mechanical causation, necessity of natural law and eternity of the
world. And they are all removed at a stroke when we substitute
intelligent cause working with purpose, will and design. To be sure, by
finding difficulties attaching to a theory we do not disprove it, much
less do we prove our own. But we should follow the view of Alexander,
who says that where a theory is not proved one should adopt the view
which has the least number of objections. This, we shall show, is the
case in the doctrine of creation. We have already pointed out a number
of difficulties attaching to the Aristotelian view, which are solved if
we adopt creation. And there are others besides. It is impossible to
explain the heavenly motions as a necessary mechanical system. The
hypotheses made by Ptolemy to account for the apparent motions conflict
with the principles of the Aristotelian Physics. According to these
principles there is no motion of translation, _i. e._, there is no
change of place, in the heavenly spheres. Also there are three kinds of
motion in the world, toward the centre (water, earth), away from the
centre (air, fire) and around the centre (the celestial spheres). Also
motion in a circle must be around a fixed centre. All these principles
are violated in the theories of the epicycle and eccentric, especially
the first. For the epicycle is a sphere which changes place in the
circumference of the large sphere.
Finally, an important objection to the doctrine of eternity as taught by
Aristotle, involving as it does necessity and absolute changelessness of
natural phenomena, is that it subverts the foundations of religion, and
does away with miracles and signs. The Platonic view (_cf._ above, p.
269) is not so bad and does not necessitate the denial of miracles; but
there is no need of forcing the Biblical texts to that opinion so long
as it has not been proved. As long as we believe in creation all
possible questions concerning the reasons for various phenomena such as
prophecy, the various laws, the selection of Israel, and so on, can be
answered by reference to the will of God, which we do not understand.
If, however, the world is a mechanical necessity, all these questions
arise and demand an answer.[284]
It will be seen that Maimonides's objections to eternity and mechanical
necessity (for these two are necessarily connected in his mind), are
twofold, philosophic and religious. The latter objection we may conceive
Maimonides to insist upon if he were living to-day. Mechanical necessity
as a universal explanation of phenomena would exclude free will and the
efficacy of prayer as ordinarily understood, though not necessarily
miracles, if we mean by miracle simply an extraordinary phenomenon not
explicable by the laws of nature as we know them, and happening only on
rare occasions. But in reality this is not what we mean by miracle. A
miracle is a discontinuity in the laws of nature brought to pass on a
special occasion by a personal being in response to a prayer or in order
to realize a given purpose. In this sense miracles are incompatible with
the doctrine of necessity, and Maimonides's objections hold to-day,
except for those to whom religion is independent of the Bible, tradition
or any external authority.
As concerns the scientific objections, the case is different. We may
allow Maimonides's negative criticism of the Aristotelian arguments,
namely, that they are not convincing. His positive criticism that
Aristotle's interpretation of phenomena on the mechanical principle does
not explain all the facts is not valid. Aristotle may be wrong in his
actual explanations of particular phenomena and yet be correct in his
method. Modern science, in fact, has adopted the mechanical method of
interpreting phenomena, assuming that this is the only way in which
science can exist at all. And if there is any domain in which mechanical
causation is still denied, it is not the celestial regions about which
Maimonides was so much concerned--the motions of the heavenly bodies
have been reduced to uniformity in accordance with natural law quite as
definitely as, and in some cases more definitely than, some terrestrial
phenomena--but the regions of life, mind and will. In these domains the
discussion within the scientific and philosophic folds is still going
on. But in inanimate nature modern science has succeeded in justifying
its method by the ever increasing number of phenomena that yield to its
treatment. Maimonides fought an obsolete philosophy and obsolete
scientific principles. It is possible that he might have found much to
object to in modern science as well, on the ground that much is yet
unexplained. But an objection of this sort is captious, particularly if
we consider what Maimonides desires to place in science's stead. Science
is doing its best to classify all natural phenomena and to discover the
uniformities underlying their behavior. It has succeeded admirably and
is continually widening its sphere of activity. It has been able to
predict as a result of its method. The principle of uniformity and
mechanical necessity is becoming more and more generally verified with
every new scientific discovery and invention.
And what does Maimonides offer us in its stead? The principle of
intelligent purpose and design. This, he says, is not open to the
objections which apply to the Aristotelian principles and methods. It is
as if one said the coward is a better man than the brave warrior,
because the latter is open to the danger of being captured, wounded or
killed, whereas the former is not so liable. The answer obviously would
be that the only way the coward escapes the dangers mentioned is by
running away, by refusing to fight. Maimonides's substitution is
tantamount to a refusal to fight, it is equivalent to flight from the
field of battle.
Aristotle tries to explain the variation in speed of the different
celestial motions, and succeeds indifferently. Another man coming after
Aristotle and following the same method may succeed better. This has
actually been the case. Leverrier without ever looking into a telescope
discovered Neptune, and told the observers in what part of the heavens
they should look for the new planet. Substitute Maimonides's principle,
and death to science! Why do the heavenly bodies move as they do?
Maimonides replies in effect, because so God's wisdom has determined and
his wisdom is transcendent. There is no further impulse to investigation
in such an answer. It is the reply of the obscurantist, and it is very
surprising that Maimonides the rationalist should so far have forgotten
his own ideal of reason and enlightenment. He is here playing into the
hands of those very Mutakallimun whom he so severely criticises. They
were more consistent. Distrustful of the irreligious consequences of the
philosophical theories of Aristotle and his Arabian followers, they
deliberately denied causation and natural law, and substituted the will
of God as interfering continuously in the phenomena of nature. A red
object continues red because and as long as God creates the "accident"
red and attaches it to the atoms of which the object is composed. Fire
taking hold of wood burns it and reduces it to ashes because God wills
at the particular moment that this shall be the result. The next moment
God may will otherwise and the fire and the wood will lie down in peace
together and no harm done. This makes miracles possible and easy.
Maimonides would not think of going so far; he has no names harsh enough
to describe this unscientific, unphilosophic, illogical, irrational,
purely imaginary procedure. But we find that he is himself guilty of the
same lack of scientific insight when he rejects a method because it is
not completely successful, and substitutes something else which will
always be successful because it will never tell us anything at all and
will stifle all investigation. Were Maimonides living in our day, we may
suppose he would be more favorably inclined to the mechanical principle
as a scientific method.
Having laid the philosophical foundations of religion in proving the
existence, unity and incorporeality of God, and purposeful creation in
time, Maimonides proceeds to the more properly religious doctrines of
Judaism, and begins with the phenomenon of prophecy. Here also he
follows Aristotelian ideas as expressed in the writings of the Arabs
Alfarabi and Avicenna, and was anticipated among the Jews by Ibn Daud.
His distinction here as elsewhere is that he went further than his model
in the manner of his elaboration of the doctrine.
He cites three opinions concerning prophecy:
1. _The Opinion of the Masses._ God chooses any person he desires, be he
young or old, wise or ignorant, and inspires him with the prophetic
spirit.
2. _The Opinion of the Philosophers._ Prophecy is a human gift and
requires natural aptitude and hard preparation and study. But given
these qualifications, and prophecy is sure to come.
3. _The Opinion of Judaism._ This is very much like that of the
philosophers, the only difference being that a man may have all the
qualifications and yet be prevented from prophesying if God, by way of
punishment, does not desire that he should.
Prophecy is an inspiration from God, which passes through the mediation
of the Active Intellect to the rational power first and then to the
faculty of the imagination. It is the highest stage a man can attain and
is not open to everyone. It requires perfection in theoretical wisdom
and in morals, and perfect development of the imaginative power. This
latter does its work when the senses are at rest, giving rise to true
dreams, and producing also prophetic visions. Dream and prophecy differ
in degree, not in kind. What a man thinks hard in his waking state, that
the imagination works over in sleep. Now if a person has a perfect
brain; develops his mind as far as a man can; is pure morally; is eager
to know the mysteries of existence, its causes and the First Cause; is
not susceptible to the purely animal desires, or to those of the
spirited soul ambitious for dominion and honor--if a man has all these
qualifications, he without doubt receives through his imagination from
the Active Intellect divine ideas. The difference in the grade of
prophets is due to the difference in these three requirements--perfection
of the reason, perfection of the imagination and perfection of moral
character.
According to the character and development of their reasons and
imaginations men may be divided into three classes.
1. Those whose rational faculties are highly developed and receive
influences from the Active Intellect, but whose imagination is defective
constitutionally, or is not under the influence of the Active Intellect.
These are wise men and philosophers.
2. When the imagination also is perfect in constitution and well
developed under the influence of the Active Intellect, we have the class
of prophets.
3. When the imagination alone is in good condition, but the intellect is
defective, we have statesmen, lawgivers, magicians, dreamers of true
dreams and occult artists. These men are so confused sometimes by
visions and reveries that they think they have the gift of prophecy.
Each of the first two classes may be further divided into two according
as the influence from above is just sufficient for the perfection of the
individual himself, or is so abundant as to cause the recipient to seek
to impart it to others. We have then authors and teachers in the first
class, and preaching prophets in the second.
