HUNGARY AND
DEMOCRACY
THE STORY OF THE NATIONS
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THE BALKANS: Rumania, Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro. By WILLIAM
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HUNGARY AND
DEMOCRACY
_By_ C. J. C. STREET
WITH A FOREWORD BY
T. P. O’CONNOR
T. FISHER UNWIN LTD
LONDON: ADELPHI TERRACE
_First published in 1923_
(_All rights reserved_)
FOREWORD
There is no more dangerous centre of future disturbance, if not of
a new war, than the regions which include Hungary and its immediate
neighbours. For the moment there is in Hungary herself the domination
of a reactionary and somewhat militaristic party; and this party is
lending encouragement, secret or open, to just the kind of movements
that want to stir up war. The materials for this campaign exist mainly
in the transfer of some of the population of the Old Hungary to the New
States that have come into existence. With this transfer, a large body
of Magyars have been placed under the control of men of another race;
the numbers are formidable: 800,000 under the Rumanians, 636,000 under
the Czechoslovakians, and 100,000 under the control of Yugo-Slavia.
That such a transfer of allegiance should be bitter to a proud race
like the Magyars is intelligible; one can sympathize up to a certain
point with them. But the answer to the complaint must be found in their
own inexcusable and almost incredible persecution of those other races,
while they held omnipotent sway over not only the Magyar but many other
races. The Magyar ascendancy had nothing like it in the modern world
outside, perhaps, the Orange regime in the six counties of Ulster;
suffice it to say that there is no form of ascendancy which was not
carried out ruthlessly and deliberately; jerrymandering, incredible
under-representation in the Parliament; relentless suppression of
the language and the schools of those other races; with now and then
the exercise of brute force to prevent the expression of opinion,
and occasionally this suppression in blood. To ask any of these now
emancipated peoples to go back to such servitude would be at once
unjust and impossible.
It is a misfortune of these Magyar peoples who have been transferred
that geography has so intermingled them with the majorities of the
other races and new kingdoms, that you could no more separate them
from their present habitations than cut out the heart of a body and
expect it still to live. These Magyars have the right to the liberties
of every minority--even though they themselves never respected these
liberties in others; liberty as to language and school and Church--and
any of the new Governments which now rule them will fall under the
disapproval of all liberal thinkers in the world if they do not live up
to this obligation.
The writer of this book is a man trained in observation, has visited
these regions, and gives the results of his investigations in what
appears to me a fair and impartial spirit; and I recommend the perusal
of his pages as the best guide to the problems of this storm-tossed
centre; and as a useful antidote to the agitation which is being
carried on in this country against the new kingdoms by the British
reactionaries who naturally throw their sympathies to the side of
reaction elsewhere.
_March, 1923._ T. P. O’CONNOR.
INTRODUCTION
The downfall of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy has resulted in a
redistribution of territory among the States of Europe. The old Kingdom
of Bohemia has been united with the Slovak districts of the former
Hungary to form the Czechoslovak Republic, Serbia has absorbed the
territories of her Yugoslav kindred, Italy has regained the Italian
districts of the former Austria, Poland has been re-united after a
partition lasting more than a hundred years, Rumania has been awarded
the care of her Transylvanian brethren. As a consequence of this
redistribution, Austria and Hungary, the partners of the former Dual
Monarchy, have shrunk to a fraction of their former size.
In these circumstances it is inevitable that complaints as to the
justice of the new frontiers should be heard. To the casual observer
it might seem that Austria and Hungary have suffered for their defeat
in the war by the dismemberment of their territories, the usual fate
of vanquished nations. Hungary to-day covers an area of approximately
33,000 square miles, and has a population of about seven and a half
millions. The Kingdom of Hungary before the war covered an area of
about 125,000 square miles, and had a population of about twenty
millions. The disparity seems enormous, and at first glance would
seem to display the savage vengeance of her enemies, an act of far
greater ruthlessness than the tearing of Alsace-Lorraine from France
in 1871. Had Hungary been a homogeneous nation, this would indeed be
the truth. But, in fact, the former Hungary was never homogeneous, and
was inhabited by races of widely divergent aims and culture. It was no
policy of vengeance that inspired the partition of Hungary, but the
operation of the principles of self-determination in the interests of
the component races of the former Kingdom.
Present-day Hungary is that part of the former kingdom in which the
Magyars are in the majority. Before the War the Magyars laid claim to
the whole of the territory ruled by them, regardless of the fact that
their yoke was bitterly resented by the non-Magyar nationalities. It is
perhaps natural that they should protest against the dismemberment of
this territory, and should make every endeavour to present a case for
the restitution to them of their former frontiers. Attempts are being
made throughout Europe and America to represent the Magyar race as the
victims of injustice, with the ultimate object of influencing some
future readjustment of the Peace Treaties in their favour. With this
end in view the Magyars have embarked upon an intensive campaign of
propaganda, the methods of which vary with the section of the community
it is desired to influence. This propaganda starts from the assumption
that Hungary is and always has been a democratic country. Upon these
premises the argument is built up that Hungary, the traditional
friend of the Allies, has been unjustly treated, that her division
was contrary to the principles of self-determination, and that her
continued existence within her present boundaries is impossible. The
only rightful and expedient course is therefore to restore her to her
former state.
