"The Dawn of Day"
The first work to follow the transitional and preparatory
criticism and comment of "Human, All-Too-Human" was "The Dawn of
Day" ("_Morgen-röte_"). Such a treatise dealing with Nietzsche's
constructive and analytical thinking, was no doubt expected. No
man could so effectively rattle the bones of the older gods, could
so wantonly trample down the tenets strengthened by the teachings
of centuries, could so ruthlessly annihilate the accepted ethical
standards and religious formulæ, unless there existed back of his
bludgeon a positivity of will which implied creation and construction.
Nietzsche realised the significance of this new book, and at its
completion, early in 1881, sent an urgent letter to his publisher
requesting its immediate printing. The publisher, however, failing to
attach any importance to the document, delayed its issuance until late
in the summer, at which time its appearance caused no excitement and
but little comment.
"The Dawn of Day" nevertheless ranks among Nietzsche's best works. Its
title, frankly symbolic, reflects the nature of its contents. It was
the beginning of Nietzsche's positive philosophy. In it he begins his
actual work of reconstruction. Many of its passages form the foundation
of those later books wherein he augmented and developed his theories.
However, there is here no radical change in his thought. The passages
are logical sequences to that simple nihilism of prevailing customs
which occupied him in his former essays. In his earliest beginnings
we can see evidences of the direction his teachings were to take. His
books up to the last were mainly developments and elaborations of the
thoughts which were in his mind from the first. Though often vaguely
conceived and unco-ordinated, these thoughts were the undeniable
property of his own thinking. Although there have been many attempts
to trace eclectic influences to the men of his time, and especially to
Schopenhauer, the results of such critical endeavours have been easily
controverted by the plainest of internal evidence. The philosophical
Nietzsche has his roots firmly implanted in the scholastic Nietzsche;
and though in superficial and non-important phases of his thought he
changed from time to time, the most diligent research fails to reveal
direct contradictions in any of his fundamental doctrines.
In "The Dawn of Day" Nietzsche goes again into the origin of morality.
He carries his analyses further and supports them by additional
enquiries and by more complicated processes of reasoning. Having
ascertained the place which morals assume in the human scale and
determined their relation to racial necessities, he points out that
their application as permanent and unalterable mandates works havoc in
any environment save that in which they were conceived. Inasmuch as
all morality is at bottom but an expression of expediency, it follows
that, since the means of expediency change under varying conditions,
morality must change to meet the constantly metamorphosing conditions
of society. And since the conditions of life are never the same in all
nations, moral codes must likewise adapt themselves to geography in
order to fulfil their function. The existing code of morals, namely:
the Christian doctrine, grew out of conditions which were not only
different from those in which we live to-day, but in many instances
diametrically opposed to them. Nietzsche saw a grave danger in adhering
to an ethical system which was not relative to the modern man, and
argues that the result of such a morality would produce effects which
would have no intelligent bearing on the racial problems of the present
day. Knowing the deep-rooted superstition in man regarding the "divine"
origin of moral laws, he undertakes the task of relating all ancient
codes to the racial conditions existent at their inception, thus
constructing a human origin for them.
Christianity, being the greatest moral force of the day, attracted
Nietzsche's attention the most, and in "The Dawn of Day" much space is
devoted to a consideration of it. While in tone these paragraphs are
milder than those which followed in "The Antichrist," they nevertheless
are among the profoundest criticisms which Nietzsche made of Nazarene
morality. Though only a portion of the aphorisms contained in this work
are devoted to an evaluation of theological modes of conduct, stumbling
blocks are thrown in the path of an acceptance of Jewish ethics which
the most sapient of modern ecclesiastics have been unable to remove.
Out of certain aphorisms found here grew "The Antichrist" which is the
most terrible and effective excoriation that Christianity has ever
called forth. Beginning on page 66 of "The Dawn of Day" there appears
one of Nietzsche's most fundamental passages dealing with Christianity.
It is called "The First Christian," and is an analysis of the Apostle
Paul. No theological dialectician has been able to answer it. Here is
an aphorism so illuminating, so profound, yet so brief, as to dazzle
completely the lay mind.
However, Christianity is but one of the subjects dealt with in "The
Dawn of Day." The book covers the whole field of modern morality. Says
Nietzsche in his introduction; "In this book we find a 'subterrestrial'
at work, digging, mining, undermining.... I went down into the deepest
depths; I tunnelled to the very bottom; I started to investigate and
unearth an old _faith_ which for thousands of years we philosophers
used to build on as the safest of all foundations.... I began to
undermine our _faith in morals."_ It is true that from the beginning
of history there has existed a ruling scale of values determining the
acts of humanity. Morality implies the domination of certain classes
which, in order to inspire reverence in arbitrary dictates, have
invested their codes with an authority other than a human one. Thus
has criticism been stifled. Morality has had the means of intimidation
on its side, and has discouraged investigation by exercising severe
penalties. Consequently morality has accumulated and grown, gathered
power and swept on without its thinkers, its philosophers or its
analysts. Of all the sciences, the science of conduct has been the last
to attract investigators.