Among the powers we have in varying degrees are those of courage and
divination. These are innate and can be perfected if one has them in any
degree. By means of the power of divination we sometimes guess what a
person said or did under certain conditions, and guess truly. The result
really follows from a number of premises, but the mind passes over these
so rapidly that it seems the guess was made instantaneously. The prophet
must have these two faculties in a high degree. Witness Moses braving
the wrath of a great king. Some prophets also have their rational powers
more highly developed than those of an ordinary person who perfects his
reason by theoretical study. The same inspiration which renders the
activity of the imagination so vivid that it seems to it its perceptions
are real and due to the external senses--this same inspiration acts also
upon the rational power, and makes its ideas as certain as if they were
derived by intellectual effort.
The prophetic vision (Heb. Mar`ah) is a state of agitation coming upon
the prophet in his waking state, as is clear from the words of Daniel,
"And I saw this great vision, and there remained no strength in me: for
my comeliness was turned in me into corruption, and I retained no
strength" (Dan. 10, 8). In vision also the senses cease their functions,
and the process is the same as in sleep.
Whenever the Bible speaks of prophecy coming to anyone, it is always
through an angel and in a dream or vision, whether this is specifically
stated or not. The expression, "And God came to ... in a dream of the
night," does not denote prophecy at all. It is merely a dream that comes
to a person warning him of danger. Laban and Abimelech had such dreams,
but no one would credit these heathens with the prophetic power.
Whenever an angel is met in Scripture speaking or communicating with a
person, it is always in a dream or vision. Examples are, Abraham and the
three men, Jacob wrestling with the angel, Balaam and the ass, Joshua
and the angel at Jericho;--all these were in a dream or vision.
Sometimes there is no angel at all, but merely a voice that is heard by
such as are not deserving of prophecy, for example Hagar, and Manoah and
his wife.
The prophets see images in their visions. These images are sometimes
interpreted in the vision itself; sometimes the interpretation does not
appear until the prophet wakes up. Sometimes the prophet sees a
likeness, sometimes he sees God speaking to him, or an angel; or he
hears an angel speaking to him, or sees a man speaking to him, or sees
nothing at all but only hears a voice.
In this way we distinguish eleven grades of prophecy. The first two are
only preparatory, not yet constituting one who has them a prophet.
1. When one is endowed by God with a great desire to save a community or
a famous individual, and he undertakes to bring it about, we have the
first grade known as the "Spirit of God." This was the position of the
Judges. Moses always had this desire from the moment he could be called
a man, hence he killed the Egyptian and chided the two quarreling men,
and delivered the daughters of Jethro from the shepherds, and so on. The
same is true of David. Not everyone, however, who has this desire is a
prophet until he succeeds in doing a very great thing.
2. When a person feels something come upon him and begins to
speak--words of wisdom and praise or of warning, or relating to social
or religious conduct--all this while in a waking state and with full
consciousness, we have the second stage called the "Holy Spirit." This
is the inspiration which dictated the Psalms, the Proverbs,
Ecclesiastes, Song of Songs, Daniel, Job, Chronicles and the other
sacred writings (Hagiographa). Balaam's discourses also belong to this
class. David, Solomon and Daniel belong here, and are not in the same
class with Isaiah, Jeremiah, Nathan, Ahiah, and so on. God spoke to
Solomon through Ahiah the Shilonite; at other times he spoke to him in a
dream, and when Solomon woke up, he knew it was a dream and not a
prophecy. Daniel's visions were also in dreams. This is why his book is
classed in the third division of the Biblical writings (Hagiographa),
and not in the second (Prophets).
3. This is the first grade of real prophecy, _i. e._, when a prophet
sees a picture in a dream under the proper conditions, and the picture
is explained to him in the dream itself. Most of the dreams of Zechariah
are of this nature.
4. When he hears speech in a prophetic dream, but does not see the
speaker, as happened to Samuel in the beginning of his career.
5. When a man speaks to him in a dream, as we find in some of the
prophecies of Ezekiel, "And the man said unto me, son of man...."
6. When an angel speaks to him in a dream. This is the condition of most
prophets, as is indicated in the expression, "And an angel of God said
to me in a dream."
7. When it seems to him in a prophetic dream as if God is speaking to
him; as we find in Isaiah, "I saw the Lord ... and he said, whom shall I
send and who will go for us" (Isa. 6, 1, 8).
8. When a _vision_ appears to him and he sees pictures, like Abraham at
the covenant of the pieces (Gen. 15).
9. When he hears words in a vision, as in the case of Abraham, "And,
behold, the word of the Lord came unto him saying, This man shall not be
thine heir" (Gen. 15, 4).
10. When he sees a man speaking to him in a prophetic vision. Examples,
Abraham in the plain of Mamre, Joshua in Jericho.
11. When he sees an angel speaking to him in a vision, like Abraham in
the sacrifice of Isaac. This is the highest degree of prophecy,
excepting Moses. The next higher stage would be that a prophet should
see God speaking to him in a vision. But this seems impossible, as it is
too much for the imaginative faculty. In fact it is possible that in a
vision speech is never heard at all, but only likenesses are seen. In
that case the eleven grades are reduced to eight.
All the details of actions and travels that are described in prophetic
visions must not be understood as having actually taken place, as for
example Hosea's marrying a harlot. They appear only in the prophet's
vision or dream. Many expressions in the prophets are hyperbolical or
metaphorical, and must not be taken literally.
Moses was the greatest of the prophets. He alone received his
communications direct from God. All the others got their divine messages
through an angel. Moses performed his miracles before the whole people
as no one else did. The standing still of the sun produced by Joshua was
not in the presence of _all_ the people. Besides it may be the meaning
is that that day seemed to the people the longest of any they
experienced in those regions. Moses alone, by reason of his superiority
to all other prophets before or after, called the people to the Law. No
one before him did this, though there were many prophets before Moses.
Abraham taught a few people, and so did others. But no one like Moses
said to the people, "The Lord sent me to you that you may do thus and
so." After Moses all the prophets urge upon the people obedience to the
law of Moses. This shows that the law of Moses will never change. For it
is perfect, and any change in any direction would be for the worse.[285]
From the theoretical part of philosophy we pass to the practical. This
includes ethics and other topics related thereto, theodicy, providence,
free will and its compatibility with God's omniscience. To give his
ethical doctrine a scientific character, Maimonides bases it upon a
metaphysical and psychological foundation. The doctrine of matter and
form gives him a convenient formula underlying his ethical discussion.
Sin and vice are due to matter, virtue and goodness to form. For
sensuous desires, which are due to matter, are at the basis of vice;
whereas intellectual pursuits, which constitute the noblest activity of
the soul, the form of the living body, lead to virtue. We may therefore
state man's ethical duty in broad philosophical terms as follows:
Despise matter, and have to do with it only so far as is absolutely
necessary.[286] This is too general to be enlightening, and it is
necessary to have recourse to psychology. Ethics has for its
subject-matter the improvement and perfection of character. Making use
of a medical analogy we may say that as it is the business of the
physician to cure the body, so it is the aim of the moral teacher to
cure the soul. We may carry this figure further and conclude that as the
physician must know the anatomy and physiology of the body before he can
undertake to cure it of its ills, so the moralist must know the nature
of the soul and its powers or faculties.
In the details of his psychology Maimonides follows Alfarabi instead of
Avicenna who was the model of Judah Halevi and Ibn Daud (pp. 175, 211).
The soul consists of five parts or faculties: the nutritive, the
sensitive, the imaginative, the appetitive and the rational. The further
description of the nutritive soul pertains to medicine and does not
concern us here. The sensitive soul contains the well known five senses.
The imaginative faculty is the power which retains the forms of sensible
objects when they are no longer present to the external senses. It also
has the function of original combination of sense elements into
composite objects having no real existence in the outside world. This
makes the imagination an unreliable guide in matters intellectual.
The appetitive faculty is the power of the soul by which a person
desires a thing or rejects it. Acts resulting from it are the pursuit of
an object and its avoidance; also the feelings of anger, favor, fear,
courage, cruelty, pity, love, hate, and so on. The organs of these
powers, feelings and activities are the members of the body, like the
hand, which takes hold of an object; the foot, which goes toward a thing
or away from it; the eye, which looks; the heart, which takes courage or
is stricken with fear; and so with the rest.
The rational faculty is the power of the soul by which a person
reflects, acquires knowledge, discriminates between a praiseworthy act
and a blameworthy. The functions of the rational soul are practical and
theoretical. The practical activity of the reason has to do with the
arts directly, as in learning carpentry, agriculture, medicine,
seamanship; or it is concerned with reflecting upon the methods and
principles of a given art. The theoretical reason has for its
subject-matter the permanent and unchangeable, what is known as science
in the true sense of the term.[287]
Now as far as the commandments, mandatory and prohibitive, of the Bible
are concerned, the only parts of the soul which are involved are the
sensitive and the appetitive. For these are the only powers subject to
control. The nutritive and the imaginative powers function in sleep as
well in waking, hence a person cannot be held responsible for their
activities, which are involuntary. There is some doubt about the
rational faculty, but it seems that here too a person is responsible for
the opinions he holds, though no practical acts are involved.
Virtues are divided into ethical and intellectual (dianoetic); and so
are the contrary vices. The intellectual virtues are the excellencies of
the reason. Such are _science_, which consists in the knowledge of
proximate and remote causes of things; _pure reason_, having to do with
such innate principles as the axioms; _the acquired reason_, which we
cannot discuss here; _clearness of perception_ and _quick insight_. The
intellectual vices are the opposites or the contraries of these.