The object of the present book is to adduce the facts necessary
for a dispassionate examination of the arguments of the Magyar
propagandists. It is, of course, impossible to reply to each of the
Magyar contentions in detail; the most that can be done is to give
some idea of the form in which they are presented. A single instance
must suffice. A periodical entitled _Chains_ is published at Oxford,
and describes itself as “The Organ of the Oxford League for Hungarian
Self-Determination.” The following is an extract from the Editorial in
its issue of March 16, 1922: “_It is fundamentally wrong to suppose
that the accident which placed Hungary by the side of our enemies
is sufficient to warrant our silent acquiescence in the destruction
of the economic and political stability of a country whose ideals
have so nearly approximated to our own for centuries past._” In the
same issue Lord Newton contributes an article on “Hungary under the
Trianon Treaty.” Extracts from this article are as follows: “Why was
Hungary treated with such vindictive ferocity?” “_The rewards of the
Succession States were, except in the case of Serbia, out of all
proportion to their services during the War, and unfortunately for the
Hungarians were made chiefly at their expense._” “It is customary to
exact territory from a conquered enemy; there was, therefore, nothing
surprising in the fact that Hungary was forced to surrender territory
to States against which she had fought.”
Now let us examine the above dispassionately. In the first place the
editors speak of the “accident” which placed Hungary by the side of our
enemies. What was this accident? The clamour for war in July 1914 was
nowhere louder than in Hungary; it was no accident which precipitated
the Magyars into war with France and Russia, but hatred of those
countries on account of their support of Serbia. The contemporary
Magyar Press is sufficient proof of this. “_What have the French, the
English and the Russians in common except spiritual decadence and moral
infamy, the only ties which bind them? Their ideal is the brutal force
of superior numbers.... Light struggles against darkness, human dignity
against slavery, the inspiration of the soul against the brutishness of
masses, idealism against barbarity and against a perversity which wears
the mask of a false culture_” (_Pester Lloyd_, September 19, 1914).
“In the true sense of the word we are confronted with an alliance of
ruffians; Russia wishes to steal territories from the Austro-Hungarian
Monarchy both on her own account and on that of Serbia; France wishes
to steal from Germany Alsace-Lorraine and more besides; as for England,
she wishes to steal from Germany her economic powers and her commerce”
(_Az Ujsag_, February 4, 1915). During the whole period of the War
the Magyar Press poured out a torrent of abuse against the nations at
war with Hungary. There is no trace among its pages of any accidental
participation on Hungary’s part.
Again, the editors of Chains speak of Hungary as a country “_whose
ideals have so nearly approximated to our own for centuries past_.”
I leave my readers to judge by the light of the facts adduced in the
following chapters how far this assumption is justified. To those who
wish to pursue the subject further, I recommend Dr. Seton-Watson’s
_Racial Problems in Hungary_, published in 1908 (now, unfortunately,
out of print).
Lord Newton, as will be seen from the quotations from his article
given above, bases his arguments upon the assumption that Hungary
was dismembered solely to reward her enemies. This is the first and
principal contention of the discontented Magyars of to-day. Their
second contention is that the transfer of the nationalities to the
jurisdiction of other States was contrary to their own wishes, and that
those States are not capable of governing their new subjects with the
same justice and impartiality as they enjoyed under Magyar rule. In
order to examine the truth of this contention it will be necessary to
investigate the conditions under which the new nationalities existed
before the transfer and their position at the present day. Finally,
the Magyars complain that their racial minorities in the States
surrounding Hungary are oppressed and denied adequate representation
in the Government of those States, while the national minorities still
remaining in Hungary are treated with the greatest consideration. The
status of these various minorities will therefore require investigation.
In the past the Magyars have regarded the non-Magyar nationalities
within their borders as of inferior culture. In the article already
quoted, Lord Newton treats the superiority of the Magyars as a fact
established beyond question. “Millions of Hungarians have been
transferred,” he says, “without any opportunity of expressing their
wishes, to alien States of an inferior civilisation.” This is in exact
accordance with the public utterances of the most prominent Magyar
statesmen in the past.
The present book is in no way inspired by hostility towards the Magyar
race, nor is it intended to create a prejudice against that race among
its readers. It is merely an attempt to supply the necessary data for
a fair examination of the arguments of the Magyars, and incidentally
to trace the relations between present-day Hungary and democracy in
the true sense of the word. If the Magyars can prove their case, there
are adequate grounds for their appeal for a revision of the Treaty
of Trianon. If the partition of Hungary was inspired by motives of
revenge; if the nationalities of the former Hungarian Kingdom are
indeed misgoverned and oppressed by States to which they yield a
reluctant obedience, while in those States the Magyar minorities
suffer political persecution, it would undoubtedly be in the interests
of the world at large that Hungary should be restored to her former
frontiers. But, on the other hand, if it appears that all these
contentions on behalf of the Magyars are inspired by the imperialism
of a reactionary and oligarchic people, which has for centuries been
accustomed to treat non-Magyar nationalities within its borders as
hewers of wood and drawers of water, and whose pride is wounded by
the emancipation of those nationalities, the reactionary tendencies
of Magyar aims will be exposed and the motives of their complaints
revealed.