The vogue of that style of philosophy which was founded on the
tradition of speculation and honeycombed with presuppositions, did
not pass out until the advent of Darwin's evolutionism. But even the
inauguration of biology and sociology did not entirely eliminate the
metaphysical assumption from constructive thinking. The scientists
themselves, not excluding Darwin, hesitated to acknowledge the laws of
natural selection and of the survival of the fit. Neo-Lamarckism was
but one of the reactions against this tough and unpleasant theory.
Alfred Russel Wallace and, to take an even more significant figure,
Herbert Spencer, endeavoured to refute the possibility of a biological
basis in thought and thus to avoid an acquiescence to the Darwinian
research. John Fiske, an avowed evolutionist, indirectly repudiated
the scientific origin of philosophy; and likewise most of the lesser
thinkers, following the exposition of Darwin's theories, refused to
apply to man the biological laws governing the animal kingdom. Balfour
and Huxley sensed the incongruities and variances in this new mode
of thinking, and strove to bridge the chasm between natural science
and human conduct, and to construct a system of ethics which would
possess a logical and naturalistic foundation. But in both cases the
question was begged. We find Balfour building up a moral system which,
while it did not deny Darwinism, had for its end the destruction, or
at least the alteration, of natural laws. And Huxley defines human
progress as an overcoming of biological principles. Thus, even in the
most materialistic of physio-psychologists, the subjugation of natural
laws was the primary thesis. Biology, therefore, instead of being used
as a basis to further philosophy, was considered an obstacle which
philosophy had to overcome.
Nietzsche saw that a science of conduct based on natural and
physiological laws was a possible and logical thing. And in him, for
the first time in the history of philosophical thought, do we find a
scholarly and at the same time an intellectual critic of authorised
standards. The biological point of view was never lost sight of by him.
If at times he seemed to abandon it, it was but for a brief period; he
ever came back to it. Even his most abstract passages have their feet
implanted in the fact that all phenomena are answerable to the law
of vital fitness. Before the tribunal of biology Nietzsche arraigns
and tries every phase of his thought, whether it deals with physical
phenomena, ethical conduct or with abstract reasoning. Philosophy,
for centuries divorced from science, is here clothed in the garments
of scientific experimentation; a relationship is established between
these two planes of rationalism and empiricism which have always been
considered by other thinkers as detached and unrelated. Nor does
Nietzsche ally himself, either consciously or unconsciously, with such
philosophers as Bruno and Plato (who stood between the scientific
thinkers on the one hand and the abstract dialecticians on the other),
and attempt a formulation of a system of thought founded on intuitive
processes. Such poetic conceptions had no fascination for him except
as they were directly applicable to the problem of the universe. Those
men who busied themselves with the mere theory of knowledge he held as
supererogatory cobweb-spinners; and even in the realm of metaphysicians
such as Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz, he dallied but casually. His
aim was to relate all thought to determinable values of life.
In his introduction Nietzsche calls morality the Circe of philosophies,
and adds: "For, to what is it due that, from Plato onwards, all the
philosophic architects in Europe have built in vain?" Later beneath
his analysis--which never assumes the negative qualities of the
metaphysical--the moral phenomenon goes to pieces, not by a few simple
strokes, nor yet by the effrontery of cynicism or pessimism, but
by the most careful and intricate surgery. He points out the great
heretics of history as examples of the men who, looked at through the
eyes of contemporaries, were "wicked" men, but who, under different
environmental circumstances, were considered "good." He denies the
static hypothesis on which morality is built, and postulates the
theory that immorality is not without its place in the development
of the reason. He is constantly attempting to translate the existing
moral values into terms of their true nature, not necessarily into
immoralities, but into natural unmoralities. The accepted virtues,
such as pity, honesty, faith, obedience, service, loyalty and
self-sacrifice, are questioned in their relation to racial needs; and
modern attitudes toward all human activities are traced to their causes
and judged as to their influence.