The ethical virtues are resident in the appetitive faculty. The
sensitive soul is auxiliary to the appetitive. The number of these
virtues is large. Examples are; temperance, generosity, justice,
modesty, humility, contentment, courage, and so on. The vices of this
class are the above qualities carried to excess, or not practiced to the
required extent. The faculties of nutrition and imagination have neither
virtues nor vices. We say a person's digestion is good or it is poor;
his imagination is correct or it is defective, but we do not attach the
idea of virtue or vice to these conditions.
Virtue is a permanent and enduring quality of the soul occupying an
intermediate position between the two opposite extremes each of which is
a vice, sinning by exceeding the proper measure of the golden mean or by
falling short of it. A good act is that form of conduct which follows
from a virtuous disposition as just defined. A bad act is the result of
a tendency of the soul to either of the two extremes, of excess or
defect. Thus temperance or moderation is a virtue. It is the mean
between over-indulgence in the direction of excess, and insensibility or
indifference in the direction of defect. The last two are vices.
Similarly generosity is a mean between niggardliness and extravagance;
courage is a mean between foolhardiness and cowardice; dignity is a mean
between haughtiness and loutishness; humility is a mean between
arrogance and self-abasement; contentment is a mean between avarice and
slothful indifference; kindness is a mean between baseness and excessive
self-denial; gentleness is a mean between irascibility and insensibility
to insult; modesty is a mean between impudence and shamefacedness.
People are often mistaken and regard one of the extremes as a virtue.
Thus the reckless and the foolhardy is often praised as the brave; the
man of no backbone is called gentle; the indolent is mistaken for the
contented; the insensible for the temperate, the extravagant for the
generous. This is an error. The mean alone is worthy of commendation.
The ethical virtues and vices are acquired as a result of repeated
practice during a long time of the corresponding acts until they become
a confirmed habit and a second nature. A person is not born virtuous or
vicious. What he will turn out to be depends upon the way he is trained
from childhood. If his training has been wrong and he has acquired a
vicious disposition in a particular tendency, he may be cured. And here
we may borrow a leaf from the book of medicine. As in bodily disease the
physician's endeavor is to restore the disturbed equilibrium in the
mixture of the humors by increasing the element that is deficient, so in
diseases of the soul, if a person has a decided tendency to one of the
vicious extremes, he must as a curative measure, for a certain length of
time, be directed to practice the opposite extreme until he has been
cured. Then he may go back to the virtuous mean. Thus if a person has
the vice of niggardliness, the practice of liberality is not sufficient
to cure him. As a heroic measure he must practice extravagance until the
former tendency has left him. Then he may return to the liberal mean.
The same thing applies to the other virtues, except that it is necessary
to use proper judgment in the amount of practice of a vicious extreme
necessary to bring about a satisfactory result. Too great deviation and
too long continued from the mean would in some cases be dangerous, as
likely to develop the opposite vice. Thus it is comparatively safe to
indulge in extravagance as a cure for niggardliness; the reverse process
must be used with caution. Care should likewise be taken in trying to
wean a person away from a habit of insensibility to pleasure by means of
a régime of indulgence. If it is not discontinued in time, he may become
a pleasure seeker, which is even worse than total indifference.
It is in this way that we must explain the conduct of certain pious men
and saints who were not content with following the middle way, and
inclined to one extreme, the extreme of asceticism and self-abasement.
They did this as a measure of cure, or because of the wickedness of
their generation, whose example they feared would contaminate them by
its contagion. Hence they lived a retired and solitary life, the life of
a recluse. It was not meant as the normal mode of conduct, which would
be as unwholesome to the soul as an invalid's drugs would be dangerous
if taken regularly by a person of sound health.
The will of God is that we should follow the middle way and eat and
drink and enjoy ourselves in moderation. To be sure, we must be always
on our guard against slipping into the forbidden extreme, but it is not
necessary for this purpose to inflict additional burdens upon ourselves
or to practice mortification of the flesh and abstention from food and
drink beyond what is prescribed in the Law. For many of the regulations
in the Pentateuch have been laid down for this very purpose. The dietary
laws, the laws of forbidden marriages, the laws of tithes, the laws
prescribing that the corner of the field, the dropped and forgotten
ears and the gleanings of the vintage should be left to the poor, the
laws of the sabbatical year, the Jubilee, and the regulations governing
charity--all these are intended to guard us against avarice and
selfishness. Other laws and precepts are for the purpose of moderating
our tendency to anger and rage, and so with all the other virtues and
vices. Hence it is folly and overscrupulousness to add restrictions of
one's own accord except in critical instances, as indicated above.
The purpose of all human life and activity is to know God as far as it
is possible for man. Hence all his activities should be directed to that
one end. His eating and drinking and sleeping and waking and motion and
rest and pleasure should have for their object the maintenance of good
health and cheerful spirits, not as an end in themselves, but as a means
to intellectual peace and freedom from worry and care in order that he
may have leisure and ability to study and reflect upon the highest
truths of God. Good music, beautiful scenery, works of art, splendid
architecture and fine clothing should not be pursued for their own sake,
but only so far as they may be necessary to relieve the tedium and
monotony of toil and labor, or as a curative measure to dispel gloom and
low spirits or a tendency to melancholy. The same thing applies to the
arts and sciences. Medicine is of assistance in maintaining bodily
health and curing it of its ills. The logical, mathematical and physical
sciences are either directly helpful to speculative theology, and their
value is evident; or they serve to train the mind in deduction and
analysis, and are thus indirectly of benefit for the knowledge of
God.[288]
The ethical qualities similarly conduce to intellectual perfection, and
the difference between one prophet and another is in large measure
dependent upon relative ethical superiority. Thus when the Rabbis say
that Moses saw God through a luminous mirror, and the other prophets
through a non-luminous, the meaning is that Moses had intellectual and
moral perfection, so far as a human being is capable of having them, and
the only partition separating him from a complete vision of God was his
humanity. The other prophets had other defects besides, constituting so
many additional partitions obscuring the divine view.[289]
Some foolish astrologers are of the opinion that a man's character is
determined in advance by the position of the stars at the time of his
birth. This is a grave error, as can be shown from reason as well as
tradition. The Bible as well as the Greek philosophers are agreed that a
man's acts are under his own control, and that he himself and no one
else is responsible for his virtues as well as his vices. It is true
that a person's temperament, which is constitutional and over which he
has no control, plays an important rôle in his conduct. There is no
denying that men are born with certain tendencies. Some are born
phlegmatic, some are passionate and hot-blooded. One man has a tendency
to fearlessness and bravery, another is timid and backward. But while it
is true that it is more difficult for the hot-blooded to develop the
virtue of temperance and moderation than it is for the phlegmatic, that
it is easier for the warm-tempered to learn courage than it is for the
cold-tempered--these are not impossible. Virtue, we have seen before, is
not a natural state, but an acquired possession due to long continued
discipline and practice. One man may require longer and more assiduous
practice than another to acquire a certain virtue, but no matter what
his inherited temperament, he can acquire it if he undertakes to do so,
or if properly trained. If man's character and conduct were determined,
all the commandments and prohibitions in the Bible would be in vain, for
without freedom command has no effect. Similarly there would be no use
in a person's endeavoring to learn any trade or profession; for if it is
determined beforehand that a given individual shall be a physician or a
carpenter, he is bound to be one whether he studies or not. This would
make all reward and punishment wrong and unjust whether administered by
man or by God. For the person so rewarded or punished could not help
doing what he did, and is therefore not responsible. All our plans and
preparations would on this supposition be useless and without meaning,
such as building houses, acquiring food, avoiding danger, and so on. All
this is absurd and opposed to reason as well as to sense. It undermines
the foundation of religion and imputes wrong to God. The Bible says
distinctly, "See, I have set before thee this day life and the good,
death and the evil ... therefore choose thou life...." (Deut. 30, 15,
19.)
There are some passages in the Bible which apparently lend color to the
idea that a person's acts are determined from on high. Such are the
expressions used in relation to Pharaoh's conduct toward the Israelites
in refusing to let them go out of Egypt. We are told there that God
hardened the heart of Pharaoh that he should not let the Israelites go.
And he did this in order to punish the Egyptians. The criticism here is
twofold. First, these expressions indicate that a person is not always
free; and second, it seems scarcely just to force a man to act in a
certain way and then to punish him for it.
The explanation Maimonides gives to this passage is as follows: He
admits that in Pharaoh's case there was a restriction of Pharaoh's
freedom. But this was a penal measure and exceptional. Normally a man is
free, but he may forfeit this freedom if he abuses it. So Pharaoh's
primary offence was not that he would not let the children of Israel go
out of Egypt. His sin consisted in his tyrannical treatment of Israel in
the past, which he did of his own accord and as a result of free choice.
His loss of freedom in complying with Moses's request to let the
Israelites go was already in the nature of a punishment, and its object
was to let all the world know that a person may forfeit his freedom of
action as a punishment for abusing his human privilege. To be sure God
does not always punish sin so severely, but it is not for us to search
his motives and ask why he punishes one man in one way and another in
another. We must leave this to his wisdom.
Another argument against free will is that it is incompatible with the
knowledge of God. If God is omniscient and knows the future as well as
the past and the present, he knows how a given person will act at a
given moment. But since God's knowledge is certain and not liable to
error, the person in question cannot help acting as God long foreknew he
would act, and hence his act is not the result of his free will.