The Magyar attitude at the present day may be exemplified by
a quotation from an interview accorded by Admiral Horthy to a
representative of the _Chicago Tribune_ on October 19, 1922. “Admiral
Horthy received me in the colossal castle formerly occupied by Emperor
Francis Joseph at the top of the ridge overlooking the Danube,” reports
the interviewer. “When I asked the possibility of Hungary paying
£300,000,000 (as reparations), he snapped back, ‘We cannot pay £3.
You cannot change Nature and make rivers run uphill over mountains
just by shifting frontiers,’ said the Regent, his eyes glancing at
the map of Transylvania. ‘That territory drains Hungary economically,
commercially, morally.’”
It is impossible within the compass of such a book as this to give
more than a bare summary of events and facts, but I have endeavoured
throughout to give references to sources whence fuller information may
be obtained. In general it may be remarked that an excellent summary of
Hungarian history is contained in Professor Alison Phillips’s article
in the _Encyclopædia Britannica_, and that Dr. Seton-Watson’s _Racial
Problems in Hungary_ is a mine of information on the subject of the
Magyar treatment of the nationalities up to the year 1908.
CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
FOREWORD 5
INTRODUCTION 7
I. HUNGARY BEFORE THE WAR 13
II. THE NATIONALITIES AND THE MAGYARS 33
III. REPRESENTATION AND JUSTICE 52
IV. EDUCATION 72
V. WAR, REVOLUTION AND COUNTER-REVOLUTION 92
VI. HUNGARY AND HER NEIGHBOURS 111
VII. THE MINORITIES IN HUNGARY TO-DAY 128
VIII. THE MAGYAR MINORITIES IN THE NEW STATES 147
IX. MAGYAR PROPAGANDA 160
X. HUNGARY’S ATTITUDE TO-DAY 183
XI. HUNGARY AND DEMOCRACY 198
INDEX 205
Hungary and Democracy
CHAPTER I
HUNGARY BEFORE THE WAR
It is beyond the scope of this book to deal, however briefly, with the
history of Hungary before the famous Ausgleich, or Compromise, of 1867.
This Compromise determined the status of Hungary as a modern State,
independent to all intents and purposes, but linked with Austria under
a common monarchy. It is sufficient for our present purposes to point
out that this link in no way prejudiced the freedom of Hungary to
manage her own internal affairs; it is no exaggeration to say that her
domestic policy was as unfettered by it as that of England or America.
The treatment of the Slovaks and Rumanians by the Magyars was in no
way influenced by Austrian legislation, although it was undoubtedly
affected by the example of the Austrians in their dealings with the
Czechs. The Magyars, owing to the measures which they took for their
own supremacy, were dominant in an independent Hungary, and up to the
outbreak of war in 1914 the internal policy of the Hungarian nation was
governed by the will of the Magyar race.
The population of Hungary at the time of the Compromise, according
to the official Hungarian census of 1869, was 13,579,000, of which
6,027,000 were of Magyar nationality, and 7,552,000 of other
nationalities. From this it will be seen that the Magyars were in
a minority, forming as they did 44·4 per cent. of the total. But in
consequence of the agreement between the Magyars and the Hapsburg
Monarchy, the former, although forming a minority upon the territory
which they occupied, contrived to become the sole directors of
the State. At the same period, Hungary was composed of the same
territories as in 1914. These were Hungary proper, Transylvania and
Croatia-Slavonia. In the first the population was preponderatingly
Magyar, in the remaining two various nationalities were closely
intermingled. It is and always has been impossible to draw definite
lines of demarcation between the different races. The most that can be
done is to indicate roughly the areas in which any given race forms
the majority of the population. In order to give a general idea of the
geographical distribution of the various races included in the former
kingdom, it may be said that the Magyars formed the majority of the
population of the central and western districts, the Serbs and Croats
the south-western corner from the Drave to the Adriatic, the Rumanians
the eastern and south-eastern portions, the Ruthenes the north-east,
and the Slovaks the north-west and north. The Germans were distributed
in compact colonies throughout Hungary proper and Transylvania, with
their greatest strength in the western frontier between Hungary and
Austria, and the Szekels, allied to the Magyars, formed a compact block
in the extreme east of Transylvania.
It will be seen from this rough description that the Magyars occupied
the hub of the wheel while the other races were situated about its rim.
Further, each of these outlying nationalities were in close contact
with their kindred in other countries, with whom they naturally sought
union, if not definitely political at first, at least cultural. They
had interests beyond the frontiers of Hungary which drew them away
from, rather than towards, the Magyars of the centre. They felt that
they were parts of living nationalities, each with its own national
characteristics, rather than the remains of defunct races of which
the inevitable destiny was absorption in a Magyar Hungary. But, given
judicious treatment, there was no reason why this feeling should
have evinced itself in disloyalty to the country in which they were
included. Had the Magyars possessed the gift of good government there
was no reason why even such a polyglot country as Hungary should not
have developed into a contented State. But the Magyars have always
regarded themselves as a superior and noble race created by God to rule
over the subject races. A Magyar, Erno Baloghy, in his book published
in Budapest in 1908 entitled _Magyar Culture and the Nationalities_,
says: “Our Nationalities cannot substitute any other culture for the
Magyar, for there is not and cannot be a special Serb, Rumanian or
Slovak culture.” This remark is merely typical of other utterances,
both written and verbal.
