The whole of the following day was devoted to the trial of Gosson. He

was condemned at nightfall, and heard by appeal before the superior court

directly afterwards. At midnight, of the 25th of October, 1578, he was

condemned to lose his head, the execution to take place without delay.

The city guards and the infantry under Capres still bivouacked upon the

square; the howling storm still continued, but the glare of fagots and

torches made the place as light as day. The ancient advocate, with

haggard eyes and features distorted by wrath, walking between the sheriff

and a Franciscan monk, advanced through the long lane of halberdiers, in

the grand hall of the Town House, and thence emerged upon the scaffold

erected before the door. He shook his fists with rage at the released

magistrates, so lately his prisoners, exclaiming that to his misplaced

mercy it was owing that his head, instead of their own, was to be placed

upon the block. He bitterly reproached the citizens for their cowardice

in shrinking from dealing a blow for their fatherland, and in behalf of

one who had so faithfully served them. The clerk of the court then read

the sentence amid a silence so profound that every syllable he uttered,

and, every sigh and ejaculation of the victim were distinctly heard in

the most remote corner of the square. Gosson then, exclaiming that he

was murdered without cause, knelt upon the scaffold. His head fell while

an angry imprecation was still upon his lips.

Several other persons of lesser note were hanged daring the week-among

others, Matthew Doucet, the truculent man of gingerbread, whose rage had

been so judiciously but so unsuccessfully directed against the Prior of

Saint Vaast. Captain Ambrose, too, did not live long to enjoy the price

of his treachery. He was arrested very soon afterwards by the states'

government in Antwerp, put to the torture, hanged and quartered. In

troublous times like those, when honest men found it difficult to keep

their heads upon their shoulders, rogues were apt to meet their deserts,

unless they had the advantage of lofty lineage and elevated position.

"Ille crucem sceleris pretium tulit, hic diadema."

This municipal revolution and counter-revolution, obscure though they

seem, were in reality of very grave importance. This was the last blow

struck for freedom in the Walloon country. The failure of the movement

made that scission of the Netherlands certain, which has endured till our

days, for the influence of the ecclesiastics in the states of Artois and

Hainault, together with the military power of the Malcontent grandees,

whom Parma and John Sarrasin had purchased, could no longer be resisted.

The liberty of the Celtic provinces was sold, and a few high-born

traitors received the price. Before the end of the year (1578) Montigny

had signified to the Duke of Alencon that a prince who avowed himself too

poor to pay for soldiers was no master for him. The Baron, therefore,

came, to an understanding with La Motte and Sarrasin, acting for

Alexander Farnese, and received the command of the infantry in the

Walloon provinces, a merced of four thousand crowns a year, together with

as large a slice of La Motte's hundred thousand florins for himself and

soldiers, as that officer could be induced to part with.

Baron Capres, whom Sarrasin--being especially enjoined to purchase him--

had, in his own language, "sweated blood and water" to secure, at last

agreed to reconcile himself with the King's party upon condition of

receiving the government-general of Artois, together with the particular

government of Hesdin--very lucrative offices, which the Viscount of Ghent

then held by commission of the states-general. That politic personage,

however, whose disinclination to desert the liberty party which had

clothed him with such high functions, was apparently so marked that the

Prior had caused an ambush to be laid both for him and the Marquis Havre,

in-order to obtain bodily possession of two such powerful enemies, now,

at the last moment, displayed his true colors. He consented to reconcile

himself also, on condition of receiving the royal appointment to the same

government which he then held from the patriot authorities, together with

the title of Marquis de Richebourg, the command of all the cavalry in the

royalist provinces, and certain rewards in money besides. By holding

himself at a high mark, and keeping at a distance, he had obtained his

price. Capres, for whom Philip, at Parma's suggestion, had sent the

commission as governor of Artois and of Hesdin, was obliged to renounce

those offices, notwithstanding his earlier "reconciliation," and the

"blood and water" of John Sarrasin. Ghent was not even contented with

these guerdons, but insisted upon the command of all the cavalry,

including the band of ordnance which, with handsome salary, had been

assigned to Lalain as a part of the wages for his treason, while the

"little Count"--fiery as his small and belligerent cousin whose exploits

have been recorded in the earlier pages of this history--boldly taxed

Parma and the King with cheating him out of his promised reward, in order

to please a noble whose services had been less valuable than those of the

Lalain family. Having thus obtained the lion's share, due, as he

thought, to his well known courage and military talents, as well as to

the powerful family influence, which he wielded--his brother, the Prince

of Espinoy, hereditary seneschal of Hainault, having likewise rallied to

the King's party--Ghent jocosely intimated to Parma his intention of

helping himself to the two best horses in the Prince's stables in

exchange for those lost at Gemblours, in which disastrous action he

had commanded the cavalry for the states. He also sent two terriers

to Farnese, hoping that they would "prove more useful than beautiful."