The research work in the present book differs from that contained in
previous volumes. Heretofore Nietzsche indulged in inquiry without
speculation; he dealt mainly with generalities. His analyses were along
broad lines of human conduct. He confined himself for the most part
to principles. But in "The Dawn of Day" these principles are balanced
with existent morality. Specific modes of moral and ethical endeavour
are weighed against expediency. Nietzsche presents a diagnosis of the
fundamental nature of society to-day, and discovers many contradictions
and inconsistencies between modern social needs and those virtues held
in the highest reverence. He finds that deportmental means made use of
by weak and subjugated peoples of ancient times to protect themselves
against hostile invaders, are retained and practised to-day by nations
whose position has been reversed to one of domination. In short, he
points out that certain moralities have, by the alteration of national
and racial conditions, become irrelevancies. Consequently there is
often a compromise between ethical beliefs and ethical practices--a
compromise made necessary by the demands of social intercourse. Even
when the practice of these ancient moralities is conscientiously
indulged in, Nietzsche denies their adequacy in coping with modern
conditions, pointing out specific instances in which necessity and
habit are constantly impinging. For instance, the softer virtues of
a democratic and socialistic morality are shown to be desirable only
in weakened nations where the hardier virtues of egotism, cruelty,
efficiency, hard-mindedness, selfishness and retaliation would work
directly against preservation.
Out of these conclusions grows a plea for individualism, and out of
this individualism the superman can be seen rearing his head above
the horizon of present-day humanity. The qualities of this man of the
future are defined, and a finger is pointed along the necessary lines
of racial culture. Nietzsche's first definite voicing of marriage
ideals follows in the train of the superman's appearance, and the first
comments of this philosopher in his criticism of woman are set down.
In this latter regard Nietzsche has been unfairly interpreted by those
who have considered his attitude toward woman superficially or without
relating it to his general theories. It would be well therefore for
the student to withhold judgment in this particular until the various
elements of Nietzsche's philosophical system have been co-ordinated and
understood. Woman plays an important, if small, part in his writings,
and his passages dealing with women should be carefully weighed in
conjunction with his theory of the superman.
In "The Dawn of Day" Nietzsche's conception of class distinction is
defined and related to his later teachings. Throughout his analyses
runs a subtle undercurrent of his doctrine, of social segregation
which finds definite expression toward the end of the volume where
modern socialism, with its altruism and philanthropy, is traced to
its birth in Nazarene morality. In place of this present popular form
of ethics Nietzsche proposes a social régime in which aristocratic
culture will be set apart from mere utilitarian culture by very
definite boundaries. He argues that not only is this disassociation
in accord with the instincts of mankind, but that, as a workable
theorem, it adequately answers the needs of present conditions. The
slave-morality and the master-morality which he develops in his later
works are defined tentatively and suggested by inference in many of
the aphorisms. Out of this conception grew his dominant principle of
the "will to power," and in "The Dawn of Day" we find this principle
set forth in adequate definition for the first time, although the
development of the idea is left till later. However, Nietzsche makes
clear its point of divergence from the Schopenhauerian theory of the
"will to live" as well as from the Darwinian theory of the survival of
the fittest.
But it is not alone abstract theory that occupies the pages of this
book. Nietzsche is never the mere metaphysician battling in an unreal
world. There are few dark closets and secret passageways in his
thought. Beyond a metaphysical hypothesis he does not go. He adheres to
demonstrable formulas, and reasons along lines of strictest reality.
The practical man he holds in high esteem, and constantly praises
the advance of science. He devotes pages to the blowing to pieces of
metaphysical air-castles. But, as I have previously pointed out, he is
in no sense of the word a materialist; nor is his assumption of the
world that of the realists. Life to Nietzsche is an eternal struggle
toward--no goal. The lessons the world has to teach are as so much
false doctrine. The meaning of life--the so-called absolute truth--is
but a chimera. Intelligence is a process, not an ultimatum. The truth
is mobile and dual, dependent on varying causes. In accepting the
material world, Nietzsche does not grant it. In assuming natural laws,
he denies them. In his adherence to logic and to the processes of cause
and effect, he is accepting phantoms and inconsistencies, and yet it is
along these lines that the race progresses.
In "The Dawn of Day" Nietzsche makes use of the same aphoristic style
as that employed in "Human, All-Too-Human." (This broken, staccato
form he uses throughout the remainder of his works, except in certain
parts of "Thus Spake Zarathustra.") Each paragraph is captioned and
deals with a specific phase of morality or with a definite critical
attitude toward human conduct. Some of these paragraphs are scarcely
a line in length--mere definitions or similes. Others extend over
several pages. But they always pertain to a single idea. Occasionally
they are in the form of a brief conversation; at other times they
are short queries. One of these aphorisms is entitled "The Battle
Dispensary of the Soul," and this is what follows: "What is the most
efficacious remedy? Victory." That is all--brief, and perhaps, on first
reading, inconsequent. But study it a moment, and you will find in
it the nucleus of a great revolutionary doctrine. On the other hand,
turn to aphorism 142, called "Sympathy," and you will discover several
pages of flashing commentary. Out of the chaos of his style springs
a feeling of plastic form. These brief paragraphs are not detached
and desultory. They are pyramided on one another, and beneath them
runs an undercurrent of unified thinking. When the end of the book
is reached we have a carefully fabricated edifice, and we realise
that each paragraph has been some necessary beam or decoration in its
construction.