The result of this attitude on the part of the Magyars has been to
alienate the nationalities, and to force them still further away
from the centre. Where capable and tactful treatment would almost
certainly have bound them by links of common policy and interest to the
Magyar nucleus, coercion and irritation have driven them to look for
their political future beyond the borders of the State. Through the
Compromise the Magyars obtained complete control over their domestic
affairs, and they utilised this control to embitter the nationalities
with whom they might have lived in perfect harmony.
The first important event which followed the Compromise was the “Law
of Nationalities,” which was adopted by the Hungarian Parliament on
December 1, 1868. This law is a most remarkable document, and had it
ever been administered in the spirit of its preamble, and the letter of
its provisions, it might very possibly have solved the whole problem of
racial difference in Hungary.[1]
The principal provisions of the law deal with the language to be
employed in Courts of Justice, Schools, Churches and Institutions. In
general, the provisions ensure that any Hungarian subject can employ
his native tongue in the course of his dealings with the State or with
his fellow subjects. In the case of schools, the wording of the law is
peculiarly definite. “Since, from the standpoint of general culture and
well-being, the success of public instruction is one of the highest
aims of the State also, the State is, therefore, bound to ensure
that citizens living together in considerable numbers, of whatever
nationality, shall be able to obtain instruction in the neighbourhood
in their mother-tongue, up to the point where the higher academic
education begins.”
The manner in which this law was administered will be dealt with in a
subsequent chapter. For the moment it is only necessary to state that
it was never enforced. One after another prominent Magyar politicians
admitted in Parliament that the law was a dead letter, or that it was
impossible to fulfil its provisions owing to the fact that those whose
duty it was to administer it were almost exclusively Magyars ignorant
of any other language but their own. The most striking commentary
on the Magyar outlook upon the law after forty years’ experience of
its operation was contained in a leading article in the _Budapesti
Hirlap_, a leading Hungarian newspaper, of April 3, 1908. Speaking of
the provision already quoted with regard to schools, the writer points
out that the educational stipulations cannot be carried out, “_because
the necessary teaching staff who could teach in a foreign tongue and
also the necessary customers are wanting_.” The Magyar organ, it will
be noticed, uses the adjective “foreign” to describe the languages
spoken by more than half the population of Hungary, and is apparently
unaware of the existence of that half. It is interesting to compare
this statement with the official Hungarian statistics of population for
the year 1900, which show that out of a total civil population whose
mother-tongue was not Magyar, of 8,132,740 only 1,365,764, or 16·8 per
cent., could speak Magyar.
The next incident of importance was the Electoral Law of 1874, which is
one of the most curious perversions of franchise which it is possible
to imagine. Under the provisions of this law, the qualifications for
the vote are extraordinarily complicated, and are such as to restrict
the voters to the propertied and official classes.[2] Only 6 per
cent. of the population enjoyed the vote under the law, and care was
taken that of these the majority should be Magyar. Not content with
this partial measure, the Magyars introduced a special franchise for
Transylvania, so ingeniously contrived that the majority of voters in
the province should be composed of the Szekels of Magyar sympathies,
while the Rumanian element, which forms the majority of the population,
was almost excluded. In fact, it was estimated that of the population
of Transylvania not more than 3·2 per cent. were enfranchised.
The Electoral Law was mainly the work of Coloman Tisza, who controlled
the policy of Hungary for some eighteen years. “Tisza’s aim was to
convert the old polyglot Hungarian kingdom into a homogeneous Magyar
State, and the methods which he employed--notably the enforced
Magyarisation of the subject races, which formed part of the reformed
educational system introduced by him--certainly did not err on the side
of moderation.”[3] This process of Magyarisation, as it came to be
called, will be dealt with more fully in a subsequent chapter. For the
moment it will be sufficient to give a short sketch of the Hungarian
educational system.
Until 1867 education in Hungary had been entirely in the hands of the
Churches of various denominations, with very slight superintendence
by the Government. To show the great diversity of religious belief in
Hungary proper, excluding Croatia-Slavonia, where the population was
about 70 per cent. Roman Catholic, 25 per cent. Orthodox, and 5 per
cent. various, and where an entirely different system of education
prevailed, the statistics given on the following page may be quoted.
It must be borne in mind that in many instances nationality and
religious faith overlap. The Serbians are mostly Greek Orthodox (Greek
Catholic); the Ruthenians are Uniat Greeks (Greek Oriental); the
Rumanians are either Greek Orthodox or Greek Uniats; many Slovaks are
Lutherans; the only other Lutherans being the Germans in Transylvania
and in the Spis (Zsepes) country in Slovakia. The Calvinists are
composed mostly of Magyars, so that in the country the Lutherans are
designated as the “German Church” and the Calvinists as the “Hungarian
Church.” The Unitarians are all Magyars. Only to the Roman Catholic
Church belong several nationalities.
---------------+-----------------------+----------------------
| 1869. | 1900.
Religion. +-----------+-----------+-----------+----------
| Number. | Per Cent. | Number. | Per Cent.