The Prince might have thought, perhaps, as much of the Viscount's

treason.

John Sarrasin, the all-accomplished Prior, as the reward of his

exertions, received from Philip the abbey of Saint Vaast, the richest

and most powerful ecclesiastical establishment in the Netherlands.

At a subsequent period his grateful Sovereign created him Archbishop

of Cambray.

Thus the "troubles of Arras"--as they were called--terminated. Gosson

the respected, wealthy, eloquent, and virtuous advocate; together with

his colleagues--all Catholics, but at the same time patriots and

liberals--died the death of felons for their unfortunate attempt to save

their fatherland from an ecclesiastical and venal conspiracy; while the

actors in the plot, having all performed well their parts, received their

full meed of prizes and applause.

The private treaty by which the Walloon provinces of Artois, Hainault,

Lille, Douay, and Orchies, united themselves in a separate league was

signed upon the 6th of January, 1579; but the final arrangements for the

reconciliation of the Malcontent nobles and their soldiers were not

completed until April 6th, upon which day a secret paper was signed at

Mount Saint Eloi.

The secret current of the intrigue had not, however, flowed on with

perfect smoothness until this placid termination. On the contrary,

here had been much bickering, heart-burning, and mutual suspicions and

recriminations. There had been violent wranglings among the claimants

of the royal rewards. Lalain and Capres were not the only Malcontents

who had cause to complain of being cheated of the promised largess.

Montigny, in whose favor Parma had distinctly commanded La Motte to be

liberal of the King's secret-service money, furiously charged the

Governor of Gravelines with having received a large supply of gold from

Spain, and of "locking the rascal counters from his friends," so that

Parma was obliged to quiet the Baron, and many other barons in the same

predicament, out of his own purse. All complained bitterly, too, that

the King, whose promises had been so profuse to the nobles while the

reconciliation was pending, turned a deaf ear to their petitions and left

their letters unanswered; after the deed was accomplished.

The unlucky Prior of Renty, whose disclosures to La Motte concerning the

Spanish sarcasms upon his venality, had so nearly caused the preliminary

negotiation with that seignior to fail, was the cause of still further

mischief through the interception of Alonzo Curiel's private letters.

Such revelations of corruption, and of contempt on the part of the

corrupters, were eagerly turned to account by the states' government.

A special messenger was despatched to Montigny with the intercepted

correspondence, accompanied by an earnest prayer that he would not

contaminate his sword and his noble name by subserviency to men who

despised even while they purchased traitors. That noble, both confounded

and exasperated, was for a moment inclined to listen to the voice of

honor and patriotism, but reflection and solitude induced him to pocket

up his wrongs and his "merced" together. The states-general also sent

the correspondence to the Walloon provincial authorities, with an

eloquent address, begging them to study well the pitiful part which La

Motte had enacted in the private comedy then performing, and to

behold as in a mirror their own position, if they did not recede ere it

was too late.

The only important effect produced by the discovery was upon the Prior of

Renty himself. Ottavio Gonzaga, the intimate friend of Don John, and now

high in the confidence of Parma, wrote to La Motte, indignantly denying

the truth of Bien Aime's tattle, and affirming that not a word had ever

been uttered by himself or by any gentleman in his presence to the

disparagement of the Governor of Gravelines. He added that if the Prior

had worn another coat, and were of quality equal to his own, he would

have made him eat his words or a few inches of steel. In the same

vehement terms he addressed a letter to Bien Aime himself. Very soon

afterwards, notwithstanding his coat and his quality, that unfortunate

ecclesiastic found himself beset one dark night by two soldiers, who left

him, severely wounded and bleeding nearly to death upon the high road,

but escaping with life, he wrote to Parma, recounting his wrongs and the

"sword-thrust in his left thigh," and made a demand for a merced.