Maimonides's answer to this objection is virtually an admission of
ignorance. He takes refuge in the transcendence of God's knowledge, upon
which he dwelt so insistently in the earlier part of his work (p. 260
ff.). God is not qualified by attributes as we his creatures are. As he
does not live by means of life, so he does not know by means of
knowledge. He knows through his own essence. He and his existence and
his knowledge are identical. Hence as we cannot know his essence, we
cannot have any conception of his knowledge. It is mistaken therefore to
argue that because we cannot know a future event unless it is already
determined in the present, God cannot do so. His knowledge is of a
different kind from ours, and he can do what we cannot. [290]
The next problem Maimonides takes up is the doctrine of evil. The
presence of evil in the world, physical as well as moral, was a
stumbling block to all religious thinkers in the middle ages. The
difficulty seems to find its origin in Neo-Platonism, or, farther back
still, in Philo of Alexandria, who identified God with the Good. If he
is the Good, evil cannot come from him. How then account for the evil in
the world? The answer that was given was extremely unsatisfactory. It
was founded on a metaphysical distinction which is as old as Plato,
namely, of matter as the non-existent. Matter was considered a principle
without any definite nature or actual being, and this was made the basis
of all imperfection, death, sin. Evil partakes of the non-existence of
matter, it is nothing positive, but only a negation or privation of good
as darkness is the absence of light; hence it needs no creator, it has
no efficient cause, but only a deficient cause. In this way physical
evil was accounted for. Moral evil as the result of man's inhumanity to
man could easily be explained by laying it to the charge of man's free
will or even to the free will of the fallen angels as Origen conceives
it. This removes from God all responsibility for evil. We shall find
that Maimonides has nothing essentially new to contribute to the
solution of the problem.
Strictly speaking, he says, only a positive thing can be made, negation
or privation cannot. We may speak loosely of the negative being produced
when one removes the positive. So if a man puts out a light, we say he
made darkness, though darkness is a negation.
Evil is nothing but the negation of the positive, which is good. All
positive things are good. Hence God cannot be said to produce evil. The
positive thing which he produces is good; the evil is due to defect in
the thing. Matter also is good so far as it is positive, _i. e._, so far
as it causes continued existence of one thing after another. The evil in
matter is due to its negative or privative aspect as the formless, which
makes it the cause of defect and evil. All evil that men do to each
other is also due to negation, namely, absence of wisdom and knowledge.
Many people think there is more evil in the world than good. Their
mistake is due to the fact that they make the experience of the
individual man the arbiter in this question, thinking that the universe
was made for his sake. They forget that man is only a small fraction of
the world, which is made by the will of God. Even so man should be
grateful for the great amount of good he receives from God, for many of
the evils of man are self-inflicted. In fact the evils befalling man
come under three categories.
1. The evil that is incident to man's nature as subject to genesis and
decay, _i. e._, as composed of matter. Hence arise the various accidents
to which man is liable on account of bad air and other natural causes.
These are inevitable, and inseparable from matter, and from the
generation of individuals in a species. To demand that a person of flesh
and blood shall not be subject to impressions is a contradiction in
terms. And with all this the evils of this class are comparatively few.
2. They are the evils inflicted by one man upon the other. These are
more frequent than the preceding. Their causes are various. And yet
these too are not very frequent.
3. These are the most common. They are the evils man brings upon himself
by self-indulgence and the formation of bad habits. He injures the body
by excess, and he injures the mind through the body by perverting and
weakening it, and by enslaving it to luxuries to which there is no end.
If a person is satisfied with that which is necessary, he will easily
have what he needs; for the necessaries are not hard to get. God's
justice is evident in affording the necessaries to all his creatures and
in making all the individuals of the same species similar in power and
ability.[291]
The next problem Maimonides discusses is really theoretical and should
have its place in the discussion of the divine attributes, for it deals
with the character of God's knowledge. The reason for taking it up here
is because, according to Maimonides, it was an ethical question that was
the motive for the formulation of the view of the opponents. Accordingly
the problem is semi-ethical, semi-metaphysical, and is closely related
to the question of Providence.
Observing that the good are often wretched and the bad prosperous, the
philosophers came to the conclusion that God does not know individual
things. For if he knows and does not order them as is proper, this must
be due either to inability or to jealousy, both of which are impossible
in God. Having come to this conclusion in the way indicated, they then
bolstered it up with arguments to justify it positively. Such are that
the individual is known through sense and God has no sensation; that the
number of individual things is infinite, and the infinite cannot be
comprehended, hence cannot be known; that knowledge of the particular is
subject to change as the object changes, whereas God's knowledge is
unchangeable. Against us Jews they argue that to suppose God knows
things before they are connects knowledge with the non-existent; and
besides there would be two kinds of knowledge in God, one knowledge of
potential things, and another of actual things. So they came to the
conclusion that God knows only species but not individuals. Others say
that God knows nothing except his own essence, else there would be
multiplicity in his nature. As the entire difficulty, according to
Maimonides, arose from the supposed impropriety in the government of
individual destinies, he first discusses the question of Providence and
comes back later to the problem of God's knowledge.[292]
He enumerates five opinions concerning Providence.
1. _The Opinion of Epicurus._ There is no Providence at all; everything
is the result of accident and concurrence of atoms. Aristotle has
refuted this idea.
2. _The Opinion of Aristotle._ Some things are subject to Providence,
others are governed by accident. God provides for the celestial spheres,
hence they are permanent individually; but, as Alexander says in his
name, Providence ceases with the sphere of the moon. Aristotle's
doctrine concerning Providence is related to his belief in the eternity
of the world. Providence corresponds to the nature of the object in
question. As the individual spheres are permanent, it shows that there
is special Providence which preserves the spheres individually. As,
again, there proceed from them other beings which are not permanent
individually but only as species, namely, the species of our world, it
is clear that with reference to the sublunar world there is so much
Providential influence as to bring about the permanence of the species,
but not of the individual. To be sure, the individuals too are not
completely neglected. There are various powers given to them in
accordance with the quality of their matters; which powers determine the
length of their duration, their motion, perception, purposive existence.
But the other incidents and motions in individual human as well as
animal life are pure accident. When a storm scatters the leaves of
trees, casts down some trunks and drowns a ship with its passengers, the
incident is as accidental with the men drowned as with the scattered
leaves. That which follows invariable laws Aristotle regards as
Providential, what happens rarely and without rule is accidental.
3. _The View of the Ashariya._ This is the very opposite of the
preceding opinion. The Ashariya deny all accident. Everything is done by
the will of God, whether it be the fall of a leaf or the death of a man.
Everything is determined, and a person cannot of himself do or forbear.
It follows from this view that the category of the possible is ruled
out. Everything is either necessary or impossible. It follows also that
all laws are useless, for man is helpless, and reward and punishment are
determined solely by the will of God, to whom the concepts of right and
wrong do not apply.
4. _The Opinion of the Mu`tazila._ They vindicate man's power to do and
forbear, thus justifying the commands and prohibitions, and the rewards
and punishments of the laws. God does not do wrong. They also believe
that God knows of the fall of a leaf, and provides for all things. This
opinion, too, is open to criticism. If a person is born with a defect,
they say this is due to God's wisdom, and it is better for the man to be
thus. If a pious man is put to death, it is to increase his reward in
the next world. They extend this to lower animals also, and say that the
mouse killed by the cat will be rewarded in the next world.
The last three opinions all have their motives. Aristotle followed the
data of nature. The Ashariya refused to impute ignorance to God. The
Mu`tazila object to imputing to him wrong, or to denying reason, which
holds that to cause a person pain for no offence is wrong. Their opinion
leads to a contradiction, for they say God knows everything and at the
same time man is free.
5. _The Opinion of our Law._ A fundamental principle of the law of Moses
is that man has absolute freedom in his conduct, and so has an
irrational animal. No one of our religion disputes this. Another
fundamental principle is that God does no wrong, and hence all reward
and punishment is justly given. There is only one exception mentioned by
the Rabbis, what they call "suffering for love," _i. e._, misfortunes
which are not in the nature of punishment for sins committed, but in
order to increase reward. There is no support, however, for this view in
the Bible. All this applies only to man. Nothing is said in the Bible or
in the Talmud of reward and punishment of animals. It was adopted by
some of the later Geonim from the Mu`tazila.
After citing these five opinions on the nature of Providence, Maimonides
formulates his own to the following effect:
My own belief in the matter, not as a result of demonstration, but based
upon what seems to me to be the meaning of Scripture is that in the
sublunar world man alone enjoys individual Providence. All other
individual things besides are ruled by chance, as Aristotle says. Divine
Providence corresponds to divine influence or emanation. The more one
has of divine influence, the more one has of Providence. Thus in plants
and animals divine Providence extends only to the species. When the
Rabbis tell us that cruelty to animals is forbidden in the Torah, the
meaning is that we must not be cruel to animals for our own good, in
order not to develop habits of cruelty. To ask why God does not provide
for the lower animals in the same way as he does for man, is the same as
to ask why he did not endow the animals with reason. The answer would
be, so he willed, so his wisdom decreed. My opinion is not that God is
ignorant of anything or is incapable of doing certain things, but that
Providence is closely related to reason. One has as much of Providence
as he has of the influence of the divine reason. It follows from this
that Providence is not the same for all individuals of the human
species, but varies with the person's character and achievements. The
prophets enjoy a special Providence; the pious and wise men come next;
whereas a person who is ignorant and disobedient is neglected and
treated like a lower animal, being left to the government of
chance.[293]
Having disposed of the question of Providence, we may now resume the
discussion undertaken above (p. 289) of the nature of God's knowledge.