---------------+-----------+-----------+-----------+----------
Roman Catholic | 6,215,251 | 45·8 | 8,136,108 | 48·7
Greek Catholic | 1,583,043 | 11·7 | 1,830,815 | 10·9
Greek Oriental | 2,067,778 | 15·2 | 2,187,242 | 13·1
Lutheran | 1,096,184 | 8·0 | 1,250,285 | 7·5
Calvinist | 2,017,391 | 14·9 | 2,409,975 | 14·4
Unitarian | 54,345 | 0·4 | 67,988 | 0·4
Jewish | 542,257 | 4·0 | 826,222 | 4·9
Other Sects | 2,880 | -- | 12,939 | --
---------------+-----------+-----------+-----------+----------
“In 1869 there were only 13,646 primary schools in existence, or one
to every 995 inhabitants; and of these hardly any were fully equipped
with the necessary teaching appliances. Many of the buildings were
overcrowded, insanitary or even too dilapidated for use; 1,598 communes
were without a school of any kind, and of the total number of children
liable to attend under the new Act, barely 48 per cent. actually
attended.”[4] It was obvious that in these circumstances it was the
duty of the State to interest itself in the matter of education and
to supplement the efforts of the denominations by the establishment
of national schools or by subsidising the existing religious
organisations. This duty was emphasised by the census of 1869, which
revealed that 63 per cent. of the population was entirely illiterate.
The result was the Primary Education Act introduced in 1868 by the
Minister of Education, Baron Eötvös. The main provisions of this Act
were compulsory education between the ages of six and twelve, and
the obligation imposed upon the communes of erecting schools where
no denominational school already existed, and where at least thirty
children were not otherwise provided for. This Act was amended by
the educational policy of Count Apponyi in 1907, which was frankly
Magyarising in its tendencies. The results of this policy were that
for the period 1913-14 Hungary (excluding Croatia-Slavonia) contained
16,929 elementary schools, with 35,253 teachers and 1,971,141 pupils.
The number of Magyar elementary schools was 13,608 with 29,963 teachers
and 1,666,270 pupils. The number of pupils according to native language
was 1,107,497 speaking Magyar and 256,020 speaking Slovak, a proportion
of 4·3 to 1, which is approximately the proportion of Magyars to
Slovaks in the population of the country. According to official
Hungarian statistics 214,267 of the Slovak pupils were allocated to
Hungarian elementary schools, that is to say schools where Magyar
was used exclusively in imparting instruction. The number of purely
Slovak elementary schools was 365, with 42,186 pupils. In other words,
while the proportion of Slovak pupils was 19 per cent. of the total
speaking Magyar or Slovak, only a little over 3 per cent. of these were
receiving education in their mother-tongue. But this is not even yet
a complete presentment of the state of national education. Under the
Apponyi Act the law provided the Government with a decisive voice in
the control of all the denominational schools, irrespective of whether
they received a Government grant or not. The Minister of Education
might, and in practice almost invariably did, arrange the hours of
instruction in Magyar (which was a compulsory subject in all schools)
in such a manner that little time was left for instruction in other
subjects. As a result, in elementary schools which were officially
designated as Slovak, German, Rumanian or Serbian, the Magyar language
was cultivated to such a degree that these schools differed but little
from purely Magyar schools, instruction in the Magyar language being
carried on for four-fifths of the time, leaving only one-fifth for the
teaching of other subjects, which might be carried on in the pupils’
mother-tongue.
As a natural consequence the educational results were very
unsatisfactory, and the number of illiterates was very large. The
average percentage of people who could read and write had certainly
risen to 63 throughout the entire area, but the increase was mainly in
the Magyar districts. In the Slovak districts the percentages were not
nearly so favourable. In the district of Saris it was only 48·6, and
in the Uzgorod (Ungvar) district only 43·5. In 1913 there were 32,700
Slovak children, including those who by law were supposed to attend
continuation schools, who were not registered in any school at all.
These figures are extremely interesting, as demonstrating the practical
working of the alleged equality of nationalities in pre-War Hungary.
The results of Magyar policy were in effect to deny adequate education
to those unwilling to abandon their native tongue and accept teaching
in Magyar. It must not be supposed that this policy was inspired
by the idea that the other languages spoken within the borders of
Hungary were moribund languages, whose abandonment would be of benefit
to civilisation. The exact opposite is indeed the case, and it may
safely be stated that but for the artificial efforts made to keep
it alive, Magyar as a modern tongue would gradually disappear. The
proscribed languages were those spoken by millions, and were in no case
confined to Hungarian territory. It was rather fear of a spreading of
these languages, and with them the national ideals of their users,
that inspired the Magyar legislators. They believed that they could
overcome the centrifugal tendencies of the nationalities by a policy
of forcing them to abandon the tongues with which they conversed with
their brethren beyond the frontiers, and grafting on them in the place
of these tongues the Magyar language, and with it the Magyar culture
and ideals. Subjection rather than alliance was the formula which was
to secure the union of Hungary, or, as one of the most prominent of
the Magyar politicians, Coloman Tisza, put it, the so-called subject
nationalities must be taught to “_be silent and pay_.” A Magyar writer,
Bela Grünwald, in a work entitled _The Highlands_, is refreshingly
frank on the subject. “_The secondary school is like a huge machine, at
one end of which the Slovak youths are thrown in by hundreds and at the
other end of which they come out Magyars._”
Enough has been said already to give the reader a rough idea of the
Magyar policy with regard to the nationalities. It may be summarised
by the statement that the Magyars, while on the surface passing
legislation which seemed to demonstrate the perfect equality which
prevailed in Hungary between the constituent nationalities, in the
administration of the law took every precaution that the nationalities
should be subordinated to the Magyar race. Before the War, as well
as at the present time, Magyar publicists made every effort to
spread throughout the world the fable of the liberty enjoyed by the
nationalities which composed the realms of the Crown of St. Stephen.