The Prior recovered from this difficulty only to fall into another,

by publishing what he called an apologue, in which he charged that the

reconciled nobles were equally false to the royal and to the rebel

government, and that, although "the fatted calf had been killed for them,

after they had so long been feeding with perverse heretical pigs," they

were, in truth, as mutinous as ever, being bent upon establishing an

oligarchy in the Netherlands, and dividing the territory among

themselves, to the exclusion of the sovereign. This naturally excited

the wrath of the Viscount and others. The Seigneur d'Auberlieu, in a

letter written in what the writer himself called the "gross style of a

gendarme," charged the Prior with maligning honorable lords and--in the

favorite colloquial phrase of the day--with attempting "to throw the cat

against their legs." The real crime of the meddling priest, however, was

to have let that troublesome animal out of the bag. He was accordingly

waylaid again, and thrown into prison by Count Lalain. While in durance

he published an abject apology for his apologue, explaining that his

allusions to "returned prodigals," "heretic swine," and to "Sodom and

Gomorrah," had been entirely misconstrued. He was, however, retained in

custody until Parma ordered his release on the ground that the punishment

had been already sufficient for the offence. He then requested to be

appointed Bishop of Saint Omer, that see being vacant. Parma advised the

King by no means to grant the request--the Prior being neither endowed

with the proper age nor discretion for such a dignity--but to bestow some

lesser reward, in money or otherwise, upon the discomfited ecclesiastic,

who had rendered so many services and incurred so many dangers.

The states-general and the whole national party regarded, with prophetic

dismay, the approaching dismemberment of their common country. They sent

deputation on deputation to the Walloon states, to warn them of their

danger, and to avert, if possible, the fatal measure. Meantime, as by

the already accomplished movement, the "generality" was fast

disappearing, and was indeed but the shadow of its former self, it seemed

necessary to make a vigorous effort to restore something like unity to

the struggling country. The Ghent Pacification had been their outer

wall, ample enough and strong enough to enclose and to protect all the

provinces. Treachery and religious fanaticism had undermined the bulwark

almost as soon as reared. The whole beleaguered country was in danger of

becoming utterly exposed to a foe who grew daily more threatening. As in

besieged cities, a sudden breastwork is thrown up internally, when the

outward defences are crumbling--so the energy of Orange had been silently

preparing the Union of Utrecht, as a temporary defence until the foe

should be beaten back, and there should be time to decide on their future

course of action.

During the whole month of December, an active correspondence had been

carried on by the Prince and his brother John with various agents in

Gelderland, Friesland, and Groningen, as well as with influential

personages in the more central provinces and cities. Gelderland, the

natural bulwark to Holland and Zealand, commanding the four great rivers

of the country, had been fortunately placed under the government of the

trusty John of Nassau, that province being warmly in favor of a closer

union with its sister provinces, and particularly with those more nearly

allied to itself in religion and in language.

Already, in December (1578), Count John, in behalf of his brother, had

laid before the states of Holland and Zealand, assembled at Gorcum, the

project of a new union with "Gelderland, Ghent, Friesland, Utrecht,

Overyssel, and Groningen." The proposition had been favorably

entertained, and commissioners had been appointed to confer with other

commissioners at Utrecht, whenever they should be summoned by Count John.

The Prince, with the silence and caution which belonged to his whole

policy, chose not to be the ostensible mover in the plan himself. He did

not choose to startle unnecessarily the Archduke Matthias--the cipher who

had been placed by his side, whose sudden subtraction would occasion more

loss than his presence had conferred benefit. He did not choose to be

cried out upon as infringing the Ghent Pacification, although the whole

world knew that treaty to be hopelessly annulled. For these and many

other weighty motives, he proposed that the new Union should be the

apparent work of other hands, and only offered to him and to the country,

when nearly completed. January, the deputies of Gelderland and Zutfelt,

with Count John, stadholder of these provinces, at their head, met with

the deputies of Holland, Zealand, and the provinces between the Ems and

the Lauwers, early in January, 1579, and on the 23rd of that month,

without waiting longer for the deputies of the other provinces, they

agreed provisionally upon a treaty of union which was published

afterwards on the 29th, from the Town House of Utrecht.

This memorable document--which is ever regarded as the foundation of the

Netherland Republic--contained twenty-six articles.

The preamble stated the object of the union. It was to strengthen, not

to forsake the Ghent Pacification, already nearly annihilated by the

force of foreign soldiery. For this purpose, and in order more

conveniently to defend themselves against their foes, the deputies of

Gelderland, Zutfen, Holland, Zealand, Utrecht, and the Frisian provinces,

thought it desirable to form a still closer union. The contracting

provinces agreed to remain eternally united, as if they were but one

province. At the same time, it was understood that each was to retain

its particular privileges, liberties, laudable and traditionary customs,

and other laws. The cities, corporations, and inhabitants of every

province were to be guaranteed as to their ancient constitutions.