The idea that God does not know the particular things in our world below
is an old one and is referred to in the Bible often. Thus, to quote one
instance from the Psalms, the idea is clearly enunciated in the
following passage, "And they say [sc. the wicked], How doth God know?
And is there knowledge in the most High? Behold, these are the wicked;
and, being alway at ease, they increase in riches. Surely in vain have I
cleansed my heart, and washed my hands in innocency...." (73, 11-13).
The origin of this notion is in human experience, which sees the
adversity of the good and the prosperity of the wicked, though many of
the troubles are of a man's own doing, who is a free agent. But this
view is wrong. For ignorance of any kind is a defect, and God is
perfect. David pointed out this when he said, "He that planted the ear
shall he not hear? He that formed the eye shall he not see?" (94, 9).
This means that unless God knows what the senses are, he could not have
made the sense organs to perceive.
We must now answer the other metaphysical arguments against God's
knowledge of particulars. It is agreed that no new knowledge can come to
God which he did not have before, nor can he have many knowledges. We
say therefore (we who are believers in the Torah) that with one
knowledge God knows many things, and his knowledge does not change as
the objects change. We say also that he knows all things before they
come into being, and knows them always; hence his knowledge never
changes as the objects appear and disappear. It follows from this that
his knowledge relates to the non-existent and embraces the infinite. We
believe this and say that only the absolutely non-existent cannot be
known; but the non-existent whose existence is in God's knowledge and
which he can bring into reality can be known. As to comprehending the
infinite, we say with some thinkers that knowledge relates primarily to
the species and extends indirectly to the individuals included in the
species. And the species are finite. The philosophers, however, decide
that there cannot be knowledge of the non-existent, and the infinite
cannot be comprehended. God, therefore, as he cannot have new and
changing knowledge knows only the permanent things, the species, and not
the changing and temporary individuals. Others go still further and
maintain that God cannot even know the permanent things, because
knowledge of many things involves many knowledges, hence multiplicity in
God's essence. They insist therefore that God knows only himself. My
view is, says Maimonides, that the error of all these people is that
they assume there is a relation of resemblance between our knowledge and
God's knowledge. And it is surprising that the philosophers should be
guilty of such an error, the very men who proved that God's knowledge is
identical with his essence, and that our reason cannot know God's
essence.
The difference between our knowledge and God's knowledge is that we get
our knowledge from the data of experience, upon which it depends. Each
new datum adds to our knowledge, which cannot run ahead of that which
produces it. It is different in the case of God. He is the cause of the
data of experience. The latter follow his knowledge, and not _vice
versa_. Hence by knowing himself he knows everything else before it
comes into being. We cannot conceive of his knowledge, for to do this
would be to have it ourselves.[294]
The last topic Maimonides considers in his philosophical work is the
reason and purpose of the commandments of the Bible, particularly the
ceremonial precepts which apparently have no rational meaning. In fact
there are those who maintain that it is vain to search for reasons of
the laws where none are given in the Bible itself; that the sole reason
in those cases is the will of God. These people labor under the absurd
impression that to discover a rational purpose in the ceremonial laws
would diminish their value and reduce them to human institutions. Their
divine character and origin is attested in the minds of these people by
their irrationality, by the fact that they have no human meaning. This
is clearly absurd, says Maimonides the rationalist. It is tantamount to
saying that man is superior to God; and that whereas a man will command
only that which is of benefit, God gives orders which have no earthly
use. The truth is quite the reverse, and all the laws are for our
benefit.[295]
Accordingly Maimonides undertakes to account for all the laws of the
Bible. The Law, he says, has two purposes, the improvement of the body
and the improvement of the soul or the mind. The improvement of the soul
is brought about by study and reflection, and the result of this is
theoretical knowledge. But in order to be able to realize this perfectly
a necessary prerequisite is the improvement of the body. This is
inferior in value to perfection of the soul, but comes naturally and
chronologically first as a means to an end. For bodily perfection one
must have health and strength as far as one's constitution permits, and
for this purpose a person must have his needs at all times. Social life
is necessary for the supply of the individuals' needs, and to make
social life possible there must be rules of right and wrong to be
observed.[296]
Applying what has just been said to the Law, we may divide its contents
broadly into four classes, (1) Precepts inculcating true beliefs and
ideas, such as the existence of God, his unity, knowledge, power, will,
eternity. (2) Legal and moral precepts, such as the inculcation of
justice and a benevolent disposition for the good of society. (3) The
narratives and genealogies of the Law. (4) The ceremonial prescriptions.
Of these the purpose of the first two divisions is perfectly clear and
admitted by all. True beliefs and ideas regarding God and his government
of the world are directly conducive to the highest end of man, knowledge
and perfection of the soul. Honorable and virtuous conduct is a
preliminary requisite to intellectual perfection. The genealogies and
narratives of the Bible are also not without a purpose. They are
intended to inculcate a theoretical doctrine or a moral, and to
emphasize the one or the other, which cannot be done so well by a bare
statement or commandment. Thus, to take a few examples, the creation of
the world is impressed upon the reader beyond the possibility of a doubt
by a circumstantial narrative of the various steps in the process, the
gradual peopling of the earth by the multiplication of the human race
descended from the first pair, and so on. The story of the flood and of
the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah has for its purpose to emphasize
the truth that God is a just judge, who rewards the pious and punishes
the wicked. The genealogy of the kings of Edom in Genesis (36, 31) is
intended as a warning to Israel in the appointment of kings. These kings
of the Edomites were all of them foreigners not of Edom, and it is
probable that the history of their tyrannical rule and oppression of
their Edomite subjects was well known to the people in Moses's time.
Hence the point of the enumeration of the list of kings and their origin
is to serve as a deterring example to the Israelites never to appoint as
king of Israel a man who came from another nation, in accordance with
the precept in Deuteronomy (17,15), "Thou mayest not put a foreigner
over thee, which is not thy brother."[297]
There remains the division of the ceremonial laws, which are the subject
of dispute. The purpose in these precepts is not evident, and opinions
are divided as to whether they have any purpose. I will endeavor to
show, says Maimonides, that these also have one or more of the following
objects: to teach true beliefs and opinions, to remove injustice and to
inculcate good qualities.
Abraham grew up among the Sabeans, who were star worshippers and
believers in the eternity of the world. The object of the law is to keep
men away from the erroneous views of the Sabeans, which were prevalent
in those days. The Sabeans believed that the worship of the stars helps
in the cultivation of the ground to make it fruitful. For this reason
they think highly of the husbandmen and laborers on the land. They also
respect cattle and prohibit slaughtering them because they are of
benefit in the cultivation of the land. In the interest of agriculture
they instituted the worship of the stars, which they believed would
cause the rain to fall and the earth to yield its fertility. On this
account we find the reverse of this in the Bible, telling us that
worship of the stars will result in lack of rain and infertility.
In the life of nature we see how one thing serves another, and certain
objects are not brought about except through certain others, and
development is gradual. So, for example, a young infant cannot be fed on
meat and solid food, and nature provides milk in the mother's breast.
Similarly in governing the people of Israel, who were living in a
certain environment, God could not at once tear them away from the
habits of thought to which they were accustomed, but he led them
gradually. Hence as they were accustomed to sacrificing to the stars,
God ordered them to sacrifice to him, the object being to wean them away
from the idols in the easiest way possible. This is why the prophets do
not lay stress on the sacrifices. To be sure, it was not impossible for
God to form their minds so that they would not require this form of
training, and would see at once that God does not need sacrifices, but
this would have been a miracle. And while God does perform miracles
sometimes for certain purposes, he does not change the nature of man;
not because he cannot, but because he desires man to be free and
responsible. Otherwise there would be no sense in laws and prophets.
Among the purposes of the law are abstention from self-indulgence in the
physical appetites, like eating and drinking and sensuous pleasure,
because these things prevent the ultimate perfection of man, and are
likewise injurious to civil and social life, multiplying as they do
sorrow and trouble and strife and jealousy and hate and warfare.
Another purpose is to inculcate gentleness and politeness and docility.
Another is purity and holiness. External cleanliness is also
recommended, but not as a substitute for internal. The important thing
is internal purity, external takes a secondary place.
Maimonides ends the discussion of the Pentateuchal laws by dividing them
into fourteen classes (following in this the divisions in his great
legal code, the "Yad Ha-Hazakah") and explaining the purposes of each
class. It will be useful briefly to reproduce the division here.
1. Those laws that concern fundamental ideas of religion and theology,
including the duty of learning and teaching, and the institutions of
repentance and fasting. The purpose here is clear. Intellectual
perfection is the greatest good of man, and this cannot be attained
without learning and teaching; and without wisdom there is neither good
practice nor true opinion. Similarly honoring the wise, swearing by
God's name, and not to swear falsely--all these lead to a firm belief in
God's greatness. Repentance is useful to guard against despair and
continuance in evil doing on the part of the sinner.