Both nationalities and citizens, according to them, enjoyed the most
complete freedom. Hungary was the true home of democracy, a modern
Utopia. How far they succeeded in imposing upon their hearers is
proved by the words already quoted: “_a country whose ideals have
so nearly approximated to our own for centuries past_.” The ideal
of the English-speaking races has been true freedom and equality
of all citizens in the eyes of the State. The legislation and the
administration of Hungary have been directly opposed to this ideal. Is
it possible to make any comparison between the franchise of England or
America and that of a country where until recently only 6 per cent. of
the population was entitled to the vote? Or between the educational
systems of these nations and one which, at the beginning of the War,
had so far succeeded that a third of the population of the country was
utterly illiterate?
Far from being the home of democracy, Hungary was, and, as will be
seen later, still is the stronghold of an oligarchy comparable only
with that of Venice before the Napoleonic era. The Magyar spirit has
always been reactionary and oppressive. It would almost seem that a
true Magyar is unable to realise that other nationalities have rights
in the political sense, or that their love of their own language,
customs, history or culture is due to anything but the most deplorable
ignorance. It is quite certain, from the perusal of the utterances of
Magyar spokesmen or the leading articles of Magyar journals, that the
rank and file of the Magyar race honestly believed that the “subject
nationalities,” as they habitually speak of the Slovaks, Serbs and
Rumanians, would be far better off as the helots of the Magyars than
as their equals. But, unfortunately, the nationalities did not see eye
to eye with their would-be masters. They exhibited an incomprehensible
desire to follow their national bents, and an equally incomprehensible
dislike of the idea of incorporation in the Magyar race. They were
consequently accused, almost tearfully, of ingratitude, of thrusting
aside the hand which endeavoured to lead them to higher planes of
existence and culture.
As a matter of fact, the Magyars have always been incapable of
dealing with the problem presented to them. If, instead of a policy
of coercion, they had followed the advice of St. Stephen of Hungary,
they might have welded the constituent parts of the nation into a
homogeneous whole. “_Treat the new-comers well_,” he writes to his
son Emmerich, at a time when he was insisting upon the advantages
which would accrue to his country from the immigration from the West,
to which he had himself opened his kingdom. “_Hold them in honour,
for they bring fresh knowledge and arms into the country; they are
an ornament and support of the throne, for a country where only one
language and one custom prevails is weak and fragile._” Enlightened
advice, more easily attributable to a statesman of the twentieth than
to a monarch of the eleventh century. Almost every modern nation has
at one time or another in its history been confronted with the problem
of absorbing into a unanimous State the different nationalities
inhabiting its territories. History proves that it is only by a policy
of give and take on the part of each of these nationalities that the
desired end can be reached. Any attempt by one of them to employ
force in the subjugation of the rest, even though the former may be
in an overwhelming majority, leads inevitably to failure. Scotland
and Ireland are cases in point. Towards the former, England, once she
abandoned her policy of aggression, adopted an attitude based upon
natural alliance. The alliance led by easy stages to union, and union
to so close an association that at the present day Scotch and English
are politically indistinguishable. Towards Ireland, England maintained
the policy of aggression until it was too late, with the result that
union was proved to be unwelcome, and the Irish nation has chosen for
itself an independent position in the Empire.
It is useless to speculate now how far the Magyars might have changed
the centrifugal tendencies of the other nationalities, which originated
in the first place in geographical position, into a centripetal
tendency founded upon mutual interest. It is possible that the racial
tendencies of the nationalities are so divergent from those of the
Magyars that the attempt would have been unsuccessful. But it is
obvious to any student of even the most limited history that a race
which formed the minority of the population of the country could not
hope to bend the majority to cheerful acceptance of its will by the
employment of coercion. That the Magyars should have contemplated such
an enterprise shows them to be alien in thought to the democratic
nations of the modern world. It is enough for them that they claim a
moral superiority; let other races fail to recognise it at their peril!
Count Czernin, a former Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, has placed
on record his opinion of the Magyar outlook. “One is forced to ask
oneself what the Magyars understand by ‘nation.’ If we apply the term
to the inhabitants of Hungary, we see that the Magyar race forms only
40 per cent. of them, that is to say, that it is in a minority. By what
right do the Magyars employ as synonymous the expressions ‘nation’ and
‘Magyar State’? The opinion of the majority in Hungary--that is to
say, the real will of the nation--is never expressed; which is due
not only to the nature of the Hungarian suffrage, set up with a view
to favouring the Magyar minority, but far more to the intimidation,
unique in Europe, to which all anti-Magyar opinions are subjected. In
addition to the nationalities, humiliated, oppressed, and reduced to
silence, there exists in Hungary, even among the Magyars themselves,
a number of people of all classes and in every station in life who do
not approve of this policy. However, any protests would involve such
measures of repression on the part of the Government, the courts of
justice and the authorities, that these people dare not express openly
what their conscience urges, that their submission is only due to
force. Hungarian elections are proverbial in Europe, and the manœuvres
of which the Prime Minister Banffy availed himself when they were held,
the unheard-of terrorism which he employed, are still fresh in the
memories of all of us.”