Disputes concerning these various statutes and customs were to be decided

by the usual tribunals, by "good men," or by amicable compromise. The

provinces, by virtue of the Union, were to defend each other "with life,

goods, and blood," against all force brought against them in the King's

name or behalf. They were also to defend each other against all foreign

or domestic potentates, provinces, or cities, provided such defence were

controlled by the "generality" of the union. For the expense occasioned

by the protection of the provinces, certain imposts and excises were

to be equally assessed and collected. No truce or peace was to be

concluded, no war commenced, no impost established affecting the

"generality," but by unanimous advice and consent of the provinces.

Upon other matters the majority was to decide; the votes being taken in

the manner then customary in the assembly of states-general. In case of

difficulty in coming to a unanimous vote when required, the matter was

to be referred to the stadholders then in office. In case cf their

inability to agree, they were to appoint arbitrators, by whose decision

the parties were to be governed. None of the united provinces, or of

their cities or corporations, were to make treaties with other potentates

or states, without consent of their confederates. If neighbouring

princes, provinces, or cities, wished to enter into this confederacy,

they were to be received by the unanimous consent of the united

provinces. A common currency was to be established for the confederacy.

In the matter of divine worship, Holland and Zealand were to conduct

themselves as they should think proper. The other provinces of the

union, however, were either to conform to the religious peace already

laid down by Archduke Matthias and his council, or to make such other

arrangements as each province should for itself consider appropriate for

the maintenance of its internal tranquillity--provided always that every

individual should remain free in his religion, and that no man should be

molested or questioned on the subject of divine worship, as had been

already established by the Ghent Pacification. As a certain dispute

arose concerning the meaning of this important clause, an additional

paragraph was inserted a few days afterwards. In this it was stated that

there was no intention of excluding from the confederacy any province or

city which was wholly Catholic, or in which the number of the Reformed

was not sufficiently large to entitle them, by the religious peace, to

public worship. On the contrary, the intention was to admit them,

provided they obeyed the articles of union, and conducted themselves

as good patriots; it being intended that no province or city should

interfere with another in the matter of divine service. Disputes

between two provinces were to be decided by the others, or--in case

the generality were concerned--by the provisions of the ninth article.

The confederates were to assemble at Utrecht whenever summoned by those

commissioned for that purpose. A majority of votes was to decide on

matters then brought before them, even in case of the absence of some

members of the confederacy, who might, however, send written proxies.

Additions or amendments to these articles could only be made by unanimous

consent. The articles were to be signed by the stadholders, magistrates,

and principal officers of each province and city, and by all the train-

bands, fraternities, and sodalities which might exist in the cities or

villages of the union.

Such were the simple provisions of that instrument which became the

foundation of the powerful Commonwealth of the United Netherlands. On

the day when it was concluded, there were present deputies from five

provinces only. Count John of Nassau signed first, as stadholder of

Gelderland and Zutfen. His signature was followed by those of four

deputies from that double province; and the envoys of Holland, Zealand,

Utrecht and the Frisian provinces, then signed the document.

The Prince himself, although in reality the principal director of the

movement, delayed appending his signature until May the 3rd, 1579.

Herein he was actuated by the reasons already stated, and by the hope

which he still entertained that a wider union might be established, with

Matthias for its nominal chief. His enemies, as usual, attributed this

patriotic delay to baser motives. They accused him of a desire to assume

the governor-generalship himself, to the exclusion of the Archduke--

an insinuation which the states of Holland took occasion formally to

denounce as a calumny. For those who have studied the character and

history of the man, a defence against such slander is superfluous.

Matthias was but the shadow, Orange the substance. The Archduke had

been accepted only to obviate the evil effects of a political intrigue,

and with the express condition that the Prince should be his lieutenant-

general in name, his master in fact. Directly after his departure in the

following year, the Prince's authority, which nominally departed also,

was re-established in his own person, and by express act of the states-

general.

The Union of Utrecht was the foundation-stone of the Netherland Republic;

but the framers of the confederacy did not intend the establishment of a

Republic, or of an independent commonwealth of any kind. They had not

forsworn the Spanish monarch. It was not yet their intention to forswear

him. Certainly the act of union contained no allusion to such an

important step. On the contrary, in the brief preamble they expressly

stated their intention to strengthen the Ghent Pacification, and the

Ghent Pacification acknowledged obedience to the King. They intended no

political innovation of any kind. They expressly accepted matters as

they were. All statutes, charters, and privileges of provinces, cities,

or corporations were to remain untouched. They intended to form neither

an independent state nor an independent federal system. No doubt the

formal renunciation of allegiance, which was to follow within two years,

was contemplated by many as a future probability; but it could not be

foreseen with certainty.

The Rise of the Dutch Republic — Volume 29: 1578, part III · 第 3 / 4 段