2. The precepts and prohibitions relating to idolatry. Here are included
also the prohibition to mix divers kinds of seeds in planting, the
prohibition against eating the fruit of a tree during the first three
years of its growth, and against wearing a garment made of a mixture of
wool and flax. The prohibition of idolatry is evident in its purpose,
which is to teach true ideas about God. The other matters above
mentioned are connected with idolatry. Magic is a species of idolatry
because it is based on a belief in the direct influence of the stars.
All practices done to produce a certain effect, which are not justified
by a reason or at least are not verified by experience, are forbidden as
being superstitious and a species of magic. Cutting the beard and the
earlocks is forbidden on a similar ground because it was a custom of the
idolatrous priests. The same thing applies to mixing of cotton and flax,
to men wearing women's garments and _vice versa_, though here there is
the additional reason, to prevent, namely, laxness in sexual morality.
3. The precepts relating to ethical and moral conduct. Here the purpose
is clear, namely, to improve social life.
4. The rules relating to charity, loans, gifts, and so on. The purpose
is to teach kindness to the poor, and the benefit is mutual, for the
rich man to-day may be poor to-morrow.
5. Laws relating to injury and damages. The purpose is to remove wrong
and injustice.
6. Laws relating to theft, robbery, false witnesses. The purpose is to
prevent injury by punishing the offender.
7. The regulation of business intercourse, like loan, hire, deposits,
buying and selling, inheritance, and so on. The purpose here is social
justice to make life in society possible.
8. Laws relating to special periods, such as the Sabbath and the
festivals. The purpose is stated in each case in the Law itself, and it
is either to inculcate a true idea like the creation in the case of the
Sabbath, or to enable mankind to rest from their labors, or for both
combined.
9. The other practical observances like prayer, the reading of "Shema,"
and so on. These are all modes of serving God, which lead to true
opinions concerning him, and to fear and love.
10. The regulations bearing upon the temple and its service. The purpose
of these was explained above in connection with the institution of
sacrifice, namely that it was a concession to the primitive ideas and
customs of the people of those times for the purpose of gradually
weaning them away from idolatry.
11. Laws relating to sacrifices. The purpose was stated above and under
10.
12. Laws of cleanness and uncleanness. The purpose is to guard against
too great familiarity with the Temple in order to maintain respect for
it. Hence the regulations prescribing the times when one may, and the
occasions when one may not, approach or enter the Temple.
13. The dietary laws. Unwholesome food is forbidden, also unclean
animals. The purpose in some cases is to guard against excess and
self-indulgence. Some regulations like the laws of slaughter and others
are humanitarian in their nature.
14. Forbidden marriages, and circumcision. The purpose is to guard
against excess in sexual indulgence, and against making it an end in
itself.[298]
To sum up, there are four kinds of human accomplishments or
excellencies, (1) Acquisition of wealth, (2) Physical perfection,
strength, beauty, etc., (3) Moral perfection, (4) Intellectual and
spiritual perfection. The last is the most important. The first is
purely external; the second is common to the lower animals; the third is
for the sake of one's fellowmen, in the interest of society, and would
not exist for a solitary person. The last alone concerns the individual
himself. Jeremiah expresses this truth in his statement, "Thus saith the
Lord, Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom, neither let the mighty
man glory in his might, let not the rich man glory in his riches: but
let him that glorieth glory in this, that he understandeth, and knoweth
me, that I am the Lord which exercise loving kindness, judgment and
righteousness in the earth" (Jer. 9, 22). "Wise man" in the above
quotation means the man of good morals. The important thing, Jeremiah
says, is to know God through his actions and to imitate him.[299]
Maimonides's ethics as well as his interpretation of the Pentateuchal
laws is intellectualistic, as the foregoing account shows. And it is
natural that it should be. The prevailing trend of thought in the middle
ages, alike among the Arabs, Jews and Christians, was of this character.
Aristotle was the master of science, and to him intellectual
contemplation is the highest good of man. The distinction of man is his
rational faculty, hence the excellence and perfection of this faculty is
the proper function of man and the realization of his being. This alone
leads to that "eudaimonia" or happiness for which man strives. To be
sure complete happiness is impossible without the complete development
of all one's powers, but this is because the reason in man is not
isolated from the rest of his individual and social life; and perfection
of mind requires as its auxiliaries and preparation complete living in
freedom and comfort. But the aim is after all the life of the intellect,
and the "dianoetic" virtues are superior to the practical. Theoretic
contemplation stands far higher than practical activity. Add to this
that Aristotle's God is pure thought thinking eternally itself, the
universal mover, himself eternally unmoved, and attracting the celestial
spheres as the object of love attracts the lover, without itself
necessarily being affected, and the intellectualism of Aristotle stands
out clearly.
Maimonides is an Aristotelian, and he endeavors to harmonize the
intellectualism and theorism of the Stagirite with the diametrically
opposed ethics and religion of the Hebrew Bible. And he is apparently
unaware of the yawning gulf extending between them. The ethics of the
Bible is nothing if not practical. No stress is laid upon knowledge and
theoretical speculation as such. The wisdom and the wise man of the book
of Proverbs no more mean the theoretical philosopher than the fool and
the scorner in the same book denote the one ignorant in theoretical
speculation. "The beginning of wisdom is the fear of the Lord." This is
the keynote of the book of Proverbs, and its precepts and exhortations
are practical and nothing else. That the Pentateuchal law is solely
concerned with practical conduct, religious, ceremonial and moral, needs
not saying. It is so absolutely clear and evident that one wonders how
so clear-sighted a thinker like Maimonides could have been misled by the
authority of Aristotle and the intellectual atmosphere of the day to
imagine otherwise. The very passage from Jeremiah which he quotes as
summing up his idea of the _summum bonum_, speaks against him, and he
only succeeds in manipulating it in his favor by misinterpreting the
word "wise." Whatever the wise man may denote in the book of Proverbs,
here in Jeremiah he is clearly contrasted with the person who in
imitation of God practices kindness, judgment and righteousness. The
word does not denote the theoretical philosopher, to be sure, but it
approximates it more closely than the expression describing the ideal
man of Jeremiah's commendation.
It is in line with Maimonides's general rationalistic and
intellectualistic point of view when he undertakes to find a reason for
every commandment, where no reason is given in the Law. He shows himself
in this an opponent of all mysticism, sentimentality and arbitrariness.
Reason is paramount. The intellect determines the will, and not even
God's will may be arbitrary. His will is identical with his reason,
hence there is a reason in everything that he wills. We may not in every
case succeed in finding the reason where he himself did not choose to
tell us, but a reason there always is, and the endeavor on our part to
discover it should be commended rather than condemned.
The details of his motivation of the ceremonial laws are very
interesting, and in many cases they anticipated, though in a cruder
form, the more scientific theories of modern critics. Take his
interpretation of the institution of sacrifices. Take away the personal
manner of expression, which might seem to imply that God spoke to Moses
in some such fashion as this: You and I know that sacrifices have no
inherent meaning or value. They rather smack of superstition and
idolatry. But what can we do? We cannot, _i. e._, we must not, change
the nature of these people. We must train them gradually to see the
truth for themselves. They are now on the level of their environment,
and believe in the efficacy of killing sheep and oxen to the stars and
the gods. We will use a true pedagogical method if we humor them in this
their crudity for the purpose of transferring their allegiance from the
false gods to the one true God. Let us then institute a system of
sacrifices with all the details and minutiae of the sacrificial systems
of the heathens and star worshippers. We shall impose this system upon
our people for the time being, and in the end as they grow wiser they
will outgrow it--take away this mode of expression in Maimonides's
interpretation, which is not essential, and the essence may be rendered
in more modern terms thus. Man's religion is subject to change and
development and progress like all his other institutions. The forms they
successively take in the course of their development are determined by
the state of general intelligence and positive knowledge that the given
race or nation possesses. The same thing holds of religious development.
The institution of sacrifices is prevalent in all religious communities
at a certain stage in their career. It starts with human sacrifice,
which is later discarded and replaced by sacrifices of animals. And this
is again in the course of time discontinued, leaving its traces only in
the prayer book, which in Judaism has officially taken the place of the
Temple service.
While the merit of Maimonides in foreshadowing this modern understanding
of ancient religion cannot be overestimated, it is clear that in some of
his other interpretations of Jewish ceremonial, he is wide of the mark.
His rationalism could not take the place of a knowledge of history. His
motivation of the dietary laws on the score of hygiene or of moderation
and self-restraint is probably not true. Nor is the prohibition against
mixing divers seeds, or wearing garments of wool and flax mixed, or
shaving the corner of the beard, and so on, due to the fact that these
were the customs of the idolaters and their priests. If Maimonides was
bold enough to pull the sacrificial system down from its glorious
pedestal in Jewish tradition and admit that being inherently nothing but
a superstition, it was nevertheless instituted with such great pomp and
ceremony, with a priestly family, a levitical tribe and a host of
prescriptions and regulations, merely as a concession to the habits and
prejudices of the people, why could he not apply the same method of
explanation to the few prohibitions mentioned above? Why not say the
ancient Hebrews were forbidden to mix divers seeds because they had been
from time immemorial taught to believe that there was something sinful
in joining together what God has kept asunder; and in order not to shock
their sensibilities too rudely the new religion let them have these
harmless notions in order by means of these to inculcate real truths?