This utterance may be compared with Count Apponyi’s description of
Hungary as the “_island of liberty_” on the occasion of his visit
to America in 1911, and with the proud declaration of the Hungarian
newspaper _Budapesti Hirlap_ on June 20, 1917: “_We proclaim in the
face of the whole world that on no part of the earth’s surface are the
problems of nationality treated with greater patience, loyalty, and
humane liberality than in Hungary._”
This astonishing declaration followed the words of Count Tisza, who,
on January 24th of the same year, in the course of a speech in the
Hungarian Chamber had said, amid loud cheers: “_I am confident that
I am expressing the opinion of the whole House, without distinction
of parties, when I say that public opinion throughout Hungary
respects the principle of nationality, that the public opinion of the
Magyar race desires the free development and the prosperity of the
nationalities._” It must be remembered that these declarations were
made under the influence of war-time conditions, when every nation
was doing its best to justify itself in the eyes of its neighbours.
In the less strenuous days of peace there had been certain Magyars,
more honest or less hypocritical than most of their fellow-countrymen,
who did not scruple to employ the German doctrine of necessity in
justification of their treatment of the nationalities. For instance, a
certain Dr. Rez, a professor in the University of Kolozsvar, had stated
publicly in the _Budapesti Hirlap_ of May 26, 1910: “_Our object is to
establish the supremacy of the Magyars: there is no sense in concealing
the fact. Let us say openly that we do not desire equality of right,
because political equality and political supremacy are contradictory
conceptions. Supremacy is inequality, it is the domination of one race
over another._”
The ethnological problems of Hungary have been extremely well set out
by Gustave Beksics, an eminent Magyar publicist, in his book _Nemzeti
Akcio_, which was published in 1912. “There is fought a confused and
bloodless struggle, sustained by social and economic means, in which
the Magyars must be victorious or perish. The Magyars would fain
spread over the whole country, or, in other words, secure a decisive
majority over the other nationalities, in such a way as to reduce them
to relative insignificance, lest the non-Magyar races spread over the
country in their turn, stimulating their national consciences and their
culture in opposition to the Magyars, and so the idea of a Magyar State
fall into oblivion. This must be the end of the underlying motive of
our national struggle: the motive of a Magyar entity, political and
social. Thus, in the near future, Hungary must either be transformed
into a natural State, or she must cease to exist as a State in her
present form.”[5]
The Magyars, obsessed by their national ideal of making Hungary a
Magyar State at the expense of the other nationalities, had already,
in the years before the War, realised that the task of suppressing
the non-Magyar races was beyond their unaided strength, and they had
therefore sought help from abroad. They knew that they could not count
entirely upon their union with Austria, for the German element in that
country was itself engaged in a desperate struggle for supremacy with
the non-German races, of which the principal was the Czech, closely
related by origin and language with the Slovaks. The Magyars therefore
centred their hopes in Berlin, believing that German aspirations to
world-sovereignty coincided with their own ends.
It will be necessary to conclude this chapter with a brief survey of
Magyar foreign policy prior to the War. Gambetta styled the Magyars
“_jingo barbarians_.” Bismarck said that their policy was a compound
of lawyer-like sophistry and of hussar-like arrogance. It may be added
that they displayed the unforgiving temperament of a Corsican. It is
possible to trace throughout the latter part of the nineteenth century
the national desire for revenge for the defeat of Villagos, in 1849,
where the Hungarian armies, commanded by Gorgei, in revolt against
Austria, were defeated by the Russians, who had been called in by the
Emperor. Their anger was directed rather against the Russians, the
leaders of an imaginary “Pan-Slav” movement which had for its supposed
object the union of the Slavs throughout Europe in opposition to the
Magyarising tendencies evinced in Hungary. It must be remembered
that all Hungarian policy was directed by the Magyars, and that the
other races had no voice in it. The consequence was that the Magyars
consistently opposed the Slav races and all other nations suspected
of being friendly or allied to them. This is, in fact, the key-note
of Hungarian foreign policy. After the occupation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina in 1909, the Magyars intrigued at Vienna and elsewhere in
favour of war against Serbia. Things reached so advanced a stage that a
manifesto was already drawn up and even approved by the Emperor, ready
for issue to the Austro-Hungarian Army. This manifesto called upon the
troops, relying upon their prowess, for which they were famous, to
punish the insolence of the Serb nation. The men at the helm of the
Magyar State were already dreaming of a war against Russia, to which
the Serbian war was to be but a prelude, and for this reason they
inclined towards Germany, which they had hitherto hated cordially, as
the motherland of the German nationals within their borders, who showed
a powerful resistance to the Magyarisation of their districts. So
violent had been this hatred that in 1879, after the alliance between
Andrassy and Bismarck, Coloman Tisza had been compelled to deny it
for fear of the disturbances which threatened to arise throughout
the country. But desire for vengeance proved stronger than this old
antagonism, and from this time the Magyars became devoted friends of
the Germans.[6]
Long before the War, the Magyar circles in Hungary did their best
to incite the Empire to war against the Serbs, the Russians and the
French. The conclusion of the Entente between England and France was
sufficient to destroy the traditional friendship, to which the Magyars
are so fond of referring, between Hungary and the Anglo-Saxon races.
