and body may receive their
compensation together as in life. If then the retribution of the soul is
corporeal, there is no need of resurrection.[330]
Hillel then proceeds to show that the words of the Rabbis which seem to
speak for corporeal retribution are not to be taken literally. In this
connection it is worth while to reproduce his classification of the
contents of the Talmud and his attitude toward them. He enumerates six
classes.
1. Passages in the Talmudic and Midrashic literature which must be taken
literally. These are the discussions of the _Halaka_ (the legal and
ceremonial portions). To pervert these from their literal meaning, or to
maintain that the _intention_ of the law is the important thing and not
the practice of the ceremony, is heresy and infidelity; though it is
meritorious to seek for an explanation of every law, as the Rabbis
themselves do in many instances.
2. Passages which should be understood as parables and allegories with a
deeper meaning. These are the peculiar _Haggadahs_, or the strange
interpretations of Biblical verses where no ceremonial precept is
involved.
3. Statements similar to those of the Prophetical books of the Bible,
which were the result of the influence of the Active Intellect and came
to the sages in a dream or in the waking state, speaking of the future
in an allegorical manner. These are the extraordinary tales found in the
Talmud, which cannot be understood literally, as they involve a
violation of the order of nature; and no miracle must be believed unless
for a very important reason.
4. The homilies addressed to the people on the occasion of holidays for
the purpose of exhorting them to divine worship and observance of the
Law. Many of these are hyperbolical in their expression, especially in
the promises concerning the future blessings in store for the people.
These were in the nature of encouragement to the people to make their
burdens easier to bear. Here belong also unusual interpretations of
Biblical verses, explanations which do not give the original meaning of
the verse in question, but are suggested in order to interest the
people. We must add, too, stories of the good things that came to pious
people in return for their piety. These must be taken for the most part
literally, unless they are clearly improbable.
5. Jokes and jests by way of relief from the strain of study. Hyperboles
belong here.
6. Narratives of miracles done for pious people, such as reviving the
dead, punishing with death by means of a word, bringing down rain, and
so on. All these must be taken literally. To disbelieve is heresy. This
is true only where the alleged miracles were done for a high purpose,
otherwise we need not believe them.
The reason the Bible and the Talmud express themselves in corporeal
terms concerning reward and punishment is in order to frighten the
people and to impress them with the terrible punishment consequent upon
wrongdoing. The people do not understand any reward and punishment
unless it is physical and corporeal. In reality spiritual existence is
more real than physical.[331]