Before concluding our sketch of Maimonides we must say a word about his
Bible exegesis. Though the tendency to read philosophy into the Bible is
as old as Philo, from whom it was borrowed by Clement of Alexandria and
Origen and by them handed down to the other Patristic writers, and
though in the Jewish middle ages too, from Saadia down, the verses of
the Bible were employed to confirm views adopted from other
considerations; though finally Abraham Ibn Daud in the matter of
exegesis, too, anticipated Maimonides in finding the Aristotelian
metaphysic in the sacred scriptures, still Maimonides as in everything
else pertaining to Jewish belief and practice, so in the interpretation
of the Bible also obtained the position of a leader, of the founder of a
school and the most brilliant and most authoritative exponent thereof,
putting in the shade everyone who preceded him and every endeavor in the
same direction to which Maimonides himself owed his inspiration.
Maimonides's treatment of the Bible texts and their application to his
philosophical disquisitions is so much more comprehensive and masterly
than anything in the same line done before him, that it made everything
else superfluous and set the pace for manifold imitation by the
successors of Maimonides, small and great. Reading the Bible through
Aristotelian spectacles became the fashion of the day after Maimonides.
Joseph Ibn Aknin, Samuel Ibn Tibbon, Jacob Anatoli, Joseph Ibn Caspi,
Levi Ben Gerson and a host of others tried their hand at Biblical
exegesis, and the Maimonidean stamp is upon their work.
We have already spoken of Maimonides's general attitude toward the
anthropomorphisms in the Bible and the manner in which he accounts for
the style and mode of expression of the Biblical writers. He wrote no
special exegetical work, he composed no commentaries on the Bible. But
his "Guide of the Perplexed" is full of quotations from the Biblical
books, and certain sections in it are devoted to a systematic
interpretation of those Biblical chapters and books which lend
themselves most easily and, as Maimonides thought, imperatively to
metaphysical interpretation. It is impossible here to enter into
details, but it is proper briefly to point out his general method of
treating the Biblical passages in question, and to state what these
passages are.
We have already referred more than once to the Talmudic expressions
"Maase Bereshit" (Work of Creation) and "Maase Merkaba" (Work of the
Chariot). Maimonides says definitely that the former denotes the science
of physics, _i. e._, the fundamental notions of nature as treated in
Aristotle's Physics, and the latter signifies metaphysics or theology,
as represented in Aristotle's Metaphysics. The creation chapters in
Genesis contain beneath their simple exterior of a generally
intelligible narrative, appealing to young and old alike, women as well
as children, a treatment of philosophical physics. And similarly in the
obscure phraseology of the vision of Ezekiel in the first and tenth
chapters of that prophet's book, are contained allusions to the most
profound ideas of metaphysics and theology, concerning God and the
separate Intelligences and the celestial spheres. As the Rabbis forbid
teaching these profound doctrines except to one or two worthy persons at
a time, and as the authors of those chapters in the Bible clearly
intended to conceal the esoteric contents from the gaze of the vulgar,
Maimonides with all his eagerness to spread abroad the light of reason
and knowledge hesitates to violate the spirit of Bible and Talmud. His
interpretations of these mystic passages are therefore expressed in
allusions and half-concealed revelations. The diligent student of the
"Guide," who is familiar with the philosophy of Aristotle as taught by
the Arabs Alfarabi and Avicenna will be able without much difficulty to
solve Maimonides's allusions, the casual reader will not. Without going
into details it will suffice for our purpose to say that in the creation
story Maimonides finds the Aristotelian doctrines of matter and form,
of the four elements, of potentiality and actuality, of the different
powers of the soul, of logical and ethical distinctions (the true and
the false on one hand, the good and the bad on the other), and so
on.[300] In the Vision of Ezekiel he sees the Peripatetic ideas of the
celestial spheres, of their various motions, of their souls, their
intellects and the separate Intelligences, of the Active Intellect, of
the influence of the heavenly bodies on the changes in the sublunar
world, of the fifth element (the ether) and so on.[301] Don Isaac
Abarbanel has already criticized this attempt of Maimonides by justly
arguing that if the meaning of the mysterious vision of Ezekiel is what
Maimonides thinks it is, there was no occasion to wrap it in such
obscurity, since the matter is plainly taught in all schools of
philosophy.[302] We might, however, reply that no less a man than Plato
expresses himself in the Timæus in similarly obscure terms concerning
the origin and formation of the world. Be this as it may, Munk is
certainly right when he says that if, as is not improbable, Ezekiel's
vision does contain cosmological speculations, they have nothing to do
with the Aristotelian cosmology, but must be related to Babylonian
theories.[303]
Another favorite book of the Bible for the exegesis of philosophers was
the book of Job. In this Maimonides sees reflected the several views
concerning Providence, divine knowledge and human freedom, which he
enumerates (p. 290 ff.).[304]
The influence of Maimonides upon his contemporaries and immediate
successors was indeed very great, and it was not confined to Judaism.
Christian Scholastics and Mohammedan theologians studied and used the
Guide of the Perplexed. Maimonides himself, it seems, though he wrote
his "Guide" in the Arabic language, did not desire to make it accessible
to the Mohammedans, fearing possibly that some of his doctrines
concerning prophecy might be offensive to them. Hence he is said to have
instructed his friends and disciples not to transliterate the Hebrew
characters, which he in accordance with general Jewish usage employed in
writing Arabic, into Arabic characters. But he was powerless to enforce
his desire and there is no doubt that such transcriptions were in use.
Samuel Tibbon himself, the Hebrew translator of the "Guide," made use of
manuscript copies written in Arabic letters. We are told that in the
Mohammedan schools in the city of Fez in Morocco, Jews were appointed
to teach Maimonides's philosophy, and there is extant in Hebrew
translation a commentary by a Mohammedan theologian on the twenty-five
philosophical propositions laid down by Maimonides as the basis of his
proof of the existence of God (p. 254).[305]
The influence of Maimonides on Christian scholasticism is still greater.
We have already said (p. 199 f.) that the philosophical renaissance in
Latin Europe during the thirteenth century was due to the introduction
of the complete works of Aristotle in Latin translation. These
translations were made partly from the Arabic versions of the
Mohammedans, partly from the Greek originals, which became accessible
after the capture of Constantinople by the Crusaders in 1207.[306]
Before this time the scope of philosophical research and investigation
in Christian Europe was limited, and its basis was the Platonism of St.
Augustine and fragments of Aristotle's logic. In general Platonism was
favorable to Christian dogma. Plato according to Augustine came nearest
to Christianity of all the ancient Greek philosophers.[307] And the
dangers to Church doctrine which lurked in philosophical discussion
before the thirteenth century were a tendency to Pantheism on the part
of thinkers imbued with the Neo-Platonic mode of thought, and an undue
emphasis either on the unity of God as opposed to the Trinity (Abélard),
or on the Trinity at the expense of the unity (Roscellinus of
Compiègne)--conclusions resulting from the attitudes of the thinkers in
question on the nature of universals.
In the early part of the thirteenth century for the first time, the
horizon of the Latin schoolmen was suddenly enlarged and brilliantly
illumined by the advent of the complete Aristotle in his severe,
exacting and rigorous panoply. All science and philosophy opened before
the impoverished schoolmen, famished for want of new ideas. And they
threw themselves with zeal and enthusiasm into the study of the new
philosophy. The Church took alarm because the new Aristotle constituted
a danger to accepted dogma. He taught the eternity of the world, the
uniformity of natural law, the unity of the human intellect, denying by
implication Providence and freedom and individual immortality. Some of
these doctrines were not precisely those of Aristotle but they could be
derived from Aristotelian principles if interpreted in a certain way;
and the Arab intermediators between Aristotle and his Christian students
had so interpreted him. Averroes in particular, who gained the
distinction of being the commentator _par excellence_ of Aristotle, was
responsible for this mode of interpretation; and he had his followers
among the Masters of Arts in the University of Paris. These and similar
tendencies the Church was striving to prevent, and it attempted to do
this at first crudely by prohibiting the study and teaching of the
Physical and Metaphysical works of Aristotle. Failing in this the Papacy
commissioned three representatives of the Dominican order to expurgate
Aristotle in order to render him harmless. You might as well think of
expurgating a book on geometry! The task was never carried out. But
instead something more valuable for the welfare of the Church was
accomplished in a different way. Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas
undertook the study of Aristotle and the interpretation of his works
with a view to harmonizing his teachings with the dogmas of
Christianity. Albertus Magnus began the task, Thomas Aquinas, his
greater disciple, the Maimonides of Christian philosophy, completed it.