Henceforth, England was regarded as a possible enemy. The Magyar
newspapers habitually launched violent attacks against the countries
suspected of friendship towards the Russians and Serbs, and extolled
German policy and German aims. It was not to be expected that the
Germans in their turn would remain insensible of the advantages to be
gained from this change of heart on the part of the Magyars, although
it would seem that its significance was lost upon the other nations
of Europe. On September 21, 1897, the Kaiser took advantage of a
visit to Budapest to make a characteristic speech on the subject of
Magyar foreign policy. It was not the speech of a mere political ally,
desirous of making the most of a momentary identity of interests,
and ready to abandon his friends as soon as that identity ceased. It
was the speech of a ruler convinced that the political ambitions of
the Germans and of the Magyars were inseparably bound together and
complementary to one another.
The nations of Western Europe seemed not to have realised the change
of policy which had taken place in Hungary since the days of Kossuth.
In France it was believed that the taste exhibited by the Magyars for
French fashions, literature and art was a sign of friendship towards
France. In England it was similarly believed that their passion for
racing, moulded upon the English model, was a proof of political
solidarity with that country. In America the persuasive words of
Apponyi convinced his hearers that Hungary was shaping a democratic
policy on the lines of the great Republic. Not one of these nations
seemed to be aware that for half a century Hungarian policy had
gravitated towards Berlin, and had chosen Germany as her political
and military ally. Western Europe anticipated a Magyar revolution
against the bonds that held Hungary to Austria, and this illusion was
encouraged and exploited by the Magyars in order to hide their true
intentions. Kossuth, the leader of the Revolution of 1848-49, was
regarded as the modern champion of independence and liberty, rights so
dear to the hearts of all democracies. But the Western nations seem
to have overlooked the fact that while Kossuth struggled against the
centralism of Austria and the policy of Metternich, he concurred in
the Magyar policy of coercion of the Slovaks, the Serbs, the Croats
and the Rumanians. He wished to centralise Hungary for the benefit
of the Magyars, and he, the champion of right, refused to listen to
the appeals for justice made by the non-Magyar nationalities, for the
granting of that justice would have sounded the knell of the domination
of Hungary by the Magyar race. The change in the attitude of Hungary
towards Austria passed almost unnoticed in the West. As soon as Vienna
abandoned her policy of centralisation of Hungary in the interests of
the Germans, and resigned the Kingdom of St. Stephen to the Magyars,
the latter abandoned their revolt against Austria. Had this tendency
been noticed and understood, there could have been no surprise at
the part played by Hungary during the War. It was no “accidental”
enmity towards the Entente Powers that animated the Magyars, but a
definite antagonism founded upon self-interest. They were persuaded
that their interests were identical with those of the Germans of
Austria, whose supremacy was equally menaced by the national movements
and consciousness of their “subject races.” Both Austria and Hungary
sheltered their political ambitions under the wings of the German eagle.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] It is too long for full quotation here, but it may be found in full
in _Racial Problems in Hungary_. The preamble is as follows: “Since all
citizens of Hungary, according to the principles of the Constitution,
form from the political point of view one nation ... the indivisible
unitary Hungarian nation ... of which every citizen of the Fatherland
is a member, no matter to what nationality he belongs; since, moreover,
this equality of right can only exist with reference to the official
use of the various languages of the country, and only under special
provisions, in so far as is rendered necessary by the unity of the
country and the practical possibility of government and administration;
the following rules will serve as standard regarding the official use
of the various languages, while in all other matters the complete
equality of the citizens remains untouched.”
[2] See page 56.
[3] A. N. Bain and W. A. Phillips, _Encyclopædia Britannica_.
[4] See Seton-Watson, _Racial Problems in Hungary_.
[5] Even the most fervent admirers of the Magyars do not attempt
to deny the repressive policy carried out by them against the
nationalities; they attempt no more than to minimise it. “Under the
influence of the Jewish Press an excessive nationalism developed in
Hungary, which created discord among populations which for a long
time had been accustomed to get on fairly well together. There is
no doubt that this Magyar Chauvinism had nothing of the brutality
which disgraced the Prussian rule in Poland. Never were Serbian or
Rumanian children beaten in Hungary for the offence of having said
their prayers in their mother-tongue! It was rather the ebullition
of a puerile vanity, which manifested itself mainly in irresponsible
chatter (_bavardages de café_), in articles in the newspapers and in
oratorical displays. However, if the word ‘oppression’ is too strong
to express the attitude of the Magyars towards their nationalities,
it must be admitted that they were not treated as equals. Nothing,
or next to nothing, was done for their material, intellectual or
moral development. The blunder of the Magyars was to regard them with
supreme indifference. As someone graphically remarked: ‘The non-Magyar
populations do not go on foot, they travel third-class’” (J. and J.
Thiraud, _Quand Israel est Roi_, Paris, Plon-Nourrit et Cie).
[6] See also _Magyars et Pangermanistes_, Paris, Editions Bossard, 1918.