And in this undertaking Maimonides was Thomas Aquinas's model.[308]
The Guide of the Perplexed was translated into Latin not long after its
composition.[309] Before Albertus Magnus, Alexander of Hales, the
Franciscan leader, and William of Auvergne, the Bishop of Paris, had
read and made use of Maimonides's philosophical masterpiece. Albertus
Magnus was still more diligent in his adoption of Maimonidean views, or
in taking account of them, where he is opposed to their adoption. But it
remained for Thomas Aquinas, who made the most systematic attempt in the
mediæval schools to harmonize the philosophy of Aristotle with the
doctrine of the Church, to use Maimonides as his guide and model. Like
Maimonides he employs Aristotelian proofs for the existence of God,
proofs based on the eternity of motion; and like him Aquinas argues that
if motion is not eternal and the world was made in time, the existence
of God is still more readily evident. In his discussion of the divine
attributes, of angels, of Providence, of Prophecy, of free will, of the
ceremonial laws in the Pentateuch, Thomas Aquinas constantly takes
account of Maimonides's views, whether he agrees with them or not. It is
no doubt an exaggeration to say that there would have been no Aquinas if
Maimonides had not preceded him. For Aquinas had access to the works of
Aristotle and his Arabian commentators, the former of whom he studied
more diligently than Maimonides himself. But there is no doubt that the
method of harmonizing Aristotelian doctrine with traditional teaching so
far as the common elements of Judaism and Christianity were concerned
was suggested to Aquinas by his Jewish predecessor. It is not our
province here to go into details of the system of Aquinas to show
wherein he agrees or disagrees with Maimonides, nor is it possible to do
more than mention the fact that after Aquinas also, Duns Scotus, the
head of the Franciscan school, had the "Guide" before him, and in
comparatively modern times, such celebrities as Scaliger and Leibnitz
speak of the Jewish philosopher with admiration and respect.[310]
That Maimonides's influence upon Jewish theology and thought was deep
and lasting is a truism. The attitude of the prominent theologians and
philosophers who succeeded him will appear in the sequel in connection
with our treatment of the post-Maimonidean writers. Here a word must be
said of the general effect of Maimonides's teaching upon Jews and
Judaism throughout the dispersion. His fame as the greatest Jew of his
time--great as a Talmudical authority, which appealed to all classes of
Jewish students, great as a physician with the added glory of being a
favorite at court, great as the head of the Jewish community in the
East, and finally great as a philosopher and scientist--all these
qualifications, never before or after united in the same way in any
other man, served to make him the cynosure of all eyes and to make his
word an object of notice and attention throughout the Jewish diaspora.
What he said or wrote could not be ignored whether people liked it or
not. They could afford to ignore a Gabirol even, or an Ibn Daud. But
Maimonides must be reckoned with. The greater the man, the greater the
alertness of lesser, though not less independent, spirits, to guard
against the enslavement of all Judaism to one authority, no matter how
great. And in particular where this authority erred in boldly adopting
views in disagreement with Jewish tradition, as it seemed to many, and
in setting up a new source of truth alongside of, or even above, the
revelation of the Torah and the authority of tradition, to which these
latter must be bent whether they will or no--his errors must be
strenuously opposed and condemned without fear or favor. This was the
view of the traditionalists, whose sole authorities in all matters of
theology and related topics were the words of Scripture and Rabbinic
literature as tradition had interpreted them. On the other hand, the
rationalistic development during the past three centuries, which we have
traced thus far, and the climax of that progress as capped by Maimonides
was not without its influence on another class of the Jewish community,
particularly in Spain and southern France; and these regarded Maimonides
as the greatest teacher that ever lived. Their admiration was unbounded
for his personality as well as his method and his conclusions. His
opponents were regarded as obscurantists, who, rather than the object of
their attack, were endangering Judaism. All Jewry was divided into two
camps, the Maimunists and the anti-Maimunists; and the polemic and the
struggle between them was long and bitter. Anathema and counter
anathema, excommunication and counter excommunication was the least of
the matter. The arm of the Church Inquisition was invoked, and the altar
of a Parisian Church furnished the torch which set on flame the pages of
Maimonides's "Guide" in the French capital. More tragic even was the
punishment meted out to the Jewish informers who betrayed their people
to the enemy. The men responsible had their tongues cut out.
The details of the Maimunist controversy belong to the general
historian.[311] Our purpose here is to indicate in brief outline the
general effect which the teaching of Maimonides had upon his and
subsequent ages. The thirteenth century produced no great men in
philosophy at all comparable to Moses Ben Maimon or his famous
predecessors. The persecutions of the Jews in Spain led many of them to
emigrate to neighboring countries, which put an end to the glorious era
inaugurated three centuries before by Hasdai Ibn Shaprut. The centre of
Jewish liberal studies was transferred to south France, but the literary
activities there were a pale shadow compared with those which made
Jewish Spain famous. Philosophical thought had reached its perigee in
Maimonides, and what followed after was an attempt on the part of his
lesser disciples and successors to follow in the steps of their master,
to extend his teachings, to make them more widespread and more popular.
With the transference of the literary centre from Spain to Provence went
the gradual disuse of Arabic as the medium of philosophic and scientific
culture, and the age of translation made its appearance. Prior to, and
including, Maimonides all the Jewish thinkers whom we have considered,
with the exception of Abraham Bar Hiyya and Abraham Ibn Ezra, wrote
their works in Arabic. After Maimonides Hebrew takes the place of
Arabic, and in addition to the new works composed, the commentaries
on the "Guide" which were now written in plenty and the
philosophico-exegetical works on the Bible in the Maimonidean spirit,
the ancient classics of Saadia, Bahya, Gabirol, Halevi, Ibn Zaddik, Ibn
Daud and Maimonides himself had to be translated from Arabic into
Hebrew. In addition to these religio-philosophical works, it was
necessary to translate those writings which contained the purely
scientific and philosophical branches that were preliminary to the study
of religious philosophy. This included logic, the various branches of
mathematics and astronomy, medical treatises and some of the books of
the Aristotelian corpus with the Arabic compendia and commentaries
thereon. The grammatical and lexical treatises of Hayyuj and Ibn Janah
were also translated. The most famous of the host of translators, which
the need of the times brought forth, were the three Tibbonides, Judah
(1120-1190), Samuel (1150-1230) and Moses (fl. 1240-1283), Jacob Anatoli
(fl. 1194-1256), Shemtob Falaquera (1225-1290), Jacob Ben Machir
(1236-1304), Moses of Narbonne (d. after 1362), and others. Some of
these wrote original works besides. Samuel Ibn Tibbon wrote a
philosophical treatise, "Ma`amar Yikkawu ha-Mayim,"[312] and
commentaries in the Maimonidean vein on Ecclesiastes and the Song of
Songs. His greater fame rests on his translation of the "Guide of the
Perplexed." He translated besides Maimonides's "Letter on Resurrection,"
the "Eight Chapters," and other Arabic writings on science and
philosophy. Moses Ibn Tibbon was prolific as an original writer as well
as a translator. Joseph Ibn Aknin (1160-1226), the favorite pupil of
Maimonides, for whom the latter wrote his "Guide," is the author of
treatises on philosophical topics, and of exegetical works on certain
books of the Bible and on the Mishnic treatise, the "Ethics of the
Fathers."[312a] Jacob Anatoli, in addition to translating Ptolemy's
Almagest and Averroes's commentaries on Aristotle's logic, wrote a work,
"Malmad ha-Talmidim," on philosophical homiletics in the form of a
commentary on the Pentateuch.[313] Shemtob Falaquera, the translator of
portions of Gabirol's "Fons Vitæ,"[314] is the author of a commentary
on the "Guide," entitled "Moreh ha-Moreh,"[315] and of a number of
ethical and psychological works.[316] Jacob Ben Machir translated a
number of scientific and philosophical works, particularly on astronomy,
and is likewise the author of two original works on astronomy. Joseph
Ibn Caspi (1297-1340) was a very prolific writer, having twenty-nine
works to his credit, most of them exegetical, and among them a
commentary on the "Guide."[317] Moses of Narbonne wrote an important
commentary on the "Guide,"[318] and is likewise the author of a number
of works on the philosophy of Averroes, of whom he was a great admirer.
The translations of Judah Ibn Tibbon, the father of translators as he
has been called, go back indeed to the latter half of the twelfth
century, and Abraham Ibn Ezra translated an astronomical work as early
as 1160. But the bulk of the work of translation is the product of the
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. The result of these translations
was that scientific and philosophical works became accessible to all
those who knew Hebrew instead of being confined to the lands of Arabian
culture. Another effect was the enlargement of the Hebrew language and
the development of a new Hebrew dialect with a philosophical and
scientific terminology. These translations so far as they relate to pure
science and philosophy were neglected in the closing centuries of the
middle ages, when conditions among the Jews were such as precluded them
from taking an interest in any but purely religious studies. Continuous
persecutions, the establishment of the Ghettoes, the rise of the Kabbala
and the opposition of the pietists and mystics to the rationalism of the
philosophers all tended to the neglect of scientific study and to the
concentration of all attention upon the Biblical, Rabbinic and mystical
literature. The Jews at the close of the middle ages and the beginning
of modern times withdrew into their shell, and the science and learning
of the outside had little effect on them. Hence, and also for the reason
that with the beginning of modern times all that was mediæval was, in
the secular world, relegated, figuratively speaking, to the ash-heap, or
literally speaking to the mouldering dust of the library shelves--for
both of these reasons the very large number of the translations above
mentioned were never printed, and they are still buried on the shelves
of the great European libraries, notably of the British Museum, the
national library of Paris, the Bodleian of Oxford, the royal library of
Munich, and others. The reader who wishes to have an idea of the
translating and commenting activity of the Jews in the thirteenth and
following centuries in the domains of logic, philosophy, mathematics,
astronomy, medicine and folklore is referred to the monumental work of
the late Moritz Steinschneider, the prince of Hebrew Bibliographers,
"Die Hebräischen Uebersetzungen des Mittelalters und die Juden als
Dolmetscher," (The Hebrew translations of the middle ages, and the Jews
as dragomen) Berlin, 1893, containing 1077 pages of lexicon octavo size
devoted to brief enumerations and descriptions of extant editions and
manuscripts of the translations referred to